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Abstract
The concept of positive action features as a traditional theme of controversy in 
the contemporary legal and political discourse on equality. The paradox of resorting to 
unequal treatment in order to achieve “full and effective equality” - according to the 
wording of the Preamble to Protocol 12 of the ECHR - has been dealt with in a parochial 
and incoherent way. This is true with regard to both the theoretical justifications provided 
and the concrete legal measures of domestic jurisdictions.
This thesis aims to explore the nature of the relationship between positive action 
and equality in a European normative and philosophical framework. The principal 
enquiry is whether it is possible to find a common European denominator regarding the 
content and legal consequences of the concept of equal treatment, understood as full 
equality.
The analytical process is carried out in four stages. Part I constitutes an attempt 
to map the theoretical debate and identify the main problems in the justificatory rationale 
of the “classical” conception of positive action. Part II provides a thorough examination 
of the current position of the European legal order on the matter. The latter is understood 
broadly, with EU law and the ECHR being the two pillars of a common normative 
framework that determines what counts as equal treatment across Europe. Part III 
explains why a “one size fits all” approach on positive action fails to adequately account 
for the idiosyncratic requirements of equal treatment in different areas of the public 
sphere, such as the employment field, politics and the judiciary. Finally, Part IV 
introduces the notions of indistinctibility of respect and proportionality of concern as the 
symbiotic conceptual axes of equality. Against this theoretical construct positive action
4should be properly understood not as an exception to equal treatment but as an expression 
of proportionality of concern.
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“Justice is equality, as all men think, even apart from argument” 
[Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, BookE, 1131a, 14-15]
Introduction
From academic amphitheatres to political fora, from the workplace to the realm of 
family life, from public debates to private discussions the nature, content and practice of 
equality generates heated debates. This is not only due to the undoubted rhetoric appeal 
and immediate resonance of the concept with every aspect of our social existence, but 
also to the fact that equality creates an oxymoron. Although most general theories of 
justice from Aristotle to the present condemn social inequalities as a pathogeny that 
democratic societies should strive to eradicate, such inequalities have proved to be 
incredibly resistant in the face of political and legal change. Part of the blame for this 
failure must be allocated to the lack of consensus regarding the true meaning of equality. 
The remaining responsibility lies with the long tradition of formal equality that has 
dominated the political and legal discourse in Europe.
Against this background, the emergence of a new equality paradigm in Europe 
bears the promise of succeeding where we have failed in the past. Full and effective 
equality, according to the Preamble to Protocol 12 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, or fu ll equality in practice, according to the equivalent phrasing of Article 141 
EC, have the potential of transforming the normative reality of European states and 
creating a truly democratic European polity that transcends the boundaries of the 
European Union. Positive action may become an indispensable weapon in the pursuit of 
these goals, not only because of its ability to achieve short-term results, but also due to
the loud and clear symbolism it connotes as a leap forward and away from formalism. 
Despite these optimistic projections, however, the classical conception of positive action 
seems inadequate to fulfil its destined role under the full and effective equality paradigm.
This thesis aims to prove that positive action is, indeed, a legitimate and even 
necessary mechanism to achieve full and effective equality in Europe, insofar as it is 
construed in a more nuanced and intellectually flexible manner. An approach to positive 
action that is sensitive to the different expectations and concerns in different areas of the 
public sphere will, in fact, be an expression of full and effective equality rather than an 
exception to it. Accordingly, the thesis will put forward a theory of equality that explains 
the new equality paradigm and define the place of positive action therein.
From a methodological point of view the philosophical project undertaken here is 
marked by two major analytical distinctions, one that is established and one that is 
deliberately omitted. The former is the division of the social sphere into three distinct 
areas: “standard” employment, elected public offices and sensitive areas of the public 
sphere. The claim put forward is that the principle of equal treatment operates differently 
in each of these areas, which entails that its normative consequences will inevitably vary. 
Positive action schemes, therefore, should vary accordingly in order to effectively 
address the inequalities that arise in each particular context.
The other distinction is the obvious one regarding the different types of 
discrimination, corresponding to the protected grounds enshrined in European equality 
law instruments. Instead of covering all possible dimensions of full equality, the 
arguments are tailored to fit the needs of a gender-oriented analysis. This priority to 
gender was deemed to be the only sound methodological choice to approach an issue of
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such breadth. In principle, however, most of these arguments will remain valid across the 
spectrum of equality of treatment.
Space limitations have inevitably determined, to an extent, the length and depth of 
the analysis in particular areas of the enquiry. For instance, the idea that a European 
Legal Order of Rights (ELOR) has emerged in the European normative space (chapter 3) 
is admittedly not fully developed. Relationships between states within this legal order, 
particularly with regard to EU Member States, are under-theorised. More work is also 
needed in order to work out the technicalities of the constitutionalised co-existence 
between Luxembourg and Strasbourg. A detailed proposal in earlier drafts regarding the a 
possible mutual reference system between the two courts, modelled along the lines of 
Article 234 EC, could unfortunately not be included in the final version of this thesis. 
Similarly, the theory of equal treatment as indistinctibility o f  respect and proportionality 
o f concern (chapter 10) is no more than a summary of a more detailed and, hopefully, 
more comprehensive future theoretical project.
In both these areas the choice of what to include in and what to leave out of this 
final version was made on the basis of a functional criterion. The objective of this thesis 
is to explore and explain how positive action can be a conceptual building block in 
arriving at full and effective equality, which, in turn, encapsulates the meaning of equal 
treatment in a common European normative framework. Arguments, therefore, that are 
instrumental in the development and coherence of the analysis are presented in full, 
whereas peripheral considerations, notwithstanding the generic interest they may 
generate, are dealt with somewhat more laconically.
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The thesis is divided into four parts, reflecting the gradual progress of the analysis 
allong the lines of a coherent narrative.
Part I  sets out the theoretical premises of the classical conception o f positive 
action and highlights the problematic aspects of the latter. The analytical project begins 
early on in chapter 2. After brief terminological clarifications and a defence of 
miethodological choices, the chapter sets out a preliminary conceptual framework to 
explore the relationship between equality and positive action in its classical formulation. 
Tlhe relationship is inevitably shaped by the understanding of positive action as a tool of 
amti-discrimination law, designed to counter the effects of past or present discrimination 
that result in certain social groups being disadvantaged or under-represented in areas of 
the public sphere.
The following two sections examine respectively two fundamental and 
interconnected problems of the classical conception of positive action that have attracted 
severe criticism in the literature. The first is the inconsistency between target groups and 
individual beneficiaries. The second problem relates to the way anti-discrimination law 
conceptualises social groups. It is argued that social groups are treated as singular entities 
which can somehow claim the allegiance of their members automatically. This is 
particularly important when it comes to tackling under-representation of a group in an 
area of the public sphere, and especially in candidature for elected office.
After identifying the problems inherent in the classical conception of positive 
action, the analysis in Part II turns to consider the principle of equal treatment within a 
European normative framework. The underlying assumption and primary objective of the 
thesis is that it is possible to identify a distinctly European conception of equality on the
18
basis of the combined rules and principles enshrined in EU law, on the one hand, and the 
European Convention of Human Rights, on the other.
Chapter 3 attempts to give this assumption normative bite, by suggesting that the 
harmonious co-existence of these two bodies of law during the past sixty years has 
gradually led to the emergence of a European Legal Order o f  Rights (ELOR). Within this 
novel and ever-developing construct, equality has a prime position, both as a right per se 
and as an overarching principle guiding the distribution and enjoyment of other rights. 
Positive action is an indispensable element of the discourse, as it constitutes the key to 
identify full and effective equality and distinguish it from other, non-meaningful 
conceptions of equality.
It is obvious, then, that the distinctly European meaning ascribed to the notion of 
full and effective equality and the relationship of the latter to positive action can only be 
found in the Luxembourg and Strasbourg jurisprudence, discussed in chapters 4 and 5 
respectively.
Chapter 4 begins by challenging the preliminary conceptual framework of 
equality, set out in chapter 2, as too simplistic to account for the nuances that may appear 
within the EU system. Instead, a more refined taxonomy of EU equality law is put 
forward, featuring five analytical categories that aim to cover a wide spectrum of possible 
interpretations of the equal treatment principle. The second section of the chapter is 
devoted to the examination of the ECJ positive action case-law. The analytical purpose of 
the section is to consider the way the ECJ conceptualises positive action as a tool in the 
achievement of fu ll equality in practice, according to the wording of Article 141 EC. At 
this stage of the enquiry, the term full equality in practice - equivalent to the term full and
effective equality that appears in the ECHR -  is taken to indicate a general commitment 
to substantive equality. In this context, the main question is whether the ECJ has shifted 
from a formal equality to a substantive equality paradigm, as a significant portion of the 
literature seems to argue when considering the Badeck formula, which encapsulates the 
interpretative status quo of EU law on positive action. According to the latter, positive 
action can legitimately operate as a tie-break between equally qualified candidates, 
insofar as the preference allocated to the beneficiary is neither automatic nor 
unconditional.
Chapter 5 moves on to consider the second limb of the normative framework 
identified earlier as the European Legal Order of Rights. The focus here is on the 
interpretation of equal treatment under the Convention system and on the place of 
positive action therein. The chapter begins with a detailed assessment of the ECtHR’s 
Opinion regarding the use of gender quotas by Signatory Parties when drawing up the list 
of candidatures for the “national” judge to serve on the Court itself. This is the only 
instance in which the ECtHR had an opportunity to consider the legality of quotas under 
the Convention and, as a result, the importance of the findings cannot be overstated. The 
ECtHR’s conclusions appear to be in tandem with those of the ECJ with one important 
difference that renders the ECtHR approach more appealing for present purposes. 
Strasbourg does not limit legitimate quotas to those acting as a tie-breaker between 
equally qualified candidates. In the absence of a Badeck-type formula the ECtHR 
reasoning seems to accept that preference to fully  qualified candidates from the under­
represented group is permissible.
Building on these findings, the following section questions whether the Opinion is 
reflective of a more general shift in the conceptualisation of the equal treatment principle 
under the Convention. The ECtHR has often been criticised for adhering to a formal 
equality paradigm in its case-law. Thlimmenos v. Greece, however, may be indicative of 
a radical change in the Court’s interpretative attitude, albeit carried out in a non- 
celebratory fashion. Interpreting the prohibition of discrimination under Article 14 
ECHR, the Court found it to encompass a state obligation to afford different treatment to 
persons in considerably different situations. The abandonment of a rigid formal equality 
reasoning is coupled with the introduction of the new Protocol 12 of the Convention, 
discussed in the final section of the chapter. Taking its cue from the Preamble to the 
latter, which reaffirms the legitimacy of measures designed to promote fu ll and effective 
equality, the section examines the extent to which the Protocol can deliver on its 
promises. In view of the reluctance with which Protocol 12 has been met and considering 
the relatively small number of ratifications, there is little room for optimism on this front.
Cautious reactions to the notion of full and effective equality, however, are not 
simply a matter of pragmatic concerns on the part of national governments regarding the 
additional regulatory burdens they would have to undertake. The problem, above all else, 
lies in the failings of the classical conception of positive action itself. The reason is none 
other than the “one size fits all” approach that seems to dominate both the interpretation 
of normative instruments and the general academic discourse.
Part III attempts to deal with the problem head on, by dissecting the concept of 
positive action into three dimensions, corresponding to the three principal areas of the 
public sphere in which it may operate.
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Chapter 6 deals with positive action in the field of employment, termed 
“standard” employment so that it is distinguished from the third category discussed later 
on. The analysis begins with a presentation of the types of permissible measures and the 
grounds upon which these are premised. It then turns to evaluate the status quo regarding 
the legality of quotas in employment from a point of view of European law. Building on 
the analysis of ECJ case-law earlier on, the focus this time is on the impact of this case- 
law on national jurisdictions.
The last section of the chapter considers arguably the biggest obstacle to the use 
of positive action in employment. This is none other than the merit principle, which is at 
the heart of liberal theory and exemplifies the commitment o f the latter to the primacy of 
the individual. The operation of merit as the ultimate criterion of selection in employment 
is also the main reason behind treating politics and the judiciary as separate categories for 
present analytical purposes, given that what counts as merit differs significantly in the 
context of each category.
Chapter 7 discusses positive action in politics, by comparing two national quota 
systems designed to address under-representation of women in elected public bodies. The 
analysis is premised on the idea that full equality in this context involves not only the 
treatment of under-represented groups but also that of the electorate as a whole. What is 
of particular importance is that the use of positive action in political candidatures is 
thought to fall outside the regulatory scope of EU law, which is designed in the first 
instance to cover the field of employment. Although it is accepted that candidature for 
elected office does not constitute employment, the view endorsed is that the requirement 
for full equality in practice encapsulates a general principle of Community law and
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should, therefore, apply across the spectrum of social activity. The final section of the 
chapter considers alternative legal bases upon which the relationship between positive 
action and full equality in this particular area can be normatively assessed.
Chapter 8 deals with the third category in which positive action may operate, that 
is the sensitive areas of the public sphere, such as the judiciary. Diversity on the bench is 
a standard feminist claim and seems prima facie compatible with full and effective 
equality. In view of the institutional role of the judiciary, however, positive action in this 
case should be geared towards maximising democracy, by ensuring that the composition 
of the judiciary is to an extent reflective of the society it is expected to serve.
Chapter 9 serves a double purpose. First, it provides a comprehensive image of 
the normative status quo under European law, by reviewing the types of positive 
measures that can legitimately be used in each category of the public sphere and the 
conditions of permissibility. Second, it critically evaluates the conceptual interplay 
between the notions of under-representation and disadvantage that constitute normative 
prerequisites of positive action. The fact that these two terms are used, by and large, 
interchangeably in the literature obscures the justificatory rationale o f positive action and 
reveals a significant lacuna in the foundations of anti-discrimination discourse.
Part IV reconstructs the concept of positive action within the framework of a 
theory of full and effective equality. It is argued, in chapter 10, that full and effective 
equality translates into an overarching legal principle of equal treatment, consisting in the 
right to indistinctibility of respect and the right to proportionality of concern. Positive 
action, in this regard, is an expression o f equal treatment seen through the lens of 
proportionality of concern. This theoretical claim is tested in chapter 11, which explains
why positive action should not be considered as a form of special treatment. The positive 
action case-law of the ECJ is once again put under scrutiny, with a view to identifying 
how the notion of proportionality of concern can resonate with existing interpretations 
and expose inconsistencies in the Court’s approach to full and effective equality. Finally, 
the penultimate section of the thesis uses proportionality of concern as a unifying theory 
that at once justifies the use of particular positive measures in employment, politics and 
the judiciary and defines the conditions under which these can be used.
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PART I: THE CLASSICAL CONCEPTION OF POSITIVE ACTION
C hapter 2: THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE ACTION: AN ATTEMPT TO
UNRAVEL THE CONTROVERSY
2.1 Methodological Choices and Working Definition of the Classical Conception: The 
Context of Non-Discrimination Law
Positive action, affirmative action, preferential treatment, positive discrimination, 
reverse discrimination, parity, positive measures, quotas. These are the most commonly 
used terms, coined to account for a whole array of policies or legal provisions designed to 
serve as the spearhead of an active anti-discrimination project. Many of these terms are 
used almost interchangeably throughout the vast literature on the subject, in spite of their 
overt and inconspicuous differences. Linguistic choices in this area may demonstrate 
political or philosophical allegiances, as some of the terms are ideologically laden. 
Reverse or positive discrimination, for instance, automatically set the tone of the 
discourse by inviting the reader to think in terms of exceptions to equal treatment that 
may or may not be justified. Positive action or affirmative action, on the other hand, seem 
to take a more “sympathetic” or, at the very least, neutral stance towards the concept they 
describe, leaving open the possibility of understanding the relevant policies and rules as 
fa ir in principle.
Against this linguistic background the term positive action, employed consistently 
throughout this thesis, reflects a conscious choice. It is inspired by the conviction that 
equal treatment is not merely a formalistic principle of due process, but that it involves a
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higher level of normative sophistication that cannot be reached through the reductionist 
conception of formal equality. It is also a generic term, wide enough to encompass all 
possible variants that relevant actors can come up with in the context o f anti- 
discrimination law. Last but not least, it is the preferred term of the European Institutions, 
featuring both in Article 141(4) of the Treaty and in secondary instruments. Having said 
that, the bulk of the analysis will be devoted to the consideration a particular instance of 
positive action, namely quotas. The reason is obvious: if the arguments presented can 
justify positive action in its “strictest” form, then they are a fortiori applicable to less 
controversial types of measures favouring social minorities. With this in mind let us now 
turn to the substance of the concept.
According to a moderate, comprehensive and relatively non-controversial 
definition, positive action denotes the deliberate use of race- or gender-conscious criteria 
for the specific purpose of benefiting a group that has previously been disadvantaged or 
excluded from important areas of the public sphere on the grounds of race or gender 
respectively.1 Two important points regarding the notion of group employed here become 
immediately obvious. First, any category of persons that have been or are being 
discriminated against on grounds of a shared characteristic should, in principle, be 
entitled to claim the status of a social group for the purposes of positive action. In other 
words, there appears to be nothing in the definition of positive action to suggest that its
1 Fredman, S. (2002). Discrimination Law Oxford University Press, p. 126.
2 On a very significant discussion on the normative construction o f  the concept o f  social group see Young, 
I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics o f  Difference. Princeton University Press., p. 42-48; Young, I. M. 
(1989). "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique o f  the Ideal o f  Universal Citizenship." Ethics 99(2): 250- 
274., p. 250-274.
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use should be limited to particular social groups.3 Second, the benefiting groups may be 
either disadvantaged or under-represented as a result of the invidious use of the shared 
characteristic. The relationship, however, between disadvantage and under-representation 
is seriously under-theorised, which
The aim of the present chapter is to assess the traditional arguments articulated 
against the group-approach, especially with respect to its doctrinal position within the 
European legal order,4 and to critically consider what ought to constitute a “target-group” 
for positive action. In this regard three major issues will be identified and discussed: the 
potential contrast between the legal subject entitled to the benefits and the actual 
beneficiaries, the construction of group identity and, finally, the conceptual confusion 
between disadvantaged (or under-privileged) and under-represented (or excluded) groups.
3 This is, indeed, the rationale behind the ongoing expansion o f the scope o f  anti-discrimination law 
towards a more inclusive approach. Besides race and gender, other human characteristics, such as age, 
ethnicity, disability and sexual orientation have been gradually added to the list o f  protected grounds o f  
discrimination. Note, for instance, the phrasing o f  Article 14 ECHR and o f  Art. 1 o f  Protocol 12 to the 
Convention.
4 The term is used here in a broad sense, encompassing the general legal principles on equality and non­
discrimination set out in primary and secondary EU legislation, as well as in the ECHR. In chapter 3 this 
normative space will be introduced as a distinct supranational legal order, the European Legal Order o f  
Rights.
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2.2 General Conceptual Framework: Three Approaches to Equality and Positive Action
Positive action is arguably one of the most controversial current legal issues. The 
theoretical debate, established in the 1960s, has been enriched with arguments coming 
not only from legal theorists, but also from all other actors and stake-holders: lawyers, 
judges, trade-unionists, economists, politicians and members of the disadvantaged and 
benefiting communities. However broad the field may be, the real question ultimately 
boils down to the underlying conception of equality one ascribes to and to the true 
meaning and consequences of equal treatment as a legal principle.
For introductory purposes, it would be useful to identify a preliminary analytical 
framework5 that seems to emerge from the literature. In this regard it is possible to 
distinguish three main approaches to positive action:6 the “symmetrical” approach, the 
“equal-opportunities” approach and the “substantive equality” approach. The first rejects 
positive action in principle; the second allows positive action within strict limits but 
seems generally uncomfortable with the idea of quotas and preferential treatment, while 
the third largely supports positive action, albeit not unconditionally.
5 For a more refined analytical categorisation in the framework o f  EU law see infra, chapter 4.1.
6 Fredman, S. (1997). "Reversing Discrimination." Law Quarterly Review 113(Ocf): 575 - 600 Fredman’s 
distinction is adopted here with certain reservations. First, it is not necessary for every contribution to the 
relevant discourse to fit comfortably within the specified conceptual boundaries o f  the three categories. It is 
possible to endorse the “substantive equality” approach that largely supports positive action and, still, reject 
positive action for reasons o f  inefficiency, as Dworkin correctly points out (see Dworkin, R. (2005). Taking 
Rights Seriously. Harvard University Press., p. 227 et seq.).
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2.2.1 Symmetrical approach
The symmetrical approach relies conceptually on two limbs: first, the Aristotelian 
notion of formal equality, which requires to “treat likes alike”,7 and, second, a strong 
individualistic background that endorses the principle of state neutrality. It invokes an 
absolute moral prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of race or sex. If 
discrimination on those grounds is unfair, then it is unfair as such and it is insignificant 
whether those benefiting from the discriminatory practices are members of a 
disadvantaged group.8 Discrimination would amount in any case to the distortion of the 
principle of equality and, consequently, to a violation of justice.9 In this respect, 
discrimination cannot be justified by appeal to the idea of equality, since the latter is 
dependent upon the notion of justice, which suffers a breach by discrimination. 
Moreover, in this view justice is an a priori concept,10 formulated independently of its 
historical or political contexts and applies, therefore, in the same way under all 
circumstances, without reference to any prior distribution of goods or benefits, which 
may have already established an unequal status for individual or groups.
The symmetrical model asserts the primacy of the individual in two dimensions: 
merit and responsibility.n The merit principle requires that every individual be treated
7 It is essential to underline that the maxim “treating likes alike” comes, indeed, from Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics (book E), but the relevant passage has often been misunderstood and misinterpreted. 
This point will be discussed in more detail later on in this thesis, especially in chapters 4.1 and 10.2.1.
8 As Justice Powell o f  the U.S. Supreme Court declared in the famous Bakke case: “The guarantee o f  equal 
protection [under the U.S. Constitution] cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and 
something else when applied to an individual o f a different colour”.
9 “All discrimination is wrong prima facie because it violates justice; and that goes for reverse 
discrimination too” (ibid). Also see Newton, L. H. (1995). Reverse Discrimination as Unjustified. The 
Affirmative Action Debate. S. M. Cahn, Routledge.
10 Ginsberg, M. (1963). "The Concept o f  Justice." Philosophy 38(143): 99-116. p. 100.
11 Fredman, supra n. 1. For an interesting study o f the historical roots o f these liberal notions see Adkins, A. 
W. H. (1960). Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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according to his or her own personal characteristics that are relevant to the situation under 
consideration. Thus, merit emerges as an objective criterion of distribution and is -  at 
least prima facie -  incompatible with any reference to race or gender whatsoever.
Responsibility is conceived solely on the basis of individual fault.12 There must be 
a direct causal link between the mistake and the agent so that the latter is held responsible 
for it. In this way, an individual cannot bear any obligation to compensate for social ills 
that are not directly attributed to him or her. According to this argument, collective 
responsibility should be regarded as nothing more than an arithmetical addition of the 
responsibility of every individual that took part in the collective decision.13 So, positive 
action would only be fair if the individuals excluded from a benefit in favour of black 
people, women or members of a minority played some part in the history of 
discrimination against these groups. But even in that, rather improbable, case positive 
action would not satisfy the condition of judging people according to merit and would 
again be regarded as unfair.
Finally, the symmetrical approach deals with positive action under the light of the 
state-neutrality principle, which requires that a state has the same “attitude” towards its 
citizens, without favouring or disfavouring some among them, and that it intervenes the 
least possible in the free market economy.14 Positive action clearly contravenes this 
principle -  the term in itself makes it obvious for that matter -  since the state takes an
12 Lavin, C. (2008). The Politics o f  Responsibility. University o f  Illinois Press., esp. pp. Viii et seq. 
(Preface).
13 This is not, o f  course, an uncontroversial view. See contra Cooper, D. (1968). "Collective 
Responsibility." Philosophy 43(165): 258-268.
14 See generally S. Wall and G. Klosko (eds.), Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory. 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, and especially Introduction p. 1-30, and G. F. Gaus, Liberal Neutrality: A 
Compelling and Radical Principle, p. 137-166.
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active stance in favour of specific groups and in many cases seeks to expand this 
favourable status into the private sector by exerting its normative powers horizontally.
2.2.2 Equal opportunities approach
The equal opportunities approach can be described as the “third way” to 
equality}5 This model dissociates from the narrow individualism of the symmetrical 
approach, recognising that the individual’s opportunities in life are determined to some 
extent by his or her initial social position and can be distorted by structural discrimination 
based on group membership. The equal opportunities approach, therefore, is committed 
to levelling the playing fie ld16 by putting all individuals at the same starting point and 
partially accepts positive action as a means towards this end.17
At the point, however, that equality of opportunities has been achieved, the 
principle of state neutrality and the individualistic ideal of equal treatment based on merit 
regain their dominance. Under this notion, therefore, softer forms of positive action, such
1 Ras single-sex training, are accepted as lawful means of ensuring equal access to 
opportunities, but the legitimacy of result quotas affecting the outcome of a selection 
process is generally contested. Preference to members of a disadvantaged or under­
represented group at the final stages of a selection process can only be accepted under
15 Along the lines o f  Gidden’s third way to social democracy. See Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Wav: The 
Renewal o f  Social Democracy. Polity Press.
16 Roemer, J. (1998). Equality o f  Opportunity. Cambridge University Press.
17 See for instance Williams, B. (1962). The Idea o f  Equality. Philosophy. Politics and Society P. Laslett 
and W. G. Runciman, Blackwell. 2nd Series., p. 125-126.
18 Burrows, N. and M. Robinson (2006). "Positive Action for Women in Employment: Time to Align with 
Europe?" Journal o f  Law and Society 33(1): 24-41.
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strict conditions19 and only within certain strands of the equality of opportunity theory, 
most notably in the Rawlsian version of equality o f  fair opportunities.
What must be made perfectly clear is that the equal opportunities approach is, in 
fact, an umbrella term used to describe a wide range of “middle of the road” views on 
equality. It is, consequently, difficult to reach definitive conclusions regarding the exact 
way in which positive action should operate within this theoretical framework. For 
present purposes what can be plausibly argued is that theories committed to equality of 
opportunities are generally not hostile to the use of positive action in principle.
2.2.3 Substantive equality approach
Substantive equality is another umbrella-term used as an analytical proxy for a 
wide range of theoretical approaches to equality. In an attempt to shed some light in this 
area of the literature, Fredman21 proposes an analytical division into four distinct, yet 
overlapping,22 tenets: equality of results or equality of outcome;23 substantive equality of
19 For the concretisation o f  these conditions within an EU law context see infra, chapter 4.2.
20 Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory o f  Justice. Harvard University Press., section 12.
21 Fredman, S. (1999). A Critical Review o f  the Concept o f  Equality in UK Anti-Discrimination Law. 
Independent Review o f  the Enforcement o f UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation. Cambridge Centre for 
Public Law and Judge Institute o f  Management Studies. W orking Paper no. 3. paragraphs 3.7 - 3.19.
22 Barnard, C. and B. Hepple (2000). "Substantive Equality." Cambridge Law Journal 59(3): 562-585., at 
564.
23 Phillips, A. (2004). "Defending Equality o f  Outcome." Journal o f  Political Philosophy 12(1): 1-19.
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opportunities;24 equality in the enjoyment of substantive rights;25 and a broad value- 
driven approach.26
The common thread holding these approaches together, albeit loosely, is that they 
have all been bom out of the need to identify and challenge the inherent limitations of 
formal or procedural notions of equality 27 Unsurprisingly, most substantive theories 
choose to begin, either explicitly or implicitly, from an a contrario position and attack the 
foundational propositions of the symmetrical approach: formal justice, individualism and 
state neutrality.28
The basic argument against a non-interventionist, symmetrical approach is simple. 
Doing nothing will inevitably lead to the perpetuation of the status quo and will, 
therefore, legitimise existing inequalities without questioning their fairness. Substantive 
approaches, then, underline the paradoxical nature of the principle of neutral state. 
Neutrality does not entail merely abstinence from action, but also a policy of non­
participation in social conflicts, whereby all parties are treated the same in order not to 
affect the result of the conflict either way. A policy of non-intervention in a society built 
upon centuries of discrimination will, inevitably, favour the dominant groups by not 
challenging the status quo. Consequently, it will facilitate the continuity of the existing 
balance - or, rather, imbalance - in the distribution of power and opportunities in every 
aspect of social life.
24 Fredman, supra n. 21, paragraph 3.12. It is obvious that this tenet o f  substantive equality seems to fit 
better under the equal opportunities approach. This apparent inconsistency that throws into disarray the 
distinction between equality o f  opportunities and substantive equality is one o f  the principal reasons behind 
the attempt for a more refined analytical distinction in chapter 4.1.
25 Fredman, S. (1998). Equality Issues. The Impact o f the Human Rights Bill on English Law. B. S. 
Markesinis, Oxford University Press., at 115-118. See also infra, chapter 5.1.
26 Barnard and Hepple, supra n. 22, p. 567.
27 Ibid, p. 526.
28 Fredman, S. (1997). Women and the Law. Oxford University Press., p. 380.
Positive action, then, is a legitimate weapon in the hands of the state when 
attempting to redress inequalities. Under substantive notions of equality the state has a 
clearly redistributive role and a positive obligation to correct the results of discrimination, 
past or present, direct or indirect. It must be said, however, that not all proponents of 
substantive equality would go so far as to argue that there is a positive obligation to take 
positive measures. From an analytic point o f view, this may be identified as the principal 
difference between equality of outcome and other, less “aggressive” notions of 
substantive equality.
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2.3 The Paradox of Positive Action: Group-Approach and Individual Beneficiaries.
One of the most problematic facets of positive action is its insensitivity to the 
actual distribution of benefits within the under-privileged or under-represented groups. 
Irrespective of the nature of benefits -  usually preferential treatment, but also allocation 
of social resources - there are several arguments asserting the theoretical incoherence of 
group-oriented positive action.
The first line of argument posits a restitutionary assumption as the governing 
principle of positive action and identifies causal discrepancies between the status of 
victim and the enjoyment of benefits. Group rights to compensation can only be justified, 
in this view, insofar as the harm of past discrimination cannot be analysed into separate 
harms to each individual apart from her being a member of the group.30 With rare but 
notable exceptions,31 group membership might have been the “vehicle” used to justify 
discrimination in the first place32 by upholding its “legitimate causes”,33 but the
29 While positive action programmes are usually designed in order to give preference to a member o f  the 
target group in a selection process, the benefits may also consist in financial allowances granted on the 
basis o f  gender or ethnicity. See the Griesmar case (Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de 1’Economie 
[2001], ECR 1-9383), where the French Civil and Military Retirement Pensions Code allocated a “service 
credit to female civil servants” for each child they had brought up during their working career.
30 Goldman, A. H. (1979). Justice and Reverse Discrimination. Princeton University Press , p. 83.
31 I assume that the Holocaust qualifies as the paradigm exceptional case o f  a group suffering collectively 
to such an extent that individualisation o f  harm, even if  it were possible, would fail to encompass the 
magnitude o f  the event and provide an appropriate ground for just compensation. Mutatis mutandis, this 
might also be the case o f  the indigenous populations in North America (Red Indians), Australia 
(Aboriginals) and colonial states in Africa. The relevant issues will be discussed further in connection with 
the problems concerning group identity.
32 Philosophers o f  the calibre o f  Schopenhauer have, unfortunately, been instrumental in attempts o f  
“epistemological” justification o f  women’s inferiority, presenting them as the “sexus sequior, the inferior 
second sex in every respect” (Schopenhauer, A. (1970). On Women. Arthur Schopenhauer: Essay and 
Aphorisms. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin.).
33 A carefully structured educational system in Nazi Germany, alongside an intense and multilevel 
propaganda, accomplished to empower the scientifically ridiculous Gobineau doctrine with relative
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detrimental effects were bestowed upon specific individual members. It follows that the 
beneficiaries of positive action ought to be selected on the basis of their individual 
victim-status and not merely take advantage of the group’s unfortunate history in which 
they did not partake.
Closely related to the above is the objection to the idea of group compensation as 
such, which is deemed appropriate only as long as the group structurally resembles a 
corporation or a group of enterprises.34 The conditions, then, that a group must meet in 
order to be entitled to compensation are the following: Similarity of purpose and 
interaction among its members, specific damages that cannot be individually assigned 
and an official representative body authorised to receive and further distribute 
compensation.35 And even if some social or ethnic groups can claim that they fulfil the 
first requirement, the second is met in exceptional circumstances, whereas the third is 
typically absent from the relevant discourse. The latter is far from surprising: The 
existence of analogies between social groups and enterprises, apart from being a counter­
intuitive assumption, is little avail here, since compensation for past discrimination is 
simply one among the declared aims of positive action.
From a slightly different perspective, random benefit distribution within the group 
is thought to reveal the self-defeating character of positive action, since it reinforces the 
existing hierarchical structures of the group itself and perpetuates inequalities among its 
members. In practice, it is said, positive action programmes are tailored -  intentionally or
credibility. As a result, a generation o f  Germans (or, at least, a significant number o f  the populace) was 
brought up to believe in the natural superiority o f the Arian race and its historic destiny to dominate over 
the supposedly inferior nations o f  the world.
34 Full winder, R. K. (1980). The Reverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis 
Rowman and Littlefield., p. 57-65.
35 Goldman, supra n. 30, p. 84-88.
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not -  in a way favourable to the top stratum of the target group. This is particularly 
obvious when it comes to the tie-break rule, which applies to equally qualified applicants: 
A member of a disadvantaged group able to live up to the merit standards of all other 
applicants is unlikely to suffer personally from disadvantage and, in this respect, does not 
properly “represent” the group, being better-off than the vast majority of his or her fellow 
members.36 Therefore, positive action as compensation will be in reverse proportion to 
individual harm caused by discrimination37 in that the actual beneficiaries are, in fact, 
those who deserve it the least.
More interesting are the arguments that recognise the multidimensional purpose 
of positive action, as a mechanism aiming not only to redress past disadvantage but also 
to enable the representation of the interests of socially excluded groups and to foster 
diversity.39 The major objection here appears to be one of efficiency. How successful can 
positive action be in its quest for pluralism and diversity, insofar as it remains committed 
to a strictly individualistic understanding of equal opportunities? In other words, if group 
representation and diversity constitute legitimate state aims with a view to contributing to 
group welfare as well as to social utility,40 the merit principle should be overridden. In 
this case, however, positive action would effectively lower the standards of selection in
36 Posner, R. (1974). The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality o f  Preferential Treatment o f  Racial 
Minorities. Affirmative Action and the Constitution. G. Chin. l.,p. 249-280. As it is obvious form the title 
o f  the cited article, Posner uses his argument solely on a race-discrimination context, but it can also apply 
on sex-discrimination, at least in its abstract form.
37 Goldman, supra n. 30, p. 90.
38 Goldman, A. H. (1975). "Reparations to Individuals or Groups?" Analysis 35(5): 168-170.
39 Fredman, supra n. 1, p. 150.
40 Instead o f  many see Dworkin, R. (2002). Affirmative Action: Does It Work? Sovereign Virtue R. 
Dworkin, Harvard University Press.,especially p. 398-400.
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order to favour less qualified candidates from the target groups.41 Consequently, it would 
become a liability to the free market economy42 and contradict fundamental theoretical 
precepts of liberalism, such as state neutrality and formal equality of treatment.
From the opposite angle now, if positive action is designed as a tie-break rule, it is 
compatible with the liberal interpretation of equal opportunities but it essentially 
undervalues the aims it purports to serve. Pluralism and diversity bear only a relative 
significance, always subject to the primacy of the individual, even at the expense of the 
target-groups” interests.43 In this regard, however, positive action becomes counter­
productive: Giving preference to an already well-qualified applicant on the grounds of 
gender or race may produce considerable adverse effects for the group as a whole, by 
stigmatising it and generating social resentment against it44 or by reducing incentives 
within the group for optimum individual performance.45
A plethora of counter-arguments have been articulated in response to the 
objections presented so far, many of which are, indeed, noteworthy. However, it should 
be made clear that many authors find it appropriate to address positive action in its 
entirety, without dealing with each problem in relation to the specific aspect of the 
concept that triggers it. In contrast, this thesis deliberately begins with the assumption 
that positive action takes up a legal task that has to be performed in the optimum way and 
within the limits set by general legal principles. The correct question to ask, then, is
41 Loury, G. (1992). "Incentive effects o f  Affirmative Action." Affirmative Action revisited: Annals o f  the 
American Academy o f  Political and Social Science 523: 19-29.
42 Abram, M. (1986). "Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers." Harvard Law Review  
99(6): 1312-1326, p. 1322.
43 This is, by and large, the approach adopted by the European Court o f  Justice (ECJ) ever since Marschall 
(Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein Westfallen [1997], E C R 1-6363). See infra, chapter 4.2.
44 Sowell, T. (1999). "The Other Side o f  Affirmative Action." Jewish World Review 8.
45 Loury, G. (1997). "How to mend Affirmative Action." The Public Interest (107): 33-43.
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whether the currently dominant conception of positive action embodies the best possible 
understanding of the project. To this end, it is crucial to analytically identify the 
problematic aspects and examine them separately before engaging in an overall 
assessment of the project and propose necessary modifications.
The focal point of the present chapter is to evaluate whether and under which 
circumstances the group-approach adopted by the classical conception threatens the 
legitimacy of positive action. The fundamental problem in this connection seems to be 
the disparity between intended and actual beneficiaries, although not necessarily from a 
compensatory standpoint.46 If the legal mandate of positive action is to promote equality 
for under-privileged and under-represented groups, the lack of control as to the 
distribution of benefits within the group may prove an insurmountable problem, insofar 
as the valuable effects for the group are peripheral and do not match the original 
expectations.
Typically in the relevant discourse, a substantial part of the debate focuses on 
whether the overall outcome of positive measures enhances the social position of the 
target-group in practice. As illustrated earlier, these concerns are both reasonable and 
useful, since they emphasise the importance of pragmatic criteria as to the success of the 
whole enterprise. The fundamental shortcoming, however, o f arguments invoking the 
inefficiency of positive action due to its unintentional adverse effects47 is their 
hypothetical status. They rely on sketchy empirical evidence48 and they rarely take into
46 The serious difficulties arising from the conception o f  positive action as a means to redress past 
disadvantage will be discussed in the relevant chapter.
47 In addition to the sources already cited see also Themstrom, S. and A. Themstrom (1997). America in 
Black and White Simon and Schuster, and Steele, S. (1994). A Negative Vote on Affirmative Action. 
Debating Affirmative Action: Race. Gender Ethnicity and the Politics o f  Inclusion N . Mills, Delta.
48 R. Dworkin, supra n. 40, p.389.
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account the different nuances of discrimination corresponding to the social context in 
which it occurs.49 Moreover, they ignore that social response to positive action, far from 
being uniform, differs immensely in Europe compared to the United States and equally 
different are the current legal positions on the matter as reflected in the recent 
jurisprudence of the ECJ and the US Supreme Court respectively. And, in any case, it is 
exactly in inherently xenophobic, racist or sexist societies, where public opinion resents 
or puts “an extra burden” upon “affirmative action babies”,50 that positive measures are 
absolutely vital in order to counter the existing pattern of explicit or tacit discrimination. 
What is more important, however, is that arguments tend to overshadow the key legal 
problems of proportionality between legitimate ends and the means employed to achieve 
them and of consistency between ends and actual results, which ought to be the subjects 
of prior scrutiny.
Inevitably, the lack of alternatives to the non-financial nature of positive measures 
plays an important role in explaining the disparity between intended and actual 
beneficiaries.51 Preferential treatment in employment and higher education can ultimately 
be enjoyed by individual members of the disadvantaged group and not by the group as a 
whole, but this fact alone puts in no serious jeopardy the legitimacy of the project, as long 
as we acknowledge the multidimensional -  and not just compensatory - character of 
positive action. Difficulties arise, however, when the specific individual beneficiary has
49 See for instance Wasserstrom, R. A. (2001). Racism and Sexism. Race and Racism. B. Boxill, Oxford 
University Press., Thomas, L. (2001). Group Autonomy and Narrative Identity: Blacks and Jews. Race and 
Racism. B. Boxill, Oxford University Press.
50 See Sigelman, L. and J. Todd (1992). "Clarence Thomas, Black Pluralism and Civil Rights Policy." 
Political Science Quarterly 107(2): 231-248., p. 31-248. Justice Clarence Thomas is regarded in the U.S. as 
a “classic example o f  an affirmative action baby”.
51 This line o f  argument invokes a form o f the double effect doctrine: the elimination o f  positive measures 
altogether would lead to no better result for the target-groups. Therefore, until a preferable alternative is 
proposed, positive action remains a plausible option.
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clearly not suffered from the detrimental effects of discrimination against the group and 
is not in a disadvantageous position on a personal level.
Let us consider the following example: A well-off female (F) applies for a 
directorial position in the civil service and, after the consideration process, she is found to 
be equally qualified52 with two of her male co-applicants (Ml and M2 respectively). 
According to the ECJ’s crystallised jurisprudence53 a legal provision giving preference to 
the female applicant on the grounds of her gender is compatible with the right of all 
citizens to equal opportunities, subject to the inclusion of a saving clause.54 The latter 
ensures that priority to equally qualified female candidates55 is neither automatic nor 
unconditional and that there exists a prior objective assessment of the specific personal 
situations of all applicants involved56 To the extent that this formulaic approach 
represents the currently dominant strand in EU law, it is essential to test the validity of 
any working hypothesis against it.57
52 Equal qualification here is taken to mean that the applicants are closely matched in every relevant respect 
and not just that they fulfil certain minimum requirements. The difference between these two possible 
formulations o f  a selection process will be further pursued in relation to the merit principle (see infra, 
chapter 6.2.4).
53 After Marschall the Court reiterated this position in Badeck (Case C -158/97, Badeck v. Landesanwalt 
beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen [1999], ECR 1-1875, 289). For a detailed discussion see infra, 
chapter 4.2.
54 Fredman, supra no. 1, p. 139.
55 Obviously the same rule should apply in principle for members o f  other disadvantaged or under­
represented groups, such as ethnic or racial minorities.
56 Badeck, para 23.
57 The model o f  positive action examined in this example is that o f the tie-break rule, where preferential 
treatment is granted to an equally qualified applicant from a target-group. The reason for choosing the 
mildest -hence, less controversial -  form o f  positive action is that a failure to justify it unequivocally would 
by definition render any other form o f  positive action virtually unjustifiable.
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The governing principle in this analytical structure remains that of individual 
merit,58 which can be overridden in order to favour under-privileged or under-represented 
groups, as long as a proviso allows for an objective inter-personal comparison of 
candidates on the basis of their personal situations. Consider, therefore, that one of the 
male applicants in the example comes from an upper socio-economic background, 
whereas the other originated from the poorest rural areas of the country and had to 
overcome a number of obstacles to achieve his academic and professional qualifications. 
Assuming that financial status and socio-economic background are constitutive elements 
of “the specific personal situations” taken into account under the savings clause, it is hard 
to imagine how preference is to be allocated here. If the tie-break rule applies, the term 
“group disadvantage” becomes conceptually distinct from and normatively prior to 
“disadvantage” per se, since the interests of the group are given precedence even when 
represented by a non-disadvantaged member vis-a-vis a genuinely disadvantaged -  
though not categorised as such -  individual.59 On the other hand, if the rule is overridden 
in the light of the proviso, positive action is left with a dangerously narrow scope of 
application that undermines its declared purpose.
58 The ECJ after Marschall reaffirmed the legitimacy o f the tie-break rule subject to a savings clause, but in 
parallel made it clear that positive measures aspiring to a substantive notion o f  equality are subordinate to 
the primacy o f  the individual (see Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson Akrich v Home Office, Judgment o f 23 
September 2003,).
59 The problem also arises in the context o f  competing claims o f  different under-privileged groups, 
especially when they are “conveniently classified as ethnic minorities” (Fredman, supra n. 1, p. 159), 
although in this case it is primarily a matter o f  fair allocation o f  benefits among equally justifiable claims. 
For a comprehensive discussion on the difficulties in dealing with disadvantage in the multicultural British 
society see Modood, T., R. Berthoud, et al. (1997). Ethnic Minorities in Britain: diversity and 
Disadvantage. The Fourth National Survey o f  Ethnic Minorities in Britain Policy Studies Institute., chapter 
10 .
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This case presents a challenging conundrum: The success of promoting “full and 
effective equality”60 depends on accommodating two competing sets of interest, namely 
those of the disadvantaged group and those of the disadvantaged individual applicant. 
The oxymoron of favouring a “privileged” individual participating in an under-privileged 
group has been a cardinal issue in the discourse. Many advocates of positive action 
suggest that even in this paradoxical situation there exist significant benefits for the group 
that enhance its social position. The symbolic power of affirming our general and 
unassailable commitment to non-discrimination and equality by upholding positive 
measures in favour of historically victimised social or ethnic groups can prove an 
indispensable weapon in the fight for a fair, pluralist and democratic society. The 
conceptual weakness of the argument is obvious: surely, if the daughter o f the United 
States” Secretary of State takes advantage of a positive measure on the grounds of her 
being an African-American female, the negative symbolic connotations will prevail 
across the social spectrum. Moreover, the typical resort to the “role-model” argument61 
causes further confusion as it relies upon an assimilationist notion of equality,62 which 
seems to be in direct contradiction with the aim of diversity.63 Especially under a 
conformist ideal of assimilation,64 where disadvantaged groups are expected to conform 
to predetermined norms, diversity turns out to be a tragic irony.
60 This is the phrasing adopted in the preamble o f  Protocol 12 to the European Convention o f  Human 
Rights. Article 141 para 4 o f  the Treaty o f  Amsterdam (former art. 119) contains the equivalent term “full 
equality”.
61 Among many see Parekh, B. (2001). Integrating Minorities. Institute o f  Contemporary Arts.
62 Young, I. M. (2001). Social Movements and the Politics o f  Difference. Race and Racism B. Boxill, 
Oxford University Press.
63 Quite interestingly, however, the role-model argument is usually employed in conjunction with diversity 
(see Fredman, supra no. 1, p. 156-158). The tension between these ideas will be thoroughly examined in 
relation to the problem o f  group-identity.
64 Young, supra no. 62, p. 393.
Most importantly, however, the arguments emphasising the indirect benefits of 
positive action for the target-groups lose focus of the explicit legal mandate, which is the 
promotion of equality. In this regard, the major legal dilemma is how to tackle 
disadvantage and under-representation as such and not necessarily within the stringent 
conceptual or normative framework of the classical group-approach. To this end it is 
imperative to rethink the notion of group in positive action, define clearly what 
disadvantage stands for and what is its relation with under-representation and, finally, 
determine how they ought to be dealt with.
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2.4 Positive action and the legal perception of group identity.
One of the most challenging tasks for contemporary legislators, judges and 
policy-makers is to adapt domestic legal orders to the emerging multicultural 
circumstances of the democratic polity. The reconfiguration of a legal system with a view 
to moving away from the archetypal conceptions of pluralism confined within the 
relatively homogeneous nation-state65 is by no means an easy task. The general aim, 
according to the legal mandate for full and effective equality, is to reshape political 
institutions so as to take into account diversity within the citizenry and existing 
inequalities among social groups.66 While many theorists have focused recently on this 
possibility,67 a number of political thinkers68 emphasise the lack of homogeneity within 
the identified groups themselves and argue for the need to realise their multifaceted, fluid 
and creative character.69
The problem, however, is not one that has to do only with social groups 
themselves. It is the law itself that seems to fail to internalise groups as a constitutive
65 The idea o f homogeneous nation states is open to debate, as far as the European historical context is 
concerned (see Loughlin, M. (2003). The Idea o f Public Law. Oxford University Press., p 16). In various 
cases, former Yugoslavia being an eloquent exemplification, the existence o f  a sovereign state does not 
entail a uniform national identity that not only supersedes religious or other peripheral allegiances but also 
transforms individual subjectivities into a concrete collective consciousness. This account, however, fails to 
encapsulate the historical and socio-political reality in the vast majority o f  European states constituting the 
so-called “old Europe”, where a strong national identity is embedded in the psyche o f  the populace as both 
a constitutive element o f  its collective political existence and a bond ensuring social cohesion and historical 
continuity.
66 Bickford, S. (1999). "Reconfiguring Pluralism: Identity and Institutions in the Inegalitarian Polity." 
American Journal o f  Political Science 43(1): 86-108.
67 See for instance I. M. Young, supra no. 2; Phillips, A. (1993). Democracy and Difference. Pennsylvania 
State University Press.; Kymlicka, W. (1989). Liberalism. Community and Culture. Oxford University 
Press.
68Anzaldua, G. (1990). Making Face. Making Soul: Haciendo Caras. Aunt Lute Foundation.; Spellman, E. 
(1988). Inessential Woman. Beacon Press.
69 See Bickford, supra no. 66., p. 87.
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element of the normative construct. Within the equality discourse the place and
70functional importance of groups appears to be severely under-theorised. As Collins 
shrewdly observes, the principle of equal treatment entails that “different groups should 
be treated equally (in otherwise similar circumstances)” but it is effectively silent on
71“how these groups should be composed’ [emphasis added].
In any case the legal perception of group identity, at least as far as positive action 
is concerned, can be described prima facie without reference either to theories of 
pluralism or to “identity politics”. According to its classical conception positive action 
belongs systematically to the normative platform of discrimination law. In this respect, 
what differentiates “groups” from legally non-significant (for the purposes o f positive 
action) clusters o f people is the common denominator used as grounds to discriminate 
against them. The female gender qualifies as such a denominator, since it has been per se
79a basis o f discrimination; hence women constitute a disadvantaged group. The same 
reasoning applies in relation to any other social or natural characteristic (race, ethnicity, 
age, sexual orientation, disability) that has been employed in violation of the equal 
treatment principle. The notion of group required here is a rather “thin” one, designed to 
include only those elements necessary in identifying victimised and excluded groups. 
Such a notion is not particularly sensitive to socio-political or anthropological 
deliberations on identity.
70 With the notable exception o f  Young that has devoted much o f  her philosophical work on exactly this 
area. See particularly I. M. Young, supra no. 2, chapter 2.
71 Collins, H. (2003). "Discrimination, Equality, and Social Inclusion." Modem Law Review 66(11: 16-43.,
p. 28.
72 Within the framework o f  discrimination law disadvantaged can only be interpreted as directly or 
indirectly resulting from unjustified discrimination.
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This story of what counts as a group for positive action, however, is inherently 
problematic due to its over-inclusivity. Throughout human history a number of natural 
characteristics have provided a convenient plateau of unequal treatment to the individuals 
bearing them.73 The list is virtually endless, especially when we contemplate that certain 
characteristics, such as body weight, have varied in social status and connotations, 
corresponding to divergence in social circumstances, beliefs or preferences.74 Under this 
thin notion of group all individuals that have suffered from discriminatory behaviour on 
the basis of a shared morally irrelevant characteristic -  whatever that may be, from hair 
length to political convictions -  can plausibly in principle claim the status of a group. The 
question whether they are entitled to the special protection afforded by positive action 
becomes then a matter of factual considerations, concerning the burden of proof (in cases 
of indirect discrimination), the persistence of discriminatory practices and the severity of 
their detrimental effects.
A further clarification needs to be made in this connection. Classical positive 
action applies when discrimination has either provoked some form of disadvantage to the 
target-group or when it constitutes the reason for the group being under-represented in 
areas of the public sphere. Thus, the semantic differential between women and a non­
significant (hence not protected) cluster of individuals may lie in the nature and the scale 
of the effects produced by discrimination against them. To accept this view, however, 
would be a serious conceptual mistake, leading to unintelligible results. If we do not rely
73 Unequal treatment here may amount either to discrimination or to allocation o f  special privileges, in 
accordance with the high or low social esteem related to the characteristic.
74 The standards o f  beauty for the female body as reflected in the works o f  art changed dramatically from 
the classical antiquity to the Renaissance and then again from the Renaissance to the modem age. 
Furthermore, excessive body weight is still regarded as a sign o f  social status in certain “primitive” African 
tribes.
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on a thicker notion of group, premised upon preconceived categories, it is impossible to 
draw a plausible distinction between groups and “non-groups” solely on the basis of 
discrimination and its results. The nature of disadvantage women had to undergo as the 
“inferior” gender cannot differ in its essentials from that of American communists during 
McCarthyism75 or HIV patients, although their particular experiences may vary.76 All the 
above were subjected to unequal treatment, their social position was adversely affected 
and they have an equally justifiable legal claim to the allocated benefits.
Restricting positive measures to a limited number of social groups77 appears to be 
instrumental to the viability of the project, but also to the resonance with its philosophical 
underpinnings. As explained earlier, the liberal vision of equal opportunities inspires the 
classical conception of positive action, infused with the recognition that a more 
substantial understanding of equality is sine qua non to the fair diffusion of opportunities 
throughout the social spectrum. The challenge to remove barriers without building new 
ones and, at the same time, to uphold the primacy of the individual requires a concrete 
notion of disadvantaged and under-represented groups.
Inevitably, the law has to deal with problems arising from group-identity head on. 
This signals the shift of our analysis towards a more traditional notion of group as a 
central unit of the social order that cannot be defined solely through the reductionist lens
75 For a detailed account o f  persecutions and their various forms against American communists in the 
McCarthyist era see Fried, A. (1996). McCarthvism. The Great American Red Scare. Oxford University 
Press.
76 It is worth noting that positive action purports to deal with the ongoing effects o f  past discrimination. 
Therefore, the argument that anti-communism in the United States no longer exists is invalid (even if  true), 
because all that needs to be proved is that today’s reality has been shaped by an unfair past. This reasoning 
applies irrespective o f  which underlying conception prevails as to the aims o f  the whole project (retribution 
for past discrimination or removal o f  present barriers). Consequently objections to the legitimacy o f group 
compensation are irrelevant insofar as positive action is not conceived in terms o f  compensation.
77 This does not mean that there should be numerus clausus o f  eligible groups, but that the set o f criteria 
identifying an entitlement ought to be clear and pre-determined.
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of discrimination suffered. The question remains whether the legal perception of groups 
fits well in social reality and, most importantly, whether positive action provides an 
adequate explanatory theory for its criteria of selecting among the in principle equally 
qualified groups.
The concept of positive action is premised upon a pluralist theory of society,
7Racknowledging by definition the existence of multiple groups within the citizenry. 
However, the extent to which group-membership defines an individual’s personality and, 
consequently, the body politics itself is open to debate. Interest group pluralism,
70dominant in political theory and political science until the 1970’s, underlines the 
cardinal importance of group allegiances and maintains an understanding of the 
democratic polity as a plateau for bargaining among interest groups.80 In this view the 
law performs a purely regulatory function, establishing rules for fair bargaining and 
ensuring a minimum overall balance for the sake of social stability. At the opposite end 
of the spectrum, the currently most prominent strand of political theory develops a 
normative conception of citizenship embedded with a concern for the public good that
o  1
overshadows parochial group interests. The role of law here is much more complex and 
subtle, since it has to uphold social integrity without becoming insensitive to difference 
and without oppressing individuality.
78 Otherwise it would be unintelligible to afford special treatment or allocate benefits to disadvantaged 
groups. In this sense it could be argued that the concept o f  positive action is non-individualistic in principle.
79 Bickford, supra no. 66, p. 89.
80 Dahl, R. A. (1956). A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago University Press.; Truman, D. (1951). The 
Governmental Process. Knopf. Interesting analogies can be drawn between interest group pluralism and 
contractarian thinking in legal philosophy.
81 Barber, B. (1984). Strong Democracy. University o f  California Press. The idea o f  concern for the 
common good or the general welfare permeates political thought since Aristotle and can hardly be credited 
to modernity as an original intellectual achievement.
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Regardless of which of the above conceptions of pluralism one accepts, positive 
action’s imperative is to cope with inequality among groups as well as among 
individuals. In this respect, it is in perfect agreement with several critics of interest group 
pluralism, who argue that social and political institutions systematically privilege some 
groups at the expense of others, due to structural deficiencies.82 This line of argument is 
central to feminist critiques of the law’s inherent logic that doctrinally legitimises
0 1
particular social relations and creates or sustains illegitimate hierarchies. Quite 
interestingly, the various strands of feminist jurisprudence84 seem to unite through the 
underlying belief that social order -  hence legal order as a social construct -  is inherently 
patriarchal.85
The problem with the feminist approach to group inequalities lies in its parochial 
understanding of group-identity, concerning both women themselves and the other social 
or ethnic groups. Although most feminist theorists identify, as mentioned above, the 
“male norm” in law as perpetuating patriarchal hegemony,86 their suggested methods to
o n
cope with existing inequalities differ dramatically from each other. These “academic”
82 Greider, W. (1992). Who Will Tell the People?. Simon & Schuster.
83 Menkel-Meadow, C. (1988). "Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education or
“The Fern Crits Go to Law School”." Journal o f  Legal Education 38(1-2): 61-85.
84 Cain, P. (1989-1990). "Feminism and the Limits o f  Equality." Georgia Law Review 24: 803-847.; Tong,
R. (2009). Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction. W estview Press.
85 Bender, L. (1988). "Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort Law." Journal o f  Legal Education 
38(1-2): 3-46.
86 Wishik, H. (1985). "To Question Everything: The Inquiries o f  Feminist Jurisprudence." Berkeley 
Women’s Law Journal 1.
87 To mention but a typical example, MacKinnon’s influential ideas (see MacKinnon, C. (1987). Feminism 
Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. Harvard University Press.) on gender equality as an issue o f  
domination and power distribution establishing male supremacy and female subordination have been 
heavily criticised by other feminist theorists for perpetuating the stereotype o f  women as victims (Harris, A. 
(1990). "Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory." Stanford Law Review 42(3): 581-614.) and for 
embracing a deterministic vision o f  male-female relations (Finley, L. (1988). "Nature o f  Domination and 
the Nature o f  Women: Reflections on Feminism Unmodified." North Western University Law Review 82:
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differences reflect, to a certain extent, the lack of consensus among women themselves as 
to what binds them together as a social (and not merely biological) group. This difficulty 
becomes even greater when it comes to heteronomous identification, that is when a 
group’s common identity is decided from an external, objective point of view, as in the 
implementation of adequate legal measures tackling disadvantage and under­
representation. In other words, individual eligibility for positive action schemes depends 
upon group-membership, which in turn can only make sense within a pre-established 
framework of legally defined social groups.
An interesting complication of the matter emerges when discrimination against 
the group becomes an integral part of its identity. It was proved earlier that law cannot 
plausibly premise its understanding of groups solely upon a “reflexive” definition, 
focusing on the social reaction towards a category of citizens.88 But when discriminatory 
practices and behaviours have a hegemonic presence in the grand narratives of a social or 
ethnic minority, they become indispensable elements in the historical process of 
collective self-determination. The case of African-Americans in the United States 
exemplifies this analysis89 and the works of Critical Race theorists90 have been
352-386.). On the other hand, the rhetoric o f  difference, emphasising the distinct female moral vision, 
which encompasses values o f  caring and relational connectedness and calls for equal weight to be given to 
women’s “different voice” (Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development. Harvard University Press.; West, R. (1988). "Jurisprudence and Gender." The University o f  
Chicago Law Review 55(1): 1-72.), has proved no less controversial, especially with regard to its 
essentialism (a critique also addressed to MacKinnon).
88 Apart from what has already been argued it should also be brought to attention that such an 
understanding would contradict fundamental and universally accepted legal principles, especially the right 
to self-determination.
89 This position is by no means uncontroversial. See contra Thomas, L. (2001). Group Autonomy and 
Narrative Identity: Blacks and Jews. Race and Racism. B. Boxill, Oxford University Press. Thomas claims 
that contemporary Jews have group autonomy despite (and not because of) the Holocaust, whereas on 
account o f  American slavery contemporary blacks do not.
instrumental in enriching “mainstream” jurisprudence with a pluralist vision, as well as in 
pointing out the hypocrisy of the “role-models” diversity that allows blacks to become 
white and women to become men.
The idea o f racial distinctiveness,91 however, provides only useful insights and 
not definitive answers on how to identify target-groups for positive action. The inherent 
conceptual limitations and the socio-historical specificity92 of the relevant arguments 
illustrate the peripheral character of such an approach. Moreover, the extent to which the 
assumptions of CRT embody in fact the “public opinion” of the community they 
allegedly represent is highly debatable.93 But even if such criticism can be dismissed on 
the basis of empirical evidence, serious objections ought still to be raised from the 
perspective of equality between two or more disadvantaged or under-represented
90 Critical Race Theory (CRT) emerged in the United States in the late 1980”s as an offshoot o f  Critical 
Legal Studies, when racial minority scholars established “an African-American movement” in legal studies, 
in order to approach the problems o f  race from the unique perspective o f  African-Americans.
See Delgado, R. and J. Stefancic (1993). "Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography." Virginia 
Law Review 79(2): 461-516..
91 Crenshaw, K. (1988). "Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Anti- 
Discrimination Law." Harvard Law Review 101(7): 1331-1387.
92 The construction o f  ethnic identity, as well as the legal perception o f  it, differs in many significant 
respects from the construction o f  racial or social identity o f  minority groups. Although analogies can be 
drawn, it should be underlined that racial distinctiveness and the very concept o f  “African-Americans” 
transcend national identities and, in this way, it effectively annihilates their meaning. The common 
denominator is lato sensu African origin in conjunction with slavery, without any reference to state or 
nation o f  origin. Therefore, the arguments o f CRT, even if  valid, correspond to a specific socio-historical 
context, outside which they appear dangerously oversimplifying.
93 In relation to positive action see Kennedy, R. (1990). "A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action 
in Legal Academia." Duke Law Review 660: 705-757. Kennedy’s extremely controversial article launches 
a forceful criticism against several central statements o f  CRT. In particular he challenges (p. 1749): “(i) the 
argument that on intellectual grounds, white academics are entitled to less “standing” to participate in race- 
relations law discourse than their colleagues o f  colour; (ii) the argument that, on intellectual grounds, the 
minority status o f  academics o f  colour should serve as a positive credential for purposes o f  evaluating their 
work; (iii) explanations that assign responsibility for the current position o f scholars o f  colour 
overwhelmingly to the influence o f  prejudiced decisions o f  white academics.”
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groups.94 As explained earlier, disadvantage is not per se a sufficient index of group 
cohesion, yet it remains the governing consideration in deciding which group falls within 
the normative scope of positive action. A scheme, therefore, that ignores certain 
disadvantaged groups while favouring others violates its legal mandate and does not 
comply with the equal treatment principle. Now, the deficiency of feminist or CRT 
arguments is exactly that they protest against inequality from an interest group point of 
view, failing to address the larger issue: their respective claims, although legitimate, 
serve a much narrower and self-centred purpose than that of positive action, which 
entertains the ambition to achieve full and effective equality throughout the social field.
The problems of relying too heavily on a group’s own perception of its identity 
become even more evident when it comes to social groups created or defined 
“negatively”95 in the first place. During the last decades homosexuals have established 
their position as a distinct social group with cultural specificity96 and autonomous 
presence in many spheres of social life.97 Discrimination on the grounds of sexual 
orientation has unfortunately been an endemic characteristic of many European societies 
and, although improvements have definitely been made in recent years, more institutional
94 Farber, E. and S. Sherry (1997). Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law. 
Minnesota Law Review. The authors accuse CRT for anti-Semitism and anti-Asiatism and challenge in 
general postmodern theories o f  radical multiculturalism as self-contradictory.
95 In the sense described above, as “others”, different from what constitutes the political or social 
correctness.
96 D ’Emilio, J. (2002). The World Turned: essays on gay history, politics and culture. Duke University 
Press.
97 It is not an overstatement to say that in the United States gay men and lesbians as an autonomous 
movement have made an impact in the legal academia as well. See, among many, Eaton, M. (1994). "At the 
Intersection o f  Gender and Sexual Orientation: Toward Lesbian Jurisprudence." Southern California 
Review o f Law and Women’s Studies 3: 183.; Hailey, J. E. (1988-1989). "The Politics o f  the Closet: 
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity." UCLA Law Review 36: 915-976. On a 
novel analysis o f  discrimination on the grounds o f  sexual orientation see Koppelman, A. (2001-2002). 
"Why Discrimination against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination." UCLA Law Review 49: 519- 
538.
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reforms are still necessary with a view to cancelling all prejudices and achieving full 
equality. Is positive action the right means to this end, considering that it focuses on 
disadvantaged and under-represented groups?
The legitimacy of giving preference to a homosexual person on the grounds of his 
or her group-membership should depend upon an examination of what this membership 
consists in.98 The traditional critique questioning whether women should be treated as a 
uniform social group takes here a more vigorous form, because sexual orientation, unlike 
gender or race, is not a visible human characteristic.99 This is not an attempt, of course, to 
underestimate the importance of sexuality as an intrinsic element of one’s identity, 
especially as long as one (or a group) regards it as a defining element o f one’s 
personality. However, many people even within the gay and lesbian communities seem to 
concede that freedom to choose one’s sexual orientation is, from a legal perspective, 
intrinsically connected more with the right to privacy or private life than with freedom of 
expression.100 And although public statements about one’s homosexuality have been 
rightly thought of as instrumental in the fight against discrimination and homophobia, it 
is fair to say that usually social allegiances are not determined by sexual identity, 
especially when the latter has no significance in terms of civil or political rights of the 
individuals. Therefore, in the democratic polity a citizen’s sexual preference should not
98 That, in fact, is a standard test that should apply in all similar situations involving allocation o f  
preference or special benefits.
99 Within the context o f  this argument even ethnicity or religious beliefs may qualify as relatively (and 
under specific circumstances) visible features. A person’s place o f  origin can be determined roughly by 
skin colour, the shape o f  the face or the eyes or even by the language or accent. Certain religious beliefs are 
expressed through a particular outfit or eating habits.
100 The opposite is the case with racial or ethnic minorities bound together with liaisons o f  cultural affinity, 
which simultaneously differentiate them from the majority o f  the populace that adheres to the “societal 
culture” (see Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Groups. 
Oxford Clarendon Press.).
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be treated as a political issue, a matter of respect to difference, exactly because sexuality 
is in most occasions not expressed publicly. To the extent, then, that its expression 
remains within the private sphere of human action, sexuality does not necessarily bear 
any cultural or political connotations per se: it becomes a political (and legal) issue only 
via discrimination against those diverging from what constitutes the ordinary 
behaviour.101
To return to the focal question concerning the legal understanding of “group”, it 
should be concluded that the classical conception of positive action presents serious 
internal contradictions. On the one hand it excludes from its scope of application 
categories of the citizenry that evidently suffer or have suffered from discrimination by 
not recognising them as social groups and, on the other, it accepts under its auspices 
artificially created and loosely defined social groups with questionable cohesion. The 
single most important problem in this regard is the conceptual incompatibility of such an 
inconsistent and confused definition of group with the idea of under-representation. If an 
individual is given preference because the group she belongs to is “visibly under­
represented” in the relevant sphere of social or political life, it follows that this individual 
undertakes the role of an unofficial representative for a certain community. Such an 
assumption would be completely untrue, however, in the absence of a minimum of group 
cohesion that would entail a maximalist and inevitably essentialist definition of social
101 It should be reminded that sexual orientation is discussed here in relation to group identity. The 
arguments presented purport to emphasise that, however important sexuality may be in the construction o f  
an individual’s personality, it is yet a legally improper basis to define social categories not because that 
would amount to “reverse discrimination”, but due to the inherently non-political (in the sense o f  non­
public) nature o f sexual preference. To accept such an assumption does not mean that one should overlook 
the larger philosophical problem o f  the public-private distinction and its legal implications. MacKinnon’s 
famous aphorism that oppression against women starts in the bedroom provides insights, which ought to be 
further explored in relation to the true meaning o f  equality. The point made here, however, is obviously a 
much narrower one.
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groups. What follows will hopefully provide a coherent alternative to the classical 
conception of positive action that will avoid these conceptual pitfalls.
PART II: THE POSITION OF THE EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER: POSITIVE 
ACTION AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN EQUALITY LAW
CHAPTER 3: THE ECJ AND THE ECTHR AS THE PILLARS OF A EUROPEAN 
LEGAL ORDER OF RIGHTS
3.1 Introduction
Before engaging with the substantive questions raised in this thesis, it is necessary 
to lay down the analytical groundwork by clearly establishing the normative framework 
within which these questions will be explored. The title reference to Europe, rather than 
to the European Union, is indicative of two foundational assumptions of the thesis: first, 
it is possible to discern a distinctly European notion o f  equality firmly rooted in the 
constitutional traditions of individual countries, despite the inevitable interpretative 
nuances within each domestic jurisdiction. Second, this common “European” meaning 
ascribed to equality entails that the legal principle of equal treatment and its relationship 
to positive action should be primarily determined by reference to European Union law 
and the European Convention of Human Rights.
The validity of both these assumptions will be tested in the present section. It is, 
however, important to note from the outset that this section makes a more “ambitious” 
claim, the normative implications of which extend beyond the limited scope of the 
current enquiry. It is submitted that, in the past fifty years, a new sui generis 
supranational legal order has gradually emerged in Europe in the area of human rights
protection. The European Legal Order o f  Rights (hereinafter ELOR) is the product of 
norms, rules and principles that have been established by EU law and the ECHR and 
impose positive obligations on European states to protect and promote the rights of 
persons under their respective jurisdictions. Respect for the principle o f  equality and 
protection of the right to equal treatment constitute indispensable elements of this legal 
order, and this inevitably has implications for the way positive action is conceptualised 
and justified.
What equality means in Europe, therefore, will be determined on the normative 
basis of the ELOR. Within this framework it should be possible to identify the common 
minimum content of the legal principle of equal treatment and determine the place of 
positive action in Europe.
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3.2 The Relationship between Equality and Human Rights
The principal aim of this thesis is to prove that positive action is a legitimate and, 
at times, necessary means to achieve full and effective equality. With equality, then, 
being at the spotlight the present claim regarding the existence of a distinct body of law 
in the field of rights that bears the hallmarks of a legal order may be mistaken for an 
obiter dictum. Such unwelcome misunderstandings could be avoided, should a 
normatively significant relationship between equality and rights were to be firmly 
established. Admittedly it goes beyond the modest ambitions of the present section to 
delve into the theoretical depths of the philosophy of rights in order to fully appreciate 
the intricacies of this relationship. It is, nonetheless, analytically feasible to attempt a 
fairly brief yet straightforward overview of the matter, which will suffice to adequately 
justify the importance of rights protection for the accomplishment of true equality in 
practice.
Linking equality to human rights bears intuitive resonance with current normative 
reality. It is no coincidence that the newly found UK Commission for Equality and 
Human Rights - the equality body that came into being after the merging of its gender 
and race predecessors -  gives equal weight to both terms in its title. But what is the actual 
nature and content of the relationship? Equality is directly connected to human rights in 
two ways that can be encapsulated in the following propositions: equality qua right and 
equality in the protection or enjoyment of other rights. In both these categories non­
discrimination seems to occupy a central position, as it is said to have a privileged
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relationship with the concept of equality.102 Some would even go so far as to suggest that 
“equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative statements of the same 
principle”.103 Appealing as this notion may sound, it is a simplistic fa9ade covering a 
much more complicated philosophical issue. What follows will hopefully shed some light 
on the matter by explaining how the concept of equality at once shapes and is being 
shaped by the human rights discourse in Europe.
3.2.1 Equality qua right
Equality qua right normatively translates into the general legal principle o f  equal 
treatment. The latter is recognised as such by most modem legal systems, including the 
EU,104 and it typically enjoys constitutional status in national jurisdictions across Europe. 
The corresponding individual right to be treated equally, therefore, is protected either 
directly, in the form of an explicit constitutional clause, or indirectly, through a number 
of more concrete expressions of the principle, most notably the prohibition o f  
discrimination.,05 These concrete normative expressions are in turn mirrored in a set of 
specific equality rights, each of which is tailored to fit a particular material context of
102 For a very interesting study on the relationship between equality and non-discrimination see 
McCrudden, C. (2004). Equality and Non-Discrimination. English Public Law. Feldman, Oxford 
University Press., chapter 11.
103 Besson, S. (2008). "Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?" 
Human Rights Law Review 8(41: 647-682., at 652.
104 See McCrudden, C. and H. Kountouros (2006). "Human Rights and European Equality Law." 
University o f  Oxford Faculty o f  Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series W orking Paper 8.
105 Most international legal instruments, with the exception o f  Article 7 o f  the Universal Declaration o f  
Human Rights, do not include an equality clause as such. Instead they opt for a prohibition o f  
discrimination, either in a generic form, as in Article 14 o f  the ECHR, or focused on specific grounds o f  
discrimination, as in the case o f  the Convention for the Elimination o f  Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW).
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application.106 Gender and race equality or protection from age discrimination, for 
instance, are all classic examples of the different facets of the general equality principle.
Equality, then, can at once be a general principle of law and a fundamental right. 
In both dimensions it materialises as a nexus o f  more concrete and complementing 
equality rights, effectively covering every aspect of social and economic life. The 
difference between principles and rights, however, is not one to be taken lightly. In the 
context of EU Law it has proved quite problematic -  so much so, in fact, that the 
distinction between the two, initially inserted in the failed Constitutional Convention, was 
later abandoned. Theoretically, the term principles is used to denote a prima facie lack of 
direct justiciability, whereas the term rights generally entails automatic invokability 
before the courts. Part of the literature, though, seems to be employing the terms 
“fundamental principle” and “fundamental right” interchangeably. Doskey, for instance, 
argues that the Court of Justice, from the early 1970s, has developed the abstract general 
principle of equality into a fundamental right of equal treatment.107
Admittedly, the ECJ itself has added to the confusion with the choice of wording 
in many of its judgments. Ever since its seminal ruling in Internationale
i f \ o
Handelsgesellschaft it has invariably referred to the protection of fundamental rights as 
forming part of the general principles of Community law. These general principles, 
however, seem to include both equality and non-discrimination, as well as particular 
expressions of the latter. Taking this interpretive route the ECJ has recognised gender
106 For instance, the right to equal pay for work o f  equal value irrespective o f  sex, enshrined in Article 141 
(4) EC.
107 Doskey, C. (1991). "The Principle o f  Equality Between Women and Men as a Fundamental Right Under 
Community Law." Industrial Law Journal 20(4): 258-280., at 258.
108 Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und 
Futtermittel (Solange I) [1970], ECR 1125.
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equality109 and protection from age discrimination110 as general principles of Community 
law on their own merit. In doing so, however, it explained that “the prohibition of 
discrimination [...] is merely a specific enunciation of the general principle o f  equality 
which is one of the fundamental principles of community law” [emphasis added].111
An important philosophical question is raised in this regard, concerning the 
relationship between equality and discrimination. In the context of the present enquiry 
this question is of cardinal significance, as it relates to the definition of equality in 
Europe. Besson, for instance, asserts that “[o]ne is treated equally when one is not 
discriminated against and one is discriminated against when one is not treated 
equally”.112 The fact that, until Mangold, the general principle of equality could not be 
directly invoked before the ECJ in discrimination cases113 seems to point to this direction. 
If Besson’s two propositions are both true, however, then there is nothing to separate the 
two concepts and equality effectively collapses into non-discrimination. In other words, 
one is left to wonder if protection from discrimination is, in practice, all there is to the 
seemingly more far-reaching concept of equality.
The answer to this theoretical conundrum cannot be an affirmative one. Both 
primary EU law and the ECHR contain separate references to non-discrimination and to 
“full equality” 114 and “full and effective equality”115 respectively. These alone suffice to 
conclude that the right to equal treatment entails state obligations that extend beyond a
109 Case C -149/77, Defrenne v Sabena [1978], ECR 1365.
110 Case C -144/04, Mangold v Rudiger Helm [2005], European Anti-Discrimination Law Review.
1,1 Joined Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co. And Hansa-Lagerhaus Stroh & Co. V  
Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen: Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe [1977] ECR 1753,, para 7.
112 Besson, supra no. 103, p. 652.
113 Martin, D. (2006). Egalite et Non-Discrimination dans la Jurisprudence Communautaire -  Etude 
Critique a la Lumiere d’une Approche Comparatiste. Bruylant., at 515-529.
114 Article 141 EC.
115 Preamble to Protocol 12 o f  the ECHR.
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negative normative formulation, such as the prohibition of discrimination. After all, one 
is not necessarily treated equally if one is merely not discriminated against. Gender or 
race neutral rules tend to be insensitive to existing differences in individual circumstances 
that stem from the fact o f being a woman or a member of an ethnic minority. Non­
discrimination echoes a formal conception of equality and by default, therefore, is subject 
to the inherent limitations that the latter carries with it.
Equality qua right under EU law and the ECHR, then, should be conceived of in a 
substantive way. It may give rise to a justiciable claim for fourth generation equality 
rights,116 such as reasonable accommodation and adjustments for employees with 
disabilities. Theoretically, it may even substantiate a claim for positive action in the form 
of preference to an individual member of a disadvantaged group that fails to enjoy full 
equality on grounds of her sex or minority status. Of course, under the dominant 
interpretation of the existing normative framework by both the Luxembourg and the 
Strasbourg court states seem to have discretion rather than an actual duty to introduce 
positive measures in such situations.117 But this does not alter the fact that the normative 
content of the notion of full equality cannot possibly be exhausted in the protection from 
discrimination. Equality qua right is a multidimensional principle that encompasses 
various prohibitive and protective rules, some of which can be relied upon directly by an 
individual bringing a legitimate claim to the European courts. What follows, in this 
regard, is that equality qua right will not always provide an autonomous legal ground for 
an individual claim, which will more often than not be substantiated in more concrete 
non-discrimination rules.
1.6 S. Fredman, supra no. 1, pg. 1.
1.7 This is, o f  course, a position with which the present thesis strongly disagrees and which will be 
consistently argued against throughout the analysis.
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3,2.2 Equality in the distribution and enjoyment o f  other rights
The second dimension of the relationship between equality and rights is, arguably, 
the most important one for present purposes. It involves an understanding of equality as 
an overarching principle that permeates the whole of the legal system, acting as a 
regulatory agent in the field of rights. When the allocation or enjoyment of rights is at 
play, equality between the individual or group beneficiaries is taken into account both at 
the stage of law and policy-making and, most significantly, in the process of judicial 
review.
Gender mainstreaming is an emblematic EU policy that exemplifies this 
approach.118 It involves the consideration of an equality dimension in every policy 
adopted by the EU institutions. In the case of mainstreaming, of course, equality is 
intended to operate as an ex ante consideration, factored in all aspects of policy-making. 
The ex post facto  facet of equality is most clearly typified in the ECHR system and its 
Article 14. The latter enshrines an individual right not to be discriminated against on any 
grounds in “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention”.119 
Article 14, then, allows the Court to treat equality -  or, more accurately, non­
discrimination -  as a measure o f  legality of state actions that affect individual rights.
Although this confirms that equality here operates as an overarching principle that 
cuts across the field of rights, the individual right not to be discriminated against under 
the Convention is accessory in its scope of application. A condition for its invokability is 
that another “substantive” Convention right provides the factual backdrop against which
118 On the relationship between gender mainstreaming and positive action see Stratigaki, M. (2005). 
"Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy." European 
Journal o f  Women's Studies 12(2): 165-186
119 Article 14 ECHR.
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discrimination can be examined and substantiated. This, however, is nothing more that 
the logical consequence of the second dimension of the equality-rights relationship. 
Equality here is a principle of due process in the allocation and protection of rights. It 
retains its autonomous nature in principle, but this autonomy is contextualised. Because 
of this accessory element in its scope of application, therefore, equality here can be a 
ground for a legally justiciable claim, but only insofar as it is factually linked to another 
right.120
As with the previous dimension of the equality-rights relationship, the normative 
content of the concept o f equality is once again relatively unclear. Non-discrimination is 
undeniably the analytical flagship here: everyone is entitled to enjoy their legally 
protected rights fully and any differentiation therein should be objectively justified. This 
echoes the “treating likes alike” Aristotelian maxim, with its formal equality 
connotations. It also brings to the fore the usual concerns regarding the undesirable 
possibility of levelling down as a potentially lawful response to inequality. If it is not 
practically feasible to secure the full enjoyment of a specific right by everyone due to 
scarcity of resources, then equality may dictate that the exercise of the right in this 
specific context is suspended.121
These concerns, however, are doctrinally unjustified. The principle of equality 
regulates not only the enjoyment of rights, which involves a distributional element that 
may prove controversial, but also their judicial protection. The need for protection, 
however, varies according to the personal circumstances of each individual. Even from a
120 According to the ECtHR case-law it suffices that this other right is factually involved, without the need 
to find a breach o f  the right.
121 Wolff, J. (2001). Leveling Down. Challenges to Democracy: The PSA Yearbook 2000. K. Dowding, J. 
Hughes and H. Margetts, Palgrave., p. 18-32.
formal equality point of view, the opposite side of the “treating likes alike” coin is that 
different situations should be treated differently. When it comes to judicial protection of 
rights, then, this entails that the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts may use the non­
discrimination principle not only in a negative way, as a standard legitimacy test for the 
legality of state actions, but also in a positive way. It is possible, therefore, for the courts 
to read positive state obligations into the principle of non-discrimination in this context, 
which stem directly from a more substantive notion of equality.
It is in this context that positive action in general and quotas in particular become 
all the more significant. Their relationship to equality could - and possibly should - be 
framed in terms of rights and this relationship could, consequently, fit within the general 
human rights discourse more comfortably than under the current anti-discrimination 
rationale. Instead of being an exception to equality, therefore, preferential treatment may 
well be an equality right in itself, insofar as the underlying concept of equality allows for 
personal and material differences to be taken into account when determining who is 
entitled to what.
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3.3 Equality and Rights in Europe: The Role of the ECJ and Of The ECtHR
3.3.1 Defining “European ” norms: The EU at the pole position
During the last decade of the 20th century the European Union has managed to 
establish itself as the major political player in the European territory. The true ambit of its 
regulatory power surpasses its geographical boundaries, since the influence of its laws 
can be felt across its borders. It is not an exaggeration to say that Community law 
constitutes a basic standard against which non-EU European states - especially those 
formerly belonging to the Eastern block - measure their success in addressing the modem 
challenges of democracy in an era of globalisation. After the fifth enlargement and the 
subsequent recent succession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU with its 27 Member 
States does no longer represent a small minority of the nation states of Europe. On the 
contrary, the peoples of the EU Member States amount to roughly 70% of the total 
population of Europe.122
The sheer size of the EU is obviously not enough to support a normative claim 
concerning the legal understanding of the concept of equality. In other words, the way the 
notion of equality is conceptualised and applied as a matter of Community law cannot tell 
the whole story of what actually happens outside Union borders. Nor is it acceptable to 
suggest that the conception of equality that inspires Community law must by default 
reflect a common “European” minimum. It would be equally erroneous, however, to 
disregard the descriptive strength of such claims. It is a fact that the standards set by
122 The 27 EU Member States have a combined population o f  about 500 million, while the total population 
o f  Europe according to the United Nations is around 730 million (in 2005). This statistic is all the more 
impressive, if  one takes into consideration that Russia alone accounts for the best part o f the remaining 
(non-EU) European population, featuring a total population o f  over 140 million.
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Community law affect directly the majority of domestic legal orders in Europe and that 
they exert a significant indirect influence on the rest.
This influence is not only exerted in an entirely abstract form. Formalised 
expressions can be found, among others, in the requirement imposed on candidate 
countries, under the Copenhagen criteria for accession, to align their human rights 
protection systems with that of the Union. If EU institutions are not satisfied, for 
instance, that gender equality is adequately protected and promoted by the domestic laws 
and practices of the Turkish state, it is highly likely that Turkey’s prospects of joining the 
Union in the near future will remain dubious.
When the EU, therefore, determines the normative content of rights and 
principles, the reverberations of this determination travels farther than its geographical or 
normative borders. Interpreting these rights and principles constitutes the privileged 
domain of the ECJ. Placed at the top of a transnational judicial hierarchy the latter has the 
privilege of being one of the few courts worldwide the case-law of which has genuinely 
far-reaching consequences, as the significance of the legal developments they bring about 
can be measured on a global scale.
3,3.2 Protection o f  fundamental rights as a matter o f  Community law: An ECJ 
success story.
Against this factual background the argument that the Community interpretation
of general legal principles represents a distinctly European approach123 that is not
reflective only of the EU Member States’ understanding seems to be gaining
123 The ECJ has often insisted that, when protecting fundamental rights as a matter o f  Community law, it 
does so on the basis o f  a European human rights standard based on “constitutional traditions common to 
Member States” {Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para 4).
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momentum.124 It is particularly important to note in this regard that the notion o f general 
legal principles has not been incorporated into the founding Treaties. From the very early 
stages o f the Community’s existence - and long before its official transformation from an 
entity with purely economic objectives to a broader political union - the ECJ has used this 
notion extensively to pursue its own agenda o f negative integration.
The field of triumph for general legal principles has been none other than 
fundamental rights.125 The founding Treaties contained no reference to human rights, 
which is not only due to practical reasons - namely the economic intentions of the 
enterprise - but also to normative ones, in view of the inherent constitutional quality that 
fundamental rights possess: An inclusion, in other words, o f a commitment to protect 
fundamental rights would have given the Community undesirable state-like 
characteristics.126 In the absence of such a system of protection, however, the ECJ claim 
that the EC Treaty had created a “sovereign legal order”127 remained unsubstantiated. The 
concept of sovereignty is intrinsically linked to the existence of a bedrock of 
constitutional provisions,128 which has the double aim of establishing a system of 
governance and setting out a number of core societal values that entail basic rights and 
obligations of citizens. Simply put, without fundamental rights the EC Treaty would be
124 See for instance Calliess, C. (2007). The Fundamental Right to Property. European Fundamental Rights 
and Freedoms. D. Ehlers, De Gruyter., at 452, where the author argues that the ECJ ever since Hauer 
{Hauer v Land-Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 321) has been using a “European standard”.
125 Kumm, M. (forthcoming 2009). Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold and the New Human Rights 
Paradigm. The Past and Future o f  EU Law: The Classics o f  EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary o f  
Rome L. A. M. Maduro, Hart.
126 Chalmers, D., C. Hadjiemmanuil, et al. (2006). European Union Law: Text and Materials. Cambridge 
University Press., chapter 6.
127 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Belastingen, ECR 1. [1963] CMLR 105; 
Case 6/64 Costa v. Ente Nazionale per L'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), [1964] ECR 585, CMLR 425.
128 This is true even if  the constitution is an “unwritten” one, as is the case in the UK.
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nothing more than another international agreement imposing mutual obligations among 
sovereign states.
When the ECJ proceeded to assert the supremacy of EC law over national 
constitutional provisions,129 the reaction of the German130 and the Italian131 Constitutional 
courts was unsurprisingly rebellious. Since fundamental rights that were enshrined in 
national constitutions did not have a textual presence in primary EC law, the rightful 
guardians of national constitutional orders were not willing to pledge their allegiance to 
the Community. This triggered a surge of judicial activism on the part of the ECJ in an 
attempt to secure acceptance of the doctrine of supremacy. Fundamental rights became 
top priority in the agenda of the Court during the 70s and the 80s through the creation and 
development of doctrines such as direct effect, indirect effect and state liability. The 
notion of general principles of Community law, which were derived from the “spirit” of 
the Treaties, the common constitutional traditions of the Member States and from 
international instruments protecting human rights, allowed the Court to bypass the lack of 
positive law.
As a result of this on-going process a relatively consistent interpretation of basic 
legal concepts that permeate or underlie the protection of fundamental rights has 
gradually emerged. Equality and non-discrimination constitute, arguably, the core of this 
nexus o f concepts that have proved instrumental in the protection of rights on the 
Community level. Far from being a coincidence, this can be attributed to at least two 
easily identifiable reasons:
129 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, op. cit.; Case 106/77, Italian Finance Administration v. Simmenthal 
[1978], ECR 629.
130 BVerfGE 6, 32 (Elfes).
131 Decision 183/1973 o f  27 December 1973 [1974] 2 CMLR 372, 336.
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Firstly, the variety of legal systems within the EU entails differing levels of
protection from Member State to Member State. If fundamental rights are to be protected
effectively as a matter of Community law, the main problem that needs to be addressed is
that of unequal treatment or discrimination between citizens of different Member States
or between citizens and immigrants.132
Secondly, the legitimacy of the ECJ’s interference with issues covered by national
constitutional provisions is seriously contested. In view of the doctrine of separation of
powers, that inspires all the domestic political systems across the EU, it is not part of the
1 ^courts’ prerogatives to substitute the legislature in making important policy choices. In 
other words, a court should not, in principle, “create” rights that have not been allocated 
by the democratically elected representatives of the people. Such claims are even more 
powerful when it comes to a European court dwelling in the realm of national 
constitutions.134 When equality is involved, however,135 this line of argument does not 
apply. By examining whether the general principle of equal treatment or the right not to 
be discriminated against have been violated the ECJ does not create new rights; it merely 
determines the correct scope rationae personae for the application of already existing 
rights. It is, of course, true that, by doing so, the ECJ may extend the corresponding 
positive state obligations and generate substantial changes in the legal landscape for 
states and individuals alike. This, nevertheless, does not alter the fact that the accusations 
against the ECJ’s legitimacy in this area are weak.
132 The latter point is connected to the universality o f  fundamental rights, at least in terms o f  their rationae 
personae scope, as accepted by the ECHR.
133 This is particularly relevant, for instance, to the level o f  protection afforded to social rights, most o f  
which are not justiciable in domestic legal orders.
134 The perceived threat to national sovereignty is, o f course, the underlying concern here.
135 Either in the form the equal treatment principle or in the more concrete form o f  the right not to be 
discriminated against.
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3.3.3 The impact o f  the Convention in protecting rights and defining equality in 
Europe: ECtHR as the EC J’s “significant other”
What the concept of equality means in Europe, therefore, should primarily be 
identified with reference to the emblematic general legal principle of equal treatment and 
the right not to be discriminated against, as these have been interpreted by the ECJ in its 
various judgments. It is by looking at this case-law that one can hope to find a distinctly 
European theory of equality and ascertain the place of positive action therein. But this is 
not the end o f the story. EC law can only reveal half of the picture. As mentioned earlier, 
the sources of EC fundamental rights, in the absence of explicit textual reference in the 
founding Treaties, were the common constitutional traditions o f the Member States and 
relevant international instruments.136 Among those the ECHR was deemed by the ECJ to 
carry special weight. So much so that the actual content of rights as a matter of 
Community law should be determined in view of the relevant Convention provisions and 
the ECtHR’s interpretation of them.
This deference of the ECJ to the ECtHR is most eloquently seen in one of its 
relatively recent rulings concerning the right to family life. In Akrich v UKU1 the ECJ 
was quite explicit in stating that “regard must be had to respect for family life under 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”. It then goes on to assert that this right “is among the 
fundamental rights which, according to the Court's settled case-law, restated by the 
preamble to the Single European Act and by Article 6(2) EU, are protected in the
136 Coupled with the “spirit” o f  the Treaties, which is nothing more than a proxy to refer to an undeniable 
moral commitment o f  democratic institutions to the respecting and protecting human rights.
137 Case C l 09/01 Secretary o f  State fo r  the Home Department v. Helene Akrich [2003] ECR 1-9607.
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Community legal order”. Instead of producing its own interpretation of the limitations to 
the right to family life under Community law138 the ECJ resorts once again openly to the 
ECtHR, suggesting that “[t]he limits of what is necessary in a democratic society [...] 
have been highlighted by the European Court of Human Rights in Boultif v 
Switzerland.
The implications of this judgment140 can be fully conceived of only when one 
takes into account that the approach adopted antedates the birth of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in Nice (2001). The non-binding nature of the Charter is, obviously, 
a plausible explanation of why the ECJ preferred to continue premising its reasoning on 
the Convention. Still, the priority given to the Convention by the ECJ seems enough to 
support the claim that, when it comes to fundamental rights, EC law is not the sole 
normative source to look at. What appears to be even more important is that the ECJ is 
not merely using the Convention as “raw material”, which can be molded into a 
“Community standard” of protection. Instead, the ECJ interpretation of the rights is not 
just in tandem with but it is actually “copied and pasted” from ECtHR case-law.
This is confirmed by the second paragraph of Article 6 TEU, which expresses the 
commitment of the Union to “respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the [ECHR] 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States [...]”. 
The importance of this provision, in view also of the unequivocal statement in the first
138 See also Barnard, C. (2007). The Substantive Law o f the EU: The Four Freedoms. Oxford University 
Press., p. 260.
139 Boultif v Switzerland, Application No. 54273/00, 2 August 2001 (nyr).
140 See also Guild, E. (2000). "The EC Directive on Race Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and 
Limitations." Industrial Law Journal 29(41: 416-423., p. 78.
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paragraph that the Union is “founded on [...] respect for human rights”,141 cannot be 
exaggerated: it effectively elevates the ECHR to a primary legal source for the protection 
of rights in the Union. Far from being a “constraint” on EU law-making, policy decisions 
and institutional actions, the Convention becomes a basic instrument to determine the 
actual meaning of rights and, hence, the extent of their protection.
The argument that the ECHR enjoys a “constitutional” status in the Community 
system for the protection of rights is further reinforced by the fact that the Convention is 
nowadays part o f the acquis Communautaire. Although it was initially held by the ECJ 
that the European Union itself could not become a Signatory Party to the Convention,142 
the Lisbon Treaty puts an end to this irregularity by establishing the legal personality of 
the Union and providing for its accession to the Convention. In addition to that, all EU 
Member States are, as a matter of Community law, under the obligation to ratify and 
enforce the Convention and its protocols. This is true for new Member States o f the 
enlarged Union but also for prospective Member States, since ratification of the ECHR 
has been added to the Copenhagen criteria for accession.
It is interesting to note at this point that the “institutional deference”, at least 
between courts, has been mutual. In its recent Bosphorus judgment143 the ECtHR has 
recognised that “the protection of fundamental rights by EC law could have been 
considered to be, and to have been at the relevant time, “equivalent” to that of the 
Convention system.” It went on to admit that “a presumption arose that Ireland did not
141 Article 6 TEU was amended by the Treaty o f  Amsterdam. In its original formulation (in the Treaty o f  
Maastricht) it was still short o f  establishing fundamental rights as a central mission o f  the Union (see 
Chalmers et al., supra no. 126, chapter.6).
142 Opinion 1/94, 15 November 1994, [1994] ECR 1-5276.
143 Bosphorus Hava Yollan Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim §irketi v. Ireland [GC], 30/06/2005, no. 45036/98, 
Reports o f  Judgments and Decisions 2005-VI
74
depart from the requirements of the Convention when it implemented legal obligations 
flowing from its membership of the EC”. This conclusion does not only accept that 
fundamental rights are protected in parallel by the Convention as well as EC law, but also 
that the ECJ - in its capacity as a “constitutional court” of the Union - has jurisdiction to 
decide on such matters when brought before it.144 As Costello eloquently points out, the 
ECtHR in Bosphorus “attempts to overcome one formal legal demarcation in order to 
promote convergence and coherence of rights protection in a wider Europe”.145
What becomes clear from the preceding analysis is that the relationship between 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg constitutes now a salient feature of the European system of 
rights protection and has attracted considerable attention in the literature.146 Through this 
“symbiotic interaction o f fragile complexity” as Douglas-Scott has eloquently described 
it,147 the two courts seem to have found a satisfactory code of conduct based on mutual 
understanding and respect of each other’s competence. This allows them to perform their 
respective functions without jeopardising the integrity of the system across the territories 
of jurisdictional overlap. If it is true, though, that Europe now possesses a “ius commune” 
of human rights, the claim that this is embedded in a European Legal Order o f  Rights 
that has gradually emerged seems the logical next step.
144 On the potential interpretative conflict between the two courts see K. Kuhner, “Bosphorus - Double 
Standards in European Human Rights Protection?”, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, Issue 2 (December) 
2006, pp. 177-189.
145 Costello, C. (2006). "The Bosphorus Ruling o f  the European Court o f  Human Rights: Fundamental 
Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe." Human Rights Law Review 6(1): 87-130., p. 88.
146 Instead o f  many see Douglas-Scott, S. (2006). "A Tale o f  Two Courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the 
Growing European Human Rights Acquis." Common Market Law Review 43(3): 629-665.; Scheeck, L. 
(2005). "The Relationship between the European Courts and Integration through Human Rights." ZaoRV 
65: 837-885.
147 Douglas-Scott, supra no. 146, p. 631.
148 Ibid, p. 665.
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3.4 At The Intersection Between EU Law And The ECHR: Towards A “European Legal 
Order O f Rights”
3.4.1 Defining the European Legal Order o f  Rights
The claim that a distinct European Legal Order of Rights (hereinafter ELOR), 
founded upon EC fundamental rights law and the ECHR, has come into existence seems 
to be deeply rooted in the current normative reality across the territory of the European 
Union. No national jurisdiction in Europe can nowadays circumvent human rights 
obligations without being subjected to the scrutiny of either Strasbourg or 
Luxembourg.149 What is more important is that this intertwined system of protection 
provides a common modus operandi for both EU Member States and non-EU European 
states that are Signatory Parties to the Convention. This is supported by the fact that the 
ECtHR has been given by the ECJ on a number of occasions the lead in ascertaining the 
content of rights. On the other hand, the acceptance on the part of the ECtHR that it no 
longer holds the monopoly of rights’ protection and its consequent deference to the ECJ 
allows us to conclude that the two courts are on an equal footing as guardians of a 
distinctly European normative framework with fundamental rights as its core.
The unique characteristic of this sui generis legal order is the duality of its 
institutional structure, with two “Supreme Courts”, the ECJ and the ECtHR, sharing the 
top stratum of an informal judicial hierarchy that serves a common purpose. ELOR, then, 
should be conceived of effectively as a bicephalus legal order, with Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg as its two heads.
149 Ibid.
A seemingly radical suggestion as the one put forward here is likely to be met 
with some mistrust. Most would readily concede that human rights are protected in the 
European public sphere through a multi-layered system or a nexus of overlapping 
systems, whereby national legislation is but one strand of the overall regulatory scheme. 
The most obvious critique that can be levelled against ELOR, then, is that it seems an 
unnecessary addition to an already convoluted normative space. Even if one were to 
agree that a greater degree of harmonisation of rules and coordination of systems is 
needed, one may argue that this can be achieved through more “conventional” means. For 
instance, there is a growing trend in the literature to regard the European Union as 
potentially the most important post-national human rights institution worldwide,150 which 
could lead the way towards strengthened protection of rights not only inside its borders 
but also internationally.
Although this “conservative” approach has an undeniable theoretical appeal, 
especially from an EU point of view, its practical implications are seriously problematic. 
It has already been conceded that the EU is a dominant player in the European normative 
arena, with its principles and laws affecting the whole of the Continent. The distance, 
however, between accepting this reality and asserting that the EU should be assigned a 
hegemonic role in human rights protection at the expense of Strasbourg is vast. Despite 
optimistic views that emphasise the Union’s emerging quality as a “human rights 
organisation”,151 one must not be oblivious to the lack of enthusiasm with which this 
identity shift is being carried out. Freedom of movement continues to take precedence
150 Besson, S. (2006). "The European Union and Human Rights: Towards a Post-National Human Rights 
Institution?" Human Rights Law Review 6(2): 323-360.
151 Krisch, N. (2008). "The Open Architecture o f European Human Rights Law." Modem Law Review  
71(2): 183-216.
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over wider societal interests and the ECJ continues to lack general competence to decide 
human rights cases.152 The political institutions are reluctant or unable to take the 
initiative and push forward an aggressive agenda of positive integration in this field, 
despite the high hopes generated by the Treaty of Amsterdam. This is evident above all in 
the decision not to incorporate the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights as part of the text 
of the Lisbon Treaty.
In this political and legal climate giving the EU “carte blanche” to dominate the 
human rights domain in Europe seems a dubious choice. Apart from creating a de iure 
hegemony, whereby non-EU countries will have to blindly follow in the footsteps o f an 
organisation they have not joined, protection of rights will be almost exclusively 
entrusted in the hands of an institutional structure that is at best reluctant at this point to 
undertake such a colossal responsibility. On top of that, unconditional priority to the EU 
will inevitably undermine the political and normative clout of the ECtHR, which is at 
present quite successful in performing its role as the principal human rights court at a 
European level.
There is another obvious factor that has deliberately not been considered up to this
1 ^point. Despite all the positive signals regarding the level of explicit or implicit 
understanding between the two courts and the mutual deference that underpins their
152 ECJ jurisdiction is established only when the issue at hand falls within the remit o f Community law, that 
is when it engages primary or secondary Community law. This will remain the case even after the entry 
into force o f  the Treaty o f  Lisbon.
153 A typical example o f  what is termed here implicit communication can be found in a series o f  Strasbourg 
judgements on sexual orientation discrimination in the military (Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. UK  [Grand 
Chamber], Application No. 31417/96, 27 September 1999, [2000] 29 EHRR 548; Smith v. UK and G rady v. 
UK, Applications Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 27 September 1999, 29 EHRR 493). See also M. D. 
Goldhaber, A  People’s History o f  the European Court o f Human Rights, Rutgers University Press, 2009, 
pp. 44-45.
relationship,154 the possibility of conflicting rulings cannot be totally excluded. No better 
example exists that their respective views on the compatibility of different pension age 
limits fo r  men and women with the principles o f non-discrimination and equal treatment. 
In Stec155 the ECtHR referred to the “strong persuasive value” of an ECJ social security 
ruling,156 before going on to find that a different retirement age for men and women is 
compatible with Article 14 of the Convention. Recently, however, the ECJ has ruled to 
the opposite direction in Commission v. Greece,157 where it has found the different 
retirement age for men and women provided for in the Greek Civil and Military Pensions 
Code to violate Article 141 EC. Although one can plausibly assume that Strasbourg will 
probably refrain from taking issue with this ruling, if the matter is once again put under 
its scrutiny, the current situation cannot be overlooked. Contradictory rulings are not a 
figment of commentators’ imagination, but a very real possibility.
With all this in mind, opting for a systematisation of the human rights protection 
regime in Europe on the basis of a distinct legal order that encompasses under its rule the 
EU, the EU Member States and the non-EU countries that are Signatory Parties to the 
ECHR appears to be a politically and normatively preferable option. It has the benefit of 
acknowledging the “special” role of the EU, while at the same time recognising that the 
latter needs to be bound in its policy-making and everyday practices by established 
principles originating from the ECHR and understood under the light of Strasbourg 
interpretations. ELOR is, then, a normative scheme that allows the EU to develop and
154 Evidenced by their apparent efforts to avoid conflicting or contradictory rulings. See Craig, P. and G. D. 
Burca (2007). EU Law Text. Cases and Materials. Oxford University Press., p. 426.
155 Stec v. UK  [Grand Chamber], 12 April 2006, Application Nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, (2006) 43 
EHRR 47.
156 Ibid, para 58.
157 Case C-559/07, Commission v Greece, 26 March 2009.
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solidify its human rights credentials, but within the confines of a genuinely European 
doctrine that is co-determined by the ECtHR.
In this respect, what still needs to be discussed is the relationship between ELOR 
and the existing legal orders in Europe. The co-existence of the Community legal order 
and the domestic legal orders of Member States has already attracted a considerable 
degree of scholarly attention within the framework of EU constitutional law. Despite 
numerous attempts to delineate the boundaries between the two, with some being more 
persuasive than others, a significant amount of uncertainty remains. It is understandable 
that any argument pertaining to describe the emergence of an additional legal order will 
initially be seen as adding to the existing complexity and ambiguity. Such reactions, 
however, are completely unfounded. Closer scrutiny of this European Legal Order of 
Rights will prove that, apart from descriptive accuracy, it possesses the quality of 
simplifying the normative structure that guarantees the protection of fundamental rights 
in Europe. This is all the more true when it comes to non-EU countries that are Signatory 
Parties to the Convention.
3.4.2 The place o f  positive action in ELOR
The relationship between equality and human rights, which is at the very 
foundation of ELOR, has already been firmly established. It is also self-evident that 
positive action has a “privileged” relationship to the concept of equality, either as an 
exception to it, as under the classical conception, or as an expression of it, as with the 
alternative conception that constitutes the backbone of this thesis. The particular way in 
which positive action fits into the ELOR system will be examined in detail in the final
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chapter,158 where it will be argued that the ELOR can prompt a race to the top with 
regard to the equal enjoyment of rights. For the time being, however, what needs to be 
determined is how the ELOR affects the implementation of the equal treatment principle 
across Europe and what consequences this has on the legality of positive action, either as 
a possibility or as a state obligation.
Without a doubt the most important contribution of the ELOR to the current 
normative framework on equality is that it allows for an unqualified expansion of the 
rationae personae scope of the equal treatment principle so that it covers every individual 
and group residing on European soil. In other words, every person within the jurisdiction 
of the countries that are either Member States of the EU or Signatory Parties to the ECHR 
- or both - should in principle enjoy the same rights as everyone else, unless a 
differentiation can be objectively justified.
Plainly put, the main issue here boils down to this: in the absence of a 
systematised pan-European legal order of rights it is highly likely that significant inter­
state inequalities in the enjoyment of rights by individuals or groups will emerge or 
continue to exist. Individuals that find themselves under the same or substantially similar 
circumstances will be treated differently by their respective states.159 A British woman, 
for instance, that applies for a position on the disciplinary board of the public body she 
works for will be treated less favourably than a Greek woman in a similar position, given 
that the latter will be given preference in view of a relevant gender quota currently in
158 See infra, chapter 11.2.
159 From an enforcement point o f  view, this is particularly evident with regard to the new optional Protocol 
12 to the ECHR, establishing a free-standing right not to be discriminated against. Individual petitions on 
this new legal basis will be admissible only against Member States that have ratified  the Protocol. See infra, 
chapter 5.4.
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force.160 Needless to say that, from an equality point of view, this differentiation is in 
principle unacceptable.
What the ELOR does, then, is ensure that such instances of inter-state inequality 
become the object of direct judicial scrutiny by either the ECJ or the ECtHR. Positive 
action in this context will no longer be a mere legislative possibility, left entirely to the 
discretion of each state. It may well become an equality obligation under the ELOR, 
stemming from the commitment to a distinctly European interpretation of the equal 
treatment principle, understood as fu ll and effective equality in practice,161 The 
legitimacy of quotas and the limitations to their use will at the first instance be 
determined under the light of the common general principle of equal treatment, with due 
regard, of course, to the socio-political idiosyncrasies and economic differences between 
states.
160 Greek Law 2839/2000 aims to ensure the balanced participation o f  men and women in decision-making 
procedures in the public administration, as well as in the entities o f the private sector and in the local 
administration agencies o f  1st and 2nd degree (municipalities). Its article 6 stipulates that the departmental 
boards throughout the public sector will be comprised to a minimum o f  1/3 by members o f  each sex.
161 This wording reflects the combined references to equality in Article 141 EC and the Preamble to 
Protocol 12 ECHR.
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CHAPTER 4. POSITIVE ACTION IN THE EU: FULL EQUALITY IN PRACTICE 
AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ
The history of positive action in Europe is inextricably connected with the 
development of the doctrine within the framework of EU law and in parallel to the 
general integrationist project. This is hardly a coincidence. Transforming the economic
1 ff)community into a political union has been a long and arduous process, marked by the
ever increasing commitment of EU institutions to the protection of the rights of European
citizens. Equality in the enjoyment of these rights has inevitably risen to the top of the
policy agenda. Commitment to fu ll and effective gender equality at the first instance,
especially after Maastricht, and to other forms of equality more recently has put positive
action under the spotlight, given that the more “conventional” equality strategies have not
proved successful in eliminating the gender gap in employment and achieving the goal of
social inclusion for minorities.
After a long period of controversy and uncertainty surrounding the positive action
1provision in article 2 (4) of the Equal Treatment Directive, the legality of positive 
action in principle can no longer be put into question. According to the unequivocal 
wording of article 141 paragraph 4, which was inserted into the Treaty of Amsterdam as a 
reaction to the Court’s ruling on Kalanke,]64 positive action is conceived of as a means to
162 And, one might add, an unfinished one.
163 Directive 2000/78/EC o f  27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation.
164 Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] E C R 1-3051
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achieve “full equality” between men and women in working life and not solely as an anti- 
discrimination mechanism.165
This signalled, according to many, a move away from the rigid and unsatisfactory 
notion of formal equality towards a more substantive notion of equality,166 which would 
be suitable to account for practical inequalities stemming from institutionalised indirect 
discrimination. The term “full equality in practice” attests to that view by implicitly 
admitting to a distance between the theoretical equality of opportunities and the actual 
social circumstances that may inhibit women from taking full advantage o f these 
opportunities. Despite the fact that there are competing views as to the meaning of
1A7equality and equal treatment in Community law, it is safe to assume that “full equality” 
encompasses broader socio-political objectives and corresponding state obligations than 
the mere establishment of a negative right not to be discriminated against. In this respect, 
positive action is not only a lawful means to achieve gender equality but may also prove 
instrumental to its attainment, providing a wide range of measures that Member States 
can employ to this end.
This does not entail, however, that all positive measures are lawful under
1 AfiCommunity law. The current position, as crystallised in the cases of Badeck and
165 Article 141(4) reads as follows: “With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and 
women in working life, the principle o f  equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under­
represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in 
professional careers.”
166 The extent to which this is true will be examined later on in this chapter (see infra).
167 For an analysis o f  the different versions o f  equality underlying various instruments o f  European equality 
law see Bell, M. and L. Waddington (2003). "Reflecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law." 
European Law Review 28(31: 349-369 , esp. p. 350-357.
168 Case C-158/97 Badeck v. Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen [1999], E C R 1-1875
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Abrahammson169 that reaffirm the approach taken in Marschall,170 appears to be 
relatively straightforward: in order to be compatible with Community law positive 
measures must not give an automatic and unconditional preference to the favoured 
person or persons and they must ensure that the selection process allows for objective
171assessment o f  the specific personal situations o f  all applicants.
Based on the rationale that equal treatment requires interpersonal comparisons of 
qualifications and of individual circumstances, this two-part formula can be applied 
satisfactorily in most areas of employment when the measure in question is o f a tie-break 
type with a saving clause.172 Policies that allocate preference to a less qualified candidate, 
however, are still very contentious. In Abrahamsson the ECJ reiterated that the governing 
principle remains the primacy of the individual and that inter-personal comparisons of 
merit are the only legitimate basis for equality in selection procedures. Consequently, it is 
stated that positive measures are not allowed when they are “disproportionate to the aim 
pursued”, but the Court stops short from concluding that “strict” quotas are always
1I'Xdisproportionate.
It seems, then, that the legal landscape of European equality law is not entirely 
clear and consistent. One could plausibly argue that the Court has “done well” in 
situations where the compatibility of the quota with Community law could not be 
seriously challenged - with the obvious but unique exception of Kalanke. Following the
169 Case C-109/01, Abrahamsson Akrich v Home Office, Judgment o f  23 September 2003,.
170 Case C-409/95, Marschall v. Land Nordrhein Westfallen [1997], EC R 1-6363
171 Badeck, op. cit., para 23.
172 Fredman characterises this approach as formulaic and discusses at some length the very interesting 
Opinion o f Advocate General Saggio, which renders proportionality as the ultimate criterion for the legality 
o f  positive measures. See S. Fredman, supra no. 1, p. 142.
173 Ibid, p. 143. The issue remains unresolved because in Abrahamsson the measure in question dictated an 
automatic preference, thus failing to satisfy the Badeck test anyway.
legislative developments and especially the introduction of Article 141 (4) in Amsterdam 
the case law gradually incorporated a more “substantive” approach to equality, despite 
the unassailable commitment to the primacy of the individual. In “hard cases” such as 
Abrahamsson, however, it is very difficult to determine where the Court stands in terms 
of doctrine. The traditional terms “formal” and “substantive” equality appear to be rather 
generic and, thus, unsuitable to describe the theoretical underpinnings of the Court’s 
reasoning in interpreting both article 2 (4) of the Equal Treatment Directive and Article 
141 (4) EC. It is, therefore, necessary to try and define more accurately the conceptual 
framework of equality within the context of European law before any further exploration 
of the place of positive action therein.
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4.1 The Taxonomy of EU Equality Law: Analytical Categories of Equality and Positive 
Action.
Earlier in this thesis it was submitted that the notion of equality can be 
analytically classified into three principal categories.174 It will be asserted later on in this 
chapter that the difference between ECJ rulings generally perceived to be inspired by a 
formal equality rationale and those that seem to conform to a more substantive 
conception of equality is not as significant as it appears to be. This is, to a large extent, 
due to the fact that the tripartite distinction between a formal-symmetrical, a substantive- 
asymmetrical and an equal opportunities model of equality does not exhaust the 
interpretative possibilities. In other words, although this categorisation has the benefit of 
relative analytical simplicity, it seems insufficiently nuanced to account for all the 
interpretations of the equal treatment principle in the European courts’ rulings.
For present purposes, therefore, it would be useful to attempt a more refined 
analytical categorisation of the “European” approaches to equality, with particular 
emphasis on the place of positive action within each category.175 The first category, 
termed non-comparative formal equality, is the only one under which quotas are not an 
acceptable mechanism to achieve equality of treatment and, for this reason, it will be 
discussed in more length than the rest.
Before moving on to examine the proposed taxonomy one last remark on 
methodology is necessary. All categories will attempt to identify what types of positive
174 See infra chapter 2.2.
175 It goes without saying that the limited scope o f  the present enquiry does not allow for a fully-fledged 
theoretical analysis o f  the proposed taxonomy. The ambition o f  this section is to provide a solid, i f  not 
comprehensive, analytical basis for the detailed examination o f  ECJ case-law that will follow.
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action are permissible in politics and in employment, according to the distinction adopted 
in Part III of the thesis. In this Part a third category, namely that of sensitive areas o f  the 
public sphere exemplified by the judiciary, is also identified and discussed. Due to space 
limitations, however, the following sections will not consider how each proposed 
category of equality responds to the specific issues raised in the context of the third 
category. Such questions will be explored instead in chapter 8.
4.1.1 Non-comparative formal equality.
Formal equality is one of the most cited and, arguably, ill-treated terms in the 
equality discourse. Liberal moral and political philosophy has claimed paternity rights on 
the term, attributing it to Aristotle, arguably one of its remote founding fathers. The 
maxim “treating likes alike” has consistently been thought to constitute a fundamental 
principle o f liberal justice, underpinning the general legal principle of equal treatment in 
its various constitutional formulations.176 It is no surprise that this particular notion of 
equality has been at the centre of liberal thinking, as it fits easily within a liberal
177 178normative framework. With state neutrality and the primacy of the individual at its 
normative core, liberalism can only afford to accommodate a principle of equality that 
does not conflict with these premises.
A closer look at Nicomachean Ethics, however, throws these assumptions into 
disarray. The laconic maxim “treating likes alike” is, indeed, of Aristotelian origin, but it
176 Most post-Renaissance constitutions include some form o f  a general equality clause among their 
provisions. The same is true about most international legal texts on the protection o f human rights, in which 
case the provision may take the form o f  a general non-discrimination clause.
177 See for instance Gutman, A. (1980). Liberal Equality. Cambridge University Press.; Sandell, M. (1982). 
Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice. Cambridge University Press.
178 Instead o f  many see Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy. Oxford Clarendon Press.
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only tells half of the story. If similar situations are to be treated according to the same 
norm, then different situations require different normative treatment. In Aristotle’s own 
words “this is the origin of quarrels and complaints - when either equals have or are 
awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares” because if two persons are not equals 
“they should not be entitled to enjoy equal shares”.179 It is obvious that, in this view, 
sameness (or similarity) and difference are equally significant parts of the concept of 
equality. Not to put too fine a point on it, they are the two sides of the same coin. If this is 
true, how can then a law that is “blind” - and, thus, insensitive to personal differences and 
to how these came about - be entrusted with the task to observe and apply the principle of 
equal treatment?
A preliminary answer to this question, that any advocate of classical formal 
equality would be ready to venture, is that differences are indeed taken into account in the 
context of individual merit. If two candidates possess different qualifications, then they 
should be treated differently on the basis of these and only these. Aristotle himself 
eloquently suggests that flute players will not perform better if they are better bom and,
i snhence, “the superior instrument should be reserved for him who is the superior artist”. 
Although the argument may sound albeit simplistic on its surface, the validity of its 
transposition into modem liberal thought should be measured against the different social 
realities of each era. Employing the Aristotelian argument in the modem socio-political 
context comes at a considerable cost: merit appears to override any other consideration 
because the aim of the Aristotelian argument was to expose the unfairness of allocating 
benefits or privileges to the noblesse de robe solely on the basis of their aristocratic birth.
179 Aristotle (2004). Nicomachean Ethics (translated bv W.D. Ross). Kessinger Publishing., p. 69.
180 Aristotle (2004). Politics, (translated by D, Jowett), Nuvision., p. 48.
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It does not, however, touch upon the exclusionary definition of citizenry, adopted by
1 Q 1
Aristotle, which leaves slaves and women outside its ambit. Obviously, then, the 
principle o f equality envisaged here cannot account for the radical shift in our 
understanding of the appropriate composition of the polity. Nor is it plausible to suggest 
that, despite this shift, the normative attitude towards previously excluded groups can 
remain unaltered as if nothing significant has changed. Both the philosophical and the 
normative scope of Aristotelian merit, therefore, are too narrow to support a notion of 
equality compatible with an inclusionary conception of democracy that underpins 
contemporary political thought and inspires modem legal systems.
From a philosophical point of view this problem could be regarded as one of 
restitutionary rather than distributive justice. In theory, therefore, one may plausibly 
argue that the inclusion of previously excluded categories of persons in the definition of 
citizenry does not necessarily put the pre-existing distributive paradigm into question, as 
the injustices suffered in the past may be adequately dealt with through compensatory 
mechanisms. It must be noted at this point, however, that under the notion of classical 
formal equality positive action cannot be justified even if seen as a form of collective
1 8 9compensation for past discrimination against specific social groups.
In any case, there still remains another important obstacle to the relationship 
between Aristotelian equality and modem liberalism. The Aristotelian notion of merit 
should be understood within the framework of his general theory of justice. In this 
context, merit as a criterion of distributive justice aims at prohibiting a double injustice, 
occurring against the individual that personally suffers from the inequality, but also
181 In fact Aristotle has ventured a defence o f  slavery in his Politics.
182 Dworkin, R. (15 May 2003). "The Court and the University." The New York Review o f  Books 50(8).
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against the community as a whole. The latter aspect of injustice is of particular 
importance here, because it is totally missing from the discourse on classical formal 
equality. The main argument is quite straightforward in an a contrario formulation: if 
merit is not the only criterion of selection, the community as a whole will be deprived 
from the positive effects of having a socially valuable activity performed at the highest 
level of excellence. The state obligation, therefore, to normatively endorse the principle 
of meritocracy has the double purpose of satisfying the legitimate expectations of the 
whole community regarding the collective benefit of the activity, as well as protecting the 
legitimate equality interests of each individual citizen.
Leaving aside for the time being the question of how a socially valuable activity 
should be defined, it is easy to see why classical formal equality appears to be at odds 
with this communitarian ethos. Its commitment to individualism entails that upholding 
the primacy of the individual is a prerequisite of justice and equal treatment. Invoking the 
collective interest of the community is not sufficient per se to override this principle, at 
least not in the sense of imposing on the individual a burden that he bears no 
responsibility for. In other words, under classical formal equality this principle of 
meritocracy should be fully applicable even in circumstances where the activity in 
question is of no particular benefit to the community. Although the liberal equality 
discourse is not indifferent to the existence of such a collective gain, the latter is usually 
constructed as an argument of efficiency rather than justice: choosing the “best man for 
the job” is not only fair, but it also ensures that the end result will be as high-quality as 
possible. Aristotelian meritocracy, on the other hand, is premised upon the assumption
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that choosing the “best man for the job” is fair partly because it ensures that the 
community will ripe the benefits of a high-quality end result.
It is clear, then, that classical formal equality poses a conundrum. It must either 
accept the full consequences of its Aristotelian pedigree or concede that the liberal 
understanding of formal equality amounts to something quite different from what the 
Aristotelian conception is really about. The first possibility is not analytically 
enlightening for obvious reasons. A communitarian version of formal equality would 
render this notion doctrinally indistinguishable from opposing conceptions with which 
the former is supposedly at odds. If the principle of the primacy of the individual can be 
overridden by considerations pertaining to the collective welfare of the community, then 
the way to a more substantive perception of equal treatment is wide open. Philosophical 
differences as to the appropriate definition and scope of this collective welfare will still 
be present in the discourse, but the point is that formal equality will cease to be “formal” 
in any meaningful sense.
The second possibility, however, offers fruitful grounds for reflection with a view 
to clarifying the analytical field on equality. Disengaged from its alleged intellectual 
progeny, a purely liberal conception of equality can make sense in a non-comparative 
context. Resting on the assumption that the allocation of certain rights or obligations is 
independent from interpersonal differences, such a conception requires a normative 
mechanism guaranteeing neutrality with respect to these particular rights or obligations. 
In other words, liberal equality properly understood is a concept closely linked to the 
notion of non-comparative rights. The latter are by nature not subject to degrees. Their 
full enjoyment, therefore, should be ensured for every individual irrespective of any other
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consideration, including but not confined to the usual grounds of gender, race and so 
forth. It follows that the implicit distinction between morally relevant and morally 
irrelevant characteristics is not applicable here, because no human characteristic can have 
moral (or normative) significance insofar as this particular set of rights is concerned.183 
Within these limits, therefore, it is possible to label this conception non-comparative 
formal equality, in the sense that it requires no comparison between persons (or groups) 
to be satisfied.
A paradigm case seems necessary at this juncture, in order to exemplify what non­
comparative formal equality signifies on a normative level. The right to respect for 
human dignity is the evident candidate for this intellectual enterprise. Its character as a 
fundamental human right that should be universally protected is generally uncontested. 
No one has ever plausibly argued that respect for human dignity may be subject to 
degrees, conditions, restrictions, limitations or derogations and this remains true even in 
the most strenuous socio-political circumstances, as in the case of war. Full enjoyment of 
the right is, at least in theory, guaranteed to everyone equally, regardless of gender, race, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, physical or mental ability or political beliefs, but also 
regardless or in spite o f personal life-choices that may have even incurred criminal 
responsibility. This is why the right to human dignity comes as close as possible to the 
notion of inherent or natural rights, in the sense that it is inalienable. For this reason and
183 This proposition has obvious implications for the human rights discourse in general, the most pertinent 
being the resulting dichotomisation o f  rights into inherent and non-inherent or fundamental and non­
fundamental. Such categorisation implies a hierarchy o f  rights which, apart from being theoretically 
controversial, will arguably create a number o f  practical difficulties. This problematic goes beyond the 
limits o f  the present enquiry and can only be adequately addressed in its appropriate context. In any case, 
the potential effects o f this approach on the human rights discourse do not affect its conceptual validity.
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because of its universal scope rationae personae,184 it is often asserted that it is the only 
truly absolute fundamental right.
Even if one is inclined to generally reject the idea of absolute rights on 
philosophical grounds,186 the meaning of absolute in this context may easier to defend as 
being very modest in its ambitions. What it connotes in the light of non-comparative 
formal equality is merely that the right should be protected in absolute terms, without the 
need to measure personal characteristics or situations against one another. This by no 
means entails that there is universal consensus on the appropriate content of the right. 
Whether female genital mutilation or the obligation to wear the headscarf constitute an 
affront to human dignity or not is highly debatable. Both camps of advocates, however, 
declare their unassailable commitment to human dignity. There is no serious dispute over 
whether human dignity can be lawfully limited or over whether it applies differently to 
men and women.
Equal treatment with regard to the right to human dignity, therefore, seems to fit 
perfectly in our proposed liberal construct of non-comparative formal equality. No 
interpersonal comparison is necessary - or even permissible - to determine whether, how 
and to what extent this right should be enjoyed. Any differentiation in the state’s attitude 
towards persons or groups in relation to human dignity would constitute unlawful 
discrimination and, hence, a violation of the principle of equal treatment.
This brings to the fore the cardinal issue of the relationship between this 
conception of equality and non-discrimination. Although it is suggested that “non-
184 In the sense that it is guaranteed for everyone equally and without any qualifications.
185 Arguably the right not to be tortured could fall under the same category, but it would seem ironic to 
even rehearse the arguments in favour o f this view in the era o f  Guantanamo and Abu Grab.
186 Suffice it to say here that the hierarchy implicit in the distinction between absolute and non-absolute 
rights has never been accepted in the jurisprudence o f national or international courts.
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comparative formal equality” offers a more succinct and accurate account of what liberal 
equality stands for than the traditional notion of “formal equality”, the proposed 
alternative is, admittedly, not capable of avoiding the normative “thinness” of which its 
philosophical predecessor has been accused. It is not difficult to see why. If non­
comparative formal equality is satisfied only when every person is treated identically 
with regard to a particular right or obligation, then the principle of equal treatment 
appears to collapse into non-discrimination. What is usually perceived, therefore, as the 
fundamental flaw of formal equality is also present in the alternative conception 
introduced here. A principle that has primarily negative functions (prohibition of 
discrimination) seems insufficient to guarantee that persons or groups are genuinely equal 
to one another in any meaningful respect. From a different perspective, if equal treatment 
is premised upon the sole fact that persons share a “common humanity”,187 then equality 
is in itself an “empty concept”.188 In this view, if an individual is a deprived of the full 
enjoyment of the right to human dignity, this constitutes a direct violation of the said 
right rather than a violation of equal treatment.
These remarks, however, even if correct, do not have any bearing on the analytical 
validity of the notion of non-comparative equality proposed here. The purpose of the 
latter is descriptive; it is an attempt to provide an intelligible framework of “purely” 
liberal equality, one that will clearly distinguish it from opposing conceptions,189 with a 
view to determining, at the end of the day, what is or should be the appropriate 
understanding of equality in a European normative context. And if classical formal
187 Williams, B. (1962). The Idea o f  Equality. Philosophy. Politics and Society P. Laslett and W. G. 
Runciman, Blackwell. 2nd Series.
188 Westen, P. (1982). "The Empty Idea o f  Equality." Harvard Law Review 95(3): 537-596
189 Which may still fall within or be closely linked to the generic category o f  liberal thought.
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equality fails to convince of its usefulness in this regard, due to its over-ambitious 
character, non-comparative formal equality commits no such mistake. Its analytical 
claims are simple and straightforward and they are compatible with a particular 
philosophical strand within the human rights discourse, one that ascribes the quality of 
inalienability to certain rights and labels them as absolute.190 Whether or not it is 
philosophically appropriate to discuss these rights in terms of equality in the first place is 
a different matter.
To put it plainly, the term non-comparative formal equality accurately describes a 
conception of equality that may be erroneous in one or more respects191 but that operates 
in a specific context and is context-dependent. It is possible, then, to argue that non­
comparative formal equality constitutes the appropriate understanding of equal treatment 
only within this context - of non-comparative rights, such as the right of respect to human 
dignity for instance - and that this will not be the case when a comparison of personal 
situations is necessary to maintain equality of treatment. By having a narrower scope of 
application than classical formal equality, therefore, the notion of non-comparative 
formal equality is more concrete and, hence, more coherent.
To sum up, non-comparative formal equality rejects by default positive action as a 
legitimate means to achieve equality, even in the form of an exception to equal treatment. 
Gender (or race and so on) should never, in this view, be relevant as a criterion to 
determine how two persons should be treated. Criminal law is, arguably, the prime field 
where this conception seems to have resonance with normative reality. In this context
190 And, o f  course, one that understands the function o f human rights to be the protection o f  individual 
autonomy vis-a-vis the state. See Fredman, S. (2005). "Changing the Norm: Positive Duties in Equal 
Treatment Legislation." Maastricht Journal o f  European and Comparative Law 12(4): 369-398.p. 370.
191 The objections to this particular notion o f  equality will be thoroughly discussed at a later stage.
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equality before the law is generally understood in non-comparative terms. Differences in 
personal situations are irrelevant when it comes to attributing criminal responsibility, 
although they may still be decisive when weighing the actual penalty.192 This is another 
indication that non-comparativeness does not amount to or entail absoluteness.
The question, of course, is whether such a notion can also underpin our 
understanding of equal treatment or equality before the law in other normative areas, 
where positive action is an issue. Within the existing EU legal framework it is evident 
that a conception of equality rejecting positive action altogether has no place. With the 
inclusion of article 2 (4) in the Equal Treatment Directive, positive action has been added 
since the mid-70s to the legal arsenal of the Member States in the battle against 
inequalities in the workplace. When Article 141 (4) was incorporated into Treaty law at 
Amsterdam, the possibility of adopting or insisting on a theory of equality that labels 
positive action as “unfair” or “discriminatory” is no longer available. Although the Court 
is in a privileged position to interpret the relevant provisions narrowly and diminish their 
effectiveness, it cannot but accept and uphold the legitimacy of positive action in 
principle.
A final remark should be made in this connection. When it comes to positive 
action, classical formal equality obfuscates the discourse: it is seen as representing a 
“symmetrical” approach,193 which is incompatible by default with any form of positive 
action, while at the same time claiming to be the offspring of Aristotelian thought, which 
has been proved to be problematic. Non-comparative formal equality, on the other hand, 
does not assert that positive action is unjustifiable across the normative field, because it
192 Despite its famous classical depiction, it seems that Justice is not totally blind after all.
193 Fredman, S. (1999). After Kalanke and Marschall: Affirming Affirmative Action. The Cambridge 
Yearbook o f  European Legal Studies - Volume One. 1998. A. Dashwood and A. Ward, Hart., at p. 200.
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does not wield a claim for the whole of the normative field. It follows that non­
comparative formal equality can be reconciled or coexist with opposing conceptions of 
equality, insofar as there is no overlap in their respective scopes of application.
4.1.2 Unqualified equality o f  outcomes.
The notion of equality of results is generally thought to occupy the opposite end 
of the analytical spectrum. If formal equality is about form and process, equality of 
outcome is concerned with “where people end up rather than where or how they 
begin”.194 The underlying assumption is that vast inequalities in outcomes can almost 
never be proven to stem from divergence in preferences, tastes or genuine choices. If this 
is true, that is if individuals do not bear personal responsibility, then these unequal 
outcomes echo some sort of unfairness. The latter may be the result of inequality of 
opportunities available at the original position195 or of inequality of burdens imposed by 
stereotypical social attitudes towards certain groups of the populace. Inequality of 
opportunities, therefore, can be classified as purely individualistic, in the sense that it 
reflects differences in personal circumstances and capacities, whereas inequality of 
burdens refers to the dissimilar obstacles posed to members of different groups due to 
stereotypical social attitudes that rest on unjustified presumptions.196 In any case, the 
relations produced do not qualify as relations of equality under this conception and they 
require corrective normative measures aiming at rebalancing the state of affairs.
Much like classical formal equality, however, the notion of equality of outcome is 
analytically unclear. The main reason is its ambiguous relationship with what is usually
194 A. Phillips, supra no. 23, at p .l.
195 In which case choices are not really genuine.
196 The latter, then, is an index o f  institutionalised indirect discrimination.
termed substantive equality. Although the conceptual affinity between the two is 
undeniable, suggesting that equality of outcome is merely the “strictest” form of 
substantive equality does not really account for the significant qualitative differences 
between the two. These become palpable in “hard” cases, where the adoption of one point 
of view rather than the other not only determines the dispute at hand, but also defines the 
appropriate normative scope of equality law. Positive action is the exemplification of 
such “hard” cases. Whether or not certain types of positive measures are justified under 
the generic category of substantive equality depends on the specific nuance of substantive 
equality at work. It is, therefore, useful to attempt a dichotomisation of substantive 
equality into two clearly distinct analytical categories, termed unqualified equality of
* 107outcomes and qualified substantive equality respectively.
The first of these categories can, indeed, be defined as the altera pars o f non­
comparative formal equality, in that it unequivocally accepts the legality of positive 
action in principle as an essential component of equal treatment. In this view positive 
action does not constitute a state of exception; it is a redistributive mechanism - 
redistributive of resources and, ultimately, power - designed to ensure that relationships 
of equality are maintained both at the starting point of the distributive process and after 
its end. It goes without saying that equality, then, is measured in terms of results rather 
than in terms of due process - and this is exactly why the difference between unqualified 
equality of outcomes and qualified substantive equality should be understood as a 
qualitative (equality of what or at what stage) rather than a quantitative one (what degree 
of equality or equalisation). Strict quotas, designed to give preference to members of
197 The category o f  qualified substantive equality will be discussed further below.
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under-represented groups without any further qualification or condition, are not only 
legitimate or justified but also necessary to attain the balance dictated by equality.
Positive action in politics can, indeed, serve as a paradigm case of what 
unqualified equality of outcomes stands for. The analysis that follows will hopefully 
allow us to distinguish this notion from its more closely linked counterpart - and ally - on 
the equality discourse, namely qualified substantive equality. From a methodological 
point of view the way to determine the semantic differential between or among opposing 
conceptions of equality with respect to positive action is to identify the strictest form of 
quota (or of any other, possibly less “invasive”, positive measure) that is justified by each 
one.
In this regard, it is submitted that unqualified equality of outcomes accepts the 
legality of quotas in favour of female (or ethnic minority) candidates for elected political 
office guaranteeing that the elected body will consist of such candidates in a fixed 
minimum percentage. Positive action of this sort can take the form of either a 
straightforward quota system as described above198 or of all-female shortlists, insofar as 
the latter guarantee that a female (or ethnic minority) candidate will definitely be 
elected.199 It must be underlined that the percentage of minimum guaranteed participation 
in the elected body does not necessarily need to accurately reflect the composition of the 
electorate. In other words, unqualified equality of outcomes may secure a minimum
198 Such a system cannot operate in cases o f  “first past the post” electoral systems that allow for a single 
candidate per constituency per political party (given that every constituency returns a single seat).
199 This will be the case only if  all political parties are under a legal obligation to employ all-female 
shortlists. It should be noted that the well-known British example o f  the late 90s involved the voluntary 
establishment o f such measures in specific constituencies by the Labour party and did not, therefore, 
constitute a compulsory legal requirement.
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female participation of 25% or 35%, despite the fact that women represent, by and large, 
half o f the electorate.200
The case of positive measures in politics, notwithstanding its inherently 
controversial character, is the most appropriate context in which to contemplate the 
modus operandi of unqualified equality of outcomes. The notion of merit therein is by 
default relative, as it is not construed according to the same “objective” standards as in 
employment. Considerations of the merit of individual candidates cannot circumvent, put 
into question or delegitimise the free and genuine choice of the people in a representative 
democracy. Of course it is desirable to end up with office-holders that possess the highest 
level of skills and qualities, but it is even more desirable and, in fact, absolutely crucial to 
end up with elected representatives that are fully aware of their mandate and their 
political role within a democratic system of governance.
Unqualified equality of results incorporates this rationale and posits the additional 
assumption that the imbalance in representation of specific social groups in elected public 
bodies can be neither logically explained nor legally justified. However counterintuitive 
this may sound, the Aristotelian connection between equality and justice is pertinent here 
as well. Under-representation corresponds to an infringement of the principle of equality, 
which in turn amounts to a violation of the fundamental principle of justice in a 
democratic context. Positive action, therefore, is legitimate insofar as it is necessary to 
ensure that the distribution of political power is not the product of unbalanced 
institutional structures of domination.
200 Obviously this does not exclude the possibility o f  a quota ensuring the highest possible percentage o f  
participation, which cannot in any case exceed 50%. The French “parity” model appears to come closer to 
this threshold, although it is not inspired by the notion o f  unqualified equality o f  outcomes for reasons that 
will be explained later on.
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The application o f such a notion of equality in politics exposes its philosophical 
weaknesses. From a liberal perspective the obvious critique is that it completely 
disregards the primacy of the individual by favouring specific candidates over others. 
This, however, seems to be a moot point, given that an argument coming from an 
opposing point of view on equality is bound to be circular. The main problem with 
unqualified equality of outcomes lies with its innate essentialism. Presupposing that 
female voters can only be properly - or, at least, better - represented by female office­
holders amounts to a conception of social representation premised on false assumptions 
about women’s collective interests or convictions.201 The very idea of a unitary theory of 
equality that can account for the “collective” interest of all women does not resonate with 
modem feminist thought202 In view of the multiplicity of ethnic minorities in European 
societies, the same appears to be true from the point of view of race equality as well.203
Along the same lines, unqualified equality of results is guilty of infantilising parts 
of the population by assuming that they are not politically mature enough to make 
informed decisions as to their choice of representatives. This idea of “immature” voters in 
need of external “guidance” sounds unduly paternalistic, if not extremely dangerous. 
Stretched to its conceptual limits it appears to negate the very foundations of direct 
participation through elections in a democratic system of governance.
From a perspective of democracy this problem affects, in fact, the whole of the 
electorate. Results quotas in political elections entail that the section of the population 
intending to vote or actually voting for female or minority candidates is treated more
201 Mouffe, C. (2005). The Return o f  the Political. Verso., pp. 76-78.
202 Cornell, D. (1990). "The Doubly-Prised World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine." Cornell Law Review  
75(3): 644.
203 Mutatis mutandis this argument applies to all under-represented social groups that may have a legitimate 
positive action claim.
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favourably than the section of the population wishing to vote or actually voting 
otherwise. The latter either have their set of options curtailed, as in the case of all-female 
shortlists, or see their choice “count for less”, as in the case of a guaranteed minimum 
percentage of representatives from specific social groups.204
In view of these complexities the realm of political representation seems 
inappropriate to accommodate a notion of unqualified equality o f outcomes. In pragmatic 
terms, though, what should be noted is that European law does not take a stance on the 
legality of positive action in politics, as the normative scope of the relevant provisions is 
limited to employment and the definition of the latter does not encompass, in the 
Commission’s view, elected office holders.205 The legitimacy, then, of all-female 
shortlists or results quotas is - primarily if not exclusively - a matter of national law and, 
in this regard, there may be substantial divergence across the Union. Thorough analysis 
of domestic legal systems is necessary in order to provide a definitive answer on this 
matter. An admittedly superficial overview of positive law, however, is in itself enough 
to offer a preliminary conclusion: positive measures of this sort may be justified only as a 
matter of exception to equal treatment, with everything that this entails.
What remains to be examined is whether and how unqualified equality of 
outcomes can be applied in the field of employment. This would involve a quota in 
favour of under-represented groups in certain areas of employment to the effect that 
positions in these areas would be filled by a minimum number of members of these
204 The argument here refers to the possibility o f  female or minority candidates being elected with an 
overall smaller percentage o f  the vote compared to other candidates (not belonging to under-represented 
groups).
205 Most Member States’ governments and national authorities, including the UK, seem to support the view  
that positive action in politics falls outside the scope o f  Community law.
206 Most importantly that the exception should be narrowly interpreted and that there should be a clearly 
defined time frame for the operation o f  such measures, probably in the form o f a sunset clause.
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groups regardless of qualifications. The semantic differential between unqualified 
equality of outcomes and the other conceptions of the substantive equality “genre” lies 
precisely in this last element.207 Professional qualifications are immaterial when it comes 
to the application of this strict quota. Individual merit, in other words, cannot override the 
need for equal treatment, as viewed through the lens of unqualified equality of outcomes.
It goes without saying that such a quota could not be justified as a matter of 
Community law as things stand at present. Even if the principle of the primacy of the 
individual is not construed in such a way as to effectively preclude strict quotas in 
general, the legality of the latter, according to the Court, depends on the existence of a 
proviso allowing for interpersonal comparisons of qualifications between or among 
candidates. Regardless of how exactly the relevant provisions are or should be interpreted 
by the Court, it seems rather improbable that positive action can lawfully operate in a 
normative framework without any reference to merit whatsoever.
Apart from positivist arguments against such a possibility, one must also consider 
the implications on the collective welfare of the wider community. Leaving merit entirely 
out of the picture seems irrational, given that the beneficiary o f preferential treatment 
must be at the very least capable of performing the job adequately. Although the 
threshold of what counts as “adequate” may, of course, vary with regard to the particular 
occupation and the potential risk the community may have to undertake as a result,208 it is 
difficult to accept that equal treatment may amount to a complete disregard of individual 
abilities. Any conception o f equality that claims to have practical social value must be
207 The analytical categories o f  qualified substantive equality and substantive equality o f  opportunities will 
be discussed further below.
208 In this respect, the threshold o f  a neurosurgeon’s “adequacy” may be higher than that o f  a research 
assistant at a University, on the basis o f  the divergent levels o f  risk involved in each occupation for both the 
individuals at the receiving end and the society as a whole.
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able to defend itself against “levelling-down” arguments. In the present context this 
means that the possession of a minimum level of professional ability must feature as a 
criterion in the selection processes for any employment post in order to avoid what is 
colloquially referred to as a “race to the bottom”. If this is the case, however, that is if the 
favoured candidate should be at least sufficiently qualified to perform the tasks at hand, 
then the underlying conception of equality cannot be what we defined as unqualified 
equality of outcomes,209 but should rather fall under the category of qualified substantive 
equality.
4.1.3 Qualified substantive equality.
Having conceded that both unqualified equality of outcomes and qualified 
substantive equality belong to the large “family” of substantive equality, our first task at 
this point should be to confirm that this analytical distinction of the two proposed 
categories is fully justified. To this end it will be useful to follow the same methodology 
and examine qualified substantive equality by reference to positive action in politics first, 
so that the differences with the previous notion of equality become patently clear from 
the outset.
Qualified substantive equality accepts the legality o f quotas in favour of under­
represented groups in elections for political office requiring that each party electoral list 
is comprised to a minimum percentage by members of these groups. Contrary to 
unqualified equality of outcomes, the compulsory quota here does not guarantee that any 
number of minority candidates will actually be elected. Its aim is to ensure that an
209 The fact that quotas in favour o f  sufficiently qualified candidates have been declared incompatible with 
Community law by the Court in the case o f  Abrahamsson (see infra) does not affect the theoretical validity 
o f  the point made here.
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adequate number of such candidates will be put to the public vote. The underlying 
assumption is quite similar to the one guiding the previous notion of equality: if certain 
social groups are excluded from or severely under-represented in elected decision-making 
bodies, the only plausible explanation appears to boil down to institutional indirect 
discrimination.
The main difference, however, with unqualified equality of outcomes is that this 
quota system has no bearing on the public’s exercise of the right to vote. The “one 
person, one vote” principle is here fully respected, since the quota does not apply at the 
deciding stage of the process. In this case it is only the individual white male (potential) 
candidates who did not make it to the party’s electoral list that bear the “cost” of the 
quota and not the electorate as a whole. Qualified substantive equality, therefore, is less 
problematic with regard to democracy.
A quota system of this sort, focused solely on gender, has been adopted in its 
most straightforward formulation by Greece with respect to municipal elections.210 The 
latter provides that the parties’ electoral lists should be comprised by members of each 
sex to a minimum of 1/3 of the total party candidates. As already explained, positive 
measures in politics seem to fall outside the remit of Community law altogether. As a 
result, the legality of schemes of the Greek variety cannot be put into question for the 
time being. What is more controversial and, hence, particularly interesting for the present 
enquiry is the application and consequences of qualified substantive equality in the field 
of employment and the types of positive action that it justifies therein.
Coming now to the area of employment, it is easier to identify how qualified 
substantive equality operates with the relation to the competing conceptions and, indeed,
210 See infra, chapter 7.2.1.
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explain the choice of terms. It is substantive equality because it accepts the legality in
• 911principle of preferential treatment to equally or even fully  qualified members of under­
represented groups within a specific employment cadre. Merit, in this regard, is not the 
sole criterion of selecting the appropriate candidate, as in the case of non-comparative 
formal equality. At the same time, however, it is qualified equality because there are 
conditions under which the merit principle can be overridden. Quotas are legitimate only 
insofar as they allow for interpersonal comparisons of individual candidates. Merit, in 
other words, is still a necessary condition for appointments or promotions, but is not a 
sufficient condition in itself to ensure equality of treatment.
The key to understanding the place of positive action in the context of qualified 
substantive equality is through reference to the notion o f fu lly qualified candidates. It is 
submitted that candidates fulfilling all the essential requirements listed in the job 
description for a particular position are deemed to be fully qualified to perform the tasks 
involved. A quota system, then, that allocates preference to a fu lly qualified candidate 
from a target group is justified under this conception of equality. The gender or race of 
the potential appointee becomes a relevant factor in the selection process after it has been 
established that the candidate is meritorious213 and that there will be no significant losses 
in terms of performance quality.
Such a system has been the object of judicial scrutiny by the ECJ in the case of 
Abrahamsson. Although this case will be extensively discussed later on in this chapter,214 
it should be noted at this point that the Swedish quota system in question was rejected by
211 The difference between these two will be explored in detail in the final chapter o f  this thesis.
212 Or any o f  the other personal characteristic used to identify target groups for positive action schemes.
213 And, o f course, provided that the group to which this candidate belongs is under-represented.
214 See below, chapter 4.2.4.
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the Court as incompatible with Article 141 (4) and the Equal Treatment Directive. 
According to the taxonomy proposed here, then, it is evident that, according to the case- 
law as it stands at present, only flexible result quota schemes pass the legitimacy test of 
the ECJ. In other words, what is described here as a qualified substantive equality 
approach has not as yet been adopted by the Court in any of its rulings. This is no 
coincidence, as the underlying rationale of EU equality law is thought to reflect an equal 
opportunities model, to the examination of which we now turn.
4.1.4 Formal equality o f  opportunities.
The discourse on equal opportunities is vast and complex. The classical “equal 
opportunities” notion - if, indeed, one can be identified - is guilty of over-inclusiveness 
and lack of certainty. It shares the same conceptual grounds with non-comparative formal 
equality in accepting the primacy of the individual and the liberal principle of state 
neutrality, but it acknowledges the need to “level the playing field” in view of existing 
inequalities stemming from discrimination. Deviations from state neutrality, then, are 
permissible for a limited period of time, until the goal of “equal opportunities” has been 
achieved. This model, however, fails to give any more specific guidelines as to the 
appropriate extent of state intervention and it does not contain a metric system that would 
allow an objective assessment of its own success. In other words, any “moderate” theory 
of equality can qualify as “equality of opportunities”, despite the vast differences that 
may exist in the determination of what constitutes a truly “level playing field”. For these 
reasons it has been deemed necessary, in the present context, to break down the generic
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category of equal opportunities into two analytical categories, in order to properly 
account for philosophically and normatively significant nuances therein.
Formal equality of opportunities can be summarised as follows: gender or race 
may be used as legitimate criteria of selection with a view to “levelling the playing field” 
for all individual candidates. Justice is not “blind” to personal differences - as it is 
supposed to be under non-comparative formal equality - insofar as these differences 
produce a restricted set of valuable options216 for members o f certain social groups.217 
Positive action, therefore, may be legitimate in its softer forms, such as targeted 
professional education or programmes of professional orientation, in order to facilitate 
access of disadvantaged social groups to the full set of options available to the non­
disadvantaged social majority.
Under this conception of equality it is obvious that positive action in politics in 
the form of compulsory quotas cannot be accepted. It may be possible to allow strategies 
designed to raise public awareness on equality issues with regard to political 
candidatures218 or programmes aimed at enhancing the opportunities of potential 
candidates from disadvantaged groups to put themselves forward in the party selection 
proceedings. But a quota system, designed to reserve places for individual members of 
the target group at any stage of the candidate selection process goes beyond what is 
permissible, because it is thought to achieve results rather than manage access to 
opportunities.
215 Although formal equality o f  opportunities shares some conceptual affinity with non-comparative formal 
equality, especially with regard to the primacy o f  the individual, it is clearly distinguished from the latter as 
it requires interpersonal comparisons.
216 Gardner, J. (1998). "On the Grounds o f  her Sex(uality)." Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 18(1): 167- 
187., at 170.
217 Under this liberal view it is the state that determines what counts as a valuable option.
218 Such as information campaigns etc.
109
In the field of employment positive action is, again, acceptable in principle as a 
mechanism to address inequalities, albeit under strict conditions. Softer forms of positive 
action will be legitimate, insofar as it can be proved that they are designed to address 
existing inequalities in the access to or distribution of opportunities. Quota systems, 
however, are in principle understood as going beyond the legitimate regulation of equal 
opportunities.
Theoretically, a tie-break rule allocating preference to an equally qualified 
member of an under-represented group might pass the threshold of legality, as it could be 
argued that the final choice between candidates of equal merit is effectively a matter of 
ensuring equality of opportunities. Even if this argument were to succeed, quota systems 
would still be faced with a very high threshold of legality. Justifying the use of quotas 
would involve an obligation to provide statistical data showing evidence of a pattern of 
favouring male candidates over equally qualified female candidates.219 It would not be 
enough, therefore, to rely on the mere fact that any particular group is under-represented, 
because the presumption that under-representation is due to discrimination does not 
suffice here. In fact, this presumption is, in a sense, reversed: the legislator has a burden 
to prove that, in the absence of the quota, there will be no equality of opportunities.
This “reversal of the burden of proof’ is explained by reference to the theoretical 
underpinnings of the notion examined here. Since formal equality of opportunities is 
conceptually committed to the primacy o f the individual, what must be demonstrated is 
that the individual beneficiary from the under-represented group in a specific selection 
procedure would be deprived from her right to enjoy equality of opportunities. Arguably,
219 Or white candidates over ethnic minority candidates.
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the reason the Court struck down the Kalanke quota scheme was exactly the insufficient 
degree of individualisation factored into the system.
4.1.5 Substantive equality o f  opportunities.
The second category within the umbrella concept of equality o f opportunities 
takes a more “substantive” turn. For this reason it is necessary to distinguish it clearly 
from the two competing notions of qualified substantive equality, on the one hand, and 
formal equality of opportunities on the other.
Starting with the former, it must be noted that the key assumption underlying 
substantive equality of opportunities is the same as in qualified substantive equality. 
Under-representation of specific groups in employment or elected public offices stems 
from institutionalised indirect discrimination. This assumption operates in favour of the 
legality of positive action, including flexible quotas. In other words, a system designed to 
allocate preference to an individual member of the target group is in principle legitimate 
under both notions of equality, insofar as it provides for the possibility of an ad hoc 
reversal of the quota on grounds of individual circumstances. This is the common 
“substantive” element of the two notions.
What tells these two notions apart, however, is, above all else, their commitment 
to different ideas about the role of equality legislation and the degree of permissible state 
intervention within a liberal theoretical framework. For qualified substantive equality 
“levelling the playing field” will not always be enough. The principle of equal treatment, 
in this view, should take into account not only present opportunities but also past and 
present obstacles that members of a particular social group have come up against when
I l l
trying to build up their set of qualifications that count as merit. As a result, preference to 
a member of an under-represented group may be legitimate even if the individual 
beneficiary is not the most meritorious candidate in absolute terms.220
Substantive equality of opportunity, on the other hand, remains unassailably 
committed to the primacy of the individual. State intervention can only go so far as to 
ensure fair access to opportunities for all individual and social groups. Any interference 
in the selection process itself, however, goes beyond the limits o f what is permissible. 
Merit as a criterion for selection, therefore, cannot be overridden. And it must be pointed 
out that, with quota systems allocating preference to equally qualified candidates from 
the target groups, the merit principle does apply throughout the selection process and is 
not actually overridden. The quota is triggered only after the application of the merit 
principle has proved insufficient to determine the outcome of the process, given that the 
result it produced was a tie.
On the same basis - albeit from a different perspective - substantive equality of 
opportunities is also distinguished from formal equality o f opportunities. The latter, as 
explained earlier, is particularly sceptical towards quota systems, which could only be 
allowed in exceptional circumstances and under very strict conditions. Substantive 
equality of opportunities, on the contrary, takes a more relaxed view, because it posits 
that flexible quotas o f the tie-break type do not violate the merit principle and are in 
principle a legitimate exception to the principle of equal treatment.
By and large, this approach has been adopted by the ECJ in Marschall and Badeck 
and seems to reflect the dominant interpretation on the position of positive action under 
European equality law.
220 This was the case with the Abrahamsson system, which was, o f  course, struck down by the ECJ.
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4.2 Positive Action in the European Union: The Jurisprudence of the ECJ and the 
Meaning of “Full Equality”.
It is a commonplace to observe that positive action has been at its most prominent 
in the field of employment. Apart from reasons of historical significance and political 
contingency, pertaining to the particular socio-political climate that gave birth to the 
concept in the United States, the principal explanation is a functional one and should be 
sought in the human condition of the post-industrial revolution era: men and women of 
our times tend to devote to their professional occupations the “best” part of their lives, 
not only in quantitative but also in qualitative terms. Work is no longer merely a means 
of subsistence for the poor and a “noble” pastime for the rich; it is rather the privileged 
social locus for the exercise of personality-related rights, the development of the self, the 
pursuit o f ambitions and, ultimately, the affirmation of a plan of life that reflects an 
individual conception of happiness and personal fulfilment. It should be no surprise, then, 
that achieving “full equality” in the workplace is a primary objective of every modem 
democratic society and that positive action litigation before the ECJ in the field of 
employment has been gaining momentum.
Long before the inclusion of an explicit reference in the Treaties, art. 2 (4) of the 
Equal Treatment Directive introduced officially the concept of positive action into 
secondary Community law as a mechanism to ensure that equal treatment would be more 
than a paper obligation for the Member States. The objective of this provision was to
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introduce an exception to the principle of gender equality in employment221 for national 
measures aiming to promote “equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by 
removing existing inequalities” 222 The wording chosen by the drafters is telling: equal 
treatment is understood as formal equality, along the lines of the well-known “treating 
likes alike” maxim, and provisions that deviate from this rule can only be justified if they 
address an actual gender gap in opportunities.
Conceiving of positive measures as exceptional in nature sets the tone for the 
interpretive margin available to the Court of Justice. Although the Court has, on more 
than one occasion, proven that its creative activism is enough to overcome obstacles 
posed by legal formalism and transform the face of Community law, it is beyond doubt 
that exceptions must be interpreted narrowly. In this regard, it is not surprising that 
Judges and Advocate Generals have found it difficult - at least initially - to come to terms 
with the “exciting” new possibilities for anti-discrimination law opened by article 2(4) of 
the Directive.
4.2.1 The early case law: Reluctance and caution.
The early case law of the Court involved the remit of this provision and the types 
of national measures that were permitted. 223 More importantly, however, these cases 
illustrate the prevalent understanding of the theoretical relationship between positive 
action and the principle of equal treatment. In Commission v. France the Court ruled that
221 Enshrined in article 1 o f  the Directive.
222 Art 2(4) Directive 76/207.
223 Generally on the early ECJ case-law on positive action and its impact on Member States see also 
Veldman, A. G. (1999). Preferential treatment in European Community Law: Current Legal Developments 
and National Practices. Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives. T. Loenen and P. R. 
Rodrigues, Kluwer Law International., pp. 279-294.
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the exception of article 2(4) was “specifically and exclusively designed to allow measures 
which, although discriminatory in appearance, were in fact designed to eliminate or 
reduce actual instances of inequality that might exist in the reality of social life”.224 The 
French legislation in question that implemented the Directive permitted collective 
agreements to include provisions “granting special rights to women” with a view to 
achieving the goal of effective equality between the sexes as envisaged in the Directive. 
The Court’s reasoning in striking down the French law is quite revealing: incompatibility 
with the Directive was the result of the generality of the French implementing provisions 
and the absence of an appropriate mechanism to review them periodically.
According to the Court, the French government failed to demonstrate that the 
“generalised preservation of special rights for women”226 fell within the ambit of the 
Directive as a justified deviation from formal equality. As observed in paragraph 14 of 
the judgment “some of the special rights preserved relate to the protection of women in 
their capacity as older workers or parents - categories to which both men and women may 
equally belong”. It seems, then, that the Court is implicitly using an effectiveness test 
here that the French provisions do not satisfy, insofar as they are not specifically 
designed to address actual instances of inequality between men and women. Without 
engaging in a detailed analysis of the issue, the Court employs the traditional 
“comparator” logic of the non-discrimination discourse but it does so with the objective 
of assessing the legitimacy of the positive measure. In other words, favourable treatment 
to female workers is unjustified, if male workers are in similar situations, which is the
224 Case C-312/86, Commission v. France Republic [1988], ECR 6315, para 15.
225 Commission v. France, para 4. These rights included, among others, extension o f  maternity leave, 
shorter working hours for female employees above a certain age and additional days o f  annual leave and 
“extra points for pension rights” for working mothers.
226 Commission v. France, para 14.
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case when using age or parenthood as the criterion of allocation. Despite appearances, 
then, this reasoning is formally compatible with the basic underlying rationale of positive 
action that requires some form of disadvantage caused by discrimination in identifying 
the target groups.227 What strikes one as particularly odd, however, is that the Court 
avoids considering whether older female workers were in practice equally disadvantaged 
as the male comparator. By simply asserting that this may be the case, the Court appears 
to be dwelling in its own virtual reality.
When dealing with the temporal dimension of the scheme in question the Court’s 
understanding of positive action’s modus operandi becomes clear. Positive action under 
the Directive is a temporary derogation form the principle of equal treatment with a view 
to achieving genuine equality of opportunities. A prerequisite for the legitimacy of such 
derogation is the existence of a legal mechanism that will allow for a periodic 
reassessment of the necessity to maintain special treatment for the target group. The goal 
is the return to formal equality as soon as possible. In the French situation the “special 
rights” were afforded through collective agreements228 and it was left to the two sides of 
industry to determine, through further collective negotiations, whether and when positive 
action was no longer necessary. The Court dismissed this “delegation” o f decision­
making as incompatible with the primary state obligation imposed by the Directive, 
namely to ensure the removal of all instances of gender discrimination in labour relations. 
The significance of using equal treatment as a counter-argument to positive action cannot 
be overstated. Positive action is dealt with here as a legal anomaly, a special case of
227 It follows from this interpretation o f  the Court’s reasoning that the outcome o f  the case might have been 
different, i f  the French government had proved that older fem ale workers were at a disadvantage - 
stemming from discrimination - compared to their male counterparts.
228 Which were signed before o f  the entry into force o f  the Directive.
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reverse gender discrimination that can only be functionally justified for a limited period 
of time and with the constant scrutiny of the state. In the arsenal of anti-discrimination 
laws positive action is a “nuclear bomb”: it may be necessary to win the war, but it is 
nonetheless a feared and loathsome weapon.
The Court’s reluctance to endorse a more substantive notion of equality was even 
more apparent in the famous Kalanke judgment.229 A German regional law with a tie- 
break clause in favour of equally qualified female candidates in sectors where women 
were under-represented was found to contravene the Directive. According to the Court, 
article 2(4) should be understood as a “derogation” from the right to equal treatment and, 
as such, it should be narrowly interpreted. Again the linguistic choices of the Court are 
very illuminating. Paragraph 16 of the judgment seems to be very informative as to where 
the Court’s loyalties lie: “A national rule that, where men and women who are candidates 
for the same promotion are equally qualified, women are automatically to be given 
priority in sectors where they are under-represented, involves discrimination on grounds 
o f sex” [emphasis added]. It is clear that the Court is particularly wary of positive action 
as reverse discrimination, in tandem with the relevant literature. Paragraphs 22 and 23 cut 
a long story short and unequivocally explain that the Directive aims at ensuring equality 
of opportunities rather than equality of results. National rules that overstep this boundary, 
therefore, will fall outside the permitted exception.
Insofar as this statement reflects a theoretical possibility, it is nothing more than a 
trivial reaffirmation of the undeniable need to set limits to the use of gender (or any other 
morally irrelevant characteristic) as a criterion of benefits allocation, even when used for 
“benign” purposes. Few would disagree with the validity of such an assumption, which is
229 Kalanke
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why most proponents of substantive equality are keen on distinguishing “their” notion of 
equality from what is usually termed equality of results or equality of outcome. This is 
not, however, what Kalanke is really about. The German scheme in question involved the 
use of a “soft” quota, one designed to favour only equally qualified candidates of the 
under-represented sex. The Court attempted to refine the rationale used in its previous 
case law by bringing into play the concept of meritocracy. Simply put, the main concern 
is that no individual male candidate should bear the cost of past discrimination against 
women. As a result, automatic preference to the female candidate will amount to 
unjustifiable reverse discrimination, exactly because there will allegedly be no room in 
the selection process to take into account the personal circumstances of the competing 
individual candidates. In this regard, measures that deviate from the principle of 
individual merit at the decision stage will not be covered, according to Kalanke, by the 
article 2(4) exception.
This judgment can easily be characterised as a particularly weak specimen of legal 
reasoning and it has rightfully attracted a good deal of harsh criticism.231 The Court 
applied its theoretical construct of permissible positive action to a tie-break quota system 
that allowed preferential treatment to the female candidate only after it had been 
established that she was equally qualified to her male competitor. How can, then, 
preference in such a case be regarded as automatic, when the system provides for a full 
assessment of the candidates’ qualifications prior to triggering the “gender” tie-breaker?
230 Phillips, supra no. 23.
231 Peters, A. (1996). "The Many Meanings o f Equality and Positive Action in Favour o f  Women under 
European Community Law - A Conceptual Analysis." European Law Journal 2(2): 177-196.; Prechal, S. 
(1996). "Case C-450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] ECR 1-3051." Common Market Law 
Review 33(6): 1245-1259.; Szyszczak, E. (1996). "Positive Action After Kalanke." Modem Law Review  
59(6): 876-873..
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In what way is the male candidate treated unfairly when gender is used as a criterion of 
last resort, instead of tossing a coin to decide who would get the job, as some egalitarian 
theorists would have it?232
The answers to these rhetorical questions become even more obvious given that 
the German provision applied only to sectors where women were under-represented. In 
other words, far from being a means to compensate for past discrimination, the positive 
measure in question here was a direct response to “existing inequalities” in working life 
between men and women, in accordance with both the language and the spirit o f the 
Directive. In a further attempt to eschew the real issue the Court finds the measure guilty 
of seeking “to achieve equal representation of men and women in all grades and levels 
within a department”, which amounts, in the Court’s view, to substituting “for equality of 
opportunity as envisaged in Article 2(4) the result which is only to be arrived at by 
providing such equality of opportunity”.233 In view of the facts o f the case the assumption 
that the German law aimed at “equal representation of men and women” seems 
completely unfounded, at least insofar as “equal representation” is understood in strictly 
numerical terms. The objective of the law was not to achieve a perfect male-female ratio 
in all areas of employment, but to rectify situations of substantial under-representation of 
women that could not be attributed but to discrimination.
Advocate General Tesauro, however, was apparently not convinced that under­
representation of women in certain employment sectors was the existing direct or indirect 
result of discrimination. In his Opinion, which appears to have been quite influential in
232 Incidentally, the Court is clearly not inspired here by an egalitarian rationale. It is, therefore, not 
necessary to elaborate on why the strictly egalitarian version o f  a tie-breaker is not more plausible in terms 
o f  fairness than the positive action response.
233 Kalanke, para 23.
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determining the outcome of the case, he wonders: “[M]ust each individual’s right not to 
be discriminated against on grounds of sex [...] yield to the rights of the disadvantaged 
group, in this case women, in order to compensate for the discrimination suffered by that 
group in the past?” What this sophistry fails to account for is the ongoing anomaly of 
certain social groups, in this case women, being currently under-represented in particular 
areas of the employment field. If such under-representation cannot be logically and 
legally justified, then it constitutes an inequality that requires corrective legislative 
intervention. What should be the sole point of judicial concern, then, is whether the 
specific means o f redressing this anomaly complies with the requirements of the principle 
of proportionality.
Advocate General Tesauro, however, does not stop there. In an epitome of 
contradiction he goes on to state that formal equality is not enough to secure the objective 
of “full gender equality in working life”, although he firmly believes that the German 
system is incompatible with the Directive. In his own words “ [fjormal numerical equality 
is an objective which may salve some consciences, but it will remain illusory and devoid 
of all substance unless it goes together with measures which are genuinely destined to 
achieve equality”.234 If one were to take this observation at face value, one would reach 
the conclusion that the German law breaches art 2(4) of the Directive because it is not 
radical enough! Indeed, Advocate General Tesauro adds to the confusion even further 
when he asserts in paragraph 28 of his Opinion that “[wjhat is necessary above all is a 
substantial change in the economic, social and cultural model which is at the root of the 
inequalities.” How then the German law, rather than being a first step to the right
234 Opinion o f  AG Tesauro, para 28.
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direction, was regarded as incompatible with the purposes of the Directive is truly beyond 
comprehension.
4.2.2 Marschall and the return to “logic
The judgment in Kalanke produced more reverberations than fierce academic 
responses. Given that a tie-break rule - probably the “softest” form of preferential 
treatment - was found to contravene the Directive, the legality of all positive measures 
was under suspicion. The Commission was, thus, forced to intervene and issued a 
Communication on Kalanke,235 where it attempted to appease the fears by “clarifying” 
the Court’s rationale. In this respect, the Communication emphasised that the German 
law was struck down only because it provided for women to be promoted over men in an 
absolute and unconditional way.236 Fortunately, it was not long before the Court was also 
able to partially redeem itself for the legal atrocity that was Kalanke and to come up with 
a more plausible interpretive solution to the conundrum of positive action. Another 
German case, Marschall237 offered the Court the perfect opportunity to review Kalanke 
without “losing face”.
In Marschall the German regional law under scrutiny was, on the face of it, not 
very different from the one struck down in Kalanke. It provided for preferential treatment 
to equally qualified female candidates in the higher echelons of a career bracket where 
women were under-represented. The difference that caught the Court’s eye, however, was 
the saving clause: priority would be given to the female candidate “unless reasons
235 COM (96) 88.
236 Barnard, C. (1998). "The Principle o f  Equality in the Community Context: P, Grant, Kalanke and 
Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows?" Cambridge Law Journal 57(2): 352-373., at p. 364-366.
237 Marschall
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specific to an individual [male] candidate tilt the balance in his favour”.238 This proviso 
was deemed by the Court enough to ensure that the selection process permitted for an ad 
hoc consideration of the candidates’ individual circumstances. In this regard, the 
preference afforded to women under this scheme could not by any standard be classified 
as “absolute” or “unconditional”.
What is of particular importance in Marschall is that the Court proceeded to 
examine the conditions for the validity of saving clauses themselves. This was no 
coincidence as a different Advocate General this time was much more “sympathetic” to 
the positive action cause. Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion engaged in a 
thoughtful analysis o f how the saving clause might become an instrument to negate the 
intended effects of positive action. He pointed out that, if not treated with care, saving 
clauses might have “the result that the post will be offered to the male candidate on the 
basis of criteria which are accepted as discriminatory”.
The Court, probably eager to make amends for Kalanke, was quick to agree. In 
paragraph 33 of the ruling it states that the criteria against which individual 
circumstances are measured must not be “such as to discriminate against female 
candidates”. It is quite obvious that the Court is now fully aware of the possibility to use 
saving clauses in order to effectively “empty” the positive measure from any real 
meaning. This would be the case if “individual circumstances” were interpreted widely, 
so as to bring stereotypical generalisations about male and female abilities through the 
back door.
238 C. Barnard, supra no. 236.
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Marschall was, thus, hailed by many pro-equality lawyers and theorists as a 
landmark decision, evidencing a shift in the Court’s attitude towards equality. Rigid 
commitment to formal equality was, in this view, abandoned in favour of a more 
substantive approach that would put the legitimacy of, at least, “soft” quotas beyond any 
doubt.240 A closer look at the relevant literature 241 and at Marschall itself, however, 
proves that the initial surge of optimism might not have been entirely justified. What 
need to be underlined here is that the outcome in Marschall could have been exactly the 
same even under an “equality of opportunities” approach - especially if understood as 
“substantive equality of opportunities”. The German quota in question was carefully 
designed this time so as to be defensible against the “reverse discrimination” type of 
argument - more so than the Kalanke quota. In this regard, the case cannot constitute an 
accurate measure of where the Court’s allegiance lies on the equality front.
Evidence to that is the fact that the principal focus in the analysis of Marschall 
has been the saving clause and the Court’s attempt to insulate it from any indirectly 
discriminatory effects rather than the confirmation of the legitimacy of “soft” quotas. The 
former is, indeed, the only irrefutable indication of a possible change in the rationale of 
positive action cases. It is, nonetheless, not a very strong indication: by suggesting that 
saving clauses must be non-discriminatory the Court merely re-states the obvious and 
applies the general gender equality rule enshrined in the Directive. The essence of the 
Kalanke formula, namely that the preference must not be automatic or unconditional,
239 Cabral, P. (1998). "A Step Closer to Substantive Equality." European Law Review 23(5): 481-488.
240 Veldman, A. (1998). "The Lawfulness o f  Women’s Priority Rules in the EC Labour Market." Maastricht 
Journal o f  European and Comparative Law 5(41: 403-414
241 C. Barnard and B. Hepple, supra no. 22, p. 583; Clayton, A. (1998). "Hellmut Marschall v. Nordrhein- 
Westfalen: Has Equal Opportunity Between the Sexes Finally Found a Champion in European Community 
Law?" Boston University International Law Journal 16(2): 423-450., pp. 441-447.
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remains untouched, only this time it is interpreted in a much more reasonable and narrow 
way. To infer from this, though, that substantive equality “won the battle” is a logical 
leap that does not correspond to reality, especially since the Marschall quota was 
particularly straightforward and well within the scope of the Kalanke formula.
On the contrary, the Court continues to advance from an “equality of 
opportunities” starting point, as stated explicitly in paragraph 25 of the judgment, which 
is clearly juxtaposed to what the UK and French governments term “equality of 
representation”242 and is most commonly referred to in the literature as “equality of 
results”. The general feeling stemming from Marschall is that the Court treats the 
provisions of secondary Community law under scrutiny with cautiousness. It shows 
deference to the Commission’s opinion on the matter as expressed in the Communication 
after Kalanke, but it refuses to go any further than necessary within the then existing legal 
framework. Positive action was still conceived of as a derogation from equal treatment 
and, despite wishful thinking to the contrary, this is not what the “substantive” approach 
stands for.
With Marschall it became obvious that, if there was to be a real shift towards 
substantive equality, the next move had to be made by the political institutions. The 
impending “constitutional” reform in Amsterdam ensured that the political climate was 
appropriate to foster more “radical” legislative initiatives with a view to solidifying the 
social dimension of the European project. Gender equality was now top of the agenda, 
with gender mainstreaming about to become a guideline for all Community policies. In 
this context positive action was bound to be seen in a different light and be regarded as an 
integral part of this more pro-active approach to achieve equality in the workplace,
242 Marschall, para 16.
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especially since it carries with it symbolic connotations that break with a long tradition of 
formal equality.
4.2.3 The “revolution” o f  Amsterdam: Article 141 (4) EC and the “Badeck test”.
What can be singled out as the most important recent development in the field of 
European equality law is the explicit inclusion of positive action in the Treaty. The new 
paragraph 4 of Article 141, inserted at Amsterdam, reads as follows: “With a view to 
ensuring fu ll equality in practice between men and women in working life, the principle 
of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting 
measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the 
underrepresented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate fo r  
disadvantages in professional careers” [emphasis added]. The phrasing of the article 
eloquently reflects the long-awaited “fresh” approach to gender equality: the term fu ll 
equality in practice can be nothing less than a loud and clear message that there exists 
another “version” of equality, which is theoretical and, hence, illusory. Under­
representation, either as a proxy to locate disadvantage or as disadvantage in itself when 
it is the result of discrimination, is now a key factor in determining the rationae personae 
scope of permissible positive action. Last but not least, positive action is not only a 
means to prevent inequalities but also a compensatory mechanism for disadvantages that 
are attributable to past or present discrimination.
On the face of it the new provision appeared to be wider in scope than article 2 
para 4 of the Equal Treatment Directive. It was not long after the signing and ratification 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam that Article 141 para 4 provided the legal basis for litigation
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before the Court of Justice. In Badeck?43 the Court had the chance to clarify the new legal 
position and explore the relationship of the latest addition to the Treaty with the 
equivalent existing provision of the Directive. The case, once again coming from 
Germany, involved public service rules that gave priority to women in promotions, access 
to training and recruitment. Such priority, however, was neither automatic nor 
unconditional: it was only allowed in sectors of the public service where women were 
under-represented, when the female candidate was equally qualified to her male 
counterpart and only if no reasons “of greater legal weight” that might tilt the balance in 
favour of the male candidate were put forward. According to the German government 
these reasons “of greater legal weight” concerned “various rules of law [...],which make 
no reference to sex and are often described as social aspects”.244
The first issue that needs to be addressed here, then, is the relationship between 
the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive and Article 141 (4) EC. The Court 
explicitly stated that Article 141 (4) EC will come into play only if the national positive 
measures were found to be prohibited under article 2 of the Equal Treatment Directive.245 
This finding, which was further confirmed in Abrahamsson,246 seems to imply that 
Article 141 (4) is “broader and more permissive”247 than article 2 of the Equal Treatment 
Directive. Although such a conclusion is well rooted in paragraph 14 of Badeck, there are
243 Badeck op. cit.
244 Badeck, para 34. In paragraph 35 the Court describes that, according to the official German position, 
there were “five groups o f  rules which justify overriding the rule o f  advancement o f  women”. In view o f  
these rules there are five categories o f  cases that take priority over positive action in favour o f  women: 
“[FJormer employees in the public service who have left the service because o f  family work”, “persons 
who for reasons o f  family work worked on a part-time basis and now wish to resume full-time 
employment”, “former temporary soldiers”, “seriously disabled persons” and long-term unemployed 
persons.
245 Badeck, para 14.
246 Abrahamsson.
247 Craig and DeBurca, supra no. 154, p. 916.
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no other guidelines in the judgment as to the actual scope of the Treaty provision and the 
extent o f the corresponding state obligations. Perhaps the Court was far too eager to 
examine the substance of the case and consciously avoided to engage with a delicate 
theoretical exercise in dealing with such a complex point of law.
The Badeck positive action system amounted to what is usually described as a 
“flexible result quota”.248 In paragraph 28 of the judgment the Court itself attributes two 
main characteristics to this system: it does not “determine quotas uniformly for all the 
sectors and departments concerned” and it “does not necessarily determine from the 
outset - automatically - that the outcome of each selection procedure must, in a stalemate 
situation where the candidates have equal qualifications, necessarily favour the woman 
candidate”. Technically speaking, however, it should be noted that the term quota is not 
used here in its literal sense. Promoting an equally qualified female candidate constitutes, 
indeed, a form of preferential treatment, but it is not a quota per se,249 given that the 
position is not, strictly speaking, set aside for members of the under-represented group.
It goes without saying that the “flexible result quota” system in principle passes 
the Marschall test with flying colours. The material scope of the provisions is very 
precise so that preferential treatment is available only in areas or sections of the 
employment field where one sex is under-represented. It is not enough that women in 
general may have been, as a group, victims of past or ongoing discrimination resulting in 
their under-representation in the public sector as a whole. Female candidates are only
248 Caruso, D. (2003). "Limits o f  the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union After the New  
Equality Directives." Harvard International Law Journal 44(2): 331-386., p. 341.
249 McColgan, A. (2005). Discrimination Law: Text. Cases and Materials. Hart Publishing., p. 161. For a 
“genuine” quota system see infra, chapter 7.2.1.
250 Ferber, M. (1997). "In Defense o f  Affirmative Action." Industrial & Labor Relations Review 50(3): 516- 
518.
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“eligible” for this “special” benefit insofar as they are situated within a bracket where 
inequality in representation of the sexes is an undeniable fact - and one that can only be 
attributed to indirect or institutional discrimination. On top of that, the system possesses 
an elaborate saving clause that leaves open the possibility for an equally qualified male 
candidate to counter the tie-breaker.
Although Badeck provoked a new surge of enthusiasm from pro-equality 
lawyers and theorists that regarded it as evidence for a shift from formal to substantive 
equality,251 its alleged radicalism has been significantly overplayed. The Court refined 
the Marschall test in order to adapt it to the requirements of Article 141 (4) but, in reality, 
the link from Kalanke to Marschall to Badeck remained unbroken.252 Badeck confirms 
that “soft” quotas are permissible in principle and maybe proves that Member States can 
now feel confident that carefully designed positive action schemes will survive the 
scrutiny of the Court. Once again, however, the Court was not faced with a hard case: if 
positive action is a contentious issue that calls for elaborate theoretical exercises in legal 
reasoning, Badeck was a let-off. As with Marschall, the quota in question here would 
pass the threshold of legality even against the theoretical backdrop of substantive equality 
o f opportunities.
The explicit reference to substantive equality, then, as a legitimate state objective 
may be welcome, but its implications are symbolic rather than normative. Accepting the 
legitimacy of selection criteria that “are manifestly intended to lead to an equality which 
is substantive rather than formal” is not enough to guarantee anything more than the
251 N. Burrows and M. Robison, supra no. 18.
252 This link is cleverly characterised by Fredman as an “individualistic straitjacket”. See Fredman, supra 
190, p. 390.
253 Badeck, para 32.
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abandonment of strict or non-comparative formal equality. This, however, begs the 
question whether Badeck has anything to add to our existing understanding of the 
concepts involved, given that the rejection of “strict formal equality” can be directly 
inferred from Article 141 (4) without the need to engage in a thorough or deep 
interpretation.
What appears to be more interesting, however, is the second question of the 
preliminary reference, concerning the “special system” providing for binding targets for 
female participation in the academic service. According to the Court this part of the 
reference “essentially asks whether Article 2(1) and (4) o f the Directive precludes a 
national rule which prescribes that the binding targets of the women's advancement plan 
for temporary posts in the academic service and for academic assistants must provide for 
a minimum percentage of women which is at least equal to the percentage of women 
among graduates, holders of higher degrees and students in each discipline”.254
The language of the national rule was bound to create suspicions as to its 
compatibility with the underlying rationale of equality of opportunities, since the term 
binding targets appears to be directly linked with equality of results. Indeed, the male 
applicants in the main proceedings argued that the aim of the rule was to “achieve a 
defined result” of sex representation in the specified employment areas255 and the 
German Land Attorney agreed, adding that the quota system in question had “no 
individual purpose” and was not “linked to a specific disadvantage encountered by 
women in their working and social lives”.256
254 Badeck, para 39.
255 Badeck, para 40.
256 Ibid.
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On the face of it, then, the German rule seems to be too deterministic and 
insufficiently individualistic to pass the Marschall test. Although the saving clause 
applies throughout the system, the logic of this particular positive measure is such that 
priority will be given to female candidates not only when women are under-represented 
in absolute terms. Since the binding target is not a fixed one but depends upon the actual 
numbers of female degree-holders in the discipline, the conception of under­
representation at work here allows for a gender group to be treated preferentially even 
when its members constitute the 60% or 70% of the total number of employees in the 
specific employment area.257 What is more, the rule prescribes that the minimum 
percentage of the binding target should be at least equal to the actual number of degree- 
holders from the gender group. It follows that the desired level of representation aimed at 
by this scheme may, theoretically, be even higher than the percentage of female degree- 
holders 258
Despite these considerations, the Court found the rule compatible with the 
provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive. The reasoning was uncharacteristically 
brief: “As the Advocate General observes [...] the special system for the academic sector 
at issue in the main proceedings does not fix  an absolute ceiling but fixes one by 
reference to the number of persons who have received appropriate training, which 
amounts to using an actual fact as a quantitative criterion fo r  giving preference to 
women. It follows that the existence of such a special system for the academic sector
257 Provided, o f  course, that the number o f  degree-holders from this gender group is even higher.
258 In reality, however, this is highly unlikely. Despite the ambiguous phrasing, the spirit o f  the rule in 
question seems to imply that the target could be higher than the number o f  female degree-holders only if  
the latter is significantly lower than that o f  the male degree-holders. Since such a difference cannot be 
logically attributed to lack o f  talent in a particular gender group, it is presumed that it stems from indirect 
or institutionalised discrimination.
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encounters no specific objection from the point of view of Community law” [emphasis 
added].259
Although this part of the Court’s ruling has not attracted as much attention as its 
answer to the first - and, arguably, more important260 - question related to the “general” 
positive action scheme, its significance must not be overlooked. For this may, in fact, be 
the first time in the history of positive action litigation before the ECJ that the Court 
breaks with tradition and disregards its own precedent in order to take a radical step 
forward in the interpretation of Community equality law. It is, therefore, necessary to 
examine the legal reasoning used here more closely.
The first thing to note is, undoubtedly, the flexibility of the rule as perceived by 
the Court: regardless of the actual percentage opted for in any given time or situation, the 
legal provision contains no specific reference to an optimum number. Instead, it 
establishes an objective metric system to calculate this optimum in concreto. This 
objectivity is guaranteed by the use of an “actual fact [namely the number of degree- 
holders from each gender group] as a quantitative criterion”. If it is accepted that “merit” 
in this context is generally reflected in the possession of a degree, then there is no 
plausible reason why the number of female employees in the academic sector should not 
reflect the number of degree-holders in the same discipline. In addition to that, it must be 
remembered that the flexible quota only applies to equally qualified candidates, which 
entails that the University degree is not necessarily the only determining factor of merit.
259 Badeck, paras 42 and 43.
260 Because o f  the fact that the first question involved the legality o f  the “general” positive action scheme, 
whereas the second question referred to a “special” aspect o f  the scheme, applicable only to particular posts 
within the academic sector.
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Also, the preference afforded to the female candidate cannot be classified as either 
automatic or unconditional, since the proviso of the general scheme remains in effect.
In view of these remarks, then, how and why is the Court distancing itself from its 
previous case-law? The question is, in fact, a theoretical one that takes us back to the 
discussion on the analytical categories of equality. It is evident that the Court links the 
absence of a fixed  ceiling with the notion of equality of opportunities (as opposed to 
equality of results): the pool of potential applicants - that is, all those who are in principle 
qualified261 to stand as candidates - does not necessarily consist of equal numbers from 
each gender group in every particular discipline. Although this may be due to a plethora 
of reasons,262 what matters in the Court’s view is the objectivity of the quantitative 
criterion. In other words, a fixed ceiling of 50% - calculated on the basis of the rough 
male / female ratio in society - does not satisfy the objectivity requirement, because in 
any given discipline the number of potential female candidates may vary substantially. 
The compatibility of the German system with Community law, then, lies exactly in the 
fact that it allows for a calculation that is “sector-sensitive”, taking into account the 
“natural” anomalies in gender representation across the employment field - anomalies, 
that is, which may be attributed, for instance, to different levels of interest in a specific 
discipline from the members of each gender group.
If this analysis is correct, the Court’s reasoning appears to be in tandem with its 
previous case law. It aims at establishing a normative platform upon which opportunities 
can be allocated without discrimination when the pool of potential applicants has already 
been determined on the basis of (equal) merit. Since the personal scope of the national
261 In this case, all degree-holders within each discipline.
262 Which may be instrumental in determining the plausibility o f  the claim discussed here, as it will, in fact, 
be proven in the course o f  the next few paragraphs.
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rule itself covers only equally qualified candidates, the Court stops short from making an 
evaluative judgement as to how this equal merit is arrived at and whether gender 
discrimination suffered by a gender group before entering the labour market can be 
legitimately compensated at the stage of selection for a particular post. In other words, 
from a substantive equality perspective the crucial issue not addressed in Badeck is 
whether national positive action schemes can go so far as to favour relatively less 
qualified candidates from the under-represented gender group, on grounds of 
discrimination in the process of acquiring qualifications.
4.2.4 The limits ofpermissible quotas: Abrahamsson and the primacy o f  merit
The first serious test in this regard came in Abrahamsson263 The case involved a 
Swedish regulation for appointments to teaching posts in higher education institutions,264 
which provided for preference to sufficiently qualified candidates of the under­
represented sex. It follows that, according to the system in question, preference can be 
given to less qualified female candidates under the proviso that the difference in 
qualifications between the male and the female candidates “is not so great that 
application of the rule would be contrary to the requirement of objectivity in the making 
of appointments” 265 Mr Anderson and Ms Abrahamsson, two candidates for a 
professorial position at the University of Goteborg, challenged the legality of the positive
263 Abrahamsson op. cit.
264 Forordningen (1995:936) om vissa anstallningar som professor och forskarassistent vilka inrattas i 
jamstalldhetssyfte [Swedish Regulation concerning certain professors' and research assistants' posts created 
with a view to promoting equality]. This regulation was premised upon Article 15a o f  Chapter 4 o f  the 
Hogskoleforordningen (1993:100) [Swedish Regulation on universities], as in force until 1998, which 
“establishes a specific form o f  positive discrimination for cases where a higher educational institution has 
decided that such discrimination is permissible in the filling o f  posts or certain categories o f  posts with a 
view to promoting equality in the workplace” (Abrahamsson, para 9).
265 Abrahamsson, para 9.
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action scheme that enabled the selection board to offer the vacant academic post to a third 
female candidate, Ms Fogelqvist. Although the latter was sufficiently qualified, she was 
neither the most qualified candidate for the job nor equally qualified to the male 
applicant. In fact, Ms Fogelqvist came in third in the assessment process, behind Mr 
Anderson who came second and in front o f Ms Abrahamsson who ended up fourth.
Unlike all previous cases brought before the Court, the Swedish rule here was not 
of the tie-break type. What is equally interesting, from either a symbolic or a pragmatic 
point of view, is that one of the applicants this time was female. Before exploring the 
significance of this oddity in the context of European equality law any further, it is 
essential to have a closer look at the reasoning of the Court and examine its consistency 
with already set interpretive principles and practices.
First of all, one must note that the Court in Abrahamsson fully confirms its 
previous findings, in Badeck, as to the functional relationship between Article 141 (4) EC 
and the provisions of the Equal Treatment Directive. In other words, interpretation of the 
former will only be necessary - or, in fact, permissible according to the Court’s phrasing - 
if “Article 2 of the Directive precludes national legislation of the kind there at issue”.267 
Once again, however, it is rather unclear what the actual differences between the two 
provisions are. The ambiguity is all the more obvious in this case, since the Court found 
the Swedish provision to be incompatible with the Equal Treatment Directive and went 
on to discuss it in the light of Article 141 (4). In doing so it remained frustratingly
266 The (female) candidate who came in first in the assessment o f  the selection board, Ms Destouni, 
withdrew her application after the selection board had recommended her appointment to the Rector o f  the 
University. In placing Ms Destouni top o f  the list the selection board expressly took into account the 
Swedish regulation at a second stage o f  assessment and reversed the initial result, according to which the 
male applicant, Mr Anderson, was deemed to be marginally the most qualified candidate.
267 Abrahamsson, para 40.
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cryptic: it considered it to be “enough to point out that, even though Article 141(4) EC 
allows the Member States to maintain or adopt measures providing for special advantages 
intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers in order to 
ensure full equality between men and women in professional life, it cannot be inferred 
from  this that it allows a selection method o f  the kind at issue in the main proceedings 
which appears, on any view, to be disproportionate to the aim pursued"’ [emphasis 
added].268
This conclusion leaves us none the wiser. A national measure that fails the 
standard proportionality requirement will anyway be prohibited, but this is a similarity 
rather than a difference between the two provisions. Although it is clear - more so than in 
Badeck - that Article 141 (4) EC is more permissive than the Equal Treatment 
Directive,269 the Court appears unconvinced that any system similar to the Swedish one 
would pass the Badeck test. If this is the case, it is difficult to see any positive measures 
stricter than the tie-break type passing the high threshold of legality set in Abrahamsson, 
especially since the Swedish rule at issue was designed in such a way as to guarantee 
maximum gender equality gains with minimum efficiency losses by limiting its rationae 
personae scope to sufficiently qualified candidates.
What needs to be underlined, however, is that the Court is not explicit in rejecting 
non-tie-break positive measures altogether. When it refers to “a selection method of the 
kind at issue in the main proceedings”, it emphasises that the Swedish rule gave, in the 
Court’s view, automatic preference to candidates of the under-represented sex subject 
only to an inadequate and ambiguous proviso, namely that the difference in individual
268 Abrahamsson, para 55.
269 Otherwise it would be pointless to examine the national measure in light o f  Article 141 (4) after having 
determined its incompatibility with the Equal Treatment Directive.
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970  •merit was not significant enough to eschew the objectivity of the selection process. It is 
exactly this automatic character of the system that renders it incompatible with 
Community law, as it directly fails to satisfy the first condition of the Badeck test. Stricter 
quota systems, then, may still be legitimate, as long as they include a saving clause that 
allows for personal circumstances of individual candidates to be taken into account at the 
all stages of the selection process.
Although this analysis offers a glimmer of hope for proponents of substantive 
equality, the crux of the matter remains that the Court takes a very formalistic and narrow 
view of the Badeck test in Abrahamsson. It asserts that the assessment of the 
qualifications of candidates under the Swedish system is not “based on clear and 
unambiguous criteria”271 without explaining why this is the case. It thus seems to 
implicitly accept that gender cannot be used as a legitimate tie-breaker between or among 
sufficiently qualified candidates, because in such a situation not all individual 
circumstances - which render candidates sufficiently but not equally qualified for the 
position all things considered - are taken into account. This, however, contradicts the 
Court’s own conclusion that, in principle, certain factors such as seniority can be 
legitimately left out of the equation because they tend to be indirectly discriminatory 
against the under-represented sex 272
If one reads paragraph 50 together with paragraph 42 of the judgment, then, one is 
left with the impression that the problem lies with the lack of clarity of the national rule. 
Such a convenient claim cannot be fully substantiated in view of the description of the 
Swedish system in the first paragraphs of the judgment. In reality, Abrahamsson begs the
270 Abrahamsson, para 52.
271 Abrahamsson, para 50.
272 Abrahamsson, para 42, where further references to Badeck.
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question whether the Court, when presented with the chance, was willing to tamper with 
the substantive equality o f  opportunities approach at all. Despite using the language of 
qualified substantive equality, most notably when reiterating principles that have 
emerged in previous case law,273 there is no corresponding interpretive shift, nor any 
indication that the fate of stricter quota systems will be any different in the future.
From a substantive equality point of view the main issue should be whether 
preference to a sufficiently qualified candidate from the under-represented sex impairs the 
basic prerequisites of fairness and equal treatment. Such analysis, which is strikingly 
missing from the reasoning, should be performed in the context of the spirit o f the 
relevant Community law provisions and with a view to producing the interpretation that 
would best serve their clear and unequivocal objectives.
4.2.5 Beyond employment quotas: the Badeck approach in Griesmar, Lommers 
and Briheche.
Although the Badeck formula is primarily designed to apply to quotas in 
employment, it is also reflective of the Court’s general attitude towards the relationship 
of positive action to the principle of equal treatment. This is evident in three relatively 
recent judgments that seem to confirm the approach taken in Badeck and extend it to 
situations where the benefit involved is not appointment or promotion.
In Griesmar274 the Court had an opportunity to apply the Badeck formula to the 
selective allocation of a social benefit only to female employees, through a system
273 Paragraph 48 o f  the judgment reads as follows: “The clear aim o f  such criteria is to achieve substantive, 
rather than formal, equality by reducing de facto  inequalities which may arise in society and, thus, in 
accordance with Article 141(4) EC, to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in the professional career 
o f  persons belonging to the under-represented sex”.
274 Case C-366/99, Griesmar v. Ministre de l’Economie [2001], EC R 1-9383
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designed to offset occupational disadvantages of women. Article L 12(b) of the French 
Civil and Military Retirement Pensions Code275 provided that female civil servants with 
children were entitled to a service credit added to their pension for each of their children, 
biological or adopted. The French government argued that this was a legitimate form of 
positive action in favour of women, as its aim was to address “disadvantages which 
[women] incur in the course of their professional career by virtue of the predominant role
9 7  f \assigned to them in bringing up children”.
The Court, however, was not convinced and found that the legislation in question 
could not be justified under Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive. Its line of 
reasoning is refreshingly straightforward. The first stage is to determine whether the 
situation of female employees that benefit from the pension credit is comparable to that 
of male employees that are not eligible for the credit.277 As the Court shrewdly observes, 
this depends on whether the system is designed to offset occupational disadvantages that 
stem from childbirth, which is a uniquely female condition, or occupational
97Rdisadvantages related to the upbringing of children, which is not. After deciding that 
the French legislator had clearly opted for the latter rather than the former,279 the second 
stage of the Court’s reasoning consisted in examining whether male civil servants could
275 Code des pensions civiles et militaires de retraite as amended by Law N o 64-1339 o f  26 December 1964 
(JORF o f  30 December 1964).
276 Griesmar, paragraph 51.
277 Ibid, paragraph 46.
278 The underlying rationale o f  this dichotomy is that childbirth is a uniquely female condition and, as a 
result, a scheme designed to address childbirth-related disadvantages is not positive action. For a more 
detailed analysis see infra, chapter 11.3.1.
279 The decisive factor for the Court was that the scheme covered adopted  children, thus being decoupled 
from occupational disadvantages related to maternity per se. See Griesmar, paragraphs 52 and 53.
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legitimately be excluded from the benefit, even if they were in a comparable situation to 
that o f female beneficiaries.280
The answer to this rhetorical question is provided by the application of the Badeck 
formula itself. Automatic exclusion of male civil servants from the scheme on grounds of 
gender is not compatible with the Equal Treatment Directive, simply because a male 
employee may be “in a position to prove that he did in fact assume the task of bringing up 
his children”.281
In Lommers the Court was called upon to scrutinise a Dutch scheme enacted by 
the Ministry of Agriculture, whereby a limited number of subsidised nursery places were 
reserved for female employees. Male employees could, as a matter of exception, take 
advantage of the scheme in “emergency” situations to be determined by the 
administration.283 The stated aim of the scheme was to tackle severe under-representation 
of women among the ranks of the Ministry staff, which was thought to be partly due to 
the lack of adequate and affordable nursery facilities.284
Although the factual setting was similar to that in Griesmar, this time the 
conclusion was different. The Court held that the difference in treatment on grounds of 
gender established by the scheme was a legitimate form of positive action under the 
Equal Treatment Directive, insofar as it satisfied the standard criteria of legality. Most 
important among these was the proviso that male employees could also take advantage of 
the prescribed benefit in “emergency” situations. This proviso, therefore, should be
280 Craig and De Burca, supra n. 154, p. 896.
281 Griesmar, paragraph 57.
282 Case C-476/99 Lommers [2002] EC R 1-2891.
283 Schutter, O. D. (2007). Positive Action. Cases. Materials and Text on National. Supranational and 
International Non-Discrimination Law. D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell, Oxford, Hart Publishing., p. 
818.
284 McColgan, supra n. 249, p. 166.
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interpreted by the authorities in such a way as to ensure that male employees who were 
solely responsible for the upbringing of their children would be eligible for the benefit
7 0 c
under the same conditions as working mothers.
Finally, in Briheche286 the object of review was another French piece of 
legislation. Law No 2001-397287 exempted certain categories of women, including 
“widows who have not remarried”,288 from the maximum age limit of 45 years for 
obtaining access to public sector employment.289 Mr Briheche, a male widower who had 
not remarried, challenged this provision after his application to sit a competitive 
examination organised by the Ministry for the Interior was rejected on the ground that he 
did not fulfil the age requirement.290
The Court was quick to reiterate the Badeck formula291 and examine whether its 
conditions were fulfilled. Agreeing with the observations of the Commission, it went on 
to conclude that the provision at issue “automatically and unconditionally gives priority 
to the candidatures of certain categories of women [...] excluding widowers who have not 
remarried who are in the same situation”.292 It follows that the scheme in question is 
incompatible with both the Equal Treatment Directive and Article 141 (4).293
285 Case C-476/99, Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij [2002], ECR 1-2891, 
paragraphs 45-46.
286 Case C-319/03 Briheche (Serge) v. Ministere de Pinterieur, de la securite interieure et des libertes 
locales [2004], ECR 1-8807.
287 Law No 79-569 o f  7 July 1979 abolishing the age limit for obtaining access to public-sector 
employment for certain categories o f  women (JORF o f 8 July 1979).
288 Briheche, paragraph 9.
289 See Fredman, S. (2005). "Changing the Norm: Positive Duties in Equal Treatment Legislation." 
Maastricht Journal o f  European and Comparative Law 12(4): 369-398., p.818.
290 Ibid, paragraph 12.
291 Ibid, paragraph 23.
292 Ibid, paragraph 27.
293 Ibid, paragraph 31.
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The analysis of these three judgments illustrates that a relatively consistent 
rationale has emerged. What has been referred to here as the Badeck approach consists in 
three criteria for the legality of positive measures. The measure must be:
• Designed to address a de facto inequality between men and women in 
employment.
• Flexible with regard to the achievement of desired results, so that the 
allocation of the benefit is not automatic.
• Contain a saving clause, so that the allocation of the benefit is not 
unconditional.
The Court explicitly or implicitly refers to each of these criteria in all of the 
judgments.294 All three criteria must be satisfied, if the measure is to pass the Court’s 
scrutiny successfully. The relationship between them, however, and the way each of them 
operates in the reasoning has, with the exception of Briheche,295 proved less 
straightforward than one might have imagined.
In Griesmar, for instance, the Court does not deny the existence of occupational 
disadvantages stemming from both childbirth and upbringing of children.296 The 
distinction between the two categories of disadvantages, though, is crucial for the 
application of the first criterion. In the case of childbirth the ensuing disadvantages
294 See, for instance, on the first criterion paragraph 46 in Griesmar, paragraph 41 in Lommers and 
paragraph 22 in Briheche; on the second criterion paragraph 56 in Griesmar, paragraph 43 in Lommers and 
paragraph 23 in Briheche; and on the third criterion paragraph 57 in Griesmar, paragraph 45 in Lommers 
and paragraph 23 in Briheche.
295 In Briheche the Court does little more than reiterate the Badeck formula and apply it to the facts o f  the 
case in a rather straightforward manner.
296 Griesmar, paragraph 46.
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amount by default to de facto gender inequality. In the case of upbringing, on the 
contrary, this is not necessarily true, even though “female civil servants are more affected 
by the occupational disadvantages entailed in bringing up children, because this is a task 
generally carried out by women” [emphasis added].297 It is, therefore, unclear whether the 
disparate impact identified here is enough to satisfy the first criterion.298 In other words, 
it is not easy to discern from the wording of the judgment whether the fatal flaw of the 
scheme, according to the Court, was down to the unsatisfactory causal link between 
gender and the targeted inequality.
A closer look at paragraphs 56 and 57 of the judgment, however, gives a different 
impression as to the main problem with the French scheme. It seems that the scheme fails 
to satisfy the second and third criteria, so that incompatibility is ultimately due to its non- 
flexible character and the lack of a saving clause. The benefit is allocated automatically 
to female civil servants with children, in the sense that they are guaranteed to receive the 
service credit irrespective of their actual individual circumstances.299 In addition to that, 
the system does not provide for the possibility of an ad hoc extension of the benefit to 
male employees that are in comparable situations with female beneficiaries.300
The question raised here is one of great normative significance. It is a given that 
the absolute exclusion from the scheme of male employees, who are in a comparable 
situation to that of female beneficiaries, cannot be justified. This, however, may be 
interpreted in two ways. It can mean either that a saving clause will suffice to render the 
scheme legitimate or that gender positive action should be abandoned altogether in this
297 Ibid, paragraph 56.
298 See also Barnard and Hepple, supra no. 22, p. 571.
299 Which entails the possibility o f  individual beneficiaries not having actually suffered occupational 
disadvantages in their professional careers.
300 This is a form o f  saving clause by analogy.
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case, because the targeted inequality is, in fact, between employees that are parents and 
employees that are not.
This is closely linked to a second interpretive question. If the French scheme in 
Griesmar fails to satisfy the first criterion, then it would not pass the threshold of 
legitimacy even with the inclusion o f a saving clause. Conversely, if the problem lies with 
the automatic and unconditional allocation of the benefit, then the lack of clarity in the 
Court’s rationale begs the question of levelling-down as a means of complying with the 
operative part of the judgment. By not excluding this route, the Court undertakes the risk 
of a national response that would be neither politically nor legally desirable. Indeed, the 
Griesmar ruling has been heavily criticised as being of doubtful sensibility and burdening 
Member States with “deregulatory constraints”.302
Insofar as determining which of the two approaches the Court has taken, the 
interpretive difficulty may be overcome if one compares the Griesmar line of reasoning 
with that of the Lommers judgment. The inequality that the Lommers scheme was 
designed to tackle is similar to that identified in Griesmar. Both schemes aim at offsetting 
professional disadvantages of working mothers. In Lommers, however, the Court chooses 
much clearer phrasing when describing the Dutch legislation in question. It asserts that 
the scheme “falls in principle into the category of measures designed to eliminate the 
causes of women's reduced opportunities for access to employment and careers and are 
intended to improve their ability to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career
301 Commission v France, para. 14.
302 Caruso, supra no. 248, p. 347.
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on an equal footing with men”.303 This is the case especially since the allocated benefit is 
not places of employment but “the enjoyment of certain working conditions”.304
There is no doubt, then, that Lommers is in line with settled positive action case- 
law and explicitly applies the Badeck formula.305 In view of the factual similarities with 
Lommers, it may be reasonable to assume that the Griesmar rationale was also intended 
to follow Badeck, despite the problematic phrasing. This does not solve the problem 
posed by the possibility of levelling-down, but it does, at least, contribute to legal 
certainty by confirming the Badeck formula as the appropriate test of legality for positive 
action.307
It is, however, interesting to note that the Court in Lommers seems generally more 
sensitive to the potential side-effects of positive action as a mechanism to combat 
inequality in employment. Willing to take account of academic opinion on the matter the 
Court considers whether such measures could inadvertently “also help to perpetuate a 
traditional division of roles between men and women” in society.308 In doing so it ends up 
reinforcing the Badeck approach by suggesting that this danger can, in fact, be avoided 
when a scheme is carefully designed so that it respects the principle of proportionality.309
303 Lommers, paragraph 38.
304 Ibid.
305 This is particularly evident in paragraphs 43-47, where the Court examines whether the scheme allocates 
benefits automatically and unconditionally, according to the second and third criteria identified earlier.
306 It must be pointed out that the latter may simply be a reflection o f  the Court’s view o f the Griesmar 
scheme as identical - or, at least very similar- to that in Commission v. France (1988, op. cit.).
307 Whether or not, however, this is enough to strike the necessary “delicate balance” between “recognising 
realities and perpetuating stereotypes” with regard to traditional gender roles in childcare is doubtful. See 
Barmes, L. and A. W. S. Ashtiany (2003). "Diversity Approach to Achieving Equality: Potential and 
Pitfalls." Industrial Law Journal 32(4): 274-296.
308 Lommers, paragraph 41.
309 Ibid, paragraph 42 et seq.
When scarcity of resources is taken into account,310 a measure such as that in Lommers, 
does not burden male employees more than their female counterparts that were not 
allocated subsidised nursery positions.311 The extent to which this approach is justified 
under the notion of full and effective equality will be examined later on in this thesis with
- j p
reference to the notion of proportionality of concern.
310 Ibid, paragraph 43.
311 Ibid, paragraph 44.
312 See infra, chapter 11.2.
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CHAPTER 5: POSITIVE ACTION AND THE ECHR: “A MEANS TO ACHIEVE 
FULL AND EFFECTIVE EQUALITY”
5.1 Introduction
Ever since its inception on 4th November 1950 the European Convention of 
Human Rights313 has proved to be hugely influential across the spectrum of its 
jurisdiction and one of the most successful international human rights instruments 
worldwide.314 Particularly during the last three decades it has gradually developed into “a 
basis for a European public law”315 that brings European countries together under the 
banner o f rights protection. Along these lines, it has been suggested earlier in this 
thesis316 that the interaction between the Convention and EU fundamental rights law has 
come to produce a common normative platform, termed here the European Legal Order 
of Rights, which is premised on a distinctly European conception of equality. It is, 
therefore, time to place the ECHR system under the spotlight and examine more closely 
where equality and positive action fit in.
A few introductory remarks are necessary in order to justify the analytical choices 
o f this chapter. First, it should be highlighted that the ECHR system deals with equality 
issues primarily in the context of non-discrimination and through the normative lens of
313 Throughout this chapter the terms ECHR and Convention will be used interchangeably to refer to the 
European Convention o f  Human Rights.
314 For a very thorough and comprehensive account o f  the ECHR influence on national European 
jurisdictions see Blackburn, R. and J. Polakiewicz (2001). Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and 
its Member States 1950-2000. Oxford University Press..
315 Jacobs, F. (1992). Human Rights in Europe -  New Dimensions. Paul Sieghart Memorial Lecture British 
Institute o f  Human Rights.
316 See infra, chapter 3.
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Article 14. It is well known that the general principle of equal treatment is textually 
absent from the Convention. Part of the theory has consequently asserted that Strasbourg 
case-law is317 - or, at least, was for quite some time - reflective of “a clear preference for 
formal equality”.318
This approach, however, is erroneous and does not do justice to the vast body of
non-discrimination case-law developed by the Court. Even commentators that identify
non-discrimination with formal equality usually concede that the Article 14 requirement
for an objective and reasonable justification of differentiations in treatment on any of the
110prohibited grounds allows the Court to introduce substantive elements in its reasoning. 
More importantly, the Court has often made explicit references to the principle of equal 
treatment, especially in the form of gender equality, as one of the key principles 
underlying the Convention?20 Especially in recent years there is a growing tendency in 
the literature to identify a gradual general shift of the Court’s interpretative position
171towards a more substantive approach to equality.
Despite this optimistic outlook, it must be bom in mind that the ECHR system 
suffers from inherent and well documented limitations. Article 14 does not provide a
317 Henrard, K. (2000). Devising an Adequate System o f Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights. 
Minority Rights and the Right to Self-Determination. Martinus NijhofF., p. 59 and p. 76.
318 Tarr, G. A., R. F. Williams, et al. (2004). Federalism. Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights. 
Praeger., p. 31.
319 K. Henrard, supra no. 317, at 77.
320 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, Series A, no. 94, § 78; 
Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, 24 June 1993, Series A, no. 263, § 67; Burgharz v. Switzerland, 
22 February 1994, Series A, no. 280-B, § 27; Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, 21 February 1997, Reports 
1997-1, § 39 in fin e; Petrovic v. Austria, 27 March 1998, Reports 1998-11, § 37; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 10 
November 2005, Reports o f Judgments and Decisions 2005-XI, § 115.
321 O’Connell, R. (2009). "Substantive Equality in the European Court o f  Human Rights?" Michigan Law 
Review First Impressions 107(129)., pp. 129-133; Tarr, Williams and Marko, supra no. 318, p. 31.
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free-standing non-discrimination right and “has no independent existence”. As a result, 
the Court on a number of occasions has been known to take the “easy way out” and avoid 
the equality dimension, simply by declaring that no “separate” issue arises under Article 
14 when a complaint under this provision read in conjunction with any of the so-called 
“substantive” provisions of the Convention has already been examined.
Protocol 12 is intended to cure this deficiency by introducing a free-standing right 
to non-discrimination. Ratification by Signatory Parties, however, is optional and any 
legal consequences thereof will translate into justiciable individual claims only against 
those jurisdictions that undertake the relevant obligations. Nonetheless, Protocol 12 does 
make a rather significant contribution to the equality discourse, especially for the 
purposes of the present enquiry. In its Preamble there is an explicit affirmation of positive 
action as a legitimate means to achieve “full and effective equality”. Apart from the 
obvious impact on the title of this thesis, the reference to a notion of fu ll and effective 
equality necessarily implies that the European conception of equality goes well beyond 
the narrow confines of non-discrimination.
The present chapter, then, will explore this distinctly European idea of equality 
further and attempt to determine where positive action fits in. The analysis will be carried 
out through focusing on three key dimensions along which the relationship between 
positive action and equal treatment unfolds within the ECHR system. First, the Court’s 
response to the use of gender quotas by national authorities in the procedures to select 
candidates to serve on the bench of the Court itself. Second, the relationship between
322 Chassagnou and others v. France (Grand Chamber), 29 September 1999, Reports o f  Judgments and 
Decisions 1999-III, § 89.
323 Instead o f  many see Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. UK  (Grand Chamber), 27 September 1999, 29 ECHR 
548, §§ 108-109.
non-discrimination and formal equality in the context of the seminal ruling in 
Thlimmenos, which seems to constitute a benchmark in the interpretation of the equal 
treatment principle within the Convention system. And, third, the importance and 
possible impact of Protocol 12 on the understanding of equality in a common European 
public sphere.
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5.2 Positive Action in Judicial Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights
The Court has had the opportunity to address the issue of positive action directly 
on only one occasion. In 2008 it delivered an Advisory Opinion on the legality o f the 
Parliamentary Assembly’s decision not to consider all-male lists of candidates for 
appointment to the Court submitted by the Contracting Parties. In a nutshell, the Court’s 
conclusion echoes the “standard” European approach on positive action, in line with the 
position of the ECJ on the matter. Positive action is in principle a legitimate means to 
achieve gender equality, but this legitimacy is subject to the measures satisfying certain 
conditions. Most importantly, national authorities have the discretion to introduce such 
measures, but no positive obligation to that effect exists.
Given the particular context in which the matter has arisen, however, the 
reasoning behind this standard conclusion could prove particularly illuminating. This is 
not only because the measures introduced here aim at improving the gender balance in 
the composition of a supranational judicial body. It is primarily because the Advisory 
Opinion, if read properly, gives rise to reasonable expectations that the quota in question 
may soon be amended so that it passes the threshold of legality set by the Court. A more 
thorough analysis of the Advisory Opinion, therefore, and of the arguments that have 
informed the debate is in order.
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5.2.1 Exploring the battlefield: Parliamentary Assembly v. Committee o f  
Ministers.
Judicial appointments to Strasbourg are the shared responsibility of the 
Contracting Parties and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Each state 
is expected to submit a shortlist of three candidates that satisfy the criteria of personal 
competence set out in Article 21 ECHR.324 The Parliamentary Assembly, then, is 
empowered under Article 22 (1) ECHR to confirm the appointment of one of the three 
candidates.325 Since the criteria of Article 21, however, are fairly generic, the Assembly 
has seen fit to lay down a more detailed set of eligibility conditions through a number of 
Resolutions.326 One of the most significant components of the appointment system as it 
currently stands is the interview process, which is carried out by an Ad Hoc Sub­
committee on the Election of Judges to the European Court of Human Rights.
In 2004 the Parliamentary Assembly decided to take active steps towards 
achieving a fairer gender balance in the composition of the Court. For this purpose it 
passed Resolution 1366 (2004),327 which introduced an array of positive measures aimed 
at promoting gender equality on the Strasbourg bench.
The first measure imposed a gender quota on the national governments that draw 
the list of nominees. Paragraph 3 (ii) of the Resolution provides that the Parliamentary
324 Article 21 (1) ECHR reads as follows: “The judges shall be o f  high moral character and must either 
possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults o f  recognised 
competence”.
325 Article 22 (1) ECHR reads as follows: “ 1. The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly 
with respect to each High Contracting Party by a majority o f  votes cast from a list o f  three candidates 
nominated by the High Contracting Party.”
326 O’Connell, R. (2009). "Substantive Equality in the European Court o f  Human Rights?" Michigan Law 
Review First Impressions 107(129)., at 550.
327 Council o f Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1366 (2004), Candidates for the European Court 
o f Human Rights, 30 January 2004.
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Assembly will not consider lists of candidates that do not “include at least one member of 
each sex”.
The second measure consisted in a recommendation to the political groups in the 
Council that appoint the members of the Sub-committee. When nominating their 
representatives of choice the political groups should “aim to include at least 40% 
women”.328 According to the Resolution, this percentage reflects “the parity threshold 
deemed necessary by the Council of Europe to exclude possible gender bias in decision­
making processes”.329
The third and last measure introduced a flexible results quota at the final stage of 
the selection process. Paragraph 4 (iv) of the Resolution provides that “owe o f the criteria 
used by the sub-committee should be that, in the case of equal merit, preference should 
be given to a candidate of the sex under-represented in the Court” [emphasis added].
Alongside Resolution 1366 (2004) the Assembly adopted a Recommendation330 
to the Committee of Ministers, suggesting that the latter should amend Article 22 ECHR 
with a view to “constitutionalising” the gender quota on national authorities imposed by 
Paragraph 3 (ii) of Resolution 1366. This development was hardly surprising. Ever since 
1999 the Assembly had recommended that the Committee of Ministers invited national 
governments to “select candidates of both sexes in every case”331 when drawing up their 
lists of nominees for appointment to the Court.
328 Paragraph 4 (ii), Resolution 1366 (2004).
329 Ibid.
330 Council o f  Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1649 (2004), Candidates for the 
European Court o f  Human Rights, 30 January 2004, 8th Sitting.
331 Council o f  Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1429 (1999), National Procedures for 
Nominating Candidates for Election to the European Court o f  Human Rights, 24 September 1999.
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A year later the Assembly decided to strengthen its equality agenda even further. 
The wording of Resolution 1366, according to which single-sex lists would not be 
considered, did not allow for the possibility of submitting an all-female list. This would 
clearly be contrary to the spirit of the Resolution, as it would defeat the purpose of the 
quota to enhance female representation on the Court. In order to rectify this omission the 
Assembly adopted Resolution 1426,332 which amended Paragraph 3 (ii) of Resolution 
1366 so that all-female lists would be accepted and considered as a matter of exception to 
the “no single-sex lists” rule.
The Committee of Ministers, however, was not convinced and refused to 
introduce the gender quota in Protocol 14 to the ECHR that was intended to amend 
Article 22 of the Convention.333 In response to the Assembly’s Resolutions 1366 and 
1426 and to Recommendation 1649 the Committee approved a Reply,334 where it asserted 
that the Assembly’s position, although correct in principle, had been concretised in an 
unacceptably rigid manner. In paragraph 8 of the Reply the Committee explains that “a 
Contracting Party may find itself obliged to submit a list containing candidates of only 
one sex” [emphasis added] in order to comply with the other criteria of selection as laid 
out in Article 21 (1) ECHR. As a result, in would be “undesirable to give such a [positive 
action] rule biding force under the Convention”.335 The Committee, then, moves on to 
invite the Assembly to reconsider its position on the matter and add a saving clause to the 
quota, whereby national authorities could legitimately derogate from the relevant gender
332 Council o f Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1426 (2005), Candidates for the European Court 
o f  Human Rights, 18 March 2005.
333 Protocol 14 was aimed at reforming the Strasbourg enforcement system. See Mowbray, A. (2004). 
"Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights." Human Rights Law Review 42(2): 331-354.
334 Council o f  Europe, Committee o f  Ministers Reply adopted on 20 April 2005, 
CM /AS(2005)Rec1649final, 22 April 2005.
335 Committee o f  Ministers Reply, paragraph 8.
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equality obligation, insofar as they can present “convincing arguments to the Committee 
of Ministers and the Assembly”.336
During this time of institutional impasse, the matter also played out in practical 
terms. In March 2004 the Maltese government produced an all-male list to replace the 
outgoing Maltese judge.337 On the basis of Resolution 1366 the Assembly refused to 
consider the list, which was subsequently resubmitted unaltered in September 2006. The 
Assembly refused once again to consider it for failure to satisfy the requirements of 
Paragraph 3 (ii) of Resolution 1366, as it had by then been amended by Paragraph 5 of
* > i o
Resolution 1426. After extended communications from the Maltese authorities and 
interventions from the Legal Affairs and Human Rights Committee339 and from the 
Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men,340 the Court was finally 
consulted for an Advisory Opinion in July 2007.341 The questions posed to the Court 
were the following:
“a. can a list o f candidates for the post of judge at the European Court of Human 
Rights, which satisfies the criteria listed in Article 21 of the Convention, be refused 
solely on the basis of gender-related issues?
336 Ibid, paragraph 9.
337 Mowbray, supra no. 326, p. 552.
338 Ibid, at 553.
339 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (o f the Parliamentary Assembly), Draft Resolution to 
amend Resolution 1366(2004), Document 11208, 19 March 2007.
340 Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (o f the Parliamentary Assembly), Explanatory 
Memorandum, Document 11243, 16 April 2007.
341 Mowbray, supra no. 326, p. 555.
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b. are Resolution 1366 (2004) and Resolution 1426 (2005) in breach of the 
Assembly’s responsibilities under Article 22 of the Convention to consider a list, or a 
name on such list, on the basis of the criteria listed in Article 21 of the Convention?”342
5.2.2 The Court’s Advisory Opinion.
The Grand Chamber of the Court was admittedly faced with an unprecedented 
issue, both in procedural and in substantive terms. As Mowbray points out,343 this was the 
first time that Court exercised its Advisory Opinion jurisdiction according to its mandate 
under Article 47 of the Convention.344 More importantly, though, this was the first time 
that the relationship between equality and positive action became the object of an 
examination under the light of the Convention.
The question of jurisdiction was easily answered to the affirmative by the Court. 
Without much effort it asserted that “the rights and obligations of the Parliamentary 
Assembly in the procedure for electing judges [...] is of a legal character”.345 On the 
substance o f the matter the Court, mindful of the sovereignty of states, adopted a cautious 
and formalistic approach. Although it was conceded that the Assembly can legitimately 
take account of additional criteria of appointment,346 the final power to determine the
342 Advisory Opinion on certain legal questions concerning the lists o f  candidates submitted with a view to 
the election o f  judges to the European Court o f  Human Rights [GC], 12 February 2008, paragraph 7.
343 Mowbray, op. cit., p. 549.
344 There was only one previous occasion in 2004 when the Court was asked to exercise this power, but it 
found the matter to fall outside its jurisdiction. See Decision on the competence o f  the Court to give an 
Advisory Opinion [GC], 2 June 2004.
345 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 38.
346 Ibid, paragraph 45.
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conditions of the selection process was found to lie with the Contracting Parties, as 
represented by the Committee of Ministers.347
In the Court’s view the latter “have, thus, set the boundaries that the Assembly 
may not overstep in its pursuit of a policy aimed at ensuring that the lists include a 
candidate of the under-represented sex”.348 These boundaries are delineated in the 
Committee’s Reply to Resolution 1366 and Recommendation 1649 and consist in the 
need to introduce the possibility of exceptions to the gender quota. Insofar as such 
exceptions are not defined by the Parliamentary Assembly, the positive action provisions 
o f the Resolutions will remain, according to the Court, incompatible with the 
Convention.349
5.2.3 Positive action in the ECHR system: A critical analysis.
A thorough study of the Advisory Opinion and of its consequences for the legality 
of positive action in the selection of judges for Strasbourg is definitely in order. Before 
moving on to examine the particular aspects of the issue, however, it is essential to 
highlight two significant points that set the tone for what will follow. First, the questions 
posed to the Court by the Committee of Ministers narrow down the scope o f the Court’s 
enquiry, as they involve only one out o f  the three positive measures that the 
Parliamentary Assembly has introduced with Resolution 1366. The conclusions of the 
Advisory Opinion, then, are applicable exclusively to the provision o f  Paragraph 3 (ii) o f  
Resolution 1366 as amended by Resolution 1426 and in no way affect the legality of 
Paragraph 4 (iv) and (vi) of Resolution 1366 and the positive measures introduced
347 Ibid, paragraph 51.
348 Ibid.
349 Ibid, paragraph 54.
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therein. Second, it should be made perfectly clear that the Advisory Opinion 
unequivocally confirms the legality o f  positive action in principle, even if there are 
certain conditions that the relevant measures need to satisfy in order to pass the threshold 
of legality.
With this in mind let us now turn to consider the substance of the matter. In the 
debate between the Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers the main 
point of contention was undoubtedly whether the failure of national authorities to abide 
by the gender quota could automatically lead to the list of candidates being effectively 
nullified. It is quite clear that the Court was also keen on placing this specific issue at the 
centre of its analytical construct in delivering its Opinion. In order to do so, it begins by 
establishing early on that both the Assembly350 and the Contracting Parties351 are entitled 
to take account of additional criteria for the purposes of choosing between candidates 
that fulfil the generic Article 21 (1) conditions. Since “neither Article 22 nor the 
Convention system sets any explicit limits on the criteria which can be employed by the 
Parliamentary Assembly”,352 there is no question that gender is among the legitimate 
criteria that can be used to distinguish between candidates or even to refuse to consider a 
candidate.
In spite of this latitude that Article 22 allows for,353 the Court makes it perfectly 
clear that “the Parliamentary Assembly is bound first and foremost by Article 21 § I”.354 
The same is true for the Contracting Parties, which cannot rely on additional criteria in 
order to release themselves “from the obligation to present a list of candidates each of
350 Ibid, paragraph 45.
351 Ibid, paragraph 42.
352 Ibid, paragraph 45.
353 Ibid, paragraph 43.
354 Ibid, paragraph 44.
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whom fulfils all the conditions laid out in Article 21 § I ”.355 It clearly follows that the 
Court adopts a two-tiered view, whereby the criteria enshrined in the Convention itself 
are first-order and those imposed by the Assembly or the Contracting Parties are second- 
order. Fulfilling the former is a conditio sine qua non for the Assembly to consider a 
candidate for appointment. But insofar as the latter are concerned the situation may be 
more complex, depending on the nature o f each particular criterion, such as gender.
According to the Court the additional criteria employed by the Assembly should
? C/Cbe further subdivided into those that flow implicitly from Article 21 § 1 and those that 
have no link with Article 21§ I .351 This distinction is, indeed, teleologically justified in 
view of the generality in the wording of Article 21. Requiring, for instance, that all 
candidates have sufficient knowledge of at least one of the working languages o f the 
Court358 is not only practically necessary,359 but can also be conceived of as part of the 
“qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office” under Article 21. Gender 
equality considerations, on the other hand, although legitimate, appear to be entirely 
unconnected to either high moral character or professional qualifications and competence 
to serve on the Court as per Article 21.
Simply put, criteria of the first subcategory are sufficiently linked to the notion of 
merit, whereas gender is not. It is the desire to reserve unquestionable priority for merit in 
selection procedures that inspires the Court’s Opinion. In answering whether the quota 
can be a legitimate ground to reject all-male lists Strasbourg here adopts a Luxembourg-
355 Ibid, paragraph 42.
356 Ibid, paragraph 47.
357 Ibid, paragraph 48.
358 Resolution 1366, paragraph 3 (iii).
359 The Court uses only English and French as its working languages (Rule 34 § 1 o f  the Rules o f  Court).
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inspired Badeck-style approach, whereby quotas are legitimate only insofar as they
contain a proviso allowing for objectively justified  derogations.
Objective justification in this context seems to be defined narrowly by the Court.
It entails that Contracting Parties will be expected to prove that their choice to submit an
all-male list was in fact inevitable in view of the need to satisfy the first-order criteria of
Article 21. In other words, the only way that national governments can justify all-male
lists is by providing convincing evidence that no female national candidate possessed the
necessary qualifications to be nominated.
With regard to the possibility of respecting the quota by nominating non-nationals
in this case, the Court was unequivocally dismissive. Although the Committee on Equal
Opportunities for Women and Men presented a strong argument premised on the fact that
“there is no citizenship requirement to become a judge on the European Court of Human 
• 1Rights” , the Court was not convinced. It considered this option to be open only in 
situations where not enough national candidates satisfy first-order criteria related to 
individual merit. It would, however, be “unacceptable for a State to be forced to nominate 
non-national candidates solely in order to satisfy the criterion relating to a candidate’s 
sex, which is not enshrined in the Convention”, because this would go against the rule 
“that one of the judges hearing a case must be the ‘national judge’.”362
It seems, then, that the Court’s main concern is to ensure that the use of the quota 
will not take priority over considerations of merit, as encapsulated in Article 21. The 
reasoning mirrors to an extent the one typically used by the European Court of Justice in 
its own positive action rulings. It has already been suggested that the ECtHR adopts a
360 See the discussion on the Badeck ruling o f  the ECJ in chapter 4.2.
361 Explanatory Memorandum, Document 11243, op. cit., paragraph 11.
362 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 52.
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Badeck-style approach, in the sense that it considers that the possibility of exceptions to 
the gender requirement should be written into the rule in order for the latter to be
' j / ' i
legitimate. Much in the same way the ECJ found in Badeck that preference to the 
female candidate under a positive action scheme should not be “automatic” and 
“unconditional”.
Despite the obvious similarities of the ECtHR’s approach in the Advisory Opinion 
with the ECJ’s Badeck formula, there appears to be a particularly significant difference 
between the respective interpretations o f the two European courts. The ECJ has been 
adamant up to now that, under Community Law, gender364 in selection processes can 
only operate as a tie-breaker between equally qualified candidates. The ECtHR’s 
Advisory Opinion, on the other hand, seems much more “sympathetic” towards positive 
action, as it does not restrict the quota’s rationae personae scope to equally qualified 
female candidates. In order for the quota to be applicable in favour of a female candidate 
she needs to be qualified fo r  appointment to high judicial office according to Article 21, 
but not necessarily equally qualified to the male candidates over whom she is given 
preference.
One need not scrutinise the wording of the Court too thoroughly before reaching 
this conclusion. Nowhere in the Advisory Opinion does the Court say or even imply that 
Contracting Parties should be allowed to derogate from the quota in order to put forward 
the three candidates that they consider to be the most qualified for the job. Insofar as 
candidates are individually fully qualified, a comparison between candidates does not
363 And, o f  course, in Marschall before that.
364 Or race etc.
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stem from Article 21 and it definitely cannot be inferred from the Court’s interpretation 
of it.
This is plainly reflected in paragraphs 53 and 54 of the Advisory Opinion. All the 
Court requires the Assembly to do is: a) make sure that there are exceptions in place 
“designed to enable each Contracting Party to choose national candidates who satisfy all 
the requirements of Article 21 § I”365 and b) if this results in an all-male list, to consider 
it nonetheless, provided that the “Contracting Party has taken all the necessary and 
appropriate steps with a view to ensuring that the list contains a candidate of the under­
represented sex, but without success”.366 There is no evidence whatsoever that 
Contracting Parties could legitimately derogate from the quota and submit an all-male list 
solely on the basis of a claim that the top three candidates were male.
Apart from the fact that the Court’s commitment to such a progressive view on 
positive action alone is bound to have a considerable normative impact, it is also 
important to note that this approach resonates with the reason behind setting up the quota 
in the first place. In the absence of national positive action measures aiming at securing 
equal participation o f the sexes in the higher cadres of judicial office,367 there is no 
guarantee that female candidates for the ECtHR will ever be nominated. The assumption, 
then, that the quota is premised on is that all-male lists may be the outcome of 
institutionalised gender bias at some stage368 of the national selection process. Even with 
a tie-break type of positive measure in place, if every time a position became available at
365 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 53.
366 Ibid, paragraph 54.
367 According to information provided by the Contracting Parties upon the request o f  the Court, only 
Austria, Belgium and Latvia “have specific provisions in their legislation ensuring egalitarian 
representation in their Supreme and/or Constitutional Courts” (Advisory Opinion, paragraph 35).
368 Most likely at the final stage.
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least three male candidates were equally qualified to the best female candidate, nothing 
would stop the national government from submitting all-male lists ad nauseam. It goes 
without saying that allowing for such a possibility would defeat the purpose of acting to 
promote a fairer gender balance in the composition of the Court.
It is possible, then, that the Advisory Opinion constitutes a real breakthrough in 
the way positive action is conceptualised in a European normative framework. By 
moving beyond the unjustifiably narrow confines of a “positive action as tie-break” 
approach, the Court paves the way for its European Union counterpart to follow suit and 
make gender equality a truly non-negotiable priority. The key is undoubtedly to substitute 
the doctrinally and pragmatically problematic “equally qualified” requirement of the ECJ 
with the more reasonable “fully qualified’ formulation of the ECtHR. When fully  
qualified women are selected or promoted over more qualified men in any area of the 
employment field, including the judiciary, the merit principle is in no way overridden or 
downgraded. Regardless of their gender, the persons selected are deemed as capable of 
meeting the expectations of the body that set the conditions of appointment or promotion. 
The benefit, therefore, of maintaining the desired gender balance369 through positive 
action is achieved without any significant cost on the merit front.
5.2.4 Anticipating the future: Some suggestions to the Parliamentary Assembly o f  
the Council o f  Europe.
From the analysis of the Advisory Opinion it becomes clear, first and foremost, 
that the Court does not consider the gender-quota per se as incompatible with the 
Convention. The particular formulation of the quota as it stands at the moment is
369 Or race balance etc.
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problematic, insofar as it does not allow for the possibility of exceptions, which 
according to the Court “should be defined [...] as soon as possible”. What follows is 
intended as a reasonable proposal for amending the Assembly’s Resolution at the first 
instance, which will hopefully be followed by a corresponding amendment of Article 21 
o f the Convention itself.
Each Contracting Party, if unable or unwilling371 to comply with the quota and 
include at least one woman among the three nominees, should submit to the Assembly 
the fu ll list o f  female candidates with detailed explanation of the reasons why these were 
rejected. The Assembly will then have the discretion to review the substance of the 
national selection process and, if unconvinced by the explanatory memorandum of the 
national authorities, it will additionally have the exceptional power to add a fourth female 
candidate to the three already put forward.
In addition to that, the amended rule should contain a proviso stating that 
Contracting Parties cannot avail of the exception to the quota by submitting an all-male 
list twice in a row. This is a reasonable burden to impose on the Contracting Parties in 
view of their declared shared commitment to improve the level of female participation in 
the Court. Since the term of office for which judges are appointed is six years, there is a 
considerable period o f time between two nominations from each government. Once an 
all-male list has been submitted, therefore, national authorities should take appropriate 
steps to ensure the presence of at least one woman in the subsequent list of nominees. 
Failure to do so would clearly indicate an unjustifiable gender gap that cannot be
370 Advisory Opinion, paragraph 54.
371 In reality it is not possible to determine with absolute certainty the motives o f a national government 
when submitting an all-male list. As with every other positive measure, the quota introduced by the 
Assembly here is premised on a reasonable assumption that in each Contracting Party there must be at least 
one female candidate that satisfies the conditions laid down by Article 21.
tolerated under the Convention system. In these highly exceptional circumstances the 
Contracting Party should be under an obligation to put forward a female nominee, even i f  
she is a non-national.
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5.3 The Case of Thlimmenos v. Greece: A Shift from Formal to Substantive Equality in 
the ECHR?
The compatibility of positive action per se with the Convention has only come 
under judicial scrutiny in the Advisory Opinion discussed above. In the absence of a 
general equality clause, the meaning o f equal treatment under the Convention should be 
sought in the Court’s Article 14 jurisprudence. This is no easy task, mainly because of the 
narrow focus of the provision on non-discrimination as opposed to equality of treatment. 
The state obligation stemming from Article 14, therefore, is primarily understood in a 
negative way, as a prohibition to discriminate, rather than as a positive obligation to 
actively redress existing inequalities. For a long time the Court’s reasoning was geared 
towards a formal equality approach,373 in line with the famous Aristotelian “treating likes 
alike” maxim.374 Article 14 was interpreted primarily as a tool to ensure that individuals 
in similar situations received the same treatment by the respondent state.375
In recent years, however, there is an apparent shift in the Court’s 
conceptualisation of equality under the Convention from a formal to a more substantive 
notion.376 Accommodation of difference is incorporated as an intrinsic element of the
372 Part o f  the literature accepts that the Court has indirectly dealt with positive action in its famous Belgian 
Linguistics judgment. See Crawford, J. (1998). The Rights o f Peoples. Oxford University Press., p. 4-5.
373 Loenen, T. (1994). "Rethinking sex equality as a human right." Netherlands Quarterly o f  Human Rights 
12(3): 253-270.
374 Amardottir, O. M. (2002). Equality and Non-Discrimination Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Martinus Nijhoff., p. 10.
375 Fredin v. Sweden, 18 February 1991, para 60; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 21 December 1999, 
31 E.H.R.R. 47, para 26; Edoardo Palumbo v. Italy, 30 November 2000, para 51.
376 Spiliopoulou-Akerman, S. (2002). "The Limits o f  Pluralism -  Recent Jurisprudence o f  the European 
Court o f  Human Rights with regard to Minorities: Does the Prohibition o f  Discrimination Add Anything?" 
Journal o f  Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe(31: 5-20.; O’Connell, R. (2009). "Commentary -
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equality rationale. The turning point for this shift was the Court’s judgment in a 
seemingly inconspicuous case, that of Thlimmenos v. Greece?11 In Thlimmenos the 
Court, for the first time in almost half a century worth of judgments, states the obvious: 
“[t]he right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable 
justification fa il to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different 
[emphasis added].378
The Court seems to concede that its case-law up to that point had an almost 
exclusive focus on instances of different treatment of analogous situations as a breach of
‘J ' J Q
Article 14. And it is indeed true that the Court has done a good job in extending the 
protection from such instances of direct discrimination to a wide range of social groups, 
through adopting an inclusive interpretation of the rationae personae scope of Article 14. 
The textual reference to “any other status” enabled the Court to bring within the scope of 
the provision distinctions based on rank, sexual orientation, disability, marital 
status383 and professional status.384 Throughout the years the approach was refined even 
further so that protection from direct discrimination was extended, among others, to
Substantive Equality in the European Court o f  Human Rights?" Michigan Law Review First Impressions 
107: 129., at 129.
377 Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], 6 July 2000, Application no. 34369/97, 31 EHRR 411.
378 Thlimmenos, para 44.
379 Inze v. Austria, 28 October 1987, App. No. 8695/79, Series A no. 126, p. 17, § 36, p. 18, § 41(cited in 
Thlimmenos, para 44).
380 Engel v. The Netherlands, 23 November 1976, 1 E.H.R.R. 647.
381 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 12 October 1981, 4 E.H.R.R. 149; Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 
21 December 1999; SL v. Austria, 9 January 2003, 37 E.H.R.R. 39.
382 Botta v. Italy, 24 February 1988,26 E.H.R.R. 241.
383 Sahin v. Germany, 11 October 2001, 36 E.H.R.R. 241.
384 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, 23 November 1983, 6 E.H.R.R. 163.
385 For an extensive list o f  relevant case-law, including the rulings cited in this section, see Janis, M., R  
Kay, et al. (2008). European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials. Oxford University Press , p. 470-471.
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distinctions between general and specialist trade unions,386 between owners of residential
i o «7 1 0 0
and non-residential housing, between victims of intentional and unintentional torts 
and between large and small landowners.389
What the Court does not explicitly admit to in Thlimmenos, however, is that this 
judgment seems to break with the traditional, rigidly formalistic interpretation of the non­
discrimination principle that permeates the case-law. In the not so distant past the Court 
has refused to acknowledge that equal treatment amounts to more than state neutrality, 
ruling that the disparate impact of formally neutral rules on particular groups did not 
constitute a breach of Article 14.390 Its attitude towards indirect discrimination as a 
potential source of violation was equally negative,391 although the possibility was never 
explicitly rejected in principle.
In this climate the reasoning in Thlimmenos sounds as a very refreshing change of 
tune. The Court acknowledges that states are under a positive obligation to take account 
of difference when aiming for equality of treatment. This interpretation o f article 14 has 
two important consequences: indirectly discriminatory national rules are clearly within 
the scope of prohibited discrimination392 and the obligation not to discriminate may
386 National Union o f  Belgian Police v. Belgium, 27 October 1975, 1 E.H.R.R. 578.
387 Spadea and Scalebrino v. Italy, 28 September 1995, 21 E.H.R.R. 482.
388 Stubbings v. United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, 23 E.H.R.R. 213.
389 Chassagnou v. France, 29 April 1999, 29 E.H.R.R. 615.
390 Abdulaziz, Cabales, and Balkandali, op. cit.
391 Tarr, G. A., R. F. Williams, et al., supra no. 318, p. 32.
392 Loenen, T. and A. Hendriks (2000). "Case Note on Thlimmenos." NJCM Bulletin 25-6: 1095-1105., 
1102.
167
require the state to make reasonable adjustments393 rather than remain notionally neutral 
through indistinctly applicable rules.
If the interpretative shift in Thlimmenos is confirmed,394 the normative 
consequences of this new equality paradigm will be particularly significant for the 
purposes of the present enquiry. Insofar as the Thlimmenos doctrine requires states to take 
active steps towards achieving equality of treatment, the possibility of using positive 
action as a legitimate means to that end remains wide open. This does not entail, of 
course, that an obligation to make reasonable adjustments can be translated into an 
obligation to take positive measures.395 It does, however, mean that Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg are moving to a similar direction with regard to their respective 
interpretations of the equal treatment principle. Although it is still too early to draw 
definitive conclusions, the judgment in Thlimmenos has the potential to radically 
transform the meaning of equality under the Convention.
393 Vieytez, E. R. (2009). Immigration and Social Cohesion: Equality o f  Treatment and Social and Cultural 
Integration o f  Immigrant Workers and their Families. European Commission for Democracy through Law. 
Venice Commission. CDL-UTD (004).
394 Ruiz Vieytez argues that the Thlimmenos doctrine has not been applied again (op. cit., para 4), but this 
conclusion seems largely unsupported in view o f  the recent case-law o f  the Court on the rights o f  Roma 
minorities.
395 For the difference between reasonable adjustments or reasonable accommodation and positive action see 
infra, chapter 6.2.3.
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5.4 Protocol 12 to the ECHR: A New Dawn for Equality under the Convention?
Protocol 12 to the Convention has clearly the potential of becoming the single 
most significant legislative development in the field of equality law within the European 
public sphere for decades. Its objective is to boost the equality profile of the Convention 
by creating a free-standing right not to be discriminated against. As with most legislative 
steps o f this magnitude, however, there is a catch. This is none other than its optional 
character. Although it opened for signature by the Member States of the Council of 
Europe on 4 November 2000 and entered into force in April 2005 for the first ten 
Member States that had hitherto ratified it, the total number of ratifications as of October 
2009 has risen to no more than 17.396 Significantly, the largest European states in terms 
of population have either not ratified the protocol397 or refused to sign it in the first 
place.398
It goes without saying that the reluctance with which Protocol 12 has been met 
diminishes its short-term practical impact. Even more importantly, it undermines its 
raison d ’etre, as it effectively creates a double-standard system for citizens of different 
Member States.399 Nonetheless, the significance of this long-awaited development is 
multi-dimensional and is not exhausted in its strictly legal consequences. The eloquent 
symbolism of a reference to fu ll and effective equality in its Preamble can hardly be 
overstated.
396 A comprehensive table o f  ratifications and signatures is available online from the Council o f  Europe 
website (http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG).
397 Germany and Italy.
398 France, Poland and the UK.
399 It is evident that individuals will have locus standi to bring “independent” discrimination claims before 
the Court only against those national governments that have ratified the Protocol.
169
One might be tempted to suggest, then, that the most substantial contribution of 
Protocol 12 is to be found not so much in the establishment of a free-standing right not to 
be discriminated against as in its subtle but crucial adoption of a substantive underlying 
notion of equality. The Preamble, which sets as a common goal of the States-Parties the 
attainment of “full and effective equality”, encapsulates an understanding of equality that 
seems to go well beyond a rigid formal approach. A closer look at this formally non­
binding but politically and normatively significant declaration is in order.
The Preamble to Protocol 12 recognises that equality before the law and the equal 
protection of the laws are fundamental and well-established general principles and 
essential elements in the protection of human rights.400 These principles, although not 
explicitly enshrined in either Article 14 or Protocol 12, “are closely intertwined” with the 
principle of non-discrimination.401 This echoes the famous Belgian Linguistics judgment, 
where the Court, as early as in 1968, made the first explicit reference to the principle of 
equal treatment as underpinning the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14.402
What is o f particular importance for present analytical purposes is the third recital 
of the Preamble. The drafters assert in no uncertain terms that positive measures taken in 
order to promote fu ll and effective equality shall not be prohibited by the principle of 
non-discrimination, insofar as an objective and reasonable justification can be provided. 
This is the first instance of an explicit reference in any of the Convention texts to the 
positive action as a legitimate mechanism to achieve equality.
400 See the Explanatory Report to Protocol 12 to the Convention, para 14.
401 Ibid.
402 Case “Relating to certain aspects o f the laws on the use o f  languages in education in Belgium” v. 
Belgium [Plenary], 23 July 1968, App. Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, Series 
A, No. 6. It should also be mentioned that the Court has made particular reference to the notion o f  “equality 
o f the sexes” in the case o f  • Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom [Plenary], 
28/05/1985, no. 9214/80 ; 9473/81 ; 9474/81, A94 (op. cit., para 78).
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In itself this appears to be a significant step forward. Although the phrasing seems 
to reflect the classical understanding of positive action as an exception to equal 
treatment,403 the abandonment of the formal equality paradigm - at least on paper - is 
uncontested. Abandoning one equality paradigm, however, does not guarantee an 
automatic substitution by another, especially when the normative distance that needs to 
be covered is considerable. In other words, when Protocol 12 is seen in the context o f the 
Convention, one cannot avoid being sceptical as to whether full and effective equality can 
be realised in the absence of structural changes to the Convention system as a whole.
Scepticism stems, first of all, from the fact that the Protocol does not create any 
new state obligations. The substantive provisions of the Protocol have as their primary 
objective “to embody a negative obligation for the Parties: the obligation not to 
discriminate against individuals”,404 without, of course, excluding altogether the 
possibility of “limited” positive obligations. Moreover, the phrasing “any right set forth 
by law” was particularly chosen in order to limit possible indirect horizontal effects405 at 
most to relations between private persons in the public sphere,406 since the bearer of the 
negative obligation not to discriminate is national public authorities. Finally, the use of 
positive action is “not prohibited”, but there is no encouragement or incentive to adopt 
such measures, let alone any programmatic obligation imposed on the Parties.407
The second source of scepticism relates to pragmatic considerations regarding the 
way the new provisions can impact on adjudication. Leaving aside the possibility of
403 This is evident not so much in the requirement for an objective and reasonable justification, but in the 
fact that the legitimacy o f  positive action is defined negatively: positive measures are not prohibited.
404 Ibid, para 24.
405 Ibid, para 29.
406 Ibid, para 28.
407 Ibid, para 16
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further expanding the Protocol’s scope of application through bold and open-minded 
judicial interpretation, the aforesaid objectives of the new provisions appear rather 
conservative to live up to the high standards of an already well-established system of 
protection. This is in no way an attempt to undermine the importance of a free-standing 
general anti-discrimination clause, but rather a way of emphasising that there does not 
appear to be any qualitative differentiation in the protection afforded by the Convention 
as a whole. On the contrary, it is made clear on many occasions that the new provisions 
and Article 14 are bound together in a symbiotic relation and cannot be applied 
separately.
The examples cited by the authors of the Explanatory Report almost beg the 
question of how useful the additions of Protocol 12 will prove in practice. When a person 
suffers from discriminatory behaviour “by law enforcement” officers controlling a 
riot”,408 the applicability of the new provisions (taken together with Article 14) will 
inevitably depend on the effects of this behaviour on the enjoyment of the applicant’s 
rights. It is difficult to envisage a scenario in which such behaviour would amount to a 
breach of rights conferred by national law but not to a simultaneous violation of any of 
the rights enshrined in the Convention, not even indirectly. In this respect, it can be 
argued that the suggested behaviour of law enforcement officers, if based on grounds of 
sex, race etc., would probably fall within the meaning of “degrading treatment” under 
Article 3 of the Convention. Article 14, then, would be directly applicable anyway, 
without having to resort to the provisions of Protocol 12. Along the same lines, Article 1 
of Protocol 12 will be violated when public authorities of a Member State fail to comply 
with the principle of equal treatment in terms of a clear obligation bestowed upon them
408 Explanatory Report, para 22.
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by national law. In this way, Protocol 12 neither imposes new positive obligations on the 
States-Parties nor widens the existing ones stemming from Article 14.
It is evident from the preceding analysis that Protocol 12 has relatively little to 
offer in achieving full and effective equality, other than on a symbolic level. An 
independent non-discrimination clause does not disengage the Court from the 
requirements and restrictions inherent in the non-discrimination normative framework, 
such as the need to identify a comparator in every case.409 Consequently, forms of 
inequality that do not fit into the anti-discrimination rationale will not be tackled under 
Protocol 12. Anti-discrimination law, after all, does not entertain the ambition to 
eliminate all forms of socio-economic inequality. The existence, therefore, of an 
independent non-discrimination clause does not per se entail endorsement of a more 
substantive notion of equality, even though the Court’s recent case-law encapsulates an 
interpretative move towards this direction.
409 In this respect, an individual applicant would find it equally difficult to prove her claim under the 
provisions o f  Protocol 12 as under article 14. The Court’s reasoning and conclusions in Pretty v. UK, for 
instance, would remain unaltered even in the light o f  the new provisions.
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PART III: POSITIVE ACTION DISSECTED: ONE SIZE DOESN’T FIT ALL
The analytical objective of Part III is to present and justify one of the principal 
claims of this thesis, namely that a “one size fits all” approach to positive action is 
conceptually problematic and normatively confusing. It is conceptually problematic 
because it fails to take into account philosophically significant nuances in the way the 
principle of equal treatment is, first, defined and, then, applied in different areas of the 
public sphere. It is normatively confusing because it entails legal uncertainty with regard 
to the appropriate test of legality for positive measures that fall outside the “standard” 
context of employment law.410
This lack o f conceptual clarity, as well as the resulting normative inadequacy, 
constitutes an inherent flaw in the classical conception of positive action. A more 
sophisticated alternative, therefore, should begin by distinguishing between different 
areas of the public sphere and examining how positive action operates in each of them. 
Accordingly, Part III is premised on an analytical distinction identifying three dimensions 
of social activity in which positive action may be used as a means towards equality: 
employment, elected public office and “sensitive” areas o f  the public sphere. The three 
corresponding chapters411 explore the European status quo, as determined by existing 
legal rules and the European courts’ interpretations, and highlight the deficiencies that 
must be addressed. The final chapter in this section provides a schematic representation 
of how positive action fits into the existing framework and scrutinises what appears to be
410 Assuming, o f course, that in employment the ECJ Badeck formula provides an adequately refined test 
for the legality o f  positive measures.
411 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 respectively.
174
the single most problematic aspect of the discourse, that is to say the relationship between 
disadvantage and under-representation as possible justificatory bases for positive action.
CHAPTER 6: POSITIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT
6.1 Introduction
It is no coincidence that this part of the enquiry begins with examining positive 
action in employment. Employment law is par excellence the normative framework 
within which positive action has been established and accepted as a legitimate equality 
mechanism. Especially when it comes to quota systems, ECJ positive action case-law,412 
as well as most of the relevant European legal instruments, seem to be almost exclusively 
employment-related.
The chapter will begin by examining the types of positive action and the possible 
grounds for the identification of target groups and then delineate the conceptual limits of 
positive action vis-a-vis reasonable accommodation. It will then move on to consider the 
impact of the test of legality encapsulated in the Badeck formula on national jurisdictions. 
Finally, the last section will critically evaluate how the notion o f merit dominates the 
discourse and identify the problems this presents for the attainment of full equality.
412 With the exception o f  Griesmar, Lommers and Briheche. See infra, chapter 4.2.5.
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6.2 What Kind of Positive Action?
6.2.1 Types o f  positive action in employment: From training and encouragement 
to preference and quotas.
In the EU jargon positive action, as already explained, is an “umbrella” term, 
understood in a deliberately generic manner so that it encompasses a wide range of 
equality and non-discrimination policies and measures. Although there is no 
terminological consensus in the literature,413 this wider view of positive action is 
supported by a number of prominent authors414 and has been adopted throughout the 
present thesis. Distinguishing, then, between different types of positive measures 
becomes an analytical necessity in order to accurately assess their success in achieving 
the aim of equality. Such a distinction is particularly valuable in the field of employment 
law, given that it is in this area that European legislators and policy-makers have focused 
most of their efforts.
The most successful recent attempt to provide a comprehensive typology of 
positive action in employment has been undertaken by De Schutter 415 He identifies six 
types of positive measures in employment:416
• “Monitoring the composition of the workforce in order to identify 
instances of underrepresentation and, possibly, to encourage the adoption of action plans 
and the setting of targets” [type 1].
4,3 See Fredman, supra no. 1, pp. 125-136, where further references.
414 Instead o f  many see McCrudden, C. (1986). "Rethinking Positive Action." Industrial Law Journal 15(1): 
219-243.
415 O. De Schutter, supra no. 283.
4,6 Ibid, p. 762.
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• “Redefining the standard criterion on the basis of which employment or 
promotion are allocated (in general, merit)” [type 2].
• “Outreach measures, consisting in general measures targeting 
underrepresented groups, such as the provision of training aimed at members of the 
underrepresented groups or job announcements encouraging members of such groups to 
apply” [type 3],
• “Outreach measures, consisting in individual measures such as the 
guarantee to members of underrepresented groups that they will be interviewed if they 
possess the relevant qualifications” [type 4].
• “Preferential treatment of equally qualified members of the 
underrepresented group, with or without exemption clause (also referred to as ‘flexible 
quotas’)” [type 5].
• Strict quotas, linked or not to objective factors beyond the representation 
of the target group in the general active population” [type 6].
De Schutter’s typology is meticulous and covers a wide range of measures and 
schemes. In essence, though, it is premised upon a rather simpler binary distinction. On 
the one hand there are “true positive measures” that involve some form of preferential 
treatment to members o f the disadvantaged groups and, on the other hand, “outreach 
measures” that aim primarily at improving the competitiveness of the group in the labour 
market without granting preferential treatment. According to this criterion417 measures of
4,7 De Schutter argues that there is a second criterion according to which positive measures can be 
classified into two categories, namely whether they require that the beneficiary is a member o f  the 
(disadvantaged) target group. Although it is true that, in certain cases, non-members can take advantage o f
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type 4, type 5 and type 6 fall under the former category, while measures of type 1, type 2 
and type 3 fall under the latter.418
Although the typology is descriptively accurate, the basic dichotomy it is 
premised on does not cure some of the unavoidable indeterminacies of the current 
positive action discourse. The most characteristic example is the dubious classification of 
measures providing targeted training to members of a specific under-represented or 
disadvantaged group [type 3]. As De Schutter himself acknowledges, these “may go 
beyond a strict definition of ‘outreaching measures’”,419 since they may consist in 
granting preference in the allocation of training places. It is obvious, then, that the 
dichotomy along the lines of preferential treatment cannot suffice here, unless it is 
specified that only preference in the allocation o f  jobs counts.420 In that case, however, a 
similar problem would arise with regard to type 4 measures. It would no longer be 
possible to characterise these as “true positive measures”, insofar as the preference 
granted to individual members of the under-represented groups takes place at a 
preliminary stage of the selection process and does not affect job allocation per se.
It is, therefore, preferable for present purposes to seek an alternative classification, 
devised to specifically reflect the fundamental distinction between softer and stricter 
forms of positive action in employment. The principal criterion for such a categorisation 
of positive measures can be none other than the nature of the benefit they allocate, which
a programme designed primarily for the benefit o f  a specific group, it is submitted that this is a direct 
consequence o f  the principle o f  equal treatment understood as proportionality o f  concern (see infra, 
chapters 10 and 11).
418 De Schutter, supra no.283, p. 762.
419 Ibid, p. 774.
420 Deciding whether a type 3 measure qualifies as preferential treatment is normatively significant in order 
to determine whether and under which conditions it is permissible under Article 141 (4) EC and the Equal 
Treatment Directive. See the ECJ ruling in Badeck, para 54.
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is in turn closely related to the characterisation of the measure as “soft” or “strict”. Soft 
measures aim at identifying groups that are under-represented or disadvantaged in 
particular employment cadres and at improving the chances of their members to compete 
in the labour market. They are designed to operate on either an abstract-general421 level 
or on a concrete-individual422 level. In the former case they consist in monitoring 
mechanisms423 and inclusive definitions o f  merit,424 corresponding to types 3 and 4 of De 
Schutter’s typology. In the latter case they consist in active encouragement425 of 
members of disadvantaged or under-represented groups to apply for particular positions, 
as well as in training opportunities that are allocated to members of these groups.
Strict measures, on the other hand, aim at removing existing inequalities and 
reducing visible under-representation of particular groups in the employment field by 
favouring individual members of these groups. This is primarily achieved through the use 
of quotas that are designed with a view to achieving results in the short term and can be 
further subdivided into flexible426 and non-flexible.421 With flexible quotas the personal 
characteristic that defines the target group is used as a criterion to grant preference in the 
form of a tie-breaker between otherwise equally qualified candidates, whereas non-
421 In the sense that no individual members o f the target groups will enjoy direct benefits from these 
measures.
422 In the sense that the application o f these measures will necessary involve individual beneficiaries.
423 For concrete examples o f  monitoring mechanisms and a useful discussion see De Schutter, supra no. 
283, pp. 763-771.
424 On how the construction o f  merit in European law can be gender-biased see Hervey, T. and J. Shaw
(1998). "Women, Work and Care: Women’s Double Burden in EC Sex Equality Law." Journal o f European 
Social Policy 8(1): 43-63.
425 For concrete examples o f  encouragement techniques in the drafting o f  job advertisements see 
Szyszczak, E. (2006). "Positive Action as a Tool in Promoting Access to Employment." Roma Rights 
Ouarterlvd l:  25-30., p. 28. Also see De Schutter, supra no. 238, p. 772-773.
426 Corresponding to type 5 measures o f  De Schutter’s typology.
427 Corresponding to type 6 measures o f  De Schutter’s typology.
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flexible quotas grant preference to individual members of the under-represented group 
that are less qualified than their counterparts.
6.2.2 Grounds o f  positive action: From gender to race, ethnicity, religion and
age.
Protection from discrimination is typically organised with reference to certain 
personal characteristics that traditionally constitute discriminatory grounds. Although the 
lists of discriminatory grounds contained in prohibitive rules of domestic and 
international instruments are usually open-ended, in practice certain among these grounds 
seem to enjoy a privileged status of “primus inter pares” on the policy-making agendas 
of particular jurisdictions. Rather than being available across the spectrum of 
disadvantaged or under-represented groups, aggressive equality policies such as positive 
measures are usually adopted for specific groups. Realistically, then, some inequalities in 
the field of employment will be addressed before others, depending on political, socio­
economic and historical reasons. While in the United States, for instance, affirmative 
action was race-oriented from the outset with women’s issues taking a back seat,428 the 
situation in Europe has been quite the opposite, with gender equality taking the lion’s 
share o f policy and legislative attention.
Historically this can be easily explained when one considers the way gender has 
shaped the experiences o f women workers across the Continent429 A common pattern of 
patriarchy, whereby a hierarchy of the sexes with men at the top exists throughout the
428 This is despite the impressive body o f  feminist jurisprudence coming from the United States, which has 
had a considerable impact in shaping feminist thinking across the globe.
429 For a very interesting overview o f  the history o f  gender in Europe see Timm, A. F. and J. A. Sanborn 
(2007). Gender. Sex and the Shaping o f  Modem Europe: A History from the French Revolution to the
Present Day. Berg Publishers.
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social sphere,430 can be identified in most European countries. Regardless of localised 
differences in the conceptualisation of gender within a given socio-political context431 or 
in the way and extent to which feminist movements have managed to influence policy­
making, there is no denying that European women in general have long suffered from 
severe and multi-faceted discrimination in the labour market. And this has been the case 
even in countries where women have enjoyed equal rights on paper for generations.
The prioritisation of gender in the fight against employment discrimination in 
Europe, therefore, is understandable.432 And this could not but be mirrored on the legal 
developments at the EU level. Until the late 1990s EU anti-discrimination law was 
effectively one-dimensional in scope, as it was exclusively433 focused on gender equality 
in employment.434 In fact, Community law at the time did not explicitly prohibit 
discrimination on any grounds other than gender,435 with the exception, of course, of 
nationality discrimination between EU citizens.436 As it has correctly been pointed out the
430 Wiesner-Hanks, M. E. (2001). Gender in History. Blackwell., p. 12-13. It must be noted, however, that 
there is no consensus on the definition o f  patriarchy. See Timm and Sandbom, op. cit., p. 13.
431 Some European societies, especially in the South o f  Europe, have traditionally been more “patriarchal” 
than others, such as the Scandinavian countries.
432 Although this should not be construed as negating the historical experience o f  race discrimination in the 
European continent, both historically and as an ongoing problem. See Fredman, S. (2001). "Equality: A 
New Generation?" Industrial Law Journal 30(2): 145-168., at 146.
433 It is noteworthy, however, that the ECJ on one occasion did extend protection from discrimination in 
employment to cover transsexuals under the original Equal Treatment Directive. See Case C-13/94, P. v. S. 
And Cornwall County Council [1996], EC R 1-2143.
434 DG Employment, Social Affairs a. Equal Opportunities (2009). International Perspectives on Positive 
Action Measures: A comparative analysis in the European Union, Canada, the United States and South 
Africa, European Commission Publications Office., p. 22.
435 Szyszczak, E. (1992). Race Discrimination: the Limits o f  Market Equality. Discrimination: The Limits 
o f  Law. B. Hepple and E. Szyszczak, Mansell., 125-147.
436 Under the free movement o f  persons provisions in Articles 39 and 43 o f  the Treaty.
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principle of gender equality is “one of the most developed concepts” in EU law437 and it 
applies to virtually every aspect of employment through a variety of specifically targeted 
Directives.438
Provisions on positive action followed suit both in Treaty law and secondary 
Community law. Article 141 paragraph 4 EC and Article 2 (4) of the original Equal 
Treatment Directive439 provided for the possibility of positive measures in favour of 
women designed to promote equal opportunities and remove existing inequalities in 
working life. It is, thus, no surprise that the literature of the late 1980s and early 1990s is 
similarly focused on the consideration of gender-oriented anti-discrimination laws and
• ■ 440positive measures.
During the last fifteen years, however, the repositioning of European societies 
towards an increasingly multicultural model has brought about new tensions and 
inequalities in the workplace. Gender, despite its continued significance as a principal 
inequality index, is no longer the sole focus of anti-discrimination and equality
437 Torella, E. C. D. (2006). "The Principle o f  Gender Equality, the Goods and Services Directive and 
Insurance: A Conceptual Analysis." Maastricht Journal o f  European and Comparative Law 13(3): 339-350., 
at 339.
438 The principle o f  gender equality is applicable to access to employment and employment conditions, 
apart from equal pay, including training (Directive 76/207/EEC), membership o f  and involvement in 
organisations o f  workers and employers and professional organisations (Directive 76/207/EEC as amended 
by Directive 2002/73/EC), certain aspects o f  self employed occupations (Directive86/613/EEC and 
Directive 76/207/EEC as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC), as well as social security issues (Directive 
79/7/EEC).
439 Directive 76/207/EEC on equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ L 39, 14.2.1976.
440 Among many see Landau, E. C. (1985). The Rights o f  Working Women in the European Community. 
Office for Official Publications o f the European Communities.; McCrudden, C. (1987). Women. 
Employment and European Equality Law. Eclipse.; Nielsen, R. and E. Szyszczak (1991). The Social 
Dimension o f  the European Communities. Handelshojskolens Forlag.; Ellis, E. (1991). European 
Community Sex Equality Law. Oxford University Press.; O'Donovan, K. and E. Szyszczak (1988). 
Equality and Sex Discrimination Law. Blackwell.; Prechal, S. and N. Burrows (1990). Gender 
Discrimination Law o f  the European Community. Dartmouth.; More, G. C. (1993). "Equal Treatment o f  the 
Sexes in European Community Law: What Does ‘Equal’ Mean?" Feminist Legal Studies 1(1): 45-74.
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legislation. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam marked a significant shift in this regard, 
with the new Article 13 becoming the cornerstone of a remarkable expansion in the scope 
of EU anti-discrimination law.441 Race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, sexual 
orientation, age and disability have been added to the protected grounds and the 
Community obtained, thus, the competence to legislate in these areas. A number of 
secondary law instruments based on Article 13 followed soon after, with the adoption of 
the Racial Equality Directive442 and the Framework Employment Directive.443 The 
former prohibits discrimination on grounds of race or ethnic origin primarily within the 
workplace but also, arguably, outside it,444 while the latter provides a comprehensive 
framework of protection against discrimination in the workplace445 on grounds of religion 
or belief, disability,446 age or sexual orientation 447
These new instruments did not simply broaden the scope of employment anti- 
discrimination law by transplanting the existing protection against sex discrimination into 
other areas. Instead they added “new definitions and understandings of key concepts,
441 M. Bell, “The new Article 13 EC Treaty: a sound basis for European anti-discrimination law?” 6 MJ
(1999), 5-23.
442 Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle o f  equal treatment irrespective o f  racial or ethnic 
origin, OJL 180/22.
443 Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, OJL 303/16.
444 Bell, M. (2002). "Beyond European Labour Law? Reflections on the EU Racial Equality Directive." 
European Law Journal 8(3): 384-399.; Brown, C. (2002). "The Race Directive: Towards Equality for All 
the People o f  Europe?" Yearbook o f  EU Law 21: 195-227.; Guild, E. (2000). "The EC Directive on Race 
Discrimination: Surprises, Possibilities and Limitations." Industrial Law Journal 29(41: 416-423.
445 Skidmore, P. (2001). "European development— EC framework directive on equal treatment in 
employment: towards a comprehensive community anti-discrimination policy?" Industrial Law Journal 
30(1): 126-132
446 Specifically on disability see infra, chapter 6.2.3.
447 There is a third instrument adopted under Article 13, namely Directive 2004/113/EC o f  13 December 
2004, implementing the principle o f  equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply 
o f goods and services [2004] OJ L 373/37.
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including discrimination and positive action”.448 More importantly, they paved the way 
for a multidimensional conception of equality law,449 whereby the possibility of 
individual employees being discriminated against on more than a single ground can be 
acknowledged. It must be pointed out, of course, that this is still more a theoretical 
possibility rather than normative reality. It is highly debatable whether EU equality law at 
this point in time can adequately address discrimination at the intersection of two or more 
personal characteristics 450
It must also be highlighted that these developments did not relegate gender 
equality from its privileged position in EU employment law. Evidence to that was the 
new Equal Treatment Directive451 for men and women in employment that introduced 
both substantial and procedural amendments to the original Equal Treatment Directive,452 
before taking its current form in 2006 under the Recast Equal Treatment Directive.453
448 Bell, M. and L. Waddington (2001). "More Equal Than Others: Distinguishing European Union 
Equality Directives." Common Market Law Review 38(3): 587-61 l.uality Law”, 12 MJ 4 (2005), 427-466., 
at 588.
449 Schiek, D. (2005). "Broadening the Scope and the Norms o f  EU Gender Equality Law: Towards a 
Multidimensional Conception o f  Equality Law." Maastricht Journal o f  European and Comparative Law 
12(4): 427-466.
450 Ashiagbor, D. (1999). The intersection between Gender and Race in the Labour Market: Consequences 
for Anti-Discrimination Law. Feminist Perspectives on Employment Law. A. Morris and T. 0 ‘Donnel, 
Cavendish.; Hannett, S. (2003). "Equality at the Intersections: The Legislative and Judicial Failure to 
Tackle Multiple Discrimination." Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 23(1): 65-86., 67.
451 Directive 2002/73/E.C. o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council o f  23 September 2002 amending 
Council Directive 76/207/E.E.C. on the implementation o f  the principle o f  equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, O.J. 
05.10.2002, L 269, p. 15.
452 Masselot, A. (2004). "The New Equal Treatment Directive: Plus £ a  Change ...: Comment on Directive 
2002/73/EC o f  23 September 2002 Amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the Implementation o f  the 
Principle o f  Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training 
and Promotion, and Working Conditions " Feminist Legal Studies 12(1): 93-104., p. 94.
453 Directive 2006/54/EC o f  the European Parliament and o f  the Council on the implementation o f  the 
principle o f  equal opportunities and equal treatment o f  men and women in matters o f  employment and 
occupation (recast), OJ L 204/23 2006. Directive 2006/54 is a consolidating instrument that replaces the 
previously separate secondary law instruments on equal pay, equal treatment, occupational social security 
and the burden o f  proof. See P. Craig and G. De Burca, supra no. 154, p. 875.
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Eliminating gender inequalities in the workplace continues to be a number one priority 
and it is no coincidence that all positive action schemes that have been scrutinised by the 
ECJ up to now involve favourable treatment towards women.
6.2.3 The case o f  disability: Positive action v. reasonable accommodation.
Disability discrimination in employment is one of the most rapidly developing 
areas of anti-discrimination law in Europe. This is in no small part due to the Framework 
Equality Directive454 that imposed on Member States an obligation to implement anti- 
discrimination measures for the protection of disabled persons in employment.455 In 
Article 5 the Directive introduces the notion of reasonable accommodation, which is 
intended to occupy centre-stage in eliminating discrimination on grounds of disability. 
The positive duty456 of reasonable accommodation entails that employers should take ad 
hoc measures “to enable a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or 
advance in employment, or to undergo training” 457 The Directive, then, purports to 
achieve a double aim: first, establish reasonable accommodation as a general norm that
454 Directive 2000/78/EC, op. cit.
455 Lawson, A. and C. Gooding (2005). Introduction, Disability Rights in Europe: From Theory to Practice. 
A. Lawson and C. Gooding, Hart., p. 1.
456 Fredman, supra n o .l, p. 59.
457 Article 5 o f  Directive 2000/78/EC reads as follows: “In order to guarantee compliance with the principle 
o f  equal treatment in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall be provided. 
This means that employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a 
person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, 
unless such measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. This burden shall not be 
disproportionate when it is sufficiently remedied by measures existing within the framework o f the 
disability policy o f  the Member State concerned.”
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applies to all employers in the public and private sectors and, second, affirm that the 
absence of it amounts itself to discrimination.458
Domestic legislation in most Member States has also adopted the approach taken 
in the Directive. A characteristic example is the UK Disability Discrimination Act 1995, 
as amended in 2005, which introduces the term “reasonable adjustments” as equivalent to 
reasonable accommodation 459 As Fredman correctly points out, through the notion of 
reasonable adjustments the Act does not simply require employers to conform to the 
“able-bodied norm” but to modify that norm with a view to “afford[ing] genuine equality 
to disabled persons”.460 The wording of the Directive and of the domestic implementing 
provisions reveals that the obligations in question are inspired by a conception of 
substantive rather than formal equality.
It is exactly this adherence to substantive equality that has led some commentators 
to regard reasonable accommodation as a form of positive action,461 although not 
necessarily as “reverse or positive discrimination”.462 This interpretation, however, is 
seriously contested,463 as it is said to confuse two substantively and procedurally distinct
458 United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion o f  the Rights and Dignity o f  Persons with Disabilities, “The Concept o f  
Reasonable Accommodation in Selected National Disability Legislation”, 2005 [available online at: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc7bkgmdra.htm],
459 For a more detailed analysis o f  the UK Disability Discrimination Act and its interpretation by national 
courts see Gooding, C. (2000). "Disability Discrimination Act: From Statute to Practice." Critical Social 
Policy 20(4): 533-549.
460 Fredman, supra n o .l, p. 59.
461 See for instance Fenwick, H. (2002). Civil Liberties and Human Rights. Cavendish , p. 1043.
462 Doyle, B. (1997). "Enabling legislation or dissembling law? The Disability Discrimination Act 1995." 
Modern Law Review 60(11: 64-78., p. 74. In the US context see Tucker, B. P. (2001). "The ADA’s 
Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm." Ohio State Law Journal 62(1): 335-390., p. 
365.
463 And not only in the European discourse. For a discussion o f the matter from a US point o f  view see 
Jolls, C. (2001). "Antidiscrimination and Accommodation." Harvard Law School 115(2): 642-699.
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normative techniques.464 Reasonable accommodation, in this view, should rather be 
conceived of as “a particular kind of non-discrimination legislative provision, related to, 
but not synonymous with, the established forms of direct and indirect discrimination” 
[emphasis added].465 It is, thus, an instrument designed according to the “difference 
model of discrimination”, which is in turn premised on an “asymmetric notion” of 
equality 466 In other words, the recognition that disabled persons are in a substantially 
different situation from able-bodied persons entails that the equal treatment principle in 
this case requires different treatment of the respective groups.
From this point of view, it is evident why reasonable accommodation does not 
amount to positive action. Whether or not disabled persons can be classified as a 
disadvantaged or under-represented group in particular employment cadres is irrelevant. 
Reasonable accommodation is, thus, understood as possessing an “individualised 
character”,467 contrary to the group-approach that is instrumental in the conceptualisation 
and operation of positive action. Admittedly, the boundaries between the two are not 
always clear. Systems that introduce a disability quota, requiring that a minimum 
percentage of the workforce should consist in disabled persons, as is the case in France, 
Austria and Sweden,468 go beyond reasonable accommodation and into the realm of 
positive action. This, however, does not undermine the validity of the overall conclusion 
that the two notions are doctrinally separate.
464Waddington, L. (2007). Reasonable Accommodation. Cases. Materials and Text on National. 
Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law. D. Schiek, L. Waddington and M. Bell, Hart., 
pp. 745-752.
465 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, supra no. 434, p. 27.
466 Ibid. See also Fredman, supra no. 1, p. 126-130, esp. 128-129.
467 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, supra no. 434, p. 28.
468 See below, chapter 6.3.
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6.3 Quotas in Employment and ECJ Case-Law: The Badeck Formula and its Influence on 
National Jurisdictions
The legitimacy of quotas in employment under EU law has been thoroughly 
examined in the relevant section,469 with emphasis on a detailed analysis of the ECJ 
positive action rulings.470 The position of EU law on the matter can, therefore, be 
summarised as follows:
• Community law instruments permit preferential treatment in favour of 
under-represented groups as a means to achieve full and effective equality in the field of 
employment, but there is no positive obligation of Member States to adopt such 
measures.
• Quotas are permissible under certain conditions: they must a) operate as a 
tie-breaker between equally qualified candidates and b) contain a proviso that will allow 
for an ad hoc suspension of the quota’s application, if there are reasons specific to the 
candidate from the “dominant group” that tilt the balance in his favour.
The delineation of permissible quotas in employment, referred to as the Badeck 
formula, sets the tone for national authorities. As long as preference to members of the 
under-represented group is neither automatic nor unconditional, in other words when 
flexible result quotas are at issue, national legislation will pass the threshold of legality 
set by the Court. Clear as these limits may seem, however, they do not entail that the
469 Infra, chapter 4.
470 Infra, chapter 4.2.
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relationship between EU law on positive action and national jurisdictions is equally 
unambiguous.
Ambiguity begins with the fact that EU law in this area is permissive rather than 
prescriptive in nature. The obvious consequence is the lack of uniformity across Member 
States in addressing similar situations. Most national legislators471 will abstain from 
directly introducing quotas in order to remedy under-representation in particular 
employment cadres,472 while others will establish compulsory quota systems. Some 
among these will only apply in areas of the public service, such as the Greek gender 
quota introduced by Law 2839/2000. The aim of this law is to ensure the balanced 
participation of men and women in the decision-making process in public administration, 
as well as in the local administration agencies (municipalities). Article 6 stipulates that 
the departmental boards throughout the public sector will be comprised to a minimum of 
1/3 by members of each sex 473 Although the scope of the relevant provision formally 
covers entities of the private sector as well, it only does so as far as appointments or 
recommendations made by the Administration are concerned. In reality, therefore, the 
quota leaves the private sector essentially unaffected.
471 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, supra no. 434, p. 29.
472 It will be argued, however, later on in this thesis that the obligation to achieve a state o ffu ll and effective 
equality may in fact entail, in certain cases, an obligation  on the part o f  the state to introduce quotas in 
order to address severe under-representation in particular employment cadres.
473 Article 6 reads as follows: “a. In every departmental board o f  state organisations, o f  entities o f  the public 
sector and o f  local administration agencies, the number o f  members o f  each sex nominated by the 
Administration shall be equal to at least 1/3 o f those nominated [ ...] . b. In cases o f  appointment or 
recommendation by the public Administration to entities o f  the public sector or local administration 
agencies o f  members o f  the board or o f  other collective managing bodies o f  entities o f  the public sector or 
o f  local administration agencies, the number o f appointed or recommended persons o f  each sex shall 
correspond to at least 1/3 o f  those appointed or recommended [ .. .]” [translated from Greek].
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Arguably the most well-known example of such a scheme is the Police (Northern 
Ireland) Act 2000,474 which established a quota system on grounds of religious belief in 
the recruitment of police officers. The severe under-representation of the Catholic 
community in the police force led to the creation of this rule, whereby an even number of 
“persons who are treated as Roman Catholic” and “persons who are not so treated”475 will 
be appointed 476 On the contrary, when it comes to the private sector, Northern Irish 
equality legislation imposes only monitoring duties on employers 477
In other Member States, however, such as France, Austria and Sweden,478 
statutory quota systems explicitly cover private employers alongside public authorities 479 
It is obvious that this lack of uniformity in the normative responses to inequalities creates 
further inequalities, only this time between EU nationals from different Member States. 
Disabled employees in France, for instance, may benefit from the quota establishing that 
at least 6% o f the workforce across the public and private sectors480 is comprised by 
disabled persons,481 while disabled employees in Greece do not enjoy a similar 
entitlement. Although in principle this is a reflection of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine that guarantees national regulatory autonomy in the EU institutional edifice, the
474 HMSO 2000, chapter 32.
475 Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, section 46 (1), under (a) and (b) respectively.
476 It is evident that the system in question introduces a parity  requirement, in the sense that the quota will 
only be satisfied if  the members o f the under-represented community selected amount to the 50% o f the 
total number o f  appointees.
477 Under Article 55 (2) o f  the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 employers 
with more than ten employees have an obligation to monitor the religious composition o f  their workforce.
478 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, supra no. 434, p. 29.
479 It should be noted that the legislation in question involves quotas in favour o f  disabled persons. Despite 
the general conclusion reached in section 6.2.3 above regarding the correct characterisation o f  measures in 
favour o f disabled persons, it is quite clear in both these cases that the measures should be classified as” 
positive action” rather than “reasonable accommodation”, as they require that disabled persons constitute at 
least a minimum percentage o f  the workforce.
480 For employers that occupy at least twenty fiill-time employees.
481 Article 1.5212-2 o f  the French Labour Code.
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normative discrepancy is difficult to justify when the factual circumstances of the target 
groups in the respective Member States are identical. In other words, if under­
representation of women in decision-making bodies of the Civil Service is equally severe 
in the UK as in Greece, it is difficult to see how the aggressive legal initiative of the 
Greek legislator, with the introduction of a gender quota, and the normative inertia of the 
UK legislator, with the absence of a similar quota, can both be legitimate answers to the 
same question.
Following on from that remark, there is yet another possibility with regard to the 
way Member States internalise EU positive action law and put into effect the ECJ 
interpretation of it. National anti-discrimination legislation may, in fact, prohibit the use 
of quotas as a form of positive action in employment, as is the case in the UK. With the 
possible exception of the Disability Discrimination Act,482 UK equality instruments do 
not permit the use of quotas in favour o f any disadvantaged or under-represented group in 
the employment field.483 The resulting state of affairs is, inevitably, an oxymoron. An 
interpretation of the Race Relations Act [RRA] or the Sex Discrimination Act [SDA] that 
leaves no room for flexible result quotas is at odds with EU law, insofar as it prohibits an 
equality device that has been declared legitimate - at least in the context of gender - by 
the ECJ.484 What is even more disturbing is that, in practice, this incompatibility cannot 
be effectively challenged, either domestically or at an EU level, as under Community law 
Member States are under no obligation to introduce quotas.
482 Collins, H., K. D. Ewing, et al. (2005). Labour Law: Text and Materials. Hart., p. 307.
483 This is true under the Race Relations Act 1976 [RRA], even in its current form as the Race Relations 
Amendment Act 2000, as well as under the Sex Discrimination Act 1976 [SDA],
484 A. McColgan, supra no. 249, chapter 3.
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The only way this schema may result in a justiciable claim is if a British employer 
wishes to introduce a flexible results racial quota in order to achieve a more diverse 
workforce and is prevented from doing so in view of the RRA or the SDA.485 It is 
submitted that such a claim would have a high probability of success under the new 
Equality Directives, as discussed earlier.486 But even if this prediction is accurate, 
successful individual claims by private employers are not envisaged in Community law 
as the appropriate mechanism through which the goal o f full and effective equality is to 
be pursued and eventually accomplished. In fact, these considerations bring to the fore 
another significant dimension of the tenuous relationship between Community law and 
national jurisdictions in this area, namely the normative gap between the public and 
private sectors.
Although the basic normative framework, as set out in primary law,487 has been 
long found capable of bearing horizontal effect,488 the preceding analysis has made it 
clear that a number of domestic jurisdictions opt for a “conservative” approach that 
leaves the private sector outside the regulatory scope of positive action schemes. From a 
purely statistical point of view this already poses serious difficulties for the achievement 
of full and effective equality in employment, given that a very significant portion of 
employees works in the private sector. What is even more important is that a female
485 The other possibility would be for the European Commission to institute Article 226 proceedings against 
the British government with a view to identifying the UK ’s failure to comply with the Community equality 
regime. This, however, seems a rather unlikely option, because o f  its dubious practical effects. Unless there 
is some evidence that British employers wish to introduce quotas and are prevented from doing so by 
domestic law, it is doubtful whether the Commission would be willing to treat the matter as a priority on an 
already busy agenda.
486 It should be noted once again, however, that the new Equality Directives have not as yet been placed 
under the scrutiny o f  the ECJ.
487 For instance Article 141 (1) EC on equal pay.
488 Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2) [1976] ECR 455.
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employee in the public sector may be treated differently compared to a female employee 
in the private sector, despite the fact that their respective personal circumstances may be 
identical for all intents and purposes.489
489 At least insofar as equality considerations are concerned.
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6.4 The Problem of Merit: Meritocracy v. Full Equality in Europe
What distinguishes employment from the other two categories of social activity 
identified in Part III of this thesis490 is, above all else, the nature, content and significance 
of the merit principle in determining equality rights and obligations. The relationship 
between merit and equality is a rather complicated one and cannot be fully deciphered in 
the limited space of this section. What can be answered, however, is whether certain 
interpretations of the merit principle constitute an obstacle to the accomplishment offu ll 
and effective equality.
First o f all, there is little, if any, disagreement that in the field of employment 
merit is a key consideration that informs both general policy and concrete decisions. 
Within a liberal political and theoretical framework it is the “best person for the job” that 
should, in principle, be preferred. Who actually is the best person for the job, however, is 
the subject of significant controversy, as there is no consensus in the literature regarding 
the correct interpretation of merit.
Merit, therefore, can easily be classified as an essentially contested concept.491 
Although there appears to be relative consensus on its role as an indispensable criterion 
of selection between individual candidates applying for a job,492 there is no agreement 
either on the types of attributes that should count towards constructing its actual content
490 Namely elected public office and sensitive areas o f  the public sphere. See infra chapters 7 and 8 
respectively.
491 On the notion o f  essentially contested concepts see W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", 
Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society, Vol.56, (1956), pp.167-198.
492 See, however, contra J. Rawls, supra no. 20, pp. 101-104. Rawls argues that, insofar as merit is 
premised on natural talents, its use as a criterion o f  selection or appointment is no less arbitrary than the 
use o f  gender or race, given that distribution o f  talents is not down to individual choice. For a forceful 
critique o f  merit see also I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, supra no.2, p. 200 et seq. 
(“The Myth o f  Merit”).
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or on the relative weight each of these attributes should carry. Dworkin’s famous 
distinction between concepts and conceptions493 has undeniable resonance with this 
conundrum: the concept of merit seems to be common to all those who use it or refer to 
it, but the meaning each actor or commentator ascribes to it may differ substantially, 
depending on the particular conception at play.
Any attempt to identify the place of merit in the new equality paradigm under 
European law, therefore, should begin by examining the basic theoretical formulations of 
merit. McCrudden has done some important work in this area, presenting a detailed 
typology of “merit principles” that comprises five different models.494 For present 
purposes, however, it would be more useful to adopt an alternative categorisation that 
will reveal more clearly the problems each of the main approaches poses in the pursuit of 
full and effective equality. Four main categories can be identified in this regard: 
procedural, contributory, functionalist and constructivist approaches to the definition of 
merit.
Procedural approaches understand merit as a principle of due process 495 They 
postulate that merit guarantees a “widespread procedural fairness in the evaluation of 
qualifications for positions”.496 The intellectual affinity of this view with formal equality 
is self-evident. It is inevitable, then, that such a conception of merit is entirely inadequate 
to ensure full and effective equality. As Young eloquently puts it, “normatively and
493 Dworkin, R. (1972). "The Jurisprudence o f  Richard Nixon." The New York Review o f  Books 18(8)., pp. 
27-28. For a recent analysis o f  the notion see Collier, D., F. D. Hidalgo, et al. (2006). "Essentially contested 
concepts: Debates and applications." Journal o f  Political Ideologies 11(3): 211-246.
494 McCrudden, C. (1998). "Merit Principles." Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 18(4): 543-579.
495 For a prime example see Fishkin, J. (1983). Justice. Equal Opportunity and the Family. Yale University 
Press.
496 Ibid, p. 22.
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culturally neutral measures of individual performance do not exist for most jobs”.497 
Assuming, then, that procedural safeguards in the selection process are somehow enough 
to ensure equality of treatment, is reflective of a naive view of employment relations that 
completely disregards the reality of endemic inequalities in the workplace.
Contributory approaches, on the other hand, conceptualise merit as desert498 or 
reward.499 They view merit as the encapsulation of individual worth, which should be the 
ultimate criterion o f selection. According to Hayek, for instance, merit should be 
conceived as reward for past “attributes of conduct that make it deserving of praise, that 
is, the moral character o f  the action and not the value o f  the achievement” [emphasis 
added].500 Merit, then, stems from attributes an agent has rather than from the value of 
what the agent does.501 This understanding of merit is undoubtedly counter-intuitive, at 
least insofar as allocation of jobs is concerned, and the objections against it from a point 
of view of efficiency and productivity costs are obvious.502 For present purposes one 
could add to these that a conception of merit as reward or desert does not seem to 
promote in any way the objective of full and effective equality, especially since it is 
generally hostile to positive action as a legitimate mechanism to achieve equality.503
Functionalist approaches to merit appear to be more in tune with liberal normative 
reality and are, consequently, worthy of more analytical attention. Merit here is
497 1. M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, supra no.2, p. 202.
498 Sandell, M. (1982). Liberalism and the Limits o f  Justice. Cambridge University Press., pp. 72-76.
499 Hayek, F. A. (1960). The Constitution o f  Liberty. University o f  Chicago Press., p. 94.
500 Ibid, as cited by McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 552.
501 Lucas, J. (1993). Responsibility. Oxford University Press. What the agent does, according to Lucas, is 
reflected in the notion o f  desert.
502 McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 553.
503 Kamp, A. R. (2002). "The Missing Jurisprudence o f Merit." The Boston University Public Interest Law 
Journal H (2-3): 141-166.
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understood as a combination of ability and effort504 or effort and achievement.505 The 
content of merit is, in this view, strictly job-related and involves the capacity to produce 
either specific job-related results or beneficial results for the organisation as a whole.506 
The “best person for the job”, then, is whoever possesses “precisely those qualities of 
excellence needed to perform a functionally defined task”.507 In order to make accurate 
predictions o f future performance, it is essential to make use of “performance proxies”,508 
such as taking account of formal qualifications acquired through education and testing 
results of abilities and skills. Functionalist approaches, therefore, are primarily concerned 
with what might be termed substantive objectivity: individual candidates “compete” with 
each other with a view to achieving the highest possible score on a set of criteria 
designed to measure their potential success in the role awaiting them.
In theory this may, indeed, sound as a straightforward, almost mechanical 
exercise, no more difficult than counting the score in a football match in order to declare 
the winner. Without a doubt, however, comparing the “merits” of two or more individual 
candidates for a particular job is an immensely complicated task.509 It involves an 
elaborate “adding-up” of both visible and subtle qualities, some of which are easily 
identifiable and measurable and some of which are not, with a view to comparing
504 Jacobs, L. A. (2004). Pursuing Equal Opportunities: The Theory and Practice o f  Egalitarian Justice. 
Cambridge University Press, p. 88. See also Daniels, N. (1996). Justice and Justification: Reflective 
Equilibrium in Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, p. 303.
505 Nielsen, K. (1985). Liberty and Equality. Rownman and Allanheld., pp. 104-112.
506 This categorisation encompasses the three latter models o f merit that McCrudden distinguishes (under 
C, D and E). See McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 559 et seq., 562 et seq. and 566 et seq.
507 Fallon, R. (1980). "To Each According to His Ability, From None According to His Race: The Concept 
o f Merit in the Law o f  Antidiscrimination." Boston University Law Review 60: 815-878.Also cited by 
McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 559.
508 1. M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f Difference, supra no. 2, p. 206.
509 Kelman, M. (1991). "Concepts o f  Discrimination in ‘General Ability’ Job Testing." Harvard Law 
Review 104(6): 1157-1247.; Selmi, M. (1995). "Testing for Equality: Merit, Efficiency and the Affirmative 
Action Debate." University o f  California Los Angeles Law Review 42(5): 1251-1314.
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individual “total scores”. Simply put, when the ability to lead and the ability to work as 
part of a team are both deemed essential qualifications for a particular job, there is no 
objective metric system through which to choose between a slightly better leader over a 
slightly better team-player.510
From an equality of treatment point of view this indeterminacy alone is enough to 
undermine the celebrated objectivity of such metric systems.511 What must be highlighted 
is that functionalist approaches are susceptible to the same objection that was raised 
against procedural approaches, regarding their attachment to a formal conception of 
equality. In this case, the problem arises when one considers that formal educational 
qualifications, for instance, may have been obtained against the backdrop of different 
individual circumstances, which may have been shaped, to an extent, by discrimination. 
In other words, functionalist approaches leave no room whatsoever to consider the 
obstacles that women of ethnic minority candidates may have faced in the process of 
acquiring what is now measured as merit. A notion of full and effective equality in 
employment must surely be sensitive to such personal differences and, for this reason, 
functionalist approaches to merit seem too narrowly constructed to be of any use in this 
respect.
The final category encompasses constructivist approaches to merit. These are 
characterised by a “bipolar” understanding of merit, which reflects a middle o f  the road 
approach in comparison to the other three categories. Procedural and contributory 
approaches seem to be more concerned with the individual', they involve safeguards 
against biased selection criteria and consideration for past individual attributes
5.0 See also McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 561.
5.1 For a well-founded and more detailed criticism along these lines see McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 520; 
I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, supra no.2, p. 206 et seq.
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respectively. Functionalist approaches, on the contrary, are geared towards maximising 
the benefits for either the employer or society as a whole,512 through ensuring the highest 
possible level of performance according to reasonable predictions. Constructivist 
approaches cut across this dichotomy by asserting that merit consists in the possession of 
qualities of general value, combined with the probability that these qualities will be 
useful in carrying out a specific function ,513 It is evident that constructivist approaches 
have a basic functionalist element but do not stop at that. Qualities, such as intelligence 
or integrity, that are generally considered useful in any area of the employment field also 
come into the equation when assessing who is the most meritorious candidate.
These approaches have been labelled constructivist exactly because they seem to 
be implicitly premised on the assumption that persons construct their own knowledge and 
understanding as they go along. They are, thus .forward-looking, as the principal question 
they pose is who can learn to do the job better.514 They are more concerned with what 
individual candidates can achieve in the future on the basis of who they are, rather than 
on what they have achieved in the past as a measure of their true abilities.
The principal benefit, then, of such conceptions of merit is that they are capable of 
breaking the vicious circle of discrimination, whereby the obstacles that women or ethnic 
minorities faced in the process of acquiring their qualifications impact on their 
opportunities in the labour market. Factors that indirectly discriminate against particular 
groups, therefore, are either absent from this definition of merit or given much less
512 Depending on the overall social significance o f the functionally defined tasks related to the job. It is fair 
to assume, for instance, that selecting the best candidate for the job o f  a neurosurgeon in a public hospital 
will be beneficial both to the employer-hospital and to the general public.
513 See R. Fallon,supra no. 507, p. 826. See also McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 557, where he describes his 
notion o f  general "common sense " merit.
514 Miller, D. (1999). Principles o f  Social Justice. Harvard University Press., p. 156 et seq.
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weight in selection processes.515 On the contrary, factors such as the diversity of 
experiences and insights one can bring into the workforce,516 for instance, become part of 
this wider definition of merit.
Constructivist approaches are, consequently, very attractive for present purposes, 
as they seem compatible with the objective of full and effective equality. This, however, 
does not entail that the current normative framework is inspired by a constructivist 
conception of merit. The reason is primarily down to the legal uncertainty that such a 
broad definition is bound to create. If it is difficult to objectively measure skills and 
abilities that have been or can be formally tested, it should be conceded that it is even 
more difficult to evaluate qualities that are not easily quantifiable. Moral judgments 
concerning a person’s integrity, for instance, are subjective, if not arbitrary. Selections 
processes based on such judgments, consequently, are prone to relativism. The problem is 
accentuated further when the need of ascribing different weight to different qualities is 
taken into account.
What the preceding analysis has demonstrated, then, is that the lack of consensus 
on the definition of merit may be, to a certain extent, justified due to the inherent 
philosophical difficulties in finding a compromise with regard to essentially contested 
concepts. This conclusion leaves us none the wiser as to how full and effective equality in 
employment can be attained through positive action, without the latter being curtailed by 
the uncompromised primacy of individual merit. However, there is one aspect of the 
debate for which the lack of consensus may be illuminating. Once it has been accepted 
that there is no single and uniform conception of merit operating across the employment
515 McCrudden, supra no. 494, p. 558.
516 See generally L. Barmes and S. Ashtiany, supra no. 307.
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spectrum, the most important question that arises is who determines what merit means in 
each case, either for a particular job or within a sector.
From a normative point of view this is primarily a question of state intervention, 
pertaining to the extent to which the latter is permissible in determining the content of 
merit. The range of possible answers to this question is, again, indicative of deeper 
philosophical allegiances regarding the appropriate role of the state in a liberal 
democratic framework. An ultra-liberal or libertarian free market approach, for instance, 
as encapsulated in Nozick’s thinking,517 would firmly deny the legitimacy of imposing a 
state-made definition of merit on private employers, who should be left to decide for
CIO
themselves what kind of qualifications and abilities best suit their business. It is 
difficult, however, to see how such a minimalist understanding of the state’s regulatory 
powers can uphold the commitment to full and effective equality. This is especially true 
in view of the fact that the use of quotas or preferential treatment may be the only 
effective means of addressing severe under-representation of particular social groups in 
employment cadres.
The fact of the matter, then, is that full and effective equality cannot materialise 
into normative reality in the absence of a more nuanced and well thought-out approach to 
the types of measures that are permissible within each particular context. This will enable 
a conceptual compromise regarding the way merit should influence selection processes in 
different areas of the public sphere.
517 Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy. State and Utopia. The Perseus Books Group.
518 R. A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Law, Harvard 
University Press, 1992, p. 163 .
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CHAPTER 7: POSITIVE ACTION IN POLITICS519
7.1 Introduction
Within the existing normative framework it is generally accepted that positive 
action in employment is, in principle, a legitimate weapon in the fight for full and 
effective equality. When it comes to elected public office, however, the issue seems to be 
doctrinally unclear and politically controversial. Although a number of European 
countries have implemented some form of positive action in favour of women in politics, 
the dominant position in the literature appears to be that candidature for political office 
does not constitute “employment” in the sense of EU law. The matter, therefore, remains 
at the first instance outside the scope of Article 141 EC and the provisions of the Equal 
Treatment Directive, and is, consequently, left to the regulatory discretion of Member 
States. The tension is obvious: achieving full gender equality forms part of the main 
objectives of the Union; yet the laws of the latter are seen as imposing no positive 
obligation to that effect in the one area of the public sphere where individual actors are 
vested with the authority to exercise state power at the highest level. If this is true, then 
how can the goal offu ll gender equality ever be truly accomplished?
Justifying the use of quotas in the realm of politics, however, is far from easy and 
straightforward. Candidates here are not selected but elected through public vote, the 
latter being the ultimate expression of the democratic principle. Prima facie, then, an 
interference with the expression of public will seems unwelcome and should, in principle,
519 This chapter relies heavily on Kapotas P. (2010). "Gender Quotas in Politics: The Greek System in the 
Light o f  EU Law." European Law Journal 16(1): 29-46.
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be kept to a bare minimum. The issue becomes more complicated when one takes into 
account that the merit of candidates for elected office is largely irrelevant. Or, to put it 
more accurately, individual qualifications are only as relevant as the electorate perceives 
them to be when choosing the representative of their choice. As it has been correctly 
pointed out, there is no job description setting out the essential qualities of a successful 
MP.520
It is evident, then, that positive action in politics cannot operate in the same way 
as in employment. Starting from this assumption, this chapter will pursue three analytical 
goals: first, to identify the types of positive measures that can be used to address under­
representation of particular social groups in elected public bodies. Second, to examine the 
position of EU law and, more specifically, to answer whether and under what conditions 
the Badeck formula may determine the conditions of legitimacy in this context. And, 
third, to consider how quotas in politics fit into the larger Union project to achieve full 
and effective equality, even outside the framework of employment.
520 See Rogers, R. and R. Walters (2006). How Parliament Works. Pearson., p. 92.
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7.2 What Type of Positive Action? Classical Quota Systems and Parity.
One of the main reasons behind the analytical distinction between employment 
and politics relates to the types of measures that can be used in each context. Although 
the full range of measures is in principle available in both cases, softer forms of positive 
action are either irrelevant or ineffective when it comes to addressing under­
representation of social groups in elected public bodies. Training of candidates, at least in 
a literal sense, seems inconceivable and does not come into the equation at all. 
Encouragement, on the other hand, o f women or other under-represented groups to stand 
for election may indeed be useful to an extent. Measures that aim to improve the 
infrastructure of supporting social services521 or to take account of specific needs and 
preferences related to group identity can go some way into removing possible 
disincentives for candidates from under-represented groups. Nonetheless, such measures 
can have little more than a peripheral effect and only once candidates have already been 
elected in office. They are unlikely, in other words, to make any difference with regard to 
“access” to candidatures and, consequently, they are bound not to have a substantial 
impact on the imbalanced composition of representative bodies.
It is unsurprising, then, that the present enquiry focuses exclusively on quotas, as 
the only truly significant form of positive action in politics. This methodological choice is 
rooted in normative reality, as European jurisdictions tend to use variations of quota 
systems in order to address gender under-representation in elected offices.522 For present 
analytical purposes these variations are classified into two large categories: “classical”
521 Such as adequate childcare facilities for parents that are the primary caretakers in their family.
522 Caul, M. (2001). Political Parties and the Adoption o f  Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross-national 
Analysis, Journal o f  Politics. 63: (4). 1214-1229
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quota systems and parity systems. In order to assess whether these systems are compatible 
with the principle of equal treatment and to evaluate their success in pursuing the goal of 
full equality the following sections will examine a paradigmatic example of each 
category.
7.2.1 The Greek and French positive action systems fo r  elected public office 
Since the early 1980s Greek theory and case-law have struggled with the notion 
o f positive measures as a possible means to achieve a more balanced participation of the 
sexes in politics. The situation was further complicated by the introduction o f restrictive 
quotas designed to limit the participation of women in certain employment areas, the 
legality o f which was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court (hereinafter SAC).523 
All doubts regarding the constitutionality of genuine positive measures and the illegality 
o f restrictive quotas in Greece have definitively ended since April 2001, when the revised 
Constitution entered into force.524 Alongside the constitutional reform, a new piece of 
legislation introducing quotas in favour of female candidates for election entered into 
force in 2000 and 2001. Law 2910/2001 in its article 75 para 2 provides that the number 
of candidates of each sex in the local and regional elections (for the 1st and 2nd degrees of
523 Until 1998 the Greek courts were, indeed, quite comfortable with upholding the constitutionality o f  
differential treatment towards women on account o f  their biological differences to the male sex. As early as 
in 1977 the SAC held that ‘derogations from this principle [of equal treatment], [are] lawful [ ...] , provided 
that they are stipulated by a formal law and justified by sufficient reasons concerning either the necessity to 
accord increased protection to women, especially in the fields o f  maternity, marriage and family [ ...]  or the 
purely biological differences that require the adoption o f  particular measures o f  differential treatment 
according to the subject matter or the relation to be regulated’ (SAC 3217/1977).
524 Its new article 116 para 2 settles the issues by providing that: a) the adoption o f positive measures for 
the promotion o f  equality between men and women does not constitute gender discrimination and b) the 
State undertakes the obligation to abolish all de facto existing inequalities, especially against women.
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local administration) must be equal to at least 1/3 of the total number o f candidates in 
each party list.
The rationale and aim of Law 2910/2001 are prima facie quite straightforward: 
under-representation of women in elected office can only be logically explained by 
reference to institutional, covert or indirect discrimination. The Greek Parliament, then, 
introduces an uncomplicated system intended to regulate one of the hottest topics of 
political and legal debate throughout Europe in a “reasonable” and relatively 
“uncontroversial” way. In the justificatory report of article 75 the legislator invokes the 
notion of substantive equality and proclaims the necessity of positive measures for its 
accomplishment. Moreover, it is made clear that positive measures should not be 
understood as derogations from substantive equal treatment but as a necessary means for 
its effective accomplishment and application. The quota in favour of female candidates in 
the regional and municipal elections, then, is in compliance with the state obligations 
arising from international conventions and from EU Law.
The quota in question can be described as “rigid” and “soft” at the same time. It is 
a “soft” quota as it does not - and cannot - include a proviso limiting the scope of its 
application. In other words, the political parties are under an absolute obligation to abide 
by the quota, on pain of nullity of their electoral lists. The issue of individual 
qualifications is here irrelevant, since the quota, on the one hand, does not correspond to 
a tie-break type of rule and the concept o f merit, on the other, does not resonate with 
political participation in the same way as with employment.
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Since the late 1990’s most Greek political parties had already incorporated some 
form of quota in favour of women in their internal selection procedures,525 following the 
trend in most EU Member States.526 As a result, the implementation of the new provision 
did not meet with considerable resistance within the parties. The use of quotas in 
principle, however, as a mechanism to remedy the problem of under-representation in the 
political field brings forth unresolved tensions with the fundamental democratic principle, 
especially in the context of representative democracy. Before turning to examine these 
issues more closely, let us look at the other type of positive action system designed to 
tackle women’s under-representation in elected office, namely French parity.
The positive action provisions of the French electoral legislation are inspired by 
the principle of parity, which was introduced by the constitutional reform of 1999.527 
Although the term parity itself appears in neither the French Constitution nor the 
Electoral Act, it is used more often than not in the academic literature to describe the 
French system of positive action in politics. This system comprises two sets of measures 
applying respectively to elections using lists and elections in single member 
constituencies. For the former the law requires equal numbers of male and female 
candidates within every six-name sequence on the party electoral list, on pain of nullity
525 See Stratigaki, M. (16 July 2000 ). noaooxcbaeiq: Tiva avayKaio Kaico” [Quotas: A necessary evil]. 
KopiaK&Tiicp Auyf) Tnewspaper], Greece.
526 In the year 2000, fifty three political parties in the EU had specific policies in order to ensure stronger 
participation o f  women in their decision-making bodies and thirty one among them implemented specific 
quotas ranging from 20% to 50% (source: www.db-decision.de).
527 See generally Sineau, M. (2002). Institutionnalisation de la parite : L ’experience fran?aise. Les femmes 
au parlement: au-dela du nombre. International IDEA.
528 This is the equivalent o f  the British “first past the post” electoral system.
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of the list. For the latter, the law provides that a party’s state funding  will be reduced, if 
less than 49% of its total candidates belong to each sex.529
On the face of it, French parity does not appear to be all that different from the 
more “conventional” and straightforward Greek quota system in terms of its actual
C 'J A
results, despite the obvious disparity in the scope of application and the ultimate 
“threshold” of gender equality they aim to achieve.531 Careful scrutiny, however, reveals 
that the concept of parity, properly understood and analysed, has a number of 
consequences that render its justification more difficult than that of the Greek quota 
system. The arguments against parity attack, in turn, its relationship with equality and 
with democracy.
7.2.2 Comparative analysis: Classical quotas systems and parity as mechanisms 
fo r  fu ll equality
Parity should be understood as an operational mechanism intended to guarantee 
the effectiveness of the principle of gender equality. This definition of parity does not 
distinguish it conceptually from classical positive action: it is designed to address the 
same problem as any quota system, namely the unjustifiable under-representation of 
women that can only stem from institutionalised indirect discrimination. Moreover, the 
fact that the scope of most quota systems in Europe, including the Greek one, is generally 
narrower in that it excludes national parliamentary elections constitutes a conscious
529 For a more detailed analysis see L^pinard, E. (2006). "Identity without Politics: Framing the Parity Laws 
and Their Implementation in French Local Politics." Social Politics: International Studies in Gender. State 
& Society 13(1): 30-58.
530 Parity covers all elections, including general elections, while the Greek law applies only to municipal 
and local elections.
531 Parity aims at an optimum o f  50-50 gender representation, while the Greek quota system sets the more 
modest goal o f  a minimum 1/3 participation o f  each sex in the electoral lists.
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policy choice that reflects socio-political particularities in each individual country. It is 
safe to assume that the Greek legislation in question would encounter more political 
resistance in Parliament and social resistance in various fora, were it to impose the same 
strict quota on Parliamentary seats. There is nothing, however, to suggest that a more 
widely applicable quota would not be equally compatible with EU law as the existing 
system. It follows that the difference in scope between French parity and the Greek 
electoral legislation in force is irrelevant for the purposes of the present enquiry or, to put 
it more accurately, it is insufficient to sustain any meaningful analytical distinction 
between the two systems.
What seem to be more important in this context are the conceptual premises and 
the corresponding objectives of parity.532 The philosophical underpinnings of parity are 
inspired by a conception of equality o f  outcome:533 since women comprise roughly half of 
the population, the optimum model of political representation is one in which half of the 
elected positions in all political institutions are occupied by women. Any inequality in 
representation thereof must be amended by means of legal intervention, which will be 
tailored to ensure an absolute balance between the sexes. In this regard, parity is much 
more “ambitious” than the Greek quota system in that it sets out to accomplish this 
optimum and not merely to establish an “acceptable” minimum of representation in the 
democratic polity, which is the principal objective of the Greek quota system.
532 For a detailed analysis see Milard, E. (2005). Constituting Women: The French Ways. The Gender o f  
Constitutional Jurisprudence. B. B. a. R. Rubio-Marin, Cambridge University Press., p. 122-148, esp. at 
143 et seq.
533 A. Phillips, supra no. 23, esp. pp. 11-12.
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This commitment to a single optimum model of political representation is 
problematic in that it is prone to essentialism,534 since it implicitly presupposes that 
women’s interests are best represented by women on account of their common group- 
membership.535 Such a presumption shifts the emphasis from qualitative to quantitative 
considerations and, thus, may bring to the forefront of the analysis the notion of formal 
equality. In other words, at the core of the concept of parity lies the simplistic idea that 
gender equality can be achieved and measured solely on grounds of numbers. Although it 
is undeniable that numbers do matter, most advocates of positive action are always quick 
to point out that increasing female participation is not panacea. It is commonplace to 
assert that during the Thatcher premiership in the UK women, if anything, did not benefit 
from the policies and legislative priorities of the female-led government.
This is not to deny any value whatsoever to the increased participation of women 
in politics by means of positive action, especially given that all quota systems are 
designed to achieve primarily an increase in numbers. The fundamental problem with 
parity, however, which seems to be particular to this version of positive action, is that it 
does not simply set minimum quantitative requirements with a view to probe a qualitative 
change - as, for instance, the Greek quota system does. Instead, it assumes that if 
numbers reach the desired maximum, the change in the gender balance of power will 
automatically be a qualitative one. Its conceptual flaw, then, consists in the confusion 
between visibility - which is, of course, desirable but not nearly enough in itself - and
534 See contra Ruiz, B. R. and R. Rubio-Marin (2008). "The Gender o f  Representation: On Democracy, 
Equality and Parity." International Journal o f Constitutional Law 6(2): 287-316.
535 Siim, B. (2000). Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France. Britain and Denmark. 
Cambridge University Press., pp. 68-69.
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genuine representativness - which is a precondition for accomplishing full and effective 
gender equality.
Arguably the most problematic aspect of parity, then, is its tenuous relationship 
with the principle o f democracy. Parity undertakes the cost of limiting individual freedom 
of choice with a view to ensuring a “fairer” representation of the gender composition in 
society. In this way, anything below a 50 percent female participation in elected office is 
deemed unsatisfactory, because it is conceived of as a product of indirect discrimination. 
This is particularly apparent with the measures applying to elections using lists, where 
state funding will be proportionally curtailed if the number of female candidates fails to 
reach the threshold of 49 percent. Simply put this entails that a political party presenting a 
list of candidates comprised by female candidates in 40 or 45 percent is deemed to fa ll 
short o f  full gender equality.
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7.3 Gender Quotas in Elected Public Office and EU Law: Does The Badeck Formula 
Apply?
As it has already been explained in detail,536 it is now generally accepted that 
positive action in employment is permitted in principle as a matter of EU law. After a 
period of trial and error the ECJ has formalised its approach and standardised the set of 
conditions that positive action schemes need to satisfy in order to pass the test o f legality. 
The Badeck formula affirms that gender quotas in employment are compatible with 
Community law when they operate as a tie-breaker between equally qualified candidates 
and insofar as they are neither automatic nor unconditional.
When it comes to political candidature the issue becomes considerably more 
complex. Both Article 141(4) EC and article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive537 as 
amended,538 which set the principal legal framework for positive action in the EU, are 
primarily designed to apply to employment. Although positive measures in political 
candidature have not yet been challenged before the ECJ, it is fair to assume that, if the 
Court were to classify the selection of party candidates as an employment matter, there 
are potential problems of compatibility with Community law in view of Badeck.539 The 
Greek quota system does not provide for an objective assessment of all candidates in the 
selection process and appears to be imposing an obligation on political parties to give 
automatic preference to female candidates solely on grounds of their gender. The first set
536 See infra, chapter 4.
537 Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation o f the principle o f  equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions [1976], OJ, 
L39/40.
538 Directive 2002/73/EC.
539 For the British concerns on the matter see Strickland, P., O. Gay, et al. (2001). "Sex Discrimination 
(Election Candidates) Bill." House o f  Commons Library. Research Paper 01(75).
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of questions that arise, then, requires us to consider whether candidature for elected 
public office does fall within the ambit of the “employment law” provisions of EU law 
and, if it does, whether quotas in favour of female candidates fail to satisfy the Badeck 
test.
Since 1998 the European Commission has expressed the opinion that neither 
article 141(4) [then article 119] nor the Equal Treatment Directive apply to candidature 
for election, given that the latter is not an employment relationship covered by a contract 
between employer and employee.540 A further argument supporting this position can be 
drawn from the definition of “worker” under article 39 EC. According to the relevant 
ECJ case-law there are three conditions that a Member State national must fulfil in order 
to qualify as a worker: she must perform services of an economic value, she must 
perform them under direction and she must receive payment for these services.541 Even if 
we assume that candidates for political office satisfy the first and third criteria,542 it is 
difficult to see how the second condition can be met. Candidates should be viewed as 
potential office holders, given that some of them will eventually be elected. Political 
office holders in a democratic society enjoy personal independence and they are not 
under a constitutional obligation to follow the “official party line” on any issue.543 If
540 Commissioner Padraig Flynn, in answer to question E -l 556/98 in the European Parliament from Nal van 
Dijk MEP, June 1998.
541 Case C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wurttemberg [1986], EC R 1-2121.
542 This is rather doubtful: as the Commission suggests, political candidates do not have a contractual 
relation with the party they belong to. Even in view o f  the Court’s over-inclusive and non-exhaustive 
definition o f  “worker”, it is difficult to see how article 39 could apply in this case.
543 It is an entirely different matter that MPs - or even local councillors in some cases - may be “expected” 
to abide by the general principles and policies adopted by their party. Failure to act “under the direction” o f  
the party leadership may result in internal sanctions o f a disciplinary nature or in disapproval by the general 
public in the following elections, but there exists no legal obligation  to follow the official party line.
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political candidates cannot be classified as workers under article 39 EC, then employment 
law provisions should prima facie be inapplicable altogether.
In the absence, however, of a binding determination by the ECJ the matter 
remains open to debate,544 in the sense that it can still be plausibly argued that the Court 
may adopt a broader interpretation of the relevant provisions than the one offered by the 
Commission.545 What is more important is that the conclusion reached above, if 
theoretically sound, allows for potential challenges to positive measures in politics from a 
different angle. By leaving candidate selection outside the scope of article 141(4), it 
eliminates the problem of meeting the Badeck requirements on the one hand, but it infers 
that positive action may not be a legitimate means to achieve “full equality” in politics on 
the other. In other words, if we accept that preference to the member of the under­
represented sex is legitimate only in employment and that political candidature does not 
fall within this framework, we can no longer deduce that positive action in politics is 
legitimate in principle.
It is true that many EU Member States have already incorporated such provisions 
in their electoral legislation and that the competent national bodies -  particularly so in the 
UK - have been extremely careful in the drafting of this legislation in order to avoid the 
possibility of a legal challenge before national courts or the ECJ.546 It is equally true, 
however, that the idea of legally enforceable positive measures in candidate selection is
544 Russell, M. and C. O ’Cinneide (2003). "Positive Action to Promote Women in Politics: Some European 
Comparisons." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52: 587-614., at 607.
545 This is not to argue, o f  course, that a possible ECJ ruling would prevent academic commentators from 
continuing to discuss the matter in its deontological dimension, possibly criticising the interpretation 
adopted by the Court.
546 For instance the Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 amended the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 in order to enable political parties to voluntarily adopt positive measures in favour o f  women in 
their internal selection procedures.
214
not extremely popular and that it is more difficult to theoretically justify, compared to 
positive action in employment or University education. If, therefore, the scope of article 
141(4) is thought to exclude candidature for political office, the presumption of 
legitimacy of positive measures may no longer apply. What needs to be considered in this 
regard, then, is the possibility that candidature for elected office is regulated by non­
employment provisions o f  EU law.
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7.4 If  not Employment. Then What? Positive Action and ‘Full’ Equality in Europe.
Despite its primary law status Article 141 remains in fact lex specialis in terms of 
its scope of application. It is an anti-discrimination provision designed specifically for the 
employment field and with a correspondingly precise wording. Ever since the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, however, the principle of anti-discrimination has become a centrepiece of 
the Treaty. Article 13 enables the Council to take appropriate measures to combat 
discrimination on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation.547 Under Article 13, therefore, positive action seems to be 
permissible in principle, since it is explicitly stated that this provision will be “[w]ithout 
prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty”. Given that there is nothing in the 
wording or spirit of Article 141 para 4 to suggest that positive action is an idiosyncratic 
exception to equal treatment applicable only to the field of employment, it must be 
concluded that Article 13 can uphold the legitimacy of positive measures even outside the 
narrow confines o f  employment /aw.548
The prospect of using Article 13 as a direct legal basis for introducing gender 
quotas in politics appears to be rather enticing. Article 13 encapsulates a general equality 
principle and, insofar as this is the case, it seems appropriate to cover every individual 
equality claim regardless of the particular area of social activity this arises. To the extent, 
therefore, that preferential treatment to female candidates for election is a response to a
547 Article 13 para 1 EC reads as follows: “Without prejudice to the other provisions o f  this Treaty and 
within the limits o f  the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action 
to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation”.
548 Bell, M. (2002). Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union. Oxford University Press., p. 136.
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legitimate equality claim of the candidates themselves, Article 13 should be a sufficient 
justificatory premise. In other words, national positive action schemes such as the Greek 
or the French one are in principle compatible with EU law because they constitute a 
legitimate549 policy by means of which the Member State observes its obligation under 
Article 13.
Although one might be tempted to regard Article 13 as a solid normative 
foundation for positive action in politics, careful scrutiny reveals that such optimistic 
views cannot be justified. The matter is indeed far more complex than it initially appears 
to be, mainly because of the purpose and modus operandi of this provision. Despite the 
explicitly stated views of the European Parliament550 the final version of Article 13 has 
no direct effect, 5 5 1  The Council is empowered with the discretion to take appropriate 
measures to combat discrimination, but it is under no positive obligation to do so.552 If 
this applies to the Council, it is a fortiori the case for Member States and their national 
legislatures.
The lack of direct effect of Article 13 entails that existing positive action schemes 
in politics remain largely unaffected. This is a qualified blessing. National positive 
measures will remain immune to possible challenges from male candidates that were 
omitted from party electoral lists in favour of female candidates in order to satisfy a 
quota. On the same token, however, the absence of national measures guaranteeing a fair 
participation of the sexes in the electoral process will also be impossible to challenge on
549 The legitimacy o f  these schemes, o f  course, also depends upon their satisfying the criteria o f  necessity 
and proportionality.
550 Parliament Resolution on racism, xenophobia and anti-semitism and on the results o f  the European 
Year against racism (1997), 1998, OJ C56/13, paragraph 4.
551 Bell, supra no. 548, p. 125.
552 Ibid.
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grounds o f Article 13. This provision, then, does little more than reiterating a generic 
equality obligation of Member States, leaving the choice of particular policies to the non- 
reviewable margin o f  appreciation of the Member States.
From a “pro-equality” point of view this is by no means a satisfactory state of 
affairs. National legislatures appear to be free to repeal existing quota systems at will, 
even if this is bound to bring about a dramatic decline in female participation in elected 
bodies of the public sphere. National courts will not be able to rely on Article 13 in order 
to uphold the legitimacy of positive measures in politics. Given the insufficient degree of 
harmonisation across national jurisdictions and without the “safety net” of European law, 
there is a real possibility that some national positive action programmes will be stricken 
down. This is all the more true in view of the absence of a standardised test, such as the 
Badeck formula, that would act as an interpretative yardstick for national judiciaries 
when dealing with positive action in politics.
The importance of leaving quotas in favour of female candidates outside the 
regulatory scope o f EU law is often underestimated by the advocates of substantive 
equality. They seem to assume that taking article 141(4) and the Badeck test out of the 
equation will suffice to insulate positive measures in politics from legal challenge at a 
European level. This is not entirely accurate. According to Article 6 para 1 TEU “[t]he 
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect fo r  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” [emphasis added]. The second paragraph of 
this Article denotes that fundamental rights are to be respected “as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. 
Article 3 Protocol 1 of the ECHR imposes on Signatory Parties the obligation to hold
218
democratic elections at regular intervals, under conditions that guarantee the “free 
expression o f  the will o f  the people as to their choice o f  representatives”.
The combined interpretation of this set of provisions leads to the conclusion that 
at least the ECtHR has a clear mandate to determine whether a compulsory quota system 
in political candidature violates the right of citizens to freely choose their representatives 
through democratic elections.553 Since the Convention has a special status as a source of 
EU fundamental rights law, as confirmed by the case-law on a number of occasions,554 it 
is also plausible to suggest that the ECJ as well is in principle vested with the authority to 
decide on the matter. It is, therefore, a mistake to claim that positive action in elected 
public office falls outside the regulatory scope of EU law altogether. Even if Article 
141(4) EC is inapplicable in this case, a legal challenge on the basis o f EU law is still 
possible. Without the presumption of legitimacy that article 141(4) provides, however, 
quotas in politics will be more difficult to justify and the debate will be open to old 
arguments against the use of positive action that have already been rehearsed and 
defeated in most international fora. In this regard, it will be difficult to suggest that the 
state is under a positive obligation to promote gender equality by means of positive action 
in the political spectrum.555
An alternative outlook on the matter seems necessary for the sake of normative 
consistency and legal certainty. At the centre of the proposed analytical framework is the 
relationship between positive action and equality. According to the crystallised position
553 Matthews v. The United Kingdom [Grand Chamber], 18 February 1999, Application no. 24833/94, 
(1999) 28 EHRR361.
554 See inter alia Case C-299/95, Kremzow v Austria [1997], ECR 1-2629; Case C-109/01 Akrich v Home 
Office, Judgment o f  23 September 2003.
555 It should be noted, however, that the argument that the positive state obligation to promote gender 
equality in the political field requires the use o f positive measures is a main point o f  reference in the 
justificatory report o f  the Greek law in question.
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of the ECJ "[...] the general principle of equality [...] is one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law".556 In this respect, it should be understood as being applicable across 
the spectrum o f  Community law. As already explained, since the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam the promotion of gender equality has been identified as an essential 
task of the Community (Article 2 EC), alongside the establishment of the common 
market. It is, therefore, plausible to assert that gender equality should be regarded as a 
general principle o f  Community law on its own right, which can no longer be limited to 
the employment field. The prohibition of gender discrimination is now enshrined in the 
Treaty itself551 supplemented by secondary legislation.558 Articles 21 and 23 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights also encapsulate this broadening of the gender equality 
principle by requiring that the latter is ensured in “all areas”.
What is, though, the true meaning of this principle o f gender equality within 
Community law? Another Treaty provision, Article 141(4), offers ample proof that 
“formal” equality, guaranteed through state neutrality,559 is not the answer; a substantive 
element of pro-active state attitude needs to be introduced in order for fu ll equality to be 
achieved, as required by the wording of Article 141(4). There is no reason to support that 
such interpretation should be confined to employment. If gender equality is, indeed, a 
general principle o f Community law, then its interpretation should be consistent 
throughout the field of its application. Any other solution would be impossible to justify 
normatively and would create a fundamental anomaly in the Community system.
556 Joined Cases Ruckdeschel & Hansa-Lagerhaus Str6h, at 1769.
557 Article 13(1) EC.
558 Most notably the new Equal Treatment Directive (op. cit.)
559 For a discussion on the notion o f  formal equality within the context o f  anti-discrimination law see 
Fredman, supra n o .l, p. 7-11.
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Within this analytical framework the place of positive action becomes clearer. In 
view of the notion of fu ll equality, positive action is a legitimate means to attain a lawful 
public aim. Given that the accomplishment of gender equality cuts across all areas of 
Community law, it follows that positive action in candidature fo r  elected public office 
should be regarded as legitimate in principle. Tackling under-representation of women in 
the political arena must be a priority, if the declared Community objective of genuine 
(‘full’) gender equality is to be achieved. It would be a mistake, therefore, to rule out 
quotas as a mechanism that can facilitate the pursuance of this goal. It would also be 
unwise to cast unnecessary doubts on systems that, after all, have already been used 
successfully in many Member States.
Of course, these systems will not be immune to legal challenge, since all the 
relevant provisions o f Community law stop short from giving Member States unqualified 
discretion as to the type of positive measures they can legitimately introduce. Ultimately, 
the compatibility of each national quota system in politics with EU law is a matter falling 
within the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Sooner or later the Court will have to develop a set of 
criteria of legality for positive measures in political candidature in a similar logic to the 
one used for positive action in employment.
This exercise in legal reasoning, however, could never result in a Badeck-type 
formula. The very essence of democratic elections is to prioritise the collective will of the 
people over individual merit. Simply put, in a democracy no candidate ‘deserves’ to be 
elected. The real question, then, is whether quotas in politics cancel or unjustifiably 
hinder this public expression of preference as to who should be one’s representative. And 
although this question cannot be definitively answered at this stage, one preliminary
conclusion seems possible. If the commitment of European law in all its dimensions to 
full and effective equality is to be meaningful, then it needs to encompass all areas of 
social activity and not be exhausted to employment in the strict sense. Quotas cannot be 
ruled out as a possible means to achieve the end of full equality. The problem, however, 
lies with the inadequacy of the classical conception of positive action to explain and 
justify when and how quotas can be legitimately used in the realm of political 
representation.
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CHAPTER 8: POSITIVE ACTION IN “SENSITIVE” AREAS OF THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE: DIVERSITY ON THE BENCH
8.1 Introduction
Being a judge in a democracy is a blessing and a curse. Judges bear a colossal 
responsibility, not matched even by that of the political leaders that legislate and govern. 
They are destined to perform a noble but difficult - and arguably self-effacing - balancing 
act between maintaining their objectivity and being adequately sensitive towards the 
subjective circumstances of each particular case. They enjoy personal and functional 
independence and they are free from bonds of either hierarchy or representation. At the 
same time, however, they must remain in direct contact with social reality and ensure that 
their interpretations, reasoning and decisions make sense in the socio-political context in 
which they are bom and they are intended to apply.
It is this latter point that has been at the centre of a growing debate over the need 
for diversity on the bench. Although the framing of the issue in terms of gender or racial 
equality is relatively new, the underlying concerns echo traditional debates surrounding 
the nature of liberal democracy and the legitimacy conditions of its institutional 
settlements. Historically, the judiciary has been the object of a certain degree of mistrust 
by a large part of the population in continental Europe throughout the 18th and 19th 
century. Judges were almost invariably perceived of as the torch-bearers of conservatism, 
the living institutional relics of the “ancien regime” after the French revolution, the 
unofficial yet powerful spokespersons of a social elite wishing to uphold and perpetuate
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the status quo. Unsurprisingly, the roots of this mistrust are to be found in the inevitable 
legitimacy concerns arising form the fact that the members of the judiciary are appointed 
rather than elected.
Apart from the ongoing philosophical debate regarding the appropriate boundaries 
of the courts’ prerogative to interpret rather than make or shape the law, the institutional 
score of the judiciary on the democratic board has also been a point of contention for 
other, more literally visible reasons. The typical image of the bench, with white, middle 
to upper-class men as its sole occupants, has always troubled those who traditionally 
associate democracy with the respect to difference.560 Although this image o f uniformity 
is not a product of modernity, the homogeneity in the composition of the judiciary is 
considerably more problematic today than it was up to a couple of centuries ago, both in 
terms of public perception and, as it will be argued, in terms of substance.
In the context o f modern-day Europe the discrepancy between the relatively 
homogeneous image of the judiciary and that of the society it serves has grown to 
alarming proportions. With legal education no longer being the reserve of the privileged 
classes and with increasing numbers of women and ethnic minority University graduates 
across European law faculties, under-representation of these social groups on the bench 
has no resonance with social reality. This is not to argue, of course, that the iconic figure 
of the white male judge could ever be justified from a point of view of social justice, as it 
was always the product of gender or race discrimination, direct or indirect. The point is, 
though, that the problem is exacerbated simply because in 21st century Europe there are
560 Benhabib, S. (1996). Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries o f  the Political. Princeton 
University Press.; A. Phillips, supra no. 67.
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no longer any serious pragmatic reasons, such as the lack of qualified candidates for the 
bench, that could explain, if not justify, this imbalance even in the short term.
Given the cardinal institutional importance of the judiciary within the apparatus of 
the democratic state, it is hardly surprising that this undeniable imbalance calls for 
immediate attention. Positive action, then, automatically emerges as the front-runner in 
the relevant debate, being the obvious candidate to address under-representation of 
women and ethnic minorities on the bench swiftly and aggressively. As with elected 
public offices, however, the legitimacy of positive action in this sensitive area of the 
public sphere is not a given. The issues involved are complex and require careful 
consideration that will result in a clear justificatory rationale, which in turn will 
determine with precision the types of measures that are legitimate.
Accordingly, the aim of this section is to explore the specific theoretical 
arguments that support the need for positive action in the judiciary, provide a coherent 
analytic framework and identify whether and under what conditions positive measures in 
the form of quotas are legitimate in this context.561 Although the normative framework is 
once again European law in a broad sense, the possibility of applying “soft” or “hard” 
quotas to increase the numbers o f female or minority judges will also be examined with 
reference to the British system of judicial appointments. The latter will serve as a useful 
case study to test the legitimacy of its equality strategies against the backdrop of 
European law. It will also provide a concrete normative platform upon which to consider 
what constitutes a fair balance of social representation on the bench, what the ultimate
561 Focusing the enquiry on quotas in this area o f  the public sphere is a justified methodological choice, on 
the basis o f  the fact that the legitimacy o f  less obtrusive forms o f  positive action is not under any serious 
doubt.
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goal in a democratic society should be in this regard and where to draw the line between 
lawful and unlawful means of achieving the desired goal.
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8.2 Four Arguments in Favour of Diversity in the Judiciary
Most arguments regarding the unbalanced composition of the judiciary and the 
necessity to address the issue inevitably tend, in a European academic and political 
context at least, to focus on the gender dimension.562 However, as it will become clear in 
what follows, the philosophical foundations of these arguments are wide enough to 
encompass the equality claims of other social groups and can justify by the same token 
positive action on grounds other than gender. For methodological reasons and with this 
crucial remark in mind the discussion that follows will adhere to the “norm” and consider 
gender under-representation on the bench. It should be noted, though, that gender under­
representation is in principle understood here as a proxy for all aspects of inequality that 
cannot be justified and should be dealt with as a matter of political and legislative 
priority.
Let us now turn to a review of the main types of arguments that have been 
articulated. Across the literature and especially in feminist writings a number of voices 
have been raised in favour of increased representation of women on the bench drawing 
upon different philosophical underpinnings. The conceptual differences between these 
positions, however, which in some cases may involve arguments contradictory or 
mutually exclusive, have not yet received adequate scholarly attention.564 Malleson has 
gone some way into providing theoretical consistency to the discourse, with an attempt to
562 The reasons for such a pragmatic choice have already been identified and discussed at an earlier point. 
See infra
563 As most o f the literature on the matter and most o f  the current policy initiatives are designed to tackle 
gender under-representation in the judiciary,
564 Feenan, D. (2008). "Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity." Journal o f  Law and 
Society 35(41: 490-519., at 491.
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systematise the various arguments and come up with a basic typology.565 She proposes a 
binary distinction between difference-based and equity-based arguments.566 The former 
largely support the thesis that increased numbers of women judges will bring a “new 
dimension”567 to the adjudication process by drawing upon their personal life- 
experiences, which are different from those of the traditional male judge. Equity-based 
arguments, on the other hand, posit that female under-representation in the judiciary can 
only be explained as “the result of unfair arrangements, both past and present, which 
disadvantage women”569
Malleson’s proposed typology is useful in that it juxtaposes the two most easily 
identifiable sources o f argument in favour of positive action in the judiciary. Despite this 
apparent advantage, this classification is by no means exhaustive. Because of its 
principally descriptive purpose, it seems to overlook or underestimate arguments that 
have not yet been forcefully articulated or have not received the attention they merit. 
Naturally, the bulk of academic writing on the matter comes from feminist legal theorists 
and, consequently, it reflects an ideologically-laden view centred on the need to 
overcome male stereotypes that undervalue the female perspective. As a result, 
Malleson’s binary analytical scheme leaves out distinct lines of defence that cannot 
comfortably fit in either of the two categories.
/
A more comprehensive analytical framework is, therefore, proposed here in order 
to examine the justificatory rationale of positive action in the judiciary. Four types of
565 Malleson, K. (2003). "Justifying Gender Equality on the Bench: Why Difference Won’t Do." Feminist 
Legal Studies 11(1): 1-24.
566 Ibid, p. 1.
567 Goldman, S. (1999). Should There be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary? Judicial Politics: Readings 
from the Judicature. E. Slotnick, American Judicature Society.
S68McGlynn, C. (1998). The Woman Lawyer. Butterworths., p. 187.
569 Malleson, supra no.566, p. 15.
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arguments are distinguished, the first two types being difference-based and equity-based 
arguments, as per Malleson’s account, and the last two being democracy-based and 
efficiency-based arguments.
Difference-based argument: The essence of the difference-based argument is that 
diversity in the judiciary is inherently valuable, because it will enable a plurality of 
ethical views, philosophical approaches and personal experiences to inform legal 
reasoning and, hence, improve the quality of justice in a democratic society. The gender 
version of the argument dominates the relevant discourse.570 Echoing traditional views of 
second generation feminists like Carol Gilligan that celebrate the “different voice” of 
women,571 it is premised on the assumption that women approach issues of justice with a 
distinctively female approach, usually referred to as an ethic o f care.572 The latter can 
underpin a more suitable normative framework to provide concrete answers to moral 
dilemmas573 compared to a typically male rights-based approach.574 Bertha Wilson, the 
first woman judge to be named to the Supreme Court of Canada, is credited with the most 
powerful articulation of the argument in the context of the judiciary.575
From a pragmatic point of view difference-based arguments claim that female 
judges will help restore genuine gender neutrality in the law, which suffers from the
570 Malleson, supra no.566, p. 2.
571 C. Gilligan, supra no.87.
572 R. Tong, supra no.84, p. 162-165.
573 Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. University o f  
California Press, p. 3-4.
574 Menkel-Meadow, C. (1985). "Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman’s Lawyering 
Process." Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 1: 39-63., pp. 39-63.
575 Wilson, B. (1990). "Will Women Judges Really Make A Difference?" Osgoode Hall Law Journal 30(1): 
506-522.
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prevalence of stereotypical assumptions576 and inherent gender biases that shape 
supposedly neutral principles.577 Women judges will be able to achieve this exactly 
because they have a different take on normative questions. It is, then what women judges 
will actually do and how they will do it that matters. Once on the bench women judges 
will bring about both substantive change, by prioritising gender equality issues,578 and 
procedural change, by moving away from a “male” model of adjudication focused on 
formalism, universal ism and objectivity579 towards a feminine, problem-solving rather 
than adversarial ethos.580
Increased female participation in the judiciary, therefore, would allow for the 
“female voice” to be heard and this, in turn, would ensure that women’s issues are 
promoted near the top of the agenda. In its most sophisticated versions the difference- 
based argument does not suggest that women judges will necessarily find if favour of 
female plaintiffs or defendants or that they will always be more liberal than their male 
colleagues. It asserts rather that they will be in a position to understand the gender 
perspective or gender implications of a given situation and, thus, will be more 
sympathetic to non-majoritarian views and open to arguments that deviate from 
traditional patterns of adjudication.
The difference-based argument for diversity on the bench has attracted severe 
criticisms, no less from within the feminist jurisprudence circle. Senior female judges
576 Sherry, S. (1986). "The Gender o f  Judges." Law and Inequality 4: 159-169., at 161.
577 Thornton, M. (1996). Dissonance and Distrust: Women in the Legal Profession. Oxford University 
Press.
578 Wickler, N. J. (1987). Identifying and Correcting Judicial Gender Bias. Equality and Judicial Neutrality. 
S. M. a. K. Mahoney, Carswell.
579 Malleson, supra no.566, p.3.
580 Menkel-Meadow, C. (1987). "The Comparative Sociology o f  Women Lawyers: The ‘Feminization' o f  
the Legal Profession." Institute for Social Science Research. Working Paper Series 3.
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both in the United States and in the United Kingdom have led the charge against what 
they perceive of as a slippery slope for the feminist cause. According to a famous excerpt 
by former US Supreme Court Justice Day O’Connor, the first woman to have been 
appointed to the highest judicial office in the US, “[ajsking whether women attorneys 
speak with a ‘different voice’ than men do is a question which is both dangerous and
C O I
unanswerable” [emphasis added].
The question is dangerous because it polarises the normative discourse,
CO*}
stereotypically dividing values into traditionally female and traditionally male ones. 
Such a divide has an obviously essentialist premise in two respects, since it not only 
posits that women will judge differently from men but also that all women will judge in 
the same way.583 Baroness Hale, the first woman to join the House of Lords as a Lord of 
Appeal in Ordinary, unequivocally states that, if this were true, “it would make [women] 
less well qualified to be judges”.584 This line of thought risks reviving traditional 
discriminatory assumptions of merit, whereby men and women are respectively more 
suitable for different categories of work.585 If this is projected on to the judiciary, women 
might, therefore, end up being regarded as better qualified to deal with Family law or 
Employment law cases but not equally well qualified to decide on Criminal law or 
Constitutional law matters.586
581 O’Connor, S. D. (1991). "Portia’s Progress." New York University Law Review 66: 1546-1558., at p. 
1557.
582 Ibid.
583 Fraser, N. (1997). Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the ‘Postsocialist’ Condition. Taylor & 
Francis., p. 102.
584 Hale, B. (2001). Equality and the Judiciary: Why Should We Want More Women Judges?. Public Law., 
p. 489-504.
585 Day O’Connor, supra no.582.
586 Ibid. See also Malleson, supra no.566, p. 13
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The question is also unanswerable simply because there is no conclusive evidence 
as to whether women judges do actually bring to the bench a distinctly feminine quality 
of adjudication. Baroness Hale has argued that it would be “manifestly inaccurate in 
many cases” to claim that female judges have a different outlook on normative questions 
compared to their male colleagues.587 Empirical studies have generally struggled to
roo
identify a statistically significant gender difference. Conclusions of academic 
commentators extrapolating the “feminine voice” from the reasoning of particular 
rulings, in which female judges were involved,589 have been challenged as flawed even 
by the protagonist herself, as in the case of Justice Day O’Connor.590
In view of the weaknesses of the difference-based argument, therefore, it is 
difficult to accept it as an adequate justificatory rationale to uphold positive action for the 
judiciary, at least insofar as it is taken on its own. Even if diversity on the bench is 
desirable, there seems to be no guarantee under the difference approach that this diversity 
will be effectively achieved through quotas or less invasive forms of positive measures.
Equity-based argument'. The deficiencies and controversial assumptions of the 
difference-based argument have led to a gradual shift o f the emphasis in the literature 
towards an equity-based rationale for gender diversity on the bench.591 According to the 
most straightforward version, presented by Malleson, the basic claim boils down to that 
“it is inherently unfair that men enjoy a near monopoly of judicial power”.592 Under­
587 Hale, supra no.585, p. 502.
588 Feenan, supra no.565, p. 492.
589 Sherry, supra no. 5 77
590 Day O’Connor, supra no. 582. See also Malleson, supra no.566. p. 5.
591 Feenan, supra no.565, p. 493.
592 Malleson, supra no.566, p. 15.
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representation of women on the bench cannot be justified from a perspective of justice, as 
no biological or socially constructed quality exists that makes men more suitable to serve 
in the judiciary. As in any other area of employment, in the absence of other plausible 
explanations it must be assumed that under-representation of women in the judiciary 
stems from systemic discrimination against them. Discrimination, direct and indirect, 
overt and covert, past and present, has resulted in “unfair arrangements” that 
“disadvantage women”593 and deprive them of “a fair crack of the whip and an equal 
chance of appointment” on the bench.594
The focus of the equity-based argument, therefore, is on the unfairness against 
women. Unlike the different-based approach, the underpinnings of this rationale are 
entirely disengaged from actual outcomes of a more proportionate gender balance. 
Regardless of whether increased female participation will improve the quality o f  justice 
or not, regardless of what women judges will actually achieve and of how they will 
adjudicate,595 correcting the imbalance in participation is a matter o f  principle. Equal 
participation is a requisite of equal treatment and has little, if anything, to do with where 
the allegiances of female judges will lie.
It goes without saying that the equity-based argument is tailored to justify and 
promote the use of positive action in judicial appointments. Women, both individually 
and as a group, have a right to participate on an equal footing with men in all decision­
making processes in the public sphere. When this basic gender equality right is being 
breached, there is a strong case for addressing the injustice dynamically and at its core. 
Preference to equally qualified female candidates for the bench, therefore, is generally
593 Ibid.
594 Hale, supra no. 585.
595 Malleson, supra no.566, p. 17.
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considered to be a legitimate means of increasing participation without jeopardising the 
merit principle.596 There is no reason to believe that this conclusion could be successfully 
challenged under EU law in view of the Badeck test,597 although the ECJ has not as yet 
had an opportunity to consider a national positive action scheme designed for judicial 
appointments.
Merit is, of course, a critical concern here, even more so than in other areas of 
employment, given the institutional importance of the function of judges in a democracy 
and the complexity of the tasks they are expected to perform. Equity-based arguments do 
not deny that the merit principle should play a central role in judicial appointments. 
Instead they usually attempt to reconstruct the notion of merit in a more comprehensive 
way, so that it includes non-traditional criteria that may not automatically, albeit 
indirectly, favour white male candidates. Arguably, an example of such an inclusive 
definition of merit can be found in the South African Constitution, where diversity o f the 
judiciary is a collective requirement of competence for candidates and it is, thus, taken 
into account alongside individual qualifications.598 The extent to which the South African 
system of judicial appointments supports the equity-based argument is highly debatable 
and it will be examined in more detail later on in this section.
The principal question for present purposes, however, is whether positive action 
of the tie-break type, whereby equally qualified women are given priority over their male 
counterparts, will be enough to make a difference in the short term. If discrimination is 
the reason behind female under-representation in the judiciary, then it is reasonable to 
assume that women will be faced with obstacles not only when they arrive at the position
596 Ibid, p. 16.
597 Badeck
598 Ibid, p. 17.
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of being considered for appointment but also during the period o f acquiring the 
appropriate qualifications to enter the pool of candidates. It is, then, logical to expect that 
there will be few female candidates as well qualified as their male counterparts, because 
of the barriers that the former had to face when building up their academic and 
professional credentials. Ensuring that these few female candidates are given preference 
will, consequently, have only minimal impact on the gender balance. As Malleson puts it 
“the only prospect for equality on the bench is if women with less experience than their 
male counterparts are appointed” [emphasis added].599
Whether or not equity-based arguments are sufficient to justify such a claim is 
undoubtedly a question of considerable theoretical interest. De lege lata, however, and 
insofar as European equality law is concerned the equity-based argument has failed to 
convincingly prove its case. In its Abrahamsson ruling600 the ECJ has flatly denied the 
compatibility of national positive action provisions giving priority to less qualified 
female candidates with the principle of equal treatment under primary and secondary EU 
law. It is, thus, imperative to move on and consider alternative arguments that may 
provide a more comprehensive justificatory basis for aggressive gender equality policies 
in the judiciary.
Democracy-based argument'. Apart from the usual challenges pertaining to the 
unreasonableness of under-representation from a perspective of fairness to individuals 
and under-represented groups, the domination of the judiciary by white male judges 
arguably also involves a profound unfairness to the democratic citizenry as a whole. The
599 Malleson, supra no.566, p. 16.
600 Abrahamsson
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principal claim is that the composition of the judiciary in a democratic society must
reflect, at least up to an extent, the composition of the society itself it purports to
601serve.
Before exploring this rationale further it is essential to delineate its analytical 
boundaries so that to distinguish it from the previous category of equity-based arguments. 
Prima facie there is an overlap between the two, as both seem to deal with gender under­
representation on the bench from a perspective of justice. Equity-based arguments, 
however, conceptualise the unfairness of under-representation in a monistic way, centred 
on the disadvantage this creates for women themselves. The democracy-based rationale, 
on the contrary, proposes a more holistic understanding of the unfairness resulting from 
gender imbalance on the bench, one that places equal value to individual fairness and 
social justice. Whether positive action, therefore, is a permissible means to boost female 
participation in the judiciary is assessed here against the backdrop of wider societal 
concerns about democracy and justice and not solely within the narrower framework of 
satisfying the legitimate claims of a particular disadvantaged group.
The claim that under-representation of women in the judiciary constitutes an 
affront to the democratic principle can be analytically distinguished into three basic 
propositions: the imbalance in the composition of the judiciary is at odds with the 
principle of self-government, it is difficult if not impossible to justify under the rule of 
law in view of the natural judge principle and, finally, it deprives the institution of its 
external legitimacy that stems form public confidence in its democratic qualities. Let us 
turn to examine these in more detail.
601 Hale, supra no.585
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The principle of self-government is usually associated with the legislative and 
executive branches of state power. It is the most literal affirmation of the meaning of 
democracy, as it asserts that “[constitutional arrangements [...] enable and warrant 
government by the people”.602 Respect to this fundamental principle ensures that the 
political institutions in Western parliamentary democracies remain true to their role as 
prescribed by their representative mandate. Citizen participation in the decision-making 
processes of the public sphere, either directly, through the exercise of the right to stand 
for election, or indirectly, through voting and getting involved in public deliberations and 
will formation processes, is the lever by which this principle moves from the territory of 
abstract political theory into the realm of applied policy and normative practice.
This basic definition begs the question of how self-government relates to the 
judiciary, given that the latter’s role is to remain an impartial arbiter and to provide 
democratic checks and balances. Although it is true that the institutional nature and 
purpose of the judiciary is such that public participation in its decision-making processes 
in neither available nor desirable,603 this does not entail a complete disengagement from 
the democratic principle. Since the judiciary is part of the state apparatus and wields state 
power, citizens as the constituents of a democratic polity have a legitimate expectation 
that the exercise of this power is subject to the same democratic guarantees as any other 
form of state power.
Suggesting otherwise would be to accept that the judiciary is entrusted with the 
task to perform democratic control, while being itself insulated from such control. Judges 
enjoy, of course, personal and operational independence and they are not directly
602 Eriksen, E. O. (2003). "The EU and the Right to Self-Government." ARENA. University o f  Oslo 
W orking Paper 17/03.
603 With the unique exception o f  juries in certain criminal law systems.
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accountable to the public as elected officers are. They do not represent the people in the 
same way and with the same mandate that politicians do. But that is all the more reason 
why the composition of the judiciary should be reflective to an extent of the polity it is 
part of. Rather than a symbolic statement about equality, this balance constitutes a 
substantive affirmation of the principle of self-government. Without some degree of 
statistical approximation between the judiciary and the citizenry in terms of gender, 
ethnicity or race, this principle would seem to only selectively apply to the white, male, 
middle or upper class part of the populace. As a result, the democratic legitimacy of the 
institution is partly contingent upon its balanced composition and it is, thus, threatened 
when certain social groups are unjustifiably under-represented.
It goes without saying that this line of argument has significant affinities with the 
debate on the fair distribution of power within a democratic society. A number of 
influential theorists from various schools of thought, ranging from Michel Foucault604 to 
Jurgen Habermas605 and Hannah Arendt,606 have explored the matter thoroughly and have 
produced important works that continue to inspire the legal and political discourse. 
Across the various strands o f feminist jurisprudence the issue o f power is also a focal 
point, either from a phenomenological perspective, as the epitome of oppression, or
•  • AOS •from a radical perspective, as the concomitant of patriarchy and male domination. With 
regard to the more narrow issue at hand, however, the principal argument, which is
604 Foucault, M. (1979). The History o f  Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. Vintage.
605 Habermas, J. (1994). Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept o f  Power. Hannah Arendt: Critical 
Essays. L. P. H. a. S. K. Hinchman, SUNY Press.
606 Arendt, H. (1970). On Violence. Harcourt Brace & Co.
607 Young, I. M. (1990). Throwing Like a Girl And Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social 
Theory. Indiana University Press.; I. M. Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference, supra no.2; Bartky, 
S. (1990). Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology o f  Oppression. Routledge.
608 C. MacKinnon, supra no.87; Allen, A. (1999). The Power o f  Feminist Theory: Domination. Resistance. 
Solidarity. Westview Press.
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compatible with the claims and conclusions of most of the works cited here, boils down 
to this: when judges come from a narrow demographic background609 that does not 
reflect the composition of society, under-representation of particular social groups in the 
judiciary fails to respect the democratic principle.
The second proposition of the democracy-based argument relates to the rule of 
law and the requirements this poses to the operation of the justice system within the 
democratic polity. One of the fundamental principles of the rule of law in most 
continental European jurisdictions is the principle of natural or legal judge. The principle 
is established in the form of a constitutional clause in Italy,610 Germany,611 Greece,612 the 
Netherlands613 and Turkey614 among other countries.615 It is encapsulated in a 
constitutionally embedded right to be tried by ordinary courts, as prescribed by the laws 
determining jurisdiction, competence and assignments of cases. The principle is also 
recognised in international law as the ius de non evocando, which is usually conceived of 
as a dimension of the right to fair trial and prohibits trial of ordinary citizens by military 
tribunals or special courts and judicial committees.616
The connection between this principle and the need for diversity on the bench is 
contingent upon the definition of what constitutes an ordinary court in a democratic
609 This seems to be the case not only in most European countries, but also in European institutions. For the 
appointment o f  female judges to the ECJ see Kenney, S. J. (2002). "Breaking the Silence: Gender 
Mainstreaming and the Composition o f  the European Court o f  Justice." Feminist Legal Studies 10: 257- 
270. For an analysis o f  the situation in the UK see Griffiths, J. A. G. (1997). The Politics o f  the Judiciary. 
Fontana.
6,0 Article 25 o f  the Italian Constitution.
611 Article 103 o f the German Basic Law.
612 Article 8 o f  the Greek Constitution.
613 Article 17 o f  the Dutch Constitution.
614 Article 142 o f  the Turkish Constitution.
6,5 However it does not seem to be present in the constitutional law o f  the United Kingdom or France.
616 Lauterpacht, E. and C. T. Greenwood (1997). International Law Reports. Cambridge University Press.
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polity. Initially, the primary aim was to insulate the right to a fair trial from the possibility 
of governmental intervention through an ad hoc change of jurisdiction. The meaning of 
this right that no person may be denied the court to which she is normally entitled, 
however, is arguably broader. An ordinary court is not simply one that has been set up 
according to the general rules establishing the judicial system of a constitutional legal 
order. Apart from this element of due process, there is also a substantive component to 
the principle. An ordinary court should also be understood as one that respects the 
democratic principle in terms of its composition. An almost all white male bench in a 
multicultural society where half of the population is women cannot be described as 
ordinary in any meaningful sense. And this democratic deficit will still exist, even if the 
actual outcomes of judicial decision-making are generally perceived of as unbiased and 
fair.
The third proposition of the democracy-based argument involves the relationship 
between the balanced composition of the judiciary and the perception of the latter in 
public opinion. The relationship between the democratic principle and public opinion is a 
rather complex one617 and cannot be explored in depth at this point. It is, however, 
possible to sketch out the basic premise that the democracy-based argument utilises to 
support increased female participation on the bench.
Public perception is a key legitimating factor for all public institutions in a 
democratic society. Social acceptance of the rules governing the establishment, 
composition and operation of public institutions lends external legitimacy to these 
institutions. This perception of fairness in its three afore-mentioned dimensions is
617 For an interesting exploration o f  certain aspects o f  the issue see Splichel, S. (2001). Public Opinion and 
Democracy: Vox Populi-vox Dei?. Hampton Press.
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considerably more important when it comes to the judiciary, due to the inherently limited 
democratic accountability of judges. In systems where judges are selected exclusively 
through appointment rather than election, as in most European countries, it is evident that 
the deficit in democratic accountability does not threaten the legitimacy of the institution 
insofar as no significant social challenge exists. Even in systems where a number of 
judicial offices are reserved for election rather than appointment, as in the United States
A I Rfor instance, the relationship between elected judges and their “constituents” is neither 
one of direct representation nor one of accountability in the classic sense.
Judicial independence, both in a personal capacity and from an institutional point 
of view, remains the defining difference of the judiciary compared to the other branches 
of state power. And, indeed, one of the reasons that European systems have opted for an 
appointed rather than elected judiciary is down to the need to safeguard judicial 
impartiality against the pressures of public opinion. Within the framework of democratic 
governance models founded on the separation o f  powers doctrine, it is exactly this 
guarantee that makes it possible for judges to fulfil their institutional role. Nevertheless 
independence does not amount to segregation form the body politic. A homogeneous 
judiciary that seems disengaged from the multicultural and polymorphic polity that it 
serves will most likely lose the confidence of the public in its democratic credentials.
This form of external legitimacy is not simply a matter of subjective perceptions. 
It is a confirmation of the authority of the institution, an implicit vote of confidence in its 
democratic nature. As such, the balanced participation of social groups in all decision-
618 Under the US system, although federal judges are appointed with life tenure, most state judges are 
elected for short terms. See Choi, S. J., G. M. Gulati, et al. (2007). "Professionals or Politicians: The 
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary." John M. 01 in Law & 
Economics Working Paper No. 357.
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making bodies of the public sphere is the most visible index of democracy. Especially 
with regard to the unelected judiciary, where the public cannot express its collective will 
directly, balanced participation is the principal factor that will determine the attitude of 
the public towards the state.
Democracy-based arguments are undoubtedly appealing, as they carry a rhetoric 
force that cannot be underestimated. What is more, these arguments resonate across the 
political spectrum. It is, thus, difficult to deny the premise that the judiciary should be to 
some extent reflective of the polity it operates in, given that this seems to be a reasonable 
corollary of the democratic principle. Under this rationale, therefore, positive action to 
address under-representation of women on the bench is not only permissible, but it may 
also constitute an obligation of the state. It follows that positive measures of the tie-break 
type are clearly and unquestionably justified. The obvious question, however, regarding 
the possibility of going even further and appoint less qualified female candidates remains 
open and needs to be examined in detail.
Efficiency-based argument: Increasing female participation on the bench will 
arguably have significant efficiency benefits for the judiciary in more than one respects. 
The basic argument is twofold: a better gender balance will inevitably improve the 
overall quality of justice, on the one hand, and will enhance the external legitimacy of the 
system, on the other.
The first facet of the argument is rather straightforward as it echoes the classic pro 
positive action efficiency rationale. On the premise of the assumption that talent is 
relatively equally distributed across the population, fewer women on the bench amounts
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to a loss in human capital. A significant number of female candidates that could 
potentially make excellent judges are deprived of the opportunity to fulfil this potential 
for a number of reasons, discrimination being a determinant factor. The quality of justice, 
reflected on the judgments delivered by all-male courts, suffers as a result.
Obviously the argument here needs further refinement, given that the pool of 
potential candidates for judicial appointment is much smaller compared to that for most 
strands of employment. Although it is the case across the employment spectrum that 
employability is delineated on grounds of basic qualifications, training and personal 
preference,619 judicial service involves a higher threshold for those that wish to make it 
into the pool of potential applicants. General legal education is, of course, a conditio sine 
qua non, but a number o f European countries operate a system whereby an additional 
educational curriculum is tailored to the specific requirements of the job, much in the 
same way that Solicitors in the United Kingdom must undertake additional training 
before achieving the status of a Barrister. Not all fully qualified lawyers, therefore, will 
automatically be eligible for judicial appointment.
Even among fully qualified lawyers there is no guarantee as to how many will be 
willing to trade a potentially lucrative career in the private sector for the honourable but 
financially not as enticing prospect to serve on the bench o f a district court. What is more, 
the choice of a career path in the public sector has traditionally been perceived of as the 
“default” option for women, with standard working hours, longer maternity leave and 
guaranteed social benefits. Gender equality developments in the past half century, both 
domestic and international, have substantially improved the status of women in the
619 Preferences consisting in the personal choice as to whether one wishes to pursue this particular line o f  
work or not.
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employment field, but their impact is considerably more significant in the public sector, 
as the horizontal application of many of these rules is still unavailable or disputed. 
Without adopting any stereotypes, then, as to the “typical” female preferences, it seems 
reasonable to expect a higher proportion of female lawyers620 to express serious interest 
in a career in the judiciary if given the opportunity.
With these elements factored in, the total or partial exclusion or severe under­
representation of specific social groups in the judiciary deprives the institution from an 
invaluable human resource. What needs to be understood here is that the notion of the 
“good judge” cannot be construed solely on the basis of existing merit. Potential to 
become a good judge is equally if not more important to the formal qualifications one 
holds. Talent in this sense is as much an image of present capabilities and accomplished 
skills as it is a reflection on the possibility of future development and achievement. 
Statistical probability, therefore, suggesting that talent is not the monopoly of male white 
citizens cannot but form an important dimension of any meaningful assessment of the 
current composition of the courts from a perspective of efficiency.
Prima facie there seems to be an overlap between this aspect of the efficiency 
argument and the difference-based argument. Ultimately the principal claim in both cases 
is that the quality of justice delivered would be substantially enhanced, if a more 
balanced composition of the judiciary were to be achieved. Difference-based arguments, 
however, are centred on the benefits of bringing a distinctly female perspective to the 
bench, which will result in an alternative, more nuanced approach to legal reasoning and 
to decision-making. Female judges, then, regardless o f  how talented they individually 
are, will inevitably contribute to a diversification of the ideas on the basis of which the
620 Compared to the respective proportion o f  male lawyers.
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task of interpreting the law will be carried out. For the efficiency-based argument, on the 
contrary, it is talent as an untapped human resource that drives the rationale forward. 
Women are not seen as the privileged bearers of a distinctive insight in legal reasoning. It 
is rather a matter o f statistical probability, arrived at through an unbiased scientific 
method, suggesting that there is a higher number of talented individuals to be found in 
those social groups that are severely under-represented in the judiciary. Whether or not 
female judges, therefore, end up reinvigorating the process of adjudication and opening 
up judicial reasoning to new ideas is irrelevant. Insofar as they are talented, increasing 
their participation will provide a net benefit in terms of quality of justice simple by 
ensuring that this talent does not go to waste.
The second facet of the efficiency-based argument is more sophisticated and 
perhaps less often articulated in its present formulation. The premise of the argument is 
that the homogeneous image of the judiciary damages public confidence in the 
institution. A high degree of public confidence strengthens the democratic legitimacy 
of the judiciary, as already discussed, but it also enables the justice system to operate 
more effectively as a result. In other words, this external legitimacy of the judiciary is not 
just an essential proof of its democratic institutional credentials but also a precondition 
for its unhindered operation within the democratic edifice.
This relationship between public confidence and judicial efficiency, mediated as it 
is by the notion of legitimacy, calls for further exploration. Public perception is a key 
legitimating factor for all state institutions in a democratic society. As explained earlier 
social recognition of the fairness of rules governing the establishment, composition and
621 Russell, P. H. (2006). Conclusion. Appointing Judges in an Age o f  Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives 
from Around the World. K. Malleson and P. H. Russell, University o f  Toronto Press., p. 434.
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operation of public institutions is a necessary condition for the external legitimacy of the 
latter. Apart from this connection between legitimacy and democracy, lack of public 
confidence in the judiciary will also inevitably influence the reasoning and arguably the 
outcomes of adjudication.
Interpretation of legal rules is a complex task that does not take place in a social 
vacuum but needs to ensure that the law can adapt to shifting social circumstances. 
Although this is usually manifest in a more tangible or explicit manner in areas of the law 
that are by default in a state of constant evolution, such as European Law, it is 
nonetheless true across the spectrum of provisions that are even remotely connected to 
fundamental value choices in any given society. A number of distinct but inter-connected 
mechanisms or tools have been envisaged to guarantee that judges have in practice the 
power to factor in ever changing social circumstances in the adjudication process, so that 
the general public is satisfied that the legal system is not out of touch with social reality.
Judicial discretion, which is a common place across European jurisdictions, is an 
umbrella concept specifically designed to serve this purpose. The same is true about the 
more concrete German notion of indefinite legal concepts,622 which has influenced public 
law in many other European countries that follow the German administrative law model 
and is coined to describe commonly used legal terms such as “public interest”, “public 
security” or “reasonableness”.623 By far the most characteristic mechanism of this sort is 
the power of Continental European courts to engage with a constitutionality review of 
every legal provision enacted by Parliament, either as part of their general judicial review
622 Unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe.
623 Singh, M. P. (2001). German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective. Springer., p. 176 et seq.
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purview or in the form of a centralised constitutionality control.624 It should be noted that 
these systems allow for the possibility of judicial review of the constitutionality of laws 
not only on procedural625 but also on substantive626 grounds.
What the existence of all these mechanisms proves is that the judiciary is not only 
democratically empowered but also under an obligation to interpret the law so that it 
remains always fit to address the exigencies of social actuality. Public confidence in the 
judiciary, then, is not simply about trusting that each individual judge is fully qualified or 
that the process of their appointment was formally compatible with procedural rules and 
regulations and with general principles. It is also about maintaining a belief in the ability 
and willingness o f the judiciary to take wider societal concerns into account when 
resolving specific legal conflicts.
Maintaining this link o f trust between the citizenry and the judiciary is by default 
a mutual responsibility. In a democratic society people are expected to recognise the 
legitimacy of an institution even when faced with actions or decisions that are perceived 
of as wrong or detrimental to individual interests.627 Diffuse support628 of this kind is “a 
reasonable indication of underlying confidence in the courts”.629 When this is lost or 
lacking, however, most judges will inevitably succumb to the pressure created and enter a 
cycle of introspection and self-doubt. Performing the job efficiently does not depend, of
624 When a Constitutional Court sits at the top o f  the judicial pyramid, as is the case among others in 
France, Italy and Germany.
625 That is when there is a fault with the due process in the enactment o f  the law under scrutiny.
626 That is when the content o f  the challenged provision violates or is incompatible with a constitutional 
clause.
627 Olson, S. M. and D. A. Huth (1998). "Explaining Public Attitudes Towards Local Courts." The Justice 
System Journal 20(1): 41-61., p. 42.
628 Genn, H. G. and S. Beinart (1999). Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think About Going to Law. 
Hart Publishing., p. 228.
629 Ibid, p. 229.
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course, on dealing with the law through moral or normative absolutes. On the contrary, a 
degree of institutional and intellectual flexibility that will allow the judge to consider his 
position from all possible angles on a matter is actually desirable. But this is not to be 
done under the strain of public mistrust in the authority of the judge, which is exactly 
why European jurisdictions opted for judicial appointment rather than election in the first 
place.
The argument here may admittedly seem controversial as its validity rests upon 
sociological and psychological assumptions, the full exploration of which lies beyond the 
ambitions of this analysis. For present purposes, though, it is sufficient to reformulate the 
argument in a more concrete fashion. An a priori lack o f public confidence in the 
judiciary because o f its homogeneous composition constitutes a burden on judges that 
may affect the efficient operation of the adjudication process, regardless of the outcome 
of any particular ruling.630 An all-male panel of judges deciding on an abortion case, for 
instance, is bound to be faced with some degree of suspicion or mistrust from a 
considerable portion of the population as to the unbiased nature of any decision they 
arrive at, even if it is generally accepted that the judges sitting on the panel are of 
impeccable personal integrity. And if judges are under an obligation to remain impartial 
and in touch with social reality at the same time, it is reasonable to argue that they should 
take into account the social fact of mistrust towards them.
This is not an analytically constructed vicious circle for the sake of a theoretical 
hypothesis. Empirical evidence in the UK reveals a statistically significant gender divide 
in public opinion with regard to confidence in the courts, with women being relatively
630 This, o f  course, does not exclude the possibility o f the outcome o f  the ruling being affected as well.
less inclined than men to respond positively to the relevant question.631 It is suggested 
that this discrepancy “may be a reflection of the domination of the courts by males”. 
Similar studies on the perception of ethnic minorities suggest that lower levels of 
confidence in the judiciary also result from its racially imbalanced composition.
631 H. G. Genn and S. Beinart, supra no.629, p. 249.
632 Ibid.
633 Shute, S., R. Hood, et al. (2004). A Fair Hearing?: Ethnic Minorities in the Criminal Courts. 
Cullompton.
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8.3 Diversity in the Judiciary: Are Quotas Legitimate? Are They Effective?
Before turning to consider the appropriateness of positive measures to increase 
female representation in the judiciary it is essential to explain how the four types of 
arguments presented above can fit together in a single justificatory rationale. First of all, 
it should be underlined that the four types of argument may be more or less convincing 
but they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the analytical framework is designed in such 
a way so that the justification of increased female or minority participation on the bench 
is predicated on two separate premises. Equity-based arguments are focused on 
disadvantage o f  the under-represented groups themselves, while democracy-based and 
efficiency-based arguments claim that an imbalanced judiciary is disadvantageous fo r  the 
society as a whole. Difference-based arguments, on the other hand, seem to tread a 
middle ground, suggesting that the recognition and utilisation of the distinctively female 
approach to law will have an overall net benefit for the justice system.
It is submitted, therefore, that a balanced composition of the judiciary should be 
understood as a policy priority that requires immediate attention. Under-representation is 
an acute problem, both because it constitutes a violation of the right of certain social 
groups to be treated equally and because it is inconsistent with the democratic principle, 
and as such it should be addressed through measures that will produce results in the 
short-term. Preference to equally qualified female or minority candidates seems to fall 
easily within the threshold of legality as delineated by all four types of justificatory 
arguments.
There are, however, two serious problems that none of the arguments presented 
here, with the possible exception of the democracy-based argument, appears capable of 
resolving automatically. First, from a pragmatic point of view there is not enough 
evidence to suggest that quotas of the tie-break type in favour of women and ethnic 
minorities will suffice to make a difference in the short term. If not enough equally 
qualified minority candidates are found, this kind of positive action will simply fail to 
achieve any substantive results. Second, even if increased female presence on the bench 
were to be accomplished, this diversity o f  characteristics does not guarantee a diversity o f  
characters. In other words, if diversity is predicated on a relationship of representation 
between the people and the judiciary, the notion o f representation at play, no matter how 
thin, cannot only involve biological characteristics. Choosing a candidate from an under­
represented group who, as an individual, is entirely unrepresentative of the group she 
belongs to would be self-defeating in that it would only satisfy the need for diversity in a 
purely formalistic sense.
The first problem seems, indeed, difficult to address in the short term. Individual 
merit cannot be easily overridden, not only due to the importance attached to it by liberal 
theory but also because of the crucial nature of the judiciary’s institutional role. Simply 
put, in positions with such responsibility and where so much is at stake it is imperative to 
ensure that the best person for the job will ultimately be selected. Even if the cost for 
making a choice on grounds of merit alone is that certain social groups may end up being 
under-represented, the solution to under-representation cannot be to select less qualified 
candidates or to lower the quality of appointed judges.
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Reasonable as this approach may sound, it is nonetheless premised on an 
unjustifiably rigid conception of the interpersonal comparison of qualifications in judicial 
appointments and promotions. As discussed earlier, the process of identifying a good 
judge should be forward-looking and not confined to a mechanical assessment of past 
achievements. It should aim at determining which candidates have the potential of using 
their competences and abilities so that they perform the tasks entrusted to them and fulfil 
their role to the highest standard.
Although this is generally true for any line of work, a number of elements 
distinguish the judiciary from “standard” employment. Apart from public responsibility 
that judges bear coupled with the fact that they wield state power, arguably the most 
significant difference is the inherent difficulty to measure the success o f a judge in 
concrete terms. It is possible, of course, to measure the failure o f a judge to perform his 
tasks adequately by reference to the amount of judgments or opinions delivered combined 
with the time frame within which these are announced. Scoring high in these indexes, 
however, is not a benchmark of actual success, as it does not involve an assessment of the 
actual quality of work produced. And it seems unrealistic, if not unintelligible, to even 
attempt to establish an objective metric system of quality of judgments. Quite 
characteristically the most common yardstick of success appears to be the respect a judge 
commands in legal circles, the academia and the community at large.
For this reason the threshold of formal qualifications required to even be 
considered for a position on the bench is already very high. Without any tangible success 
standards, this is the only safeguard that the candidates selected will live up to the 
expectations of the role. When this latter point is taken into account the notion of merit at
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play here needs to be conceived in a different way compared to any other area of 
employment. It is reasonable to assume that at least all candidates that have been 
shortlisted are fully qualified to serve on the bench. If this is the case, all fully qualified 
candidates should be regarded as equally capable o f  excelling as judges. Giving 
preference, then, to a fully qualified female candidate for the bench, even if she is not 
equally qualified to her male counterparts, does not violate the merit principle.
The second problem is arguably more complex, as it echoes the failings of the 
“classical” group-approach under the traditional conception of positive action. Even if 
one is willing to accept that aggressive quotas in favour of under-represented social 
groups are legitimate in order to achieve a fairer balance in the composition of the 
judiciary, there is a danger that the individuals selected through such a process are much 
closer to the “mainstream” than expected. Obviously, if this is the case, the balance that 
the quotas aim to achieve will only be superficial. No real change can ensue from 
programmatic statements about equality that are put into practice without appropriate 
safeguards that will ensure substantive results. In this case, it is difficult to see how the 
promotion of a female judge hostile to feminist views - understood in the broadest 
possible sense - is in any way capable of differentiating the existing balance.
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that this is not simply a theoretical concern. 
The position o f Justice Day O’Connor, for instance, on issues regarding the Equal 
Protection Clause has been reported to be identical or similar to that of her male 
colleagues on forty cases over the course of a decade.634 What is even more interesting is 
that Day O’Connor dissented in only 10% of the rulings on gender or race discrimination
634Alliotta, J. (1995). "Justice O’Connor and the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine Voice?" Judicature 
78(5): 232-235.
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issues over the course of her 25-year career, despite the fact that the US Supreme Court
fkX ^was male-dominated throughout this period. Insisting on the minutiae of Day 
O’Connor’s record is not coincidental. For better or worse the first female judge in the 
history of the US Supreme Court was the one that wrote the majority opinion in the 
infamous Grutter v. Bollinger ruling, which held that the University of Michigan’s 
undergraduate admissions program was unconstitutional as its affirmative action clauses 
amounted to reverse discrimination.
Diversity here, therefore, should be conceived of as diversity o f  characters, that is 
diversity of opinions and ideas, rather than diversity o f  characteristics, such as sex, race 
or colour. Obviously, some of the traits that qualify as the “usual suspects” for 
discrimination - which, in turn, are usually at the root of under-representation or social 
exclusion - by definition involve opinions and ideas, such as religious or philosophical 
beliefs. This, however, does not alter the fact that diversity is meaningful when it is 
internal rather than external, when it involves the way people think and act rather than 
where people appear to belong.
It goes without saying that this latter point needs further elaboration. One might 
be quick to note that women do not simply appear to be women; they are women in a 
very real and normatively meaningful sense. For the purposes of the present discussion 
women constitute a distinct social group that is under-represented in a particular strand of 
employment or in a high stratum within this strand that engages with decision-making or 
with the exercise of power. And this should be understood as a social fact rather than as 
an essentialist statement about womanhood in general. Regardless, then, of the small or
635 Bender, P. and C. S. Durkin (2007). "Justice O'Connor's Race and Gender Jurisprudence." Arizona State 
Law Journal 39(3)., at 830.
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large differences amongst individual women, the point of the matter remains that no 
woman or relatively too few women make it to the top of the judicial hierarchy and that 
this is not due to their lack of talent, abilities, knowledge or desire to succeed.
Even if this latter point is valid, partially or even in its entirety, it does not account 
for the substance of the matter. It is inspired by a formal conception of equality, in that it 
places the emphasis on inter-group equality based on traditional group allegiances rather 
than on substantive infra-group differentiations. In a nutshell, it fails to resonate with the 
multicultural nature of modern-day western societies, where a white middle-class woman 
might be much closer to the social mean and, hence, much closer to the “white male” 
norm than an ethnic minority man. If the composition of the judiciary must reflect and 
resonate with social reality, it is the ideological, political or philosophical allegiances of 
individual judges that we must be looking at. Otherwise, if we put all our faith on the 
image alone, positive measures in favour of women will most likely re-create a distorted 
version of the current state of affairs and risk ending up with a much more “conservative” 
set-up than we bargained for.
This is not to deny either the legality or the necessity, for that matter, of positive 
measures in favour of women and other under-represented social groups. Even in 
European countries that have been dealing with gender equality as a matter of priority in 
the field of employment the problem seems to be particularly severe in the judiciary. 
Britain appointed its first woman to its highest appellate court, Lady Brenda Hale, in
f\“xn2003 nearly 25 years after the United States and Canada. An imperfect system,
636 Although this final point might raise some controversy, in view o f  the stereotypical idea that seems to be 
shared by quite a few women as well regarding the relationship between career and motherhood.
637 Kennedy, S. J. (2008). "Gender on the Agenda: How the Paucity o f  Women Judges Became an Issue." 
The Journal o f  Politics 70(3): 717-735., at 717.
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therefore, is still preferable to the alternative of staying idle and it may well serve as the 
starting point for further refinements in the near future.
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CHAPTER 9: GENERAL OVERVIEW AND CRITICAL EVALUATION: THE 
UNDERLYING RATIONALE OF POSITIVE ACTION IN EUROPEAN LAW
This concluding chapter of Part III has a double purpose: first, to present a 
relatively coherent overview of how positive action in the three areas of social activity 
identified earlier fits into the normative framework of European law, according to the 
position adopted by the ECJ. Second, to explore a key theoretical problem regarding the 
justificatory rationale of positive action as an equality mechanism, namely the 
relationship between under-representation and disadvantage as possible bases for the 
identification of target groups.
9.1 Making Sense of the Tripartite Distinction: The Modus Qperandi of Positive Action 
in Employment, in Politics and in the Judiciary
The exclusive objective of this section is to succinctly summarise the preceding 
analysis and present a graphic representation that encapsulates the dominant position of 
EU equality law on positive action, as interpreted by the ECJ. Table 1 will employ the 
tripartite distinction between employment, politics639 and sensitive areas of the public 
sphere640 established in this Part of the thesis and it will hopefully provide an accurate 
frame of reference for approaching the issue.
638 The position o f  the ECtHR on the matter does not differ from that o f  the ECJ. As a result, the latter is 
taken to be reflective o f  the position o f  the European Legal Order o f  Rights, as described in chapter 3.
639 Or elected public office.
640 Exemplified in the case o f  the judiciary.
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POSITIVE 
ACTION IN:
EMPLOYMENT POLITICS JUDICIARY
TYPE 
SOFTER 
FORMS 
(encouragement 
/ training)
PERMISSIBLE
for under-represented 
groups in a particular 
employment cadre
NOT UNLAWFUL
as falling outside the scope 
of EU law and the ECHR
PERMISSIBLE
for under-represented 
groups
TYPE
QUOTAS / 
PREF.
TREATMENT
PERMISSIBLE 
as a tie-breaker 
between equally 
qualified candidates 
(subject to Badeck 
conditions)
NOT UNLAWFUL
as falling outside the scope 
of EU law and the ECHR
PERMISSIBLE 
as a tie-breaker 
between equally 
qualified candidates 
(subject to Badeck 
conditions)
CRITERION 
to trigger quota 
and determine 
target groups
UNDER­
REPRESENTATION 
as a proxy for 
DISADVANTAGE
of the target group in 
the specific cadre
UNDER­
REPRESENTATION as a 
proxy for 
DISADVANTAGE
of the target group in the 
particular elected body
UNDER­
REPRESENTATION 
as a proxy for 
DISADVANTAGE
of the target group in 
the specific cadre
Table 1: De Lege Lata -  positive action under the dominant conception of equal
treatment in Europe
Generally speaking, the table is self-explanatory and does little more than bring 
together the conclusions of the preceding sections. There is, however, one dimension of 
these preliminary conclusions that presents considerable theoretical interest and needs to 
be explored further. The analysis up to this point has demonstrated that target groups are 
selected on the basis of their under-representation in a particular area of the public 
sphere. This criterion of selection rests on the assumption that under-representation is 
indicative of group disadvantage, the redress of which constitutes the ultimate aim of 
positive action. The relationship between under-representation and disadvantage, 
however, is neither straightforward nor adequately theorised. What follows is an attempt
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to contribute to the discourse by identifying the conceptual problems and laying down the 
groundwork for the alternative conception of equal treatment and positive action exposed 
in chapters 10 and 11.
9.2 Under-Representation and Disadvantage: Does the Former Always Amount to the 
Latter?
Throughout the literature on positive action the terms disadvantaged (or under­
privileged) groups and under-represented groups are used interchangeably, in accordance 
with what seems to fit best in each particular case. This is understandable considering the 
diversity of the aims that positive action entertains, which range from providing a specific 
remedy for invidious race or sex discrimination to the more general purpose of increasing 
participation of excluded or visibly under-represented groups in important public 
spheres.641 Disadvantage and under-representation, then, are understood as variations of 
the consequences than may befall upon social groups or ethnic minorities, which have 
been victims of direct or indirect discrimination. This interpretation, convenient though it 
may sound, fails to go past a superficial level of analysis and underestimates the 
complexity of the issues involved.
When positive measures taken in a specific area of law are unclear as to their 
rationale in targeting disadvantaged instead of simply under-represented groups or vice 
versa, the two obviously non-tautological terms seem to collapse into one another. The 
problems arising in this connection are not confined to academic concerns about 
theoretical clarity and consistency or linguistic accuracy. Apart from the obvious issue of
641 See Fredman, supra n o .l, p. 126.
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accommodating competing claims from groups equally entitled in principle to special 
protection or preferential treatment, the lack of legal integrity in selecting beneficiaries 
imperils the legitimacy of positive action due to potential conflict with the underlying 
principle of equal treatment. What is more, when dealing with under-representation the 
theoretical validity o f many traditional defence lines for positive action642 becomes 
questionable, since they appear to presuppose some sort of tangible social disadvantage 
resulting from past discrimination. The way these two terms operate within the group- 
approach becomes, then, a cardinal factor in evaluating the merits of positive action in its 
classical conception.
The notion of disadvantage within the conceptual framework of positive action is 
difficult to define concretely. However, a useful distinction can be drawn between natural 
and social disadvantage, with the latter being exclusively in the foreground of our 
interest. In this regard, disabled persons may fall within the normative scope of positive 
action only insofar as they are victims of discrimination on the grounds of their natural 
condition and, therefore, suffer from social disadvantage. In other words, a natural 
disability is the basis for discriminatory behaviour against its bearer but it is 
discrimination that constitutes the grounds for taking adequate legal measures, which, in 
turn, allocate special protection or benefits.
By and large, social disadvantage denotes a state of affairs in which the group is 
unjustifiably643 deprived of rights or opportunities. To the extent that positive action is 
restricted within the normative framework of discrimination law, a causal link should
642 Especially in relation to arguments invoking compensation as a legitimate aim o f positive action.
643 Prisoners, for instance, constitute the paradigm case o f justified disadvantaged or social exclusion. On 
the contrary, discrimination against former convicts may be a legal basis for entitlement to positive action, 
depending on whether they quality as a social grouping accordance with the preceding analysis.
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exist between the lower social position of the group and the discriminatory practices 
against it. In other words, entitlement to benefits is justified on the legal basis not only of 
disadvantage but also of its causes644 and, in fact, the latter consideration should be taken 
into account first in adjudication.
Although in practice the identification process may prove extremely complicated, 
the legitimacy of affording special protection to disadvantaged social groups cannot be 
seriously contested in principle. Of course, a purely individualistic version of liberalism 
may be uncomfortable with the group-approach altogether and accept only measures 
taken on a case-by-case basis. But the actual beneficiaries of positive action, especially 
when it consists in allocating preference, are indeed individuals and their group- 
membership is used, in fact, as a qualification or an index. The primacy of the individual 
is not threatened and the ECJ, as noted earlier, has been prudent enough to make this 
explicitly clear. When it comes to under-representation, however, things become 
significantly more complex.
Tackling under-representation of women and ethnic minorities in several aspects 
of social life has been a primary concern in Europe for many years and is hailed 
nowadays as positive action’s main goal. The moral justification of such measures seems 
relatively straightforward, since social exclusion contradicts the fundamental precepts of 
the democratic polity. From a more pragmatic point of view, it is reasonable to assume 
that, statistically, talents and natural abilities are evenly spread across the populace,645
644 The analytical process, then, comprises three stages, answering to corresponding questions: Which 
clusters o f  individuals constitute social groups? Which social groups are or have been discriminated 
against? Which o f  the latter groups are disadvantaged suffer from detrimental effects o f  discrimination)?
645 Hemes, H. (1987). Welfare state and women power: Essays in state feminism. Norwegian University 
Press.; Helgesen, S. (1990). The female advantage: Women’s wavs o f  leadership. Doubleday.
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which renders the absence of certain social groups from employment areas irrational and 
counter-productive.
Confusion begins, however, when under-representation is used as a proxy to 
locate social disadvantage. Although the two are not mutually exclusive and, in practice, 
they often coincide or even causally relate to one another,646 under-representation does 
not necessarily entail disadvantage and vice versa. To mention but a simple example, the 
fact that there are more female than male nurses is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition to characterise men as a disadvantaged group in this specific employment area. 
The issue, then, is whether under-representation requires positive measures irrespective 
of its actual negative consequences for the affected group.
To come back to the view of under-representation as undemocratic and counter­
productive, a further remark has to be made. The classical conception of positive action, 
contrary to the conclusion drawn above, seems to implicitly adopt an understanding of 
under-representation as amounting per se to social disadvantage. If the latter consists in 
the deprivation of rights and opportunities, under-representation falls comfortably within 
the scope of the definition. The argument, then, that rules out the absurd result of 
“disadvantaged male nurses” invokes that under-representation matters only insofar as it 
is not the outcome of free and genuine choice in a state of equal opportunities. In this 
respect, women’s under-representation in Parliament constitutes disadvantage if and only 
if there are not enough female candidates in party shortlists, in which case the voters are
646 Groups that are excluded from decision-making processes or from certain areas o f  employment, either 
horizontally (total absence from certain areas) or vertically (absence from the higher ranks within a certain 
area), are inevitably more likely to suffer from relative disadvantages compared to the rest o f  the 
population, even if  their exclusion per se is not regarded as such (which, o f  course, seems rather 
implausible).
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presented with an unlawfully limited set of options that restrains their freedom of 
choice.647
Individual choice is apparently instrumental to the liberal notion of equal 
opportunities, which dominates the discourse in the European legal order, and the 
emphasis on it is far from surprising. What is quite surprising, on the contrary, is the self- 
defeating nature of the relevant arguments in the context of positive action. If our primary 
legal (and political) concern is to provide citizens with the widest possible set of 
options, result-oriented quotas that secure a number of Parliamentary seats -  or any 
other elected public offices in decision making bodies -  for a specific group inhibit one’s 
freedom to select one’s representatives. Favouring members of under-represented groups 
may be to some extent a “legitimate sacrifice” of freedom of choice and, for this reason, 
the latter cannot be plausibly used as a justification for positive measures.
The matter is quite different, though, when quotas apply to the selection of 
candidates for elected offices. Clearly, all-male shortlists affect substantially the outcome 
of the process and predetermine an uneven landscape in terms of representation. The 
reasoning applies equally now to any selection process, even when the position in 
question is not an elected public office, and the arguments if favour of positive action can 
be classified under the headline of diversity. As mentioned earlier, if under-representation
647 In the opposite case, when equal opportunities are ensured for all candidates and the widest possible set 
o f  options is provided to voters, a potentially unbalanced representation o f  social groups in Parliament 
reflects the democratically expressed choice o f  the electorate body and cannot be subject to further legal 
scrutiny.
648 This is, by and large, the principle claim o f  liberal egalitarianism that appears to inspire much o f the 
literature in defence o f  positive action. On the question how far does equality o f  opportunity require that 
the cultural values and commitments o f  different groups be taken into account when public policy on 
access to jobs, educational places and so forth is being decided see the debate between Brian Barry (Barry, 
B. (2001). Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f  Multiculturalism. . Polity Press.) and his critics 
(Kelly, P. (2002). Multiculturalism Reconsidered: ‘Culture and Equality’ and its Critics. Polity 
Press/Blackwell Publishers.)
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is not only unfair but also irrational and at odds with social utility, diversity ought to be 
conceived of as inherently valuable, hence a legitimate pursuit for the democratic state.
The relation between diversity and representation, unfortunately, is one of 
unresolved tension. The classical conception of positive action assumes that a group’s 
under-representation entails its lower position in the social hierarchy. But whether 
preferential treatment to any one member of the group is the answer depends on the 
underlying understanding of representation and its functioning. The distinction between 
social representation and opinion representation649 sets the tone o f the discourse. The 
terms are self-explanatory and they have been omnipresent in the positive action debate, 
either explicitly or implicitly. Early feminists and civil rights activists dismissed the 
dilemma relatively easily by firmly supporting social representation as the only available 
way to end years of discrimination and oppression against women. Social exclusion was 
an apparent as well as appalling reality and positive action presented an excellent 
opportunity to deal with the situation effectively and immediately.
Historical experience, however, has been disillusionary, proving that the actual 
difference made by positive action programmes was nowhere near the initial ultra- 
optimistic predictions. More women (and minority members) were accepted in previously 
excluded areas and, if anything, this was a sign o f progress. But the extent to which this 
change reflected to the group as a whole was significantly less than intended. The mere 
presence of women or blacks in positions of power or in the same occupational groups as 
men does neither mean that they are all on the same footing650 nor that the former are 
willing and able to contribute towards enhancing the overall social status of their
649 Perkins, J. and D. L. Fowlkes (1980). "Opinion Representation versus Social Representation; or Why 
Women Can’t Run as Women and Win." The American Political Science Review 74(1).
650 Bergmann, B. (1996). In Defence o f  Affirmative Action. Basic Books., pp. 42-43.
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respective groups.651 By far the most eloquent example of the latter is the former U.S. 
National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice. During her term of office she explicitly 
backed the Bush administration in its campaign against preferential treatment for 
minorities in University admission policies,652 although she acknowledged that, in her 
opinion, race should be taken into account as a morally relevant factor. Her reluctance 
to voice a strong dissenting opinion is rather ironic, considering her public 
acknowledgement that she was herself a beneficiary of positive action when admitted to 
Stanford University.654
This is not to argue that one’s rejection of positive action as ineffective or even 
unfair signifies automatically the betrayal of one’s allegiance to the disadvantaged group. 
The concept of representation in itself, however, requires a minimum degree of solidarity 
between the individual “representative” and the rest of the group. A reflection of this 
should be the existence of shared fundamental beliefs and interests; otherwise positive 
measures against under-representation would be pointless. To put it differently, 
commitment to the conception of social representation is inadequate to account for quotas 
in candidate selection for public offices, because it allows only for a superficial diversity 
of gender, race or ethnicity and not for a substantial and meaningful diversity in opinions, 
interests and ideas.
651 Fredman (supra n o .l) contends that the position o f  many women in Britain declined during the 
premiership o f  Margaret Thatcher. The U.S. Secretary o f  State, Collin Powell, who incidentally has voiced 
publicly his disagreement with the White House’s negative stance on positive action in University 
admission policies (see Younge, G. (21/01/03). "Powell opposes Bush line on race." The Guardian.), has 
been the target o f  similar criticism for his lack o f  support to the black community (see Younge, G. 
(23/11/02). "Different class." The Guardian., where the singer and one-time civil rights activist Harry 
Belafonte is quoted to compare the Secretary o f  State to a “house slave, permitted to come into the house o f  
the master”).
652 See Younge, G. (27/01/03). America is a class act. The Guardian.
653 See G. Younge, “A  supreme showdown” in The Guardian, 21/06/03.
654 See Younge, G. (21/06/03). A supreme showdown. The Guardian.
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Many opponents of positive action falsely suggest that under-representation is not 
an issue as long as democratic institutions ensure in principle that all voices are heard. 
The very fact that specific social or ethnic groups have always been disproportionately 
represented in or completely absent from the higher ranks of socio-political hierarchy, far 
from being coincidental, echoes the fundamental institutional deficit that reproduces a 
subtle pattern of discrimination, defying equal opportunities and equal treatment. The 
legal enquiry undertaken here is whether quotas insensitive to the beneficiaries’ 
connectedness with their group are effectively cancelling under-representation. And since 
it seems impractical to seek a metric system of “group loyalty”, the solution is to rethink 
the group-approach with a view to making it more consistent with the theoretical 
premises of positive action that encompass both disadvantage and under-representation, 
as well as more effective in achieving the expected results.
To this end a plausible analysis of under-representation must distinguish between 
a political sphere (elected public offices, decision-making bodies) and a non-political 
one. The implications of ignoring opinion representation within the former as a 
constitutive element o f any successful legal provision have already been discussed. As 
regards the latter, which covers the best part of the employment field, it is apparent that 
representation does not bear the connotation of political deliberations and expression of 
group interests. In this respect, under-representation in employment is legally significant 
for positive action only insofar as it designates disadvantaged social or ethnic groups, 
which in turn brings about the unresolved questions concerning benefit distribution 
within the group. Therefore, the classical conception of positive action proves inadequate 
as a theoretical framework, if the celebrated purpose of “full and effective equality” is to
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be achieved. What follows will hopefully provide a viable, coherent and more efficient 
alternative.
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PART IV: POSITIVE ACTION RECONSTRUCTED: A THEORY OF
EQUALITY THAT FITS
The final part o f the thesis intends to put forward an alternative conceptual 
framework for equality in Europe and determine the place of positive action within this 
framework. Constructing a theory of equality is, undeniably, a philosophical task of 
massive proportions. It goes without saying that such a task cannot be successfully 
undertaken within the relatively narrow parameters of the present thesis without certain 
analytical compromises. The main compromise here consists in the conscious 
methodological decision to construct the alternative conceptual framework against the 
backdrop of the specific research questions constituting the backbone of the thesis. 
Positive action, therefore, retains its central position and is used as the analytical 
yardstick to determine the meaning of full equality in Europe.
Instead of attempting to present a fully-fledged theory of equality, then, the 
following chapters will focus on presenting a theory o f  equality that fits. The objective, in 
other words, is primarily normative rather than purely philosophical. Full equality is 
translated into a principle of equal treatment, which is premised on indistinctibility o f  
respect and proportionality o f  concern as its two conceptual limbs. After establishing the 
basic framework in chapter 10, the penultimate chapter of the thesis will reconstruct 
positive action as an integral element of a truly European conception of full equality.
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10. The Right to Equal Treatment: Indistinctibilitv of Respect and Proportionality of 
Concern
10.1 Introduction
This section purports to examine equality as an individual right to equal treatment 
and explore the abstract normative content of this right. Utilising Dworkin’s notion of 
equal concern and respect as a starting point, it will put forward a modified version of 
this conception, introducing the notions of indistinctibility o f  respect and proportionality 
o f concern as the two complementary dimensions of the basic right to equal treatment.
The section will be divided into two parts. The first part will begin by discussing 
the right to equal treatment as a liberal notion. Throughout its history the concept of 
equality admittedly presents an interesting paradox: treating persons as equals may 
require treating them unequally. This fundamental precept of liberal egalitarianism is, 
arguably, at its most prominent in Dworkin’s theory of equality, who defines the 
principle of equal treatment as encapsulating a right to equality o f concern and respect, 
requiring the state to remain neutral among different conceptions of the good. Placed 
within a liberal theoretical framework, this construct should be understood with reference 
to an omnipresent bipolarity in the equality discourse between formal and substantive
equality. Regardless o f nuances, refinements and sub-categorisations, the primordial
\
dichotomy between these two has dominated the discourse in one form or another. In this 
regard, the principal question explored here is whether equality of resources can provide 
a compelling interpretation of equality that rises above this distinction by combining
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procedural and substantive elements and, most importantly, by placing the emphasis on 
an overarching right to equal respect and concern.
The latter part of the section will investigate the link between the abstract legal 
principle of equal treatment and the concrete individual right to respect and concern. Its 
principal aim will be to propose an alternative understanding of the right to equal 
treatment, one that retains the emphasis on the individual right to respect and concern but 
is designed to address the major criticisms levelled against liberal egalitarianism in a 
more convincing way than Dworkin’s equality of resources. In this regard, it will be 
conceded that equality of respect is, by and large, a misleading term, as respect for human 
worth, encapsulated primarily in the right to human dignity, cannot be susceptible to 
degrees and, hence, it is not a matter of equality in the first place. The result of this 
Kantian analysis is that equality of respect collapses into a notion of formal equality, 
which in turn is, in this context, indistinguishable from what is usually referred to as our 
common humanity. In reality, then, what is required from the state is indistinctibility o f  
respect.
On the contrary, when it comes to equality of concern, state neutrality is not an 
option. Fair allocation of concern, with a view to protecting and promoting the 
corresponding individual right, necessarily involves considerations of distributive justice. 
In this regard, differing amounts of concern shown to each individual or group - which is 
an important difference between the notion of equal concern and that of proportional 
concern - are not only possible but also essential for realising equal treatment. The claim 
put forward, therefore, is that the state is under a positive obligation to demonstrate
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proportional concern by actively intervening in favour of those more in need of concern, 
with a view to redressing unjustified inequalities.
10.2 Liberal Equality Revisited: Formalism. Difference and Equality of Resources
10.2.1 Equality and difference: is there really any room fo r  formalism?
Modem theories of justice or equality655 seem to share a basic Aristotelian 
assumption:656 it is fair to “treat likes alike”. Although this proposition is generally 
understood as the most eloquent representation of formal equality, it is in fact a double- 
edged sword for the proponents of the latter. Treating likes alike necessarily entails that 
those in different situations should be treated differently. This acknowledgement is 
shared by advocates of all conceptions of equality and is inevitably one of the precepts of 
European equality law.657 Difference should be taken into account when it matters in 
order to achieve equality of treatment. The key question, of course, which constitutes the 
main point o f theoretical and political controversy, is when it actually does matter. And, 
one might add, what is that which matters (or matters more) in any particular context and 
how (in what way) or how much (to what extent) it matters.
Despite their fundamental differences, therefore, contemporary theories of 
equality and justice must accept that, at least in certain areas of the law, interpersonal 
comparisons are necessary to determine who is entitled to what. In other words, there is
655 It is accepted that “virtually all the approaches to the ethics o f social arrangements that have stood the 
test o f  time [ ...]  want equality o f  something'. See Sen, A. K. (1979). "Utilitarianism and Welfarism." The 
Journal o f Philosophy 76(9): 463-489.p. ix.
656Winthrop, D. (1978). "Aristotle and Theories o f  Justice." The American Political Science Review 72(4): 
1201-1216.
657 For an eloquent example see the discussion on the Thlimmenos ruling o f  the ECtHR (infra, chapter 5.3).
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consensus on the need of the law to treat certain personal differences as 
factual differences and allocate rights and obligations accordingly. Distinctions and 
differentiations in the legal treatment of persons, therefore, are perfectly legitimate in 
principle, insofar as they are not irrelevant or arbitrary. Not only that: such distinctions 
constitute, in fact, one of the essentialia of the concept of justice itself. In ancient Greek 
the root of the terms “Sucaiov” and “5iKaioor>vr|” - which are translated as “fair”, 
“fairness” or “justice” - is the word “81xa” or “8uca”, which is best translated as 
“distinction”.658 Nomos or “v6po<;”, the Greek term for “the law”, derives from the verb 
“vspco”, which means to distribute or to divide. It is the work of (s)he who is responsible 
for administering justice and interpreting the law, that is the work of the judge - 
“5ucacrrr|<;”,659 to make sure that the necessary distinctions are part of the interpretive 
process so that legal treatment of persons is reflective of their normatively relevant 
differences.
Acceptance of differentiation as an expression of fair and equal treatment is 
usually linked to the concept of distributive justice. Most major theories of justice and 
equality appear to be premised upon a common assumption:660 a fa ir  distribution is one 
that involves in principle some form of differentiation on the basis of a set of pre-agreed 
and thus objective criteria.661 Social benefits and burdens, rights and obligations are 
allocated, therefore, according to some notion that reflects the recipient’s desert however 
that may be construed or measured. Merit, worth and need are the most commonly used
658 And it is also the root o f  the term dichotomy.
659 The term “5iKaarfj<;” also comes from the linguistic root biya or diica.
660 Or, at least, concede that the assumption is generally correct.
661 Objectivity here is taken to mean that the criteria will not be such as to knowingly favour a single 
individual or a group o f  individuals in advance or by default. Rawls’ “veil o f  ignorance” obviously inspires 
and informs this proposition, but it should be noted that the current formulation does not accept all the 
implications o f  the Rawlsian theory.
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generic terms reflecting this idea of desert in the distributions. Each will be scrutinised 
appropriately in due course. In the meantime, it is possible to draw some preliminary 
conclusions.
Incorporating difference in a theory of equality poses no conceptual problems 
insofar as the outcomes of distributions are concerned.662 The debate, of course, on the 
appropriate yardstick of desert is still very much on. And so is the substantive question 
regarding the choice between any number of possible interpretations of merit or any 
other notion of desert.663 Indeed, this is where the thrust of the matter lies both 
philosophically and politically. For our present purposes, however, it is enough to 
maintain consensus on the moderate view that, under any plausible account, 
automatically dividing the object into equal shares does not by itself amount to a fa ir  
distribution. Even in cases where allocation of equal shares represents the desired 
distributive outcome, the above statement remains true. The fairness of such a 
distribution is not a given; it rather depends on whether the outcome can be justified 
under the specific circumstances as compatible with the principle of equal treatment. In 
other words, the fairness of the distribution depends on whether normatively significant 
differences have been taken into account.
Counter-intuitive as it may sound, formal equality also shares this premise. 
Although it is usually thought to be the least “accommodating” of difference conception 
of equality, the famous maxim lying at its heart points to the opposite direction, if 
understood properly. “Treating likes alike”, apart from revealing the Aristotelian progeny
662 According to John Rawls’ famous and influential theory o f  justice that has shaped twentieth century 
jurisprudence, difference is one o f  the two basic principles o f  justice. See J. Rawls, supra no.20, esp. p. 303.
663 Instead o f  many, for a recent attempt to tackle the issue see SchefTler, S. (2007). Distributive Justice and 
Economic Desert. Desert and Justice. S. Olsaretti, Oxford University Press, at p. 69 and Wolff, J. (2007). 
The Dilemma o f  Desert. Desert and Justice. S. Olsaretti, Oxford University Press, at p. 219.
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of formal equality, indicates that the latter can only operate on the basis of a fundamental 
distinction between those who are “like” one another and those who are not. The 
necessary condition and logical implication of addressing only identical situations in the 
same way is that different situations will have to be treated differently - otherwise the 
maxim does not make much sense.664 Even under this conception, then, equal treatment 
cannot be in principle satisfied by a blanket policy whereby every individual receives the 
exact same percentage of the total of distributable resources.
Establishing that the notion of difference is in some way connected or compatible 
with formal equality is by no means enough to provide us with final answers on its 
theoretical validity or usefulness. Centuries of philosophical investigation and 
argumentation, of course, cannot be lightly dismissed in a few paragraphs. Proponents of 
formal equality will be quick to respond that they do not deny the possibility of an uneven 
distribution of benefits or obligations. On the contrary, this is a desirable result in their 
eyes, as it affirms the primacy of the individual through allowing personal choices to 
become the decisive factor in the distribution. Essentially, formal equality is about 
process rather than substance: it is concerned with the fairness of the criteria of 
distribution, selection or election. It is not concerned with the outcome of these processes 
because it rests on the assumption that, insofar as due process and the rule of law are 
observed, the outcome must be regarded as fa ir in an objective sense. Formal equality, 
therefore, is not about utility, collective or individual, and it is not about reducing 
inequalities; its purpose is to ensure that such inequalities are legitimate and, hence, 
justified. Legitimacy, in this view, stems from the impartiality of the distributing 
apparatus: the role of the latter is to remain a neutral guarantor of procedural objectivity
664 Instead o f  many see Lucas, J. R. (1965). "Against Equality." Philosophy 40(153): 296-307.
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and fairness. If these conditions are met, no individual will be entitled to “complain” of 
unequal treatment, even though she might end up being worse-off compared to her fellow 
citizens.
It has already been stated that such a conception of equality is in tandem with the 
primacy o f  the individual, one of the traditional building blocks of liberal political theory. 
A liberal state is expected to set up a normative framework that “treats persons equally” 
in the first instance and then operates with the minimum intervention in the actuality of 
their social life.665 Substantive questions regarding one’s desired plan of life or one’s 
perception of happiness are inherently subjective and should thus be left to individual 
discretion, limited only by the rights of others and, under certain circumstances, by 
safeguards for the protection of minorities. Depending on the “strictness” or “purity” of 
the version, liberalism (in its less libertarian formulations) may be open to accepting the 
notion of the common good as a legitimate restriction to individual freedom.
Equal treatment, in this respect, amounts to a very simple and easy-to-follow 
principle: law in itself should be “blind” to difference. Individual differences, then, will 
count exactly because the law allows them to count by being indifferent towards them. 
The emerging paradox should by now be obvious: formal equality, allegedly hostile to 
difference due to the “blindness” argument, appears to celebrate difference as an 
expression o f  individualism. In doing so, formal equality is self-destructive or, to put it 
more accurately, self-deconstructing. It is premised on a sharp distinction between 
process and outcome, asserting that the latter is always justified in view of the former. 
But how can this be the case when the inter-personal differences that determine the 
outcome may have been acquired in an improper manner? What if these differences are
665 With the possible exception o f  the realm o f  criminal law.
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the result of horizontal indirect discrimination for instance, that is discrimination that 
cannot be attributed to the fault of state actors or of the distributive process itself?666
These two questions point to a direction where procedural approaches to equality 
and justice seem incapable to follow. Constructing a normative framework that insulates 
the distributive process from externalities is aimed at regulating the “state v. individual” 
relationship. Horizontality, however, is completely left out of the equation. The fairness 
of the distribution from an equality point of view cannot be assessed in a vacuum, as 
equality is not an a priori concept. Personal and social circumstances play a crucial role in 
defining the actual content of equal treatment in any given situation. What we need, 
therefore, is a theory of equality that takes into account all these considerations and is 
centred around an overarching individual right to equal treatment, combining due process 
with substance, fairness of procedure with tangible outcomes.
Dworkin’s theory of equality seems an obvious candidate. In his latest major 
work, under the eloquent title Sovereign Virtue, Dworkin refines the notions of equal 
concern and respect that he has introduced in the seventies and places them at the heart of 
his version of liberal egalitarianism. “No government is legitimate”, he claims, “that does 
not show equal concern for the fate of all [...] citizens”, given that “[ejqual concern is the 
sovereign virtue of political community”. He then explains that “equal concern 
requires that government aims at a form of material equality”, which he has famously 
labelled “equality of resources”.668 This elaborate construct inspires the analysis that 
follows, serving at once as its theoretical background and as the starting point o f the 
alternative interpretation proposed later on.
666 Assuming that the latter remain impartial.
667 Dworkin, R. (2002). Sovereign Virtue. Harvard University Press, p. 1.
668 Ibid, p. 3.
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10.2.2 Equality as the "sovereign virtue the right to equal concern and respect
Suggesting that every human being is entitled to the respect and concern o f others 
in general and of the state in particular possesses instinctive appeal. It is a proposition 
that one should find very difficult to discard, disregard or disagree with in principle. 
Apart from its obvious moral dimension, relating to a moral duty of care one owes to the 
fellow members of one’s species, it resonates with a basic idea of social justice. Either as 
a political or as a normative concept, the latter affirms, first and foremost, the innate 
value of human beings and underpins a system of governance and a system of law that 
reflect this common value. The recognition of a right to respect and concern encapsulates, 
in a sense, the semantic differential between the state of nature and the social condition of 
humanity.
One might be tempted, at the first instance, to suggest that there is no obvious 
need to conceive of these two notions as essentially intertwined. It is possible to 
disengage the right to respect from the right to concern, as the former seems to be a more 
suitable candidate to attract unreserved support from different political and philosophical 
camps, when it comes to agreeing on the absolute minimum obligations of a state towards 
its citizens. Failure to show respect for a person’s worth as a human being definitely 
deprives a state not only from legitimacy but from its raison d ’etre. A state that 
disrespects the innate value of human life fails to justify its very existence under any 
rational explanation of the social condition of humanity. But it may not be equally clear 
or straightforward why the same is true about the right to concern. One might argue that
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the recognition of human worth, coupled with a tangible display of respect, should suffice 
to delineate the bare minimum obligation of a state towards its citizens.669
This is simply false. The right to concern, far from being the mere reflection of a 
moral duty, stems from a fundamental commitment to the democratic principle. Concern 
for the well-being670 of everyone stems from the realisation that the state - or, at least, the 
democratic state - is the outcome of a society of equals, a society that is comprised by 
members that claim their membership to it on grounds of their common humanity. If 
every person, then, comes to this social arrangement as a priori equal to everyone else, it 
is only logical to expect the state to account for the discontinuation of this preliminary 
social relationship of equality. Viewed in this light the right to concern entails a basic 
state obligation to continually check whether the differentiations in individual status are 
justified despite of common humanity. In this regard and upon further reflection, the right 
to concern, alongside the right to respect, can be conceived of as the true precondition of 
the democratic polity.
Consensus ceases to exist, however, when the adjective “equal” is added to the 
equation. Three major types of disagreement can be identified in this regard. First, there 
is disagreement as to the necessity of referring to the concept o f equality in the first place. 
If common humanity is the foundation of the right to respect and concern the argument 
goes, then there is no real equality consideration involved, since the notion of humanity
669 Such an argument need not deny that a state might, in actual fact, have more obligations towards its 
citizens; it could simply suggest that any further obligation that a state has undertaken is a matter o f  social 
conventions, either in the typical form o f  a social contract (in which case state obligations stem form an 
explicit or implicit pact among citizens) or in any other similar form (as the obligation o f  a state to protect 
its citizens form harm that itself has brought upon them in the first place). For the purposes o f  the present 
discussion it is easier to think o f  this argument and o f its rebuttal in contractarian terms, so that one can 
readily rule out the possibility o f  an authoritarian social arrangement with forced membership.
670 Not necessarily for the welfare in its commonly used sense in the context o f  political philosophy.
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does not allow for degrees or differentiations. I shall call this the “triviality argument”, 
with the aim to prove that there is nothing trivial about equality in this regard.
Second, there is disagreement as to the “correct position” of the adjective “equal” 
within the proposition. Although most people671 would probably agree that everyone is, 
in principle, equally entitled to respect and concern merely on grounds of their humanity, 
they would be reluctant to concede that everyone is, in principle, entitled to equal respect 
and concern, if equal here is taken to mean “equal shares” of respect and concern. Given 
that the notions of respect and concern are by default open to quantitative differentiations, 
the amount of respect or concern owed to each individual may vary depending on this 
individual’s attitude, behaviour, qualities or actions. I shall call this the “linguistic 
argument”, purporting to prove that the difference between “treating equally” and 
“treating as equals”672 is void of normative substance and has been used only because 
there is linguistic confusion as to the meaning of equal treatment. If the latter is properly 
understood, it will be argued, then the term “treating equally” collapses into “treating as 
equals”, as the two should be conceived of as normatively tautological. Any remaining 
disagreement, therefore, is a disagreement about the concept of equality per se and of its 
normative consequences.
Third, as explained above, there is disagreement regarding the correct normative 
content of the proposition specifically with regard to the notions of “respect” and of 
“concern”. In other words, the actual meaning of “respect” and “concern” within a legal 
framework may be contested, even if one is willing to accept that there exists a relative 
state obligation to protect and promote a basic equality right in this context. I shall call
671 Or, at least, most o f  those who are not convinced by the triviality argument and would not oppose to 
equality being a legitimate consideration in this case.
672 This distinction, employed by Ronald Dworkin, elucidates the type o f  disagreement identified here.
279
this the “normative” argument. This is to signify that the extent of the positive obligation 
may be open to debate - and a substantive one for that matter. But for all intents and 
purposes the issue here is primarily one of equal treatment. Regardless of disagreements 
on the particular distributions of social benefits, therefore, one must acknowledge that the 
“correct” amount o f respect and concern owed to a particular individual or group may in 
principle depend on the amount of respect and concern shown to another individual or 
group.
280
10.3 Interpreting the Legal Principle of Equal Treatment: Indistinctibilitv of Respect and 
Proportionality of Concern
10.3.1 Equal treatment as the right to indistinctibility o f  respect.
Indistinctibility of respect, as one of the two dimensions of the right to equal 
treatment, denotes a basic obligation to treat every person as a moral agent worthy of 
respect for her human dignity and her personality solely on the basis of her humanity.673 
Premised on the assumption that our common humanity is an inalienable feature of 
individual identity, the right to indistinctibility of respect prohibits any distinction or 
grading of persons as regards their human worth on any grounds.
Indistinctibility of respect prima facie mirrors the generally established principle 
of non-discrimination minus the possibility o f  justified exceptions. This difference can be 
seen most eloquently in the context of the initial confusion caused by the wording of 
article 14 ECHR in the French original text. The phrase “sans distinction aucune” 
literally translates into English as “without any distinction”, which would effectively 
entail that any differentiation in the enjoyment o f rights - be it in terms of their personal 
scope of application or in terms of possible restrictions or limitations to them - would 
automatically be contrary the Convention. To avoid such an absurd and clearly undesired 
outcome the English original text reads “without any discrimination”, which covers only 
those distinctions that are unjustified. Indistinctibility of respect, therefore, can be 
understood as a notion encapsulating the “French version”, whereby no distinction is 
legitimate.
673 The Kantian origins o f  this position are obvious and the influence o f  Kant’s theory in constructing the 
category o f  indistinctibility o f  respect is duly acknowledged.
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This reading of indistinctibility of respect, however, is misleading. Discrimination 
is not the appropriate conceptual yardstick by which to explain how indistinctibility of 
respect operates either on a philosophical or on a normative level. The reason is simple: 
discrimination is intrinsically connected with some form of comparison. Its identification 
requires an actual or, at least, a perceived relationship of inequality between two 
individuals or groups, namely a victim and a comparator. In a very real sense, therefore, 
the existence of a victim presupposes the possibility of a comparison. For a comparison 
to be possible an identifiable comparator needs to exist.674 Let us label this the “no 
comparator, no victim ” principle. When it comes to indistinctibility of respect, this 
principle is not applicable. Anything but fu ll enjoyment of the right to respect will lead to 
a violation, irrespective o f  any actual or potential comparisons.
The difference, then, between indistinctibility of respect and non-discrimination is 
more profound than one might recognise at first glance. Being an equal to all other 
persons in this sense requires a departure from a traditional understanding of equality that 
accepts, explicitly or implicitly, non-discrimination as a necessary minimum or an 
inevitable starting-point. Prohibition of all distinctions within this narrowly defined 
framework renders discrimination a factual impossibility. Identifying whether and when a 
violation occurs does not call for anti-discrimination considerations, because anything 
that would normally qualify as discrimination collapses into a breach of the right to 
respect in itself. Equal treatment as indistinctibility of respect, therefore, is, in reality,
674 Note the difference here between identifiable and identified comparator, which explains why the 
precondition o f  victim status is in fact the possibility  (rather than the actuality) o f  carrying out a 
comparison.
675 This is primarily the case with formal conceptions o f equality, but it is also true for substantive equality 
and its variations. The latter go, admittedly, much further than non-discrimination, but they still seem to 
accept it as an inevitable starting-point.
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completely disengaged from the anti-discrimination rationale and not just a variation of 
it.
What is, then, the actual legal content of the right to indistinctibility of respect as 
defined here? Protection of human dignity in all its forms obviously constitutes the basic 
normative materialisation of this abstract right. Fundamental rights further substantiating
f f l f .
this protection, such as the right to life, the right not to be tortured or be subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment,677 as well as personality rights, should also be 
considered as particular expressions of the general right to respect.
The link between indistinctibility of respect and those rights directly stemming 
from human dignity seems to be self-explanatory, as they are both “transpositions” of our 
common humanity into the realm of the law. In other words, insofar as a breach of any of 
these rights constitutes an affront to human dignity,678 the right to respect will also be 
automatically engaged as the overarching general legal principle. Interrogation practices, 
for instance, that are found to be contrary to Article 3 ECHR will also be in violation of 
the right to respect regardless of whether they amount to either torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment.
Personality rights, on the other hand, may constitute a somewhat disputed 
territory, mainly because of the possibility to conceive of personality as an expansionist 
notion that covers various facets of a person’s social condition. If personality rights, in 
this regard, extend from protection against libel to participation in the economic life, the 
notion of indistinctibility of respect may become unintelligible given the rigid prohibition
676 Article 2 o f  the European Convention o f  Human Rights (ECHR). The rights enshrined in the ECHR are 
taken here as a proxy o f  the minimum common denominator o f  the European constitutional traditions on 
the protection o f  rights.
677 Article 3 ECHR.
678 Which is their common underlying rationale.
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of distinctions it involves, as this will render it practically unworkable and normatively 
undesirable. Undoubtedly, the relationship between indistinctibility of respect and 
personality rights needs further elaboration, with a view to addressing the pragmatic 
concerns raised by the latter without jeopardising the theoretical integrity of the former. 
This is, however, a task that goes beyond the limits of the present enquiry and cannot be 
undertaken here.
Returning to the main axis of analysis, the proposed working definition of 
indistinctibility of respect offers a preliminary response to the “normative” argument, as 
it provides a minimum content of the right to respect. Further refinement, of course, is 
required in order to specify the particular obligations of the state when the right to respect 
is at stake either in itself679 or in the form of any of its constituent rights. This will also 
explain why indistinctibility of respect is preferable to equality of respect, both in terms 
of terminology (“linguistic” argument) and in terms of substance.
Starting with the substance of the matter, it is necessary to repeat the basic 
justificatory rationale o f the present analytic project. The reason for proposing an 
alternative to the right to equal respect in the first place is that resource equality fails to 
encapsulate what the right to respect is really about.680 In fact, Dworkin explicitly links 
resource equality with the right to concern in most of his writings but is considerably 
more cryptic on its relationship with the right to respect. This is not to say that 
distributive justice is, in his view, irrelevant to the right to respect. And how could this 
be, when he advocates for a right to equal respect? It follows that the model of equality of
679 This would be the case, i f  the material expression o f  respect to a particular individual or group was 
different from that offered to others.
680 The same justificatory rationale, o f  course, applies mutatis mutandis to the right to concern.
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resources that he proposes must be understood as incorporating the right to equal respect 
as one of its foundational elements.
Arguably the right to equal respect in this light resembles a negative or first
Z O  1
generation right, according to the classical - yet somewhat obsolete - distinction in the 
human rights discourse. The liberal state is primarily expected to remain a neutral arbiter 
between different conceptions of the good, different ideas on what constitutes a 
successful choice in the pursuit of a fulfilling life for every individual. Equal respect, in 
this view, mirrors a notion of formal equality: since all persons are alike in their common 
humanity, the right to equal respect entails that they are entitled to be treated in the same 
way insofar as the constituents of this humanity are concerned.
This account fails on two grounds: first, it commits the right to equal respect to a 
formal conception of equality, the problems of which have already been thoroughly 
discussed. Second, through equality of resources it attaches excessive importance to 
individual choices. In this regard, treating people as equals collapses, in fact, into treating 
them with equal respect to the choices they make. Plausible as this may seem at first 
glance, it produces undesirable and contradictory outcomes when applied to a number of 
real life situations.
This latter point needs further elaboration. Respect for human worth, as the 
essence of our common humanity, should be conceived of as being in principle 
independent from individual choices,682 The right to respect, as defined here, does not 
involve respect for actions or behaviours; it is rather a more profound respect for the 
human condition that cannot be cancelled, diminished or reduced for any reason
681 Arat, Z. F. K. (2006). Human Rights Worldwide: A Reference Handbook. ABC-CLIO., pp. 33-37.
682 This should not be confused with the classical Kantian view that moral worth is independent from all 
contingencies. For a thoughtful discussion o f  this point see B. Williams, supra no.l 87.
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whatsoever. Arguing to the opposite is conceivable only in an “Old Testament” view of 
the world, where criminal justice can legitimately deliver sentences as cruel and inhuman 
as the crimes committed. Modem legal systems, on the contrary, are invariably premised 
upon a foundational assumption that society (or the state) owes to all persons a minimum 
of respect mirroring their humanity regardless of or even despite their actions. This 
Kantian notion683 prevents society from responding to an affront to human worth with 
another affront. Even perpetrators of crimes against humanity benefit from this minimum 
of respect that does not depend on reciprocity.
It is particularly interesting to note that the argument holds true even if one 
accepts the death penalty as a legitimate form of punishment. In that case the right to 
respect materialises as the determinant factor of the acceptable forms to deliver the 
punishment and the conditions under which this will be carried out. In its landmark 
decision in Soering684 the European Court of Human Rights refrained from proclaiming 
that the possibility of facing capital punishment was in itself reason enough to deny 
extradition of the applicant to the United States. It then went on to find in favour of the 
applicant anyway on grounds of the existence of the death row phenomenon, which 
“would expose him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article
685
Preference for the notion of indistinctibility rather than equality of respect is 
further evidenced when one considers the following scenario. A sexually active adult
683 According to Kant’s philosophical construct moral worth (which is very similar but not necessarily 
tautological to what w e have identified here as human worth) is independent o f  contingencies and, hence, 
equal respect is owed to each person in his or her capacity as a rational moral agent. For the purposes o f  the 
present argument it would suffice to accept that every person has the potential to act as a moral agent, as a 
result o f  his or her humanity, even though not everyone fulfils this potential to the same extent.
684 Soering v. the United Kingdom, (1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439.
685 Ibid.
286
consciously decides to stop practicing safe sex, despite the fact that he has multiple 
sexual partners and that he is fully aware of the dangers involved. Assume now that this 
genuine choice, driven purely by hedonistic considerations, results in the person 
contracting a life threatening sexually transmitted disease. Is it plausible to deny this 
person access to the public healthcare system on the basis of his bad individual choices?
Discounting scarcity of resources for the time being, which is a factor pertaining 
to concern rather than to respect, the answer should clearly be a negative one. From a 
human rights perspective it is simple to justify this answer by reference to the right to 
life, which involves a positive obligation of the state to provide its citizens with adequate 
medical assistance when faced with life threatening diseases. The justificatory rationale 
supported by indistinctibility of respect is equally self-explanatory. Leaving a person 
unassisted in such a case would violate the right to indistinctibility of respect, provided 
that the right to health or the right to life are recognised as established legal expressions 
of the right to respect.
From an equality of resources point of view, however, justification can only stems 
from the operation of the hypothetical insurance device. “Average people of normal 
prudence” would have probably purchased insurance against illness and diseases, had 
they had the opportunity to do so on equal terms. In the context of our example, though, 
such justification is inadequate for two reasons.
First, the individual in question can hardly be described as a person of “normal 
prudence”. His choices, at least insofar as the matter at hand is concerned, indicate rather 
that he is consciously and explicitly willing to undertake a much higher than average risk. 
It is unclear in this case how exactly equal respect materialises into a positive state
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obligation and what the extent of such obligation under resource equality might be. One 
might be quick to remark that a person in the habit of engaging in risk-prone projects 
would have had all the more reason to insure himself against the potential adverse effects 
of such choices. This line of argument is at best debatable, as it presupposes a level of 
analytical skills and a degree of self-understanding that seem to go beyond those of the 
average person.
Even if this line of argument is correct, however, there is a second dimension in 
which resource equality fails to address situations where individual choice should not 
count against the person. This is particularly evident in the context of cross-border 
situations, where an individual has the status of a real rather than a hypothetical 
immigrant. In this case, he may find himself in the position of getting more than he 
bargained for, especially if he comes from an authoritarian or inegalitarian home state.
(L Q f.
Consider the facts in another seminal Strasbourg judgment, that of D  v. UK. The case 
concerned the deportation of a terminally ill AIDS patient from the UK to St Kitts. D was 
detained upon entering the UK in 1993 for possession of a large quantity of cocaine and, 
while serving his sentence, he was diagnosed with AIDS. Prior to his release and with a 
deportation order already issued by the immigration authorities, D filed a request to 
remain in the UK on grounds that his life expectancy would be substantially shortened if 
he were to be removed to St Kitts, where there existed no appropriate means of medical 
care for AIDS patients. His request was refused by the administration and the decision 
was upheld by domestic courts.
The reasoning of the judgment is illuminating. The Court starts off by reminding 
that it “has repeatedly stressed in its line of authorities involving extradition, expulsion or
686 D v. the United Kingdom, 2nd May 1997, application no. 30240/96, Reports 1997-III.
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deportation of individuals to third countries that Article 3 [...] prohibits in absolute terms 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and that its guarantees apply
f.on
irrespective o f  the reprehensible nature o f  the conduct o f  the person in question” 
[emphasis added]. In other words, the right to respect for the human condition, either as 
human dignity or as protection from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, should 
be understood as independent from individual choices. Removing D from the medical and 
palliative care he has been receiving during his stay in the UK “would expose him to a 
real risk o f dying under most distressing circumstances and would thus amount to 
inhuman treatment”.688
The Court, o f course, is fully aware of the disruptive effects of potential free­
riding on the national healthcare systems, if the gates are wide open for healthcare or 
social benefits-shopping. In this regard, it “emphasises that aliens who have served their 
prison sentences and are subject to expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to 
remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, 
social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State during their stay in
iTOQ
prison”. The exceptional nature of the circumstances in D v. UK is confirmed by the 
recent judgment in N v. UK.690 The case concerned N, a Ugandan citizen and AIDS 
patient, living in London. Her allegation was that her return to Uganda, after the refusal 
of immigration authorities to grant her asylum, would cause her suffering and lead to her 
early death due to her illness. The Court reiterated that “the fact that the applicant's 
circumstances, including [her] life expectancy, would be significantly reduced if [she]
687 Ibid, para 47.
688 Ibid, para 53.
689 Ibid, para 54.
690 N  v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber, 27 May 2008, application no. 26565/05.
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were to be removed from the Contracting State is not sufficient in itself to give rise to 
breach of Article 3”691 [emphasis added]. Admitting that “the level of treatment available 
in the Contracting State and the country of origin may vary considerably”, there is no 
“obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision of 
free and unlimited health care to all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction” 
as this would “place too great a burden on the Contracting States”.692
This rationale fits well with the notion of indistinctibility of respect. Note that the 
Court in N v. UK suggests that expulsion or extradition is not in itself enough to find a 
violation of Article 3. It is, however, obviously enough to engage Article 3. There 
appears to be little doubt that the issue may be connected to a fundamental overarching 
right to respect as presently defined. Although the threshold to find a violation of the 
constituent rights of the latter is admittedly high, it is sufficient for our goals here that 
possible affronts to human worth do not involve formal equality considerations and that 
comparators and comparisons are completely left out of the equation. By the same token, 
the right to respect is not merely a negative right; under certain circumstances it requires 
the state to take active steps towards upholding and protecting it, as in the case of D v. 
UK, where the United Kingdom is under an obligation to continue the provision of 
palliative and medical care.
What remains to be examined in this context is the “triviality argument”. This is 
simultaneously the easiest and the most difficult to deal with at this point. The reason is 
none other than the partisan nature of the philosophical arguments involved. Equality 
possesses a peculiar trait as a concept: when invoked, it usually generates instinctive
691 Ibid, para 42.
692 Ibid, para 44.
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reactions, positive or negative, to those participating in the discourse. Both opponents and 
advocates engage in the discourse with the implicit or explicit realisation that whatever 
conclusion they come to will necessarily pertain to the most basic of questions in political 
philosophy. Above all else the answers to questions of equality involve a choice about the 
kind of political society we wish to live in.
Why, then, is it easy to make sense of the “triviality” argument in the context of 
indistinctibility of respect? The answer is simple: in view of the preceding analysis it is 
clear that the “triviality” argument is partly accepted as valid. As explained earlier, the 
right to indistinctibility of respect translates into a basic non-discrimination principle 
without the possibility of justified exceptions. In this sense, showing anything less than 
fu ll respect to each individual or group should constitute a violation of the right to respect 
per se, without the need to demonstrate an inequality compared to any other individual or 
group. By removing the element of comparison from the equation, indistinctibility of 
respect will, arguably, be a more satisfactory notion for the critics of equality.
By the same token, however, the “triviality” argument is difficult to deal with 
properly in the narrow confines of the present chapter. This is because the concession 
regarding its validity applies only insofar as equality of respect is understood as formal 
equality. Introducing the notion of indistinctibility of respect as a better analytical 
alternative does not entail that there is no connection whatsoever between the right to 
respect and the principle of equal treatment. On the contrary, there exists a dual 
connection that should suffice to dismiss the “triviality” argument, at least in its strictest 
formulation for our present purposes.693
693 See for instance P. Westen, supra no. 188. For a more comprehensive critique o f  equality see Raz, J. 
(1986). The Morality o f  Freedom. Clarendon Press (OUP)., ch. 9.
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First, indistinctibility of respect endorses the existence of a distributive dimension 
to the relevant right and the corresponding state obligation. Protecting this right to respect 
involves active state intervention, when necessary through its mechanisms for 
redistribution of social and material resources, so that human dignity or personality 
related rights do not become “theoretical and illusory”694 but are fully enjoyed in practice 
by everyone. In this regard, the right to respect cannot be disengaged from the right to 
concern. Proper evaluation of an issue arising under any of the two requires that the 
validity of the outcome is tested against the other.
The examples discussed above illustrate this point. Even if the United Kingdom 
was found to be under an obligation not to deport D on grounds of his right not to be 
subjected to inhuman treatment, reducing the level or quality of medical treatment 
offered to D would have been discussed in the related but different context of his right to 
concern. In this regard, scarcity of resources, for instance, or his status as an alien could 
count as legitimate reasons to justify differentiations in treatment, insofar as these do not 
fall under a minimum threshold - which would amount to a violation of the right to 
respect. Allowing for the possibility of differentiations, however, automatically brings 
equality back into play.
Following on from that point, the second and arguably more concrete link 
between indistinctibility of respect and equality is a negative one, in the sense that it 
comes to the fore when the right to respect is violated. The fact that anything less than 
full respect amounts to a breach of the said right says nothing about the appropriate 
means of retribution to the victim of the violation. Equality in the form of comparison
694 According to the standard terminology employed by the European Court o f  Human Rights.
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between individuals or groups, then, must also be taken into account when considering 
the appropriate type or level of retribution for such a violation.
It is particularly important to realise that the appropriateness of such retribution 
involves a sometimes precarious balance between an external-objective and an internal- 
subjective point of view. Legislation and policy decisions will be formally compatible 
with indistinctibility of respect when they assume an objective point of view, when, that 
is, they do not undervalue the human worth of any individual or group affected by them. 
This, however, is not sufficient. Decisions should also be substantively compatible with 
indistinctibility of respect, which requires law or policy-makers to value equally the 
subjective perceptions of individuals or groups regarding respect for their human worth. 
For it to be consistent with its liberal pedigree indistinctibility of respect needs to steer 
clear from essentialist evaluations of what constitutes a “worthy” plan of life on the part 
of the state, which would inevitably lead to an assimilationist - and, for this reason, 
illiberal - understanding of equal treatment. It is imperative, therefore, that breaches of 
the right to respect are rectified in a way that mirrors the particular needs and 
“preferences” of those that suffered the breach.
10.3.2 Equal treatment as the right to proportionality o f  concern.
Proportionality of concern, as the second dimension o f the overarching right to 
equal treatment, shares the basic philosophical premises of the notion of equal concern in 
the “traditional” liberal formula. It denotes a commitment to a fundamental duty o f care 
bom by the community as a whole towards its individual members. Concern materialises 
into legislation or policy decisions that allocate various types of social benefits
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proportionally, that is on grounds of desert or need.695 These benefits may take the form 
of specifically tailored rights that are reserved for a particular group,696 fluctuating
/ q *7
degrees of obligations according to individual capacity or allocation of preference to
members of a targeted group, as in the case o f positive action.
Aiming to treat people as equals presupposes an interpersonal comparison of 
situations so that individual attributes,698 as well as societal facts,699 are taken into 
account. Difference, then, is at the heart of liberal equality. This fascinating paradox, 
explored thoroughly in strands of the relevant literature - feminism and critical race 
theory being two prominent examples - is ironically one of the least controversial aspects 
of a highly debated topic. Liberal egalitarianism, with all its shortcomings, is admittedly 
correct in attempting to reconcile two fundamental tenets of political community, liberty 
and equality.700 Contentious as the outcomes of this philosophical endeavour may be and 
leaving aside the extreme ends of the academic and political spectrum,701 there appears to 
be a relatively broad consensus that any state intervention should seek to enable rather 
than frustrate individual autonomy. In most cases, however, this enabling function cannot
695 The terms desert and need  are admittedly value-laden and seem to already place the notion o f  
proportional equality within the relevant discourse. Proportionality o f  concern can, indeed, be classified as 
a needs-based approach to equality, but the particularities o f  this classification and the extent to which it is 
justified will be fully explored later on in this section.
696 This is the case, for instance, with the right to legal a id  in criminal proceedings for defendants who 
cannot afford legal representation.
697 The archetypical example o f  proportional equality applied across modem legal systems is none other 
than tax law, which is premised upon the basic principle “from one according to one’s financial capacity”, 
this is, o f  course, true o f  direct taxation.
698 Such as gender or race.
699 Such as gender or race discrimination.
700 J. Rawls, supra no. 20.
701 Ranging from the deification o f  individual liberty and o f  the invisible self-regulating powers o f  the 
market (Nozick, supra no.517) to the total negation o f  individuality and difference that is symbiotic with 
tyrannical regimes.
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in principle be fulfilled by means of blanket policies that are insensitive to existing 
inequalities, material or otherwise.
As such, the notion of proportionality of concern introduced here does not pose 
any challenge to the basic liberal conceptual framework - at least in its non-extreme 
formulations. Starting from the position that a “one size fits all” approach is generally 
incompatible with the legal phenomenon,702 proportionality of concern advocates that 
equal treatment in principle does not amount to uniformity, 7 0 3  Crude generalisations 
about the human condition are incapable of providing a solid foundation for the actions of 
a liberal state and, as a result, some degree of normative flexibility in approaching 
individual situations is sine qua non, if we are to avoid the pitfall of essentialism.
The semantic difference, however, between proportionality of concern and its 
traditional liberal counterparts consists in its rationae materiae and its rationae personae 
scope of application. Egalitarian theories of justice of late seem to favour a clear divide 
with regard to the material content of concern.704 From an analytical point of view it is 
possible to classify them into two large but distinct categories, namely those advocating 
welfare and those prioritising resources as the correct yardstick for concern 
respectively.705 Proportionality of concern cuts through this divide, proposing that the
702 This incompatibility obviously does not refer to general principles o f law, which, despite their 
generality, do not constitute a “blanket” approach.
703 Uniformity o f  treatment, o f  course, is not in itself impossible or a priori illegitimate. It will be the 
inevitable outcome in cases where interpersonal comparisons happen to involve two individuals in identical 
situations.
704 For an insightful analysis see Nussbaum, M. C. and A. K. Sen (2002). Introduction. The Quality o f  Life. 
M. C. Nussbaum and A. K. Sen, Oxford University Press.
705 See generally Rae, D. (1981). Equalities. Harvard University Press.. For present purposes Ronald 
Dworkin is regarded as the leading advocate o f  equality o f  resources, while equality o f  welfare is 
understood in terms o f  both its classical utilitarian formulation and its more refined modem variants. For an 
example o f  the former see Hare, R. M. (1981). Moral Thinking. Its levels. Method and Point. Oxford 
University Press. For the most eloquent specimens o f  the latter instead o f  many see Sen, A. K. (1979).
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state should be concerned for both the welfare and the resources o f its citizens when 
treating them as equals.706 Proportionality of concern also deviates from the standard 
liberal version in that its personal scope intends to cover individuals as well as social 
groups. In this regard, concern is not understood as being allocated solely on an 
individual basis, but it explicitly requires provision for the disadvantaged, the under­
privileged, the under-represented or the socially excluded.
Let us try to explore these two novel dimensions that proportionality of concern 
introduces in more detail, starting with the rationae personae scope. Liberalism is 
traditionally focused on the primacy of the individual, so much so that it has become 
oblivious of a growing social tendency. Multiculturalism is nowadays the norm in a 
globalised world. This is particularly true for western societies that aspire to take the lead 
in the protection of human rights and in the recognition of otherness as part of our 
collective self, part of a larger, more comprehensive, common “we”.707 Despite the best 
of intentions, this recognition is carried out in an erroneous way. By allowing 
individualism to take unconditional conceptual precedence, there is a risk of favouring 
assimilation over equality. Social groups seem to become relevant only indirectly, when 
discrimination against their individual members is at play.
"Utilitarianism and Welfarism." The Journal o f  Philosophy 76(9): 463-489.; A. K. Sen,, supra no.656 (on 
the “capabilities to achieve functionings” approach); Cohen, G. A. (1989). "On the Currency o f  Egalitarian 
Justice." Ethics 99(4): 906-944.(on the “equality o f  access” approach).
706 This may have similar normative effects to but it is not the same as suggesting that equality o f  resources 
presupposes equality o f  welfare. For an elaboration o f  the latter position see Roemer, J. E. (1986). 
"Equality o f  Resources Implies Equality o f  Welfare." The Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 101(4): 751- 
784.
707 Modood, T. (1997). Introduction: The Politics o f  Multiculturalism in the N ew  Europe. The politics o f  
multiculturalism in the new Europe: Racism. Identity, and Community. T. M. a. P. J. Werbner, Zed Books., 
chapters 1 and 2.
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Proportionality of concern addresses this deficiency by requiring that equal 
consideration is given to both groups and individuals in decision-making. The celebrated 
primacy of the individual is not compromised, but it is recalibrated so that it mirrors more 
accurately the reality of identity-formation in modem societies. Instead of being 
understood as a singular unit, the individual is conceived of as the resultant of various 
components, including biological characteristics and their potential social connotations, 
as well as multiple and, at times, overlapping memberships of a plethora of social groups. 
When the state, therefore, shows its concern for its citizens, it must make sure that it 
knows who these citizens really are, what they perceive themselves to be and how 
strongly the groups they belong to affect their personality, preferences, opportunities and 
needs.
Turning to the second novelty of proportionality of concern, namely its rationae 
materiae scope, one must note that the dichotomy between welfare and resource equality 
may not be as rigid as their respective advocates usually proclaim. The key to overcome 
the dilemma this dichotomy poses is to conceive of disadvantage as the indisputable 
focal point of both the philosophical enquiry and the normative instruments of equality 
law. In a major recent work of political philosophy Wolff and De-Shalit708 make a 
decisive step in this direction. They claim that disadvantage should be understood in a 
pluralist sense,709 so that it takes into account the complexity of social relations. In this 
view, then, the notion of disadvantage may encompass deficits both in terms of welfare 
and in terms of resources. What is more important is that, according to the authors, it is 
possible to find consensus on a general idea that governments should gear policy-making
708 Wolff, J. and A. De-Shalit (2007). Disadvantage. Oxford University Press.
709 Ibid, chapter 1, esp. pp. 22-23.
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towards giving “priority to the worse-off’,710 even in the absence of agreement on the 
actual content or roots of disadvantage.
The general lines of proportionality of concern, then, are in place. A full 
exposition of the theory in all its dimensions is, of course, an impossible task, given the 
space limitations of the present project. There is, however, one important aspect of the 
analysis that moves a step further from the Wolff and De-Shalit position and must be 
highlighted. Although proportionality of concern fully ascribes to the general views 
expressed by the authors, it is also explicit as to how priority to the worse-off should 
materialise in the realm of law through the use of positive action.711 The latter, under 
proportionality of concern, is not only a legitimate means to an end but also an obligation 
o f the state in particular areas of the public sphere.712 It is now time to test this theoretical 
construct and its implications against the backdrop of the existing European normative 
framework, as defined in the preceding analysis.
7,0 Ibid, p. 155.
711 WolfF and De-Shalit also delve into this issue in chapter 10, but with different conclusions.
7,2 See infra, chapter 11.5.
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CHAPTER 11: POSITIVE ACTION RECONSTRUCTED
11.1 Introduction
The previous chapter had the aim of setting out the basic conceptual framework 
for a novel interpretation of the legal principle of equal treatment that encapsulates what 
is termed “full” or “full and effective” equality. It was claimed that equal treatment can 
only amount to full equality if premised upon the notions of indistinctibility of respect 
and proportionality of concern. Within this framework it is clear that the classical 
conception o f positive action, whereby “one size fits all”, is monolithic and insufficiently 
nuanced to account for the legitimate use of positive measures across the spectrum of 
social activity. What is needed, therefore, is a reconceptualisation of positive action: 
instead of being a legitimate exception to equal treatment, it should be rather understood 
as one of the dimensions of full equality, expressed as proportionality of concern.
It is now time to test these seemingly abstract assertions against the backdrop of 
tangible normative reality. The analysis will begin by briefly considering the place of 
equal treatment and positive action in the European Legal Order of Rights, that is the 
supranational normative topos created at the intersection of EU law and the ECHR 
through their constant dialectic interaction. It will then move on to elucidate why positive 
action should be regarded as an expression of equal treatment rather than as a form of 
special treatment. The arguments will once again be gender-oriented, and geared towards 
an analytical dichotomy between disadvantaged groups on the one hand, which may have
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a legitimate expectation to be allocated positive action benefits, and vulnerable groups on 
the other, entitled to special treatment.
The remaining space will be devoted to a substantial reconsideration of the ECJ 
positive action case-law under the light of proportionality of concern. Using the latter as 
an analytical tool, the aim here will be twofold: first, to critically evaluate the validity of 
the common assumption that the case-law reflects a shift from what is usually termed 
formal equality to a more substantive version of it. Secondly, to consider whether 
proportionality of concern can prove to be the basis of a more coherent analytic 
framework that will allow us to identify both the strengths and the lacunae in the equality 
reasoning of the Court. Finally, the penultimate section will attempt to offer a glimpse of 
the big picture. It will demonstrate how the interpretation of equal treatment put forward 
here has the required normative flexibility so that it can at once respect the tripartite 
distinction between employment, politics and the judiciary and, still, remain an all- 
encompassing unifying theory that accommodates difference in all its dimensions without 
jeopardising legal certainty.
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11.2 Equality and Positive Action in the European Legal Order of Rights
One of the innovative propositions of this thesis is that a common European 
denominator regarding the meaning of equality and its relationship to positive action can 
be identified. In fact, it has been argued that this is not a matter of academic opinion but 
one of normative reality. The principle of equal treatment, according to this argument, is 
one of the foundational principles of a new European Legal Order of Rights that has 
gradually emerged and now constitutes the de facto supranational normative framework 
for the protection of rights in Europe. On this basis and before moving on to the more 
substantive analysis of the reconstructed notion of positive action, it is worth clarifying 
how the existence of the ELOR will affect the law and practice of equality and positive 
action in Europe.
ELOR can be the trigger for a race to the top rather than a race to the bottom. 
European states will be under an obligation to take active steps in order to match the 
better scores of their neighbours and counterparts on the equality front. Assuming, then, 
that in both Greece and the UK under-representation of women in the top stratum of a 
particular cadre in the civil service is comparably severe, when one of these states 
introduces positive measures in favour of women to rectify the problem the other should 
in principle follow suit.
Obviously the measures will differ in content from one jurisdiction to another, as 
they should be designed to fit the particular needs of each country. Ultimately the choice 
of measures that serve best the common purpose in a given socio-political context lies 
with national legislatures, falling clearly within their margin o f  appreciation. This well-
established doctrine of Community law, as well as the ECHR system, should continue to 
play a cardinal role in maintaining the desired balance between national regulatory 
autonomy and the post-national ELOR structure. States, however, will have an onus o f  
justification when failing to match the equality successes of their European counterparts. 
An omission on the part of the UK, for instance, to introduce gender quotas in an area 
where women are severely under-represented will be subjected to strict scrutiny by the 
European courts, provided that other European countries have already began addressing 
similar inequalities by means of specific national legislation and policy initiatives.
Such measures will form part of a rights acquis. Reversing them will only be 
possible if national authorities can provide compelling evidence to the effect that the 
measures are ineffective or unsuitable in view of a significant change in the 
socioeconomic circumstances of the country that require a reorientation of social policy 
priorities. A gender quota, for instance, could only be suspended if the state were in a 
position to prove that a more pressing social need to increase the representation of ethnic 
minorities should temporarily take precedence over gender equality. This would only lead 
to the suspension of the gender quota, of course, if there is satisfactory evidence that it is 
not possible to pursue both objectives simultaneously.
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11.3 Positive Action qua Equal Treatment Rather Than Special Treatment: 
Distinguishing Between Disadvantaged and Vulnerable Social Groups
When equal treatment is understood as proportionality of concern and 
indistinctibility of respect, positive action is no longer a legitimate exception to equality. 
It rather becomes an expression of equality, an indispensable legal tool to accomplish 
equality of treatment in situations where “conventional” or “neutral” means do not suffice 
to overcome endemic disadvantage of individuals or groups. Unlike, then, what is often 
argued under its classical conception, positive action does not constitute a case of special 
treatment. It is this claim that the thesis turns now to explore, within the theoretical 
framework of proportionality of concern.
In order to solidify the claim that positive action does not amount to special 
treatment the following sections will aim to establish a clear dividing line between the 
two in European equality law on the basis of a proposed distinction between 
disadvantaged groups - that may entitled to positive action - and vulnerable groups - that 
may be entitled to special treatment. Having said that, the analysis will remain conscious 
of the underlying concern for equality, which is the common ultimate goal in both cases. 
The question will be examined in the context of gender equality and with particular 
reference to pregnancy as an exemplification of how disadvantage and vulnerability play 
out in the field of employment.
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11.3.1 Gender equality, disadvantage and vulnerability.
The practical impact of EU gender equality law has been seriously contested from
n \* \a feminist perspective both at the early stages of its development and even after the 
recent additions to the normative framework.714 Most commentators recognise the 
contributions of new legislation and of the policy and governance tools that have been 
employed, such as gender mainstreaming,715 in improving the socio-economic status of
71 f \European women, especially during the last decade. Significant gender inequalities 
across the spectrum, however, continue to exist despite the efforts of European 
institutions and national legislators.
For some this is the inevitable result of a general institutional mentality that 
“condemns” EU social policy to the back seat in a primarily market-oriented policy 
agenda.717 In feminist writings, however, the problem lies primarily with the conception 
of equality at play, which fails to recognise and adequately structural disadvantage.718 
This is particularly evident in the case of pregnancy and the way the ECJ has interpreted 
the relevant legal provisions.
713 Fredman, S. (1992). "European Community Discrimination Law: A Critique." Industrial Law Journal 
21(2): 119-134.
714 Masselot, A. (2007). "The State o f  Gender Equality Law in the European Union." European Law Journal 
13(2): 152-168.
715 Beveridge, F. (2007). "Building against the past: the impact o f  mainstreaming on EU gender law and 
policy." European Law Review 32(2): 193-212.; Shaw, J. (2005). "Mainstreaming Equality and Diversity in 
European Union Law and Policy." Current Legal Problems 58(255-312). See, however, a more sceptical 
view in Beveridge, F. and S. Nott (2002). "Mainstreaming: A Case for Optimism and Cynicism." Feminist 
Legal Studies 10(3-4): 299-311.
7,6 For an overview o f  the disadvantaged status o f  women across the EU at the end o f  the 20th century see 
Glasner, A. (1998). Gender and Europe: Cultural and Structural Impediments to Change. Social Europe. J. 
Bailey, Longman.
717 Prechal, S. (2004). "Equality o f  Treatment, Non-Discrimination and Social Policy: Achievements in 
Three Themes." Common Market Law Review 41(21: 533-551., at 533.
7,8 Fredman, supra no.714, p. 134.
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McGlynn, for instance, accuses the Court for adopting the “dominant ideology of 
motherhood”719 across its case-law on gender equality. Although its motives may be 
benign, the aim of addressing structural discrimination against women is only 
superficially served. If traditional assumptions about the socially constructed role of 
women are not shattered, then under-representation of women in positions of power near 
the top of the socio-political hierarchy will continue to mar any superficial success of 
equality strategies.720
But what McGlynn goes on to suggest is far more radical than that. In her view 
the underlying problem is that EU gender equality law revolves around a “paternalistic 
‘protection’ principle”721 that overrides equal treatment. In other words, the “rhetoric of 
protection”722 that presents women as a vulnerable social group is itself at fault for the 
perpetuation of vulnerability.723 If this is true for pregnancy-related legislation,724 then it 
is true a fortiori for positive action. The echoes of the typical social stigma argument are 
loud and clear.725 It would be redundant to rehearse the full set of counter-arguments, 
especially in view of the fact that the real point here seems to be more refined compared 
to its classical formulation in the US literature.
719 McGlynn, C. (2000). "Ideologies o f  Motherhood in European Community Sex Equality Law." European 
Law Journal 6(1): 29-44., at 31-32.
720 On the normative attitudes towards women see generally S. Fredman, supra no.28.
721 Ibid, at 35.
722 Ibid.
723 The argument here is not a distinctly feminist one, in the sense that it applies equally to other 
disadvantaged or under-represented social groups.
724 Conaghan, J. (1993). "Pregnancy and the Workplace: a question o f  strategy?" Journal o f  Law and 
Society 20(1): 71-92., at 82-83.
725 For a recent empirical analysis o f  the argument in its racial dimension see Onwuachi-Willig, A., E. 
Houh, et al. (2008). "Cracking the Egg: Which Came First - Stigma or Affirmative Action?" California 
Law Review 96(5): 1299-1352.
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To do justice to this critique one needs to move beyond the feminist reluctance of 
labelling women as vulnerable and understand the thrust of the argument in the following 
terms: women should be treated as a vulnerable group in need of special protection only 
when they are actually vulnerable because of attributes specific to their gender.726 When 
they are disadvantaged because of their gender, on the other hand - that is because of the 
simple fact that they are women - the matter should be dealt with as a case of direct or 
indirect gender discrimination. Eradicating disadvantage that stems from discrimination 
or from gender-biased normative perceptions does not qualify as special protection, even 
though it may require “asymmetric” legal tools such as positive action.
Distinguishing between vulnerable groups and disadvantaged groups is no easy 
task in practice but it is normatively significant. It is a necessary condition to understand 
positive action as an expression o f  equal treatment, viewed through the lens of 
proportionality o f concern, and not as a form of special treatment as in its classical
7 7 7  77 8conception. Disadvantaged groups, then, are entitled to positive action, whereas 
vulnerable groups are entitled to the special benefits provided for in general policies that 
promote social inclusion?29 according to the basic ideals of the welfare state.
This latter dichotomy between positive action and general welfarist or social 
inclusion policies is clearly and coherently presented in the recent Report on Positive
726 These attributes are not necessarily - if  at all - biological. The argument here refers primarily to social 
attributes that may render women a vulnerable group in a specific social context. Women o f  a particular 
ethnic or religious background, for instance, may be subjected to cultural or religious rituals, without their 
consent, as a matter o f  custom or religious doctrine. In this case the external perception o f  gender imposes 
additional burdens on women that need to be taken into account when allocating legal protection.
727 Although it must be pointed out that special treatment is also accommodated within the notion of 
proportionality o f  concern. In other words, special treatment as an exception to equality is permissible when 
mandated or justified under proportionality o f  concern.
728 Or, in any case, can become legitimate target groups for positive action programmes.
729 On social inclusion as the principal goal o f  anti-discrimination law see H. Collins, supra no.70.
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Action of the European Commission.730 Drawing insights from the Report one can also 
make sense o f the further distinction between disadvantaged and vulnerable groups 
introduced here. Children, for instance, constitute an emblematic and arguably 
uncontested case of a vulnerable social group. They are thus allocated special protection 
exactly because of their perceived vulnerability, without this violating the general 
principle of equal treatment.731 Free education for young persons is a good example of 
such special protection.732 As cogently pointed out in the Report, the fact that free 
education is only available for this particular age group does not entail that the education 
system is “an age-related form of positive action”.733
Admittedly in some cases there will be inevitable overlap, as disadvantage and 
vulnerability may appear as concomitant elements of the social condition of the same 
group. Ethnic minority children, for instance, are not simply a vulnerable group but may 
additionally suffer from disadvantage related to their ethnic origin. In this case, it may be 
necessary to supplement the “standard” protection reserved for children in general with 
positive measures specifically designed to cancel the effects of the additional 
disadvantage this particular group of children is burdened with.
730 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities, supra no.434, p. 28.
731 It is interesting to note that this is true under any conception o f  equal treatment and not only under the 
notion o f  proportionality o f  concern put forward here.
732 Commission Positive Action Report, p. 28.
733 Ibid.
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11.3.2 Addressing disadvantage through positive action: Why non-discrimination 
is not the appropriate framework.
It was mentioned in the previous section that the distinction between vulnerability 
and disadvantage is a precondition for the proper conceptualisation of positive action as 
an expression of proportionality of concern. The reasoning behind this statement is quite 
straightforward: the fatal flaw of the classical conception of positive action is that it is 
firmly locked within an anti-discrimination philosophical and normative framework and 
lacks a direct link to the principle of equal treatment as such. It thus becomes incapable 
of acting as an adequate remedy for disadvantage, when this is not possible under an anti- 
discrimination rationale. In order to make this clearer it is worth putting the dichotomy 
between vulnerability and disadvantage to the test by examining the case of pregnancy in 
its normative context.
It is evident that, with regard to issues such as pregnancy, there is an even finer 
line to be drawn between vulnerability and disadvantage. Pregnant women are 
undoubtedly a vulnerable group. This is not, however, due to the fact that pregnancy is a 
uniquely female condition -  the latter is true but irrelevant. The key consideration here is 
that pregnancy entails financially measurable costs734 that should not be bom by 
prospective mothers alone but rather be part of a burden-sharing social mechanism. 
Despite what McGlynn and others suggest, this does not render women vulnerable 
because of their womanhood, but because of the socio-economic consequences of 
pregnancy, the burden for which is allocated collectively rather than individually.
734 Financial costs may be direct, as regular medical care and prescription medication, as well as indirect, 
such as the need for maternity leave.
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This, however, is only part of the story. Pregnant women can also be classified as 
a disadvantaged group. Pregnancy has often created obstacles to the professional 
development of women and has been used as an excuse to establish and perpetuate 
discriminatory practices against them in the workplace. This is why there is a well- 
developed legal framework of protective rules and why pregnancy discrimination has 
attracted the attention of the ECJ. A closer look at this case-law is in order.
The first noteworthy point is that, unlike the standard methodology used to 
construct legal reasoning in discrimination cases, pregnancy-related complaints do not 
require a comparator to be classified as gender-discrimination. In 1990 in two seminal 
pregnancy rulings, Dekker735 and Hertz,736 the ECJ held in no uncertain terms that 
dismissals or failures to offer employment due to pregnancy-related absence from work 
are by definition gender-discrimination, because they involve a condition that uniquely 
affects women. During the protected period,737 therefore, dismissal or refusal to hire 
female employees on grounds of pregnancy would amount to direct discrimination 
without the need to seek a comparator in a male employee that is absent due to sickness, 
as was the dominant view hitherto.738 Although this now seems a commonsensical and 
relatively uncontroversial approach, it was rightly considered as a major breakthrough at 
the time.
The early optimism, however, was not fully justified by subsequent developments 
in the case-law. When matters become more complicated it seems that the Court fails to
735 Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingcentrum voor Jonge Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) [1990], 
EC R 1-3941
736 Case C -179/88, Hertz v. Aldi Marked [1990], ECR 1-3979
737 Which starts with pregnancy and extends to the end o f maternity leave. See Sciarra, S. (2001). Labour 
Law in the courts: National judges and the European Court o f  Justice. Oxford Hart., p. 87.
738 Ibid.
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be equally clear and unequivocal. In its Webb judgment,739 a few years later, the Court 
confirmed that the dismissal of a woman employee on an indefinite contract on grounds 
of her pregnancy was discriminatory, even though this particular employee had been 
explicitly employed with the initial intention of replacing another employee on maternity 
leave. Although the principle was established, the Court left open the possibility of an 
apparently neutral reason for pregnancy-related dismissal, if the female employee was 
recruited on a fixed-term, contract or on a temporary basis.740 The comparator approach, 
therefore, is brought back into play, as in that case the Court would be looking for a male 
employee that is unavailable to perform the specific tasks he was contracted for.741
The Webb scenario exemplifies why the anti-discrimination normative framework 
is often too narrow to ensure equality of treatment when vulnerability and disadvantage 
coincide. As explained earlier, pregnancy entails certain socio-economic consequences 
for women that should be shared by society as a whole. This welfarist rationale underlies 
the nexus of legal provisions that protect pregnant women in the workplace and alleviate 
work-related burdens that may ensue in the short or long term, for instance by 
guaranteeing extended periods o f maternity leave. On this basis it seems reasonable to 
argue that the right not to be dismissed during pregnancy should be absolute. The 
principal claim, then, is this: if pregnant women are not adequately protected as a 
vulnerable group, they will become a disadvantaged group in the workplace.
Such an absolute prohibition of dismissal, however, cannot be rooted in an anti- 
discrimination rationale without contradicting the philosophical precepts of anti­
739 Case C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v  EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd. [1994], QB 718
740 T. Hervey and J. Shaw, supra no.424, at 51.
741 The lack o f  clarity as to whether pregnancy-related discrimination is direct or indirect gender 
discrimination is also evident here and this may create further complications with regard to the means o f  
justifying the exception.
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discrimination law itself. In cases of the Webb type it is difficult to see how anti- 
discrimination law can prohibit the dismissal of a pregnant employee that is unable to 
perform the duties she was specifically contracted for, while at the same time permitting 
the dismissal of a male employee who is equally unavailable due to a serious accident. 
One may be tempted to resort to “acrobatics” in legal reasoning and suggest that this 
difference in treatment can be justified under an Aristotelian conception of formal 
equality that inspires anti-discrimination law, because a pregnant woman is not in the 
same situation as a temporarily incapacitated man. Although the latter is, in fact, true, the 
argument itself is normatively weak and pragmatically dangerous.
It is normatively weak because of its reliance on the need for a comparator, even 
if only to prove the lack of similarity in the respective situations. By adopting a 
comparative approach the argument effectively cancels the single most important 
achievement in pregnancy discrimination case-law, namely that pregnancy is recognised 
as a uniquely female condition. Under this interpretation, pregnancy-related rights, such 
as the right not to be dismissed, are not dependent upon the success of a futile search for 
a potentially analogous male condition. In other words, pregnant women are a vulnerable 
group in need of protection, expressed among others as immunity from dismissal for a 
period of time. This immunity should be entirely unrelated to whether or not other 
individuals or groups may have a legitimate claim for an expansion o f  the rationae 
personae scope of this entitlement so that they are also recognised as legitimate 
recipients.
This last point reveals why the argument is also pragmatically dangerous. When 
pregnancy-related rights are decoupled from the need of a comparator, the only route
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available to satisfy equally legitimate claims from other groups is by levelling-up. If a 
male employee that was contracted under the same conditions as Ms Webb, for instance, 
is temporarily incapacitated through injury or illness, he may be entitled to seek 
temporary immunity from dismissal.742 On the contrary, when identifying a comparator is 
a precondition of granting the right, then levelling-down is wide open as a possibility. The 
inversion of the rationale is obvious: if it is lawful to let go a temporarily incapacitated 
male employee, then so should be to dismiss Ms Webb. Reasonable as the solution may 
sound in extreme circumstances, especially from the point of view of the employer, it 
must be bom in mind that levelling-down will open Pandora’s box. Once it has been 
established as a legitimate option, it will be virtually impossible to draw a sharp line 
between cases in which levelling-down is permissible and those in which it is not.
The solution to this conundrum can be found in the alternative conception of 
positive action as an expression of proportionality of concern. Temporary immunity from 
dismissal during pregnancy can be construed as a form of preferential treatment similar to 
its effects to a flexible results quota. Pregnant women are a legitimate target as a 
disadvantaged group in the labour market, because their employment prospects are 
adversely affected by the fact that they will have to suspend their professional endeavours 
during a period of time. These prospects would be considerably worsened, if pregnant 
employees were subject to dismissal from their current employment. Hence, temporary 
immunity from dismissal during pregnancy is a gender-oriented positive measure 
designed to avoid the onerous results of a possible dismissal. At the same time it is a 
flexible measure, because it does not guarantee that pregnant women will be offered a job 
or will retain their position after the expiry of the protected period.
742 Assuming, o f  course, that existing employment legislation on work-related accidents does not suffice.
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If equality is understood as proportionality of concern, temporary immunity from 
dismissal is not special treatment. Pregnant women are a group worthy of more protection 
and this is exactly what they receive. This is not far, in fact, from the ECJ’s reasoning in 
Dekker and Hertz: pregnancy is indeed a unique condition and the legal treatment of it 
should reflect this uniqueness by steering clear from forced and often unintelligible 
comparisons.743 If this is true, the justification of temporary immunity is completely 
independent from quantitative considerations. Simply put, any comparison is, at the first 
instance, irrelevant.
Comparisons are only permissible after the right of pregnant women to temporary 
immunity from dismissal has been established and forms part of an acquis, so that 
levelling-down is no longer an option. At this point, it will be possible for other 
individuals or groups to claim that they are exceptionally entitled to receive the same 
treatment, insofar as they can prove that any other solution would infringe on their right 
not to be discriminated against. Of course, in such a case the employer would also be 
allowed to counter that the non-extension of the pregnancy-related benefits to male 
employees in analogous situations is objectively justified.
743 This is not to deny, o f  course, that pregnancy is a uniquely fem ale  condition. For the purposes o f  the 
argument against a comparative approach, however, the emphasis should be on the uniqueness o f  the 
condition itself. The fact that only women can find themselves in this condition should be treated as 
coincidental.
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11.4 Positive Action in European Law Revisited: The Case-Law of the ECJ through the 
Lens of Proportionality of Concern
A very considerable portion of the analysis up to this point has been devoted to 
the case-law of the ECJ, reflecting a conscious methodological choice. This choice will 
be carried through to this final part of the thesis, with a view to testing the validity of the 
theoretical propositions advanced earlier regarding the distinctly European understanding 
of what equality of treatment amounts to. It goes without saying that the success of the 
theoretical construct of indistinctibility of respect and proportionality of concern hinges 
on its viability when placed under the Court’s scrutiny.744
What follows is an attempt to review the ECJ positive action case-law from a 
proportionality of concern point of view. Since this is a novel interpretation of the 
principle of equal treatment, the analysis will inevitably balance between an ontological 
level -  what the Court has actually decided that can fit into the proposed conception of 
equal treatment -  and a deontological level -  what the Court should have decided in order 
to maintain interpretative integrity and remain true to the mandate of achieving fu ll 
equality.
744 It should be pointed out that the exclusive focus on EU law and on the case-law coming from 
Luxembourg in this section does not in any way diminish the importance o f  the ECHR and o f Strasbourg 
case-law in determining the status and meaning o f  equality in Europe. In view o f  the inevitable space 
constraints, however, it would be impossible for the present thesis to thoroughly explore both the ECJ and 
the ECtHR case-law through the lens o f proportionality o f  concern. ECJ, then, is the obvious choice 
between the two, since up to date there are no rulings o f  the Strasbourg court that consider the legality o f  
positive action in view o f  Protocol 12 o f  the Convention (with the exception o f the Court’s Advisory 
Opinion that was extensively discussed in chapter 5.2).
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11.4.1 The early case-law: Is there any room for proportionality o f  concern?
The way proportionality of concern impacts - or should impact - on the Court’s 
reasoning when interpreting the equal treatment principle can be traced back to the very 
first ruling on positive action. More than twenty years ago,745 in Commission v. France, 
the Court decided to strike down the French legislation implementing the Equal 
Treatment Directive because it created instances of unequal treatment in favour of 
women that fell outside the limits laid down by the Directive.746 As explained in the 
previous section, the Court based its finding on two reasons: the generality o f the French 
positive action scheme and its ineffectiveness in specifically addressing existing 
inequalities in the workplace between men and women. Positive action is understood by 
the Court as an exception to equal treatment and, as a result, the relevant provisions are to 
be interpreted narrowly and they must have a limited and clearly defined lifespan in order 
to pass the legality threshold.
Against this position the typical critique, already rehearsed in the previous 
sections, emphasises the distinction between competing conceptions of equality. 
Adopting a formal equality - or non-comparative formal equality - point of view, the 
argument goes, is the real problem with the Court’s rationale, and one that is carried 
through to the inevitable conclusions. There is no disagreement that, in a normative 
interpretive environment, exceptions and derogations should be narrowly construed as a 
matter of principle. But the socio-political developments of the last decades in Europe 
have proved that achieving true equality requires, first of all, an understanding of equality
745 For a very interesting overview o f  the ECJ case-law since then and up until Badeck see Mancini, G. and 
S. O’Leary (1999). "The new frontiers o f  sex equality law in the European Union." European Law Review  
24(4): 331-353.
746 Commission v. France, para 16.
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in substantive rather than formal terms. In turn, this entails that positive action, where 
needed, cannot be regarded as derogation from equality but as a precondition for its 
accomplishment.
Although this line of argument has certain undoubted merits, it has little practical 
significance when it comes to this particular ruling. The position of European law on the 
matter has admittedly shifted in the last decade or so, from considering positive action as 
a “necessary evil” to realising that it is a fully legitimate means of achieving effective 
equality, at least in the field of employment. An advocate of the Court’s interpretive 
integrity, therefore, would easily dismiss the attack by pointing out that the position of 
the case-law gradually changed, following the move of the law from a formal to a 
substantive understanding of equality.747
A discussion of this sort, however, may inadvertently conceal a more substantial 
issue regarding the Court’s rationale here. It is debatable whether the Court in 
Commission v. France is actually reading the equal treatment principle solely through the 
lens of non-comparative formal equality. This would indeed constitute not simply a 
“conservative” interpretive choice - that may or may not accurately reflect legislative 
intentions - but a serious philosophical mistake. As explained earlier, the category of 
formal equality, understood as indistinctibility of respect, is not the appropriate analytical 
framework to discuss and test the legality of positive action. The latter is rather an 
expression of concern for the welfare and needs of individuals or groups, which may 
have been compromised because of discrimination.
But is the Court really liable for such a failure? Is it, in other words, unaware in 
the late 1980s of the two co-existing yet distinct dimensions of equal treatment, identified
747 Which is, arguably, the case with the new Equality Directives.
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here as indistinctibility of respect and proportionality of concern? Let us try to reconsider 
the issue under the light of the claim that these two notions together formulate the 
normative content of the general principle of equal treatment in Europe.
Although often ignored by commentators, the main defence of the French 
government calls for thorough consideration. Under French constitutional law, the state 
bears a positive obligation to ensure gender equality in every area of the law. This 
obligation, however, is not one that can be met through procedural adjustments alone. 
Implementation of the constitutional guarantee involves not only different treatment of 
different situations, but also the use of special rights where necessary to remove 
inequalities and cancel their effects. The underlying rationale justifying the use of special 
rights is particularly illuminating: “[t]he existence of special rights favouring women is 
nevertheless considered compatible with the principle of equality when those special 
rights derive from a concern fo r  protection” [emphasis added].748
The significance of this quote for our present analytical purposes cannot be 
overstated. Protection of the laws should be allocated with equality in mind, but this does 
not necessarily entail that every person or group of people is entitled to the exact same 
“amount” or type of protection. The reason is that concern fo r  protection may be the 
same for everyone in principle, but in practice it differs according to the relative 
situations of each individual or group. The state, therefore, “owes” its citizens different 
levels of concern corresponding to actual disadvantage, which encapsulates the essence 
of proportionality o f concern.
Read in this way the French position is more “radical” than it appears to be at first 
sight. It goes beyond a mere recognition of difference as a structural element of the
748 Commission v. France, para 10.
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principle of equal treatment when applied in practice. Maternity leave, for instance, is a 
right guaranteed in principle to every female employee, but whether extended leave 
should be awarded in certain cases will depend on personal circumstances.749 The right in 
question, then, is the same and the difference in the content, type or intensity of
•7 C A
protection is the logical result of factual dissimilarities. The French constitutional 
clause, however, further allows the use of special rights that are reserved for a particular 
category of persons deemed to deserve a greater degree of concern on the part of the 
state. Concern for protection, then, can only be allocated proportionally, as it inevitably 
fluctuates according to actual necessities. And it is exactly proportionality of concern that 
turns gender equality from a procedural venture into a substantive one.
Despite the outcome of the ruling, the reaction of the Court to this approach was 
neither dismissive nor as negative as one might expect. It is true that the Court regards 
positive action as a justified exception to equal treatment,751 but this is arguably a direct 
implication of the phrasing and general tone of the Equal Treatment Directive itself. 
When identifying the generality of the French legislation as a source of incompatibility, 
though, the Court does not consider this to be the whole story. On the contrary, it 
explicitly states that it is not satisfied with certain of the examples of special rights cited 
in the pleadings.
The major problem with the French positive action scheme, therefore, appears to 
be that “some of the special rights preserved relate to the protection of women in their 
capacity as older workers or parents - categories to which both men and women may
749 Medical reasons, for instance, such as post-natal depression may justify extended maternity leave.
750 This seemingly obvious analysis becomes particularly pertinent when it comes to determining, for 
example, whether a female employee who adopts an infant has the same right to maternity leave as a 
natural parent.
751 Commission v. France, para 13.
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equally belong”.752 It is the concrete provisions of the scheme, then, that fail to “add up”, 
rather than the underlying rationale regarding the equal treatment principle. There is 
nothing here to suggest that concern for protection should not be allocated proportionally. 
But, as the Court correctly implies, the French legislator seems to be inconsistent in the 
identification of the appropriate target groups for such allocation. Indeed, if older female 
workers are entitled to a greater degree of concern on the part of the state that 
materialises into special rights, it is imperative to fully account for the non-extension of 
this concern to older male workers or older workers in general. The legitimacy of 
granting special rights or preferential treatment to a particular category of disadvantaged 
employees becomes dubious when another disadvantaged group is excluded from the 
benefits. Without full and concrete justification of this policy decision, it remains elusive 
whether the aim of equal treatment will be accomplished.
One should note, of course, that the purpose of the French legislation in question, 
as well as of the Equal Treatment Directive itself, was to achieve gender equality in 
employment and not to introduce an all-encompassing equality policy across the social 
field. A measure designed to promote gender equality, therefore, may not be deemed 
unlawful, ineffective or unsuccessful on the basis of its “modest” ambitions. Accepting 
this, however, is still not enough to exonerate the French positive action scheme. The 
reason is simple, even though the Court’s ruling is somewhat obscure in that respect. 
There is lack of clarity as to the particular disadvantage that triggers the need for 
“additional” state concern. In other words, it is unclear whether older female workers are 
disadvantaged - and, hence, in need of special protection - because they are female or 
because they are older. And although it may be the case that older female workers face a
752 Ibid, para 14.
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double disadvantage, France surprisingly fails to bring this compelling argument to the 
attention of the Court.
The notion of proportionality of concern entails a more comprehensive outlook on 
equality that can adequately address the problem of double753 or multiple disadvantage754 
in a programmatic way. Disadvantage becomes the centre of the discourse and the 
definitive criterion to select the appropriate target groups and to prioritise equally valid 
claims and corresponding policy choices. Under proportionality of concern the legislators 
and, eventually, the courts would have to test the legality of positive action schemes on 
grounds of their effectiveness in performing a redistributive function. Although the Court 
in Commission v. France does not advance from this theoretical position, there is no real 
evidence that it is opposed to it.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the infamous Kalanke ruling. By 
interpreting the text of the Equal Treatment Directive as an endorsement o f a superficial 
equal opportunities rhetoric, the Court misses the point entirely. Improving the ability of 
women “to compete on the labour market and to pursue a career on an equal footing with
H C C
men” through positive measures, according to Article 2(4) of the Directive, involves 
some form of priority or preference being given to female candidates at the expense of 
some of their male counterparts. Priority or preference in this context is logically 
necessary only when the female candidate is not already more qualified, in which case 
the quota system becomes redundant. And if such priority is ruled out as discriminatory 
even in its softest form, it is difficult to imagine what other “measures relating to access
753 The typical example o f  a group suffering rom double disadvantage is minority women. See S. 
Spiliopoulou-Akerman, supra no.376, p. 12.
754 Corresponding to but not collapsing into the notion o f  multiple discrimination. See D. Schiek, supra
no.449, at 454.
755 Kalanke, para 19.
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to employment, including promotion”756 may be legitimately employed by the Member 
States to pursue the aims of the Directive.
Kalanke is, thus, usually identified by pro-equality lawyers as an anomaly in the 
jurisprudence of the Court. Despite the truth in this statement, it is worth mentioning that 
the German quota system under scrutiny raises interesting questions that were not 
adequately explored by the Court. Proportionality plays no part in the reasoning, in a 
rather striking omission, especially since the German court explicitly refers to it in the 
formulation of its second question.757 There is, of course, one obvious explanation: if the 
intention of the Court all along was to convey a strong and clear message that quotas, 
irrespective of their form, fall outside the limits set by Article 2 (4) of the Directive, then 
the illegitimacy of the German scheme does not stem from a violation of the 
proportionality principle. Positive action of this type is not permitted in principle under 
Community law, according to the Court, and there is nothing the German legislator could 
have done differently to render the scheme compatible.758 Simply put, the problem for the 
Court is not one o f disproportionate preference but one of preference that is illegitimate 
altogether under the conception of formal equality o f  opportunities that seems to 
permeate its rationale.
By disregarding the principle of proportionality, however, the Court commits a 
serious interpretive mistake. It substitutes the intentions or ultimate aims of the German 
scheme for its actual effects. The scheme provides that a female candidate with the same 
qualifications as her counterparts will be given priority in sectors where women are
757 Ibid, para 11.
758 Other than, o f  course, to alter the scheme altogether and opt for a less “aggressive” type o f  positive 
action to pursue gender equality.
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under-represented?59 Under-representation, for the purposes of the law, exists when 
women “do not make up at least half o f  the sta ff in the individual pay, remuneration and 
salary brackets in the relevant personnel group within a department” [emphasis added].760 
It is clear from the above that the Court confuses the modus operandi of the scheme with 
its underlying rationale: what the tie-break quota actually does is allocate preference to 
an equally qualified female candidate. This policy is justified through the equation of 
under-representation to disadvantage, which will cease to exist when parity has been 
finally achieved. But the application of the scheme itself in practice does not ensure 
equality of outcome - at least not in the short term - as it only operates as tie-breaker in 
cases of equally qualified candidates. Equality of outcome would be the modus operandi 
of the scheme only if the quota was triggered irrespective o f  any consideration o f  
individual qualifications.
More than an anomaly Kalanke is, therefore, a missed opportunity. Individual 
candidates are not promoted simply because they belong to the under-represented gender, 
as the Court seems to imply. Nor is the merit principle automatically overridden simply 
because of the application of the quota. The scheme requires an interpersonal comparison 
of individual merit to be carried out prior to the final decision and, should the female 
candidate prove to be equally qualified, only then does the quota kick in. If the German 
scheme, then, is incompatible with Community law, the Court should have looked for the 
problem elsewhere. Under-representation of a social group in a particular sector of 
employment, and especially in the higher echelons within the sector, may indeed be an 
index of disadvantage stemming from indirect or covert discrimination. Such
759 Paragraph 4, Recital 1 o f  the Bremen Law on Equal Treatment for Men and Women in the Public 
Service, as cited in Kalanke, para 3.
760 Ibid, in Recital 5.
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disadvantage should, in principle, attract a greater degree of concern on the part of the 
legislator for the members of this specific group, which automatically brings positive 
action into play as a legitimate policy option to address this discrepancy.
In practice, though, the issue is far more complex and calls for a detailed analysis 
of how proportionality of concern should inform positive action schemes and solidify 
their legality. The Bremen law in Kalanke begs the question of whether and under which 
circumstances under-representation amounts to disadvantage. When parity forms the 
philosophical underpinnings of gender equality policy, as with the German legislation in 
question, anything below an even 50% of gender representation, reflecting an absolute 
balance between male and female employees in any given employment cadre, falls short 
of the ultimate equality goal. For present purposes and in view of its normative effects 
parity operates as the equivalent of a sunset clause. If this goal of absolute balance is not 
reached, positive measures will continue to remain in force.
Parity, however, as a conception of equality is of dubious philosophical 
credibility. It seems to be awfully close to non-comparative formal equality, an affinity 
its proponents would not be very proud of. Although parity is typically classified as a 
proactive egalitarian notion, thriving in a considerable portion of feminist academic 
circles,761 it rests upon essentialist presumptions about the “human condition” of 
particular social groups, and most notably women. If a 50% of female representation in 
an area of the employment field constitutes a rigid target, then there is no room to 
account for specific preferences that may reflect a collective idiosyncrasy different from
761 On the parity model in feminist jurisprudence see generally Atkins, S. and B. Hoggett (1984). Women 
and the Law. Blackwell.
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the common “standard”.762 Such preferences should be enough to justify at least a small 
deviation in numbers. If this is true, how can 45% of female presence in a particular 
sector count as under-representation that needs to be rectified through positive action?
Applying the principle of proportionality to the allocation of concern allows for a 
fine-tuning or even a re-calibration of positive action so that it answers real challenges 
and remedies real inequalities. A scheme such as the one at issue in Kalanke should, 
therefore, include some prioritisation mechanism, which would allow for a more rigorous 
enforcement o f the quota in sectors of severe under-representation. On the other hand, 
where under-representation is marginal, the system should provide for milder forms of 
positive action and allow for the emphasis to be placed on other, more pressing instances 
of inequality. Most importantly, it should be designed in such a way so as to target 
primarily the higher echelons within each sector, where decision-making that may affect 
future employment prospects - such as participation in boards responsible for recruitment 
or promotions - is actually taking place. After all, one needs to be mindful of the fact that 
the higher up in the employment hierarchy one goes the more difficult it will be to find 
equally qualified female candidates for promotion.
From a proportionality of concern point of view the Kalanke scheme also raises 
another important question. Even if one is willing to accept parity as the optimum 
equality outcome, there is no escaping the social reality of variegated inequalities across 
the spectrum. Assuming again that women in a particular bracket of the sector are 
marginally under-represented, the investment of resources, material or “normative”, in 
redressing this minimal abnormality is legally questionable. Satiability of resources
762 The collective element here refers to particular “sub-groups” within the social group itself. For instance, 
the preferences o f  minority women may substantially differ from those o f  the “average” white woman.
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entails that some prioritisation of targets is necessary in order to ensure that equality 
policies, apart from serving long-term goals, will also be effective in the short-term. 
When scarcity of resources is added to the equation the need to prioritise becomes a 
categorical imperative.
Choosing between equally valid claims of under-represented social groups, then, 
is a matter of pragmatism but also a matter of fairness. Legislators need to premise their 
policy choice of which inequalities to address first or more actively on considerations of 
effectiveness - selecting the type of measure that fits better with the particular needs of 
each group or each employment section - as well as on considerations of justice - placing 
the most pressing inequalities at the top of the agenda. Measures promoting gender 
equality, therefore, must be understood as part of a comprehensive equality project and 
their ad hoc legality will additionally763 depend upon whether they adhere to the principle 
of proportionality, applied to the distribution of concern between equally qualified 
equality claims.
This is particularly pertinent, of course, when dealing with cases of double or 
multiple disadvantage.764 A female employee that belongs to an ethnic or social minority 
is likely to face significantly higher obstacles compared to a female national of the home 
state, especially if the latter has no affinities to social minorities or comes from the 
middle or upper socio-economic strata. Treating these two women identically, as being 
equally disadvantaged, solely on the simplistic grounds that women are under­
represented in a particular employment field, constitutes a misplacement of state concern. 
A quota that fails to take this differentiation into account and accord a higher degree of
763 That is in addition to the “standard” criteria o f legality o f  positive action schemes.
764 See D. Schiek, supra no. 449.
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priority to the female candidate that is a victim of double or multiple disadvantage, is 
inevitably peripheral and, for this reason, self-defeating.
These concerns are absent from the rationale of the Kalanke scheme. To cut a 
long story short, the problem with the Bremen quota system lies in the fact that it is not 
nearly as refined or as elaborate as it should be. It fails to provide a comprehensive 
justification as to why even marginal gender under-representation qualifies as 
disadvantage. Equally unrefined, however, is the Court’s rationale in striking down the 
scheme as incompatible with the Equal Treatment Directive. “Absolute and unconditional 
priority for appointment or promotion”765 of women is contrary to Community law, but 
this is not the case with the Kalanke quota. The outright rejection of tie-break quotas as a 
legitimate form of positive action deprives the Court of an opportunity to engage in an in- 
depth analysis of the relationship between equality and proportionality.
11.4.2 The Marschall ruling revisited: A return to what kind o f  logic?
Such an opportunity presented itself in Marschall, only this time the Court was 
prepared to approach the matter in a more thorough and meticulous manner. This was to 
no small degree due to the German quota at issue, which was more carefully designed 
than the one in Kalanke. As already explained at an earlier point, the semantic differential 
of the Marschall positive action scheme that renders it compatible with the Equal
*7 f \ ( \Treatment Directive is, in the Court’s view, the existence of a saving clause. The latter 
allows for “an objective assessment which will take account of all criteria specific to the
765 Kalanke, para 22.
766 Marschall, paras 3 and 5.
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individual candidates”767 so that the priority accorded to the equally qualified female 
candidate can be overridden ad hoc.
There is no doubt, then, that the “failings” of the Kalanke system are not repeated 
here. Priority to the members of the under-represented gender within a particular career 
bracket, in this case, is neither automatic nor unconditional. The quota is not automatic in 
that it will only come into play after an interpersonal comparison of all candidates that 
establishes the female candidate as being of “equal suitability, competence and
n £ .Q  7AQ
professional performance” to her male counterparts. It is not unconditional, given 
that the equally qualified male candidate can “tilt the balance to his favour”,770 if his 
personal circumstances so merit.
In this regard, then, the underlying rationale of the Marschall scheme seems to be 
very close to what has been labelled here proportionality of concern. Under­
representation o f women within a particular career bracket constitutes disadvantage 
resulting from indirect gender discrimination. According to the observations of the 
German government “where qualifications are equal, employers tend to promote men 
rather than women because they apply traditional promotion criteria which in practice put 
women at a disadvantage, such as age, seniority and the fact that a male candidate is a 
head of household and sole breadwinner for the household” 771 A quota system, therefore, 
in favour o f women exemplifies the active concern on the part of the state to redress this
767 Marschall, para 33.
768 Marschall, para 3.
769 It is worth reminding the reader, o f  course, that the Kalanke scheme was unfairly attacked as according 
automatic priority to the female candidate.
770 Marschall, para 3.
771 Marschall, para 4.
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inequality. Showing more concern to the disadvantaged gender is an expression of equal 
treatment in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
The proportionate, and thus fair, character of such an uneven allocation of state 
concern is eloquently supported by the submissions of the Finnish, Swedish and 
Norwegian governments, intervening in the case. Two distinct arguments are used to 
substantiate the justificatory basis for positive action under the circumstances. Labour 
markets “are still broadly partitioned on the basis of gender”772 with a glass ceiling 
effect:773 even when women are adequately represented in the “lower positions in the 
occupational hierarchy”,774 they are almost absent from the higher echelons. Moreover, 
“softer” forms of legislative action, such as occupational training, guidance and 
initiatives to share the burden of occupational and family responsibilities between men 
and women,775 have proved, according to the Finnish government, insufficient to heal the 
gender bias of the labour market. The German scheme at issue, therefore, respects 
proportionality of concern both in terms of accurately targeting existing disadvantage in 
particular career brackets and in terms of being the least onerous effective alternative.
An important clarification is necessary at this point regarding the relationship 
between Marschall and Kalanke and how they fit into the theoretical construct of 
proportionality of concern. As with Marschall, the Bremen scheme in Kalanke is also 
designed to target particular career brackets. In this way both schemes avoid, at least in 
theory, the danger of being insensitive to the glass ceiling phenomenon, given that gender 
representation is not counted against the total number of employees in the sector. In the
772 Marschall, para 16.
773 Giele, J. Z. and L. F. Stebbins (2003). Women and Equality in the Workplace: A Reference Handbook. 
ABC-CLIO Ltd.
774 Marschall, para 16.
775 Ibid.
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absence of a saving clause, however, the Kalanke scheme falls short of adhering to 
proportionality of concern at the point of its application in practice. When the “chips are 
down” the Kalanke scheme allows for a less disadvantaged individual to be accorded 
more concern simply because she nominally belongs to an under-represented group. 
Especially in cases where under-representation of women is marginal this apparent 
inconsistency becomes seriously problematic, so much so that it undermines the overall 
legitimacy of the scheme.
Marschall, on the other hand, is not guilty of such a fault. The key issue, 
therefore, in view of proportionality of concern is the saving clause. Although the Court’s 
rationale manifestly revolves around it, this is done for the wrong reasons. The Court 
appears to be relieved in the realisation that it has a chance to reverse Kalanke without 
having to denounce it for what it was, that is a conservative and unsophisticated 
interpretation of the general principle of equal treatment. The saving clause allows for ad 
hoc interpersonal comparisons of qualifications, which is, in the eyes of the Court, an 
unambiguous reaffirmation of the primacy o f the individual. At the end of the day and 
with all things considered, the ultimate decision between the male and the female 
candidate, found to be equally qualified, will be premised upon individual characteristics, 
since personal circumstances can tramp gender in concreto and cancel the effect of the 
quota.
What the Court fails to see, however, is that the ultimate criterion is disadvantage. 
The German scheme is designed in such a way so as to favour the candidate actually 
suffering from disadvantage in each particular case. There is a presumption in favour of 
women because “the mere fact that a male candidate and a female candidate are equally
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qualified does not mean that they have the same chances”.776 But this presumption is 
reversible exactly because proportionality of concern requires flexibility in assessing the 
particularities of individual situations. Ideally, positive action programmes should ensure 
that concern is allocated proportionally even within the target group itself. When this is 
not possible, there must, at least, be a safeguard in favour of the disadvantaged person, 
who may or may not belong to the under-represented gender.
This is, once again, the direct result of understanding equality as a holistic 
imperative, whereby under-representation per se is a necessary but insufficient condition 
to justify preferential treatment. A male candidate suffering from socio-economic 
disadvantage may be given priority over an otherwise non-disadvantaged female 
candidate?11 This is the essence of proportionality of concern and this is why the proviso 
is central to its materialisation into legal provisions tailored to pursue equal treatment. 
Without negating the primacy of the individual its deserved importance in a liberal 
theoretical framework, the real issue here is quite different.
The saving clause constitutes a bridge that connects gender-targeted measures 
with the mainframe o f  equality law and policy. Positive measures in favour of women 
have the principal aim of promoting gender equality in areas where this is most needed. 
But, at the same time, they remain part of a comprehensive equality project. In this 
regard, their function cannot be independent from other equality considerations, 
regarding race, ethnicity, age or even socio-economic status. When the quota is triggered, 
therefore, it is imperative that its ad hoc application is also justified from the perspective 
of prioritising gender equality over competing equality claims.
776 Marschall, para 30.
777 That is other than the fact that women are generally under-represented in the particular career bracket.
330
On the face of it this may seem as allowing an individual claim of a disadvantaged 
person to tramp the collective claim of a disadvantaged group. This schematic depiction 
may be rather simplistic and inadequate to tell the whole story, but it is not in itself 
contrary to proportionality of concern. In fact, one of the main deficiencies o f the group- 
approach under the “classic method” of positive action778 is its conceptual commitment to 
“standardised” notions of what constitutes a social group.779 For the purposes of positive 
action, however, it is socio-economic disadvantage that should count as the ultimate 
decisive criterion for the identification of beneficiaries, as it is the inequalities created by 
disadvantage that positive action is intended to address. An individual worker that suffers 
from such disadvantage should not be deprived of the chance to have his personal 
circumstances - i.e. his state of disadvantage - tilt the balance in his favour, even if he 
cannot be formally “classified” as a member of a disadvantaged group.
More often than not, however, a male employee will be disadvantaged for reasons 
that will make group classification possible. As the Court shrewdly observes in Kalanke, 
older candidates may be disadvantaged vis-a-vis their younger colleagues regardless of 
gender. Although this does not in any way affect the legitimacy of a gender quota per se, 
especially if one takes account of the possibility of double-disadvantage for older female 
workers, it does offer a common scenario of conflict, whereby rules promoting gender 
equality may clash with the need to counter age discrimination. In view of the recent
*7()A
ruling in Mangold, where the Court declared protection from age discrimination to be 
among the general principles of Community law, it seems plausible to treat such a clash
778 D. Caruso, supra no.248.
779 See infra, chapter 2.4.
780 Mangold v Rudiger Helm [2005], European Anti-Discrimination Law Review, (C-144/04)
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as a genuine possibility with indeterminate consequences. Interestingly, a while before 
Mangold was decided there was an actual opportunity for the Court to review the issue in 
the context of the Badeck positive action scheme.
What is important for our present analytic purposes is that the “loser” of 
preferential treatment allocated through gender quotas is not simply the individual 
candidate that did not get the job or the promotion. This candidate is highly likely to 
belong to a multitude of social groups, one or more of which may also be under­
represented and, hence, disadvantaged within a particular career bracket. Through this 
group v. group schema it is easier to realise how the saving clause really operates within 
the conceptual framework ofpositive action and as an exemplification of proportionality 
o f concern. Instead of circumventing the quota altogether in favour of a return to 
unqualified individualism, the saving clause enables the selection panel to take a step 
back, look at the bigger picture and follow a comprehensive and consistent equality 
paradigm.
This harmonious coexistence of competing equality claims under the conceptual 
“aegis” of proportionality of concern is not reflected in the Court’s reasoning. Although 
the operative part of the ruling in Marschall is unimpeachable, the Court still makes 
minimal use of the principle of proportionality to test and solidify the legality o f the 
positive measures it examines. One might be tempted to suggest that, after the disaster 
that was Kalanke, the Court was right to keep things uncomplicated and allow for the 
Marschall scheme to pass the legality test with flying colours. Even with these benign 
intentions taken into account, there is one rather striking omission from the analysis. As 
with Kalanke, the scheme in Marschall is designed to tackle under-representation of
332
women without any consideration for the severity o f the problem and without any 
corresponding adjustments according to the degrees o f under-representation. From a 
proportionality of concern point of view, therefore, the Marschall quota is equally 
unsophisticated to the Kalanke one and is liable to lead to a situation where a marginally 
under-represented group enjoys unnecessary preference.
Unlike Kalanke, the Marschall scheme does not set absolute parity as its ultimate 
goal. This may have made it easier to for the Court to “look the other way” and ignore the 
absence of “success standards” either in the form of a sunset clause or in the form of 
specified targets, the accomplishment of which would satisfy the equality requirement 
and render the quota redundant. It is exactly on these grounds that the Badeck positive 
action system thrives over its German predecessors. And it is no coincidence that the 
Court found the opportunity in this case to further refine its approach on positive action 
and to standardise its test of legality with direct links to proportionality.
11.4.3 The Amsterdam “revolution Is Badeck a step closer to proportionality o f  
concern?
The positive action scheme in Badeck introduced a wider array of positive 
measures compared to the previous German schemes brought before the Court. Apart 
from a flexible results quota781 in favour of equally qualified female candidates in areas 
of the public service where women were under-represented, it also included binding 
targets of female participation in particular areas of employment and timetables for the
781 Badeck, para 28.
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attainment of these targets.782 Although Badeck was decided ten years ago, the fact that 
this was the first time that the national measure challenged did not merely consist in a 
straightforward gender quota calls for precise analysis of each component of the 
programme from the perspective of proportionality of concern.
Specifically, the Law o f the Land o f Hesse on equal rights fo r  women and men
no**
and the removal o f  discrimination against women in the public administration was a 
comprehensive five-pronged legislative plan to incorporate the Equal Treatment 
Directive into the national legal order. It provided for:
• Priority to equally qualified female candidates in areas of the public sector 
where women were under-represented, unless reasons o f  greater legal weight that 
emerge through an objective assessment of all candidates tilt the balance in favour of 
another candidate [measure 1].
• Binding targets guaranteeing a minimum percentage o f women for temporary 
posts in the academic service and for academic assistants, which is at least equal to the 
percentage o f  women among graduates, degree- holders and students in each discipline 
[measure 2].
• At least half o f  training places to be allocated to women in occupational areas 
where they are under-represented and where the State does not hold a monopoly of 
training, unless there are not enough applications from women despite appropriate 
measures to draw their attention to available training positions [measure 3].
782 Schiek, D. (1998). "Sex Equality Law After Kalanke and Masrchall." European Law Review 4(2): 148- 
166.
783 Hessisches Gesetz iiber die Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und Mannem und zum Abbau von 
Diskriminierungen von Frauen in der offentlichen Verwaltung, 21 December 1993, GBVB1.1, p. 729.
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• Equally qualified female candidates to be called fo r  interview in sectors where 
women are under-represented, insofar as the female candidates satisfy all the conditions 
required [measure 4].
• Recommendation that the objective of the advancement plan to ensure that at 
least half of the members of representative, administrative and supervisory bodies are 
women must be taken into account when adopting implementing legislative measures 
[measure 5],
All these measures share a basic conceptual premise, as they form part of a 
women’s advancement plan designed to actively promote gender equality in employment 
and eliminate the under-representation of women in particular sectors o f the public 
service. Two elements can be singled out as the common denominator of these five 
measures: first, under-representation of women is a conditio sine qua non for any of the
no a
provisions to come into play; second, wherever merit is an issue, female candidates 
need to be equally qualified to take advantage of the benefits provided. At first sight, 
therefore, the Badeck scheme appears to be more refined and wide-ranging than the 
Marschall one, but it does not substantially deviate from the principles constituting the 
theoretical backbone of the latter. This is particularly obvious with regard to measure 1, 
which is very similar to the Marschall quota.
A more detailed analysis of the Badeck measures, however, reveals that the 
differences with previous schemes are more far-reaching than one would suspect. Starting 
with the flexible result quota itself, one is bound to notice the terminological novelty with 
regard to the phrasing of the saving clause. Instead of referring to “reasons specific to an
784 This is clearly the case for measures 1 and 4. The way merit operates with regard to measures 2 and 5 
will be explored in detail in what follows.
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individual [male] candidate [that may] tilt the balance in his favour”785 the Badeck quota 
stipulates that the female candidate will be given preference “/ /  no reasons o f  greater 
legal weight are opposed\ 786
Quite understandably this choice of wording drew the attention of the Court, 
which asked the German authorities for clarifications on the meaning and content of the 
clause. In his written submission the German Prime Minister explained that “those 
reasons of greater legal weight concern various rules o f  law, governed partly by statute 
and partly by decree, which make no reference to sex and are often described as social 
aspects” [emphasis added].787 These social aspects “are based, from a constitutional point
*700
of view, partly on the principle of the social State”, which is the equivalent of the 
Anglo-Saxon welfare state principle.789
This direct reference to the welfare state principle as the normative source of 
reasons that could override the quota has a multilayered significance that cannot be 
underestimated. Its principle effect is the decoupling of the saving clause from 
unqualified individualism. Instead of being of a purely individualistic nature, the saving 
clause is tailored in such a way so that broader social considerations can also be taken
785 Second sentence o f  Paragraph 25(5) o f the Beamtengesetz fur das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (Law on 
Civil Servants o f  the Land), in the version published on 1 May 1981 (GVNW, p. 234), as last amended by 
Paragraph 1 o f  the Seventh Law amending certain rules relating to the civil service, o f  5 February 1995 
(GVNW, p. 102).
786 Badeck, para 26.
787 Badeck, para 34.
788 Ibid. Article 20 (1) o f  the Basic Law for the Federal Republic o f  Germany (Grundgesetz, GG) provides: 
“The Federal Republic o f  Germany is a democratic and social Federal state.” Article 28 (1) o f  the Basic 
Law stipulates: “The constitutional order in the Laender must conform to the principles o f  republican, 
democratic, and social government based on the rule o f  law, within the meaning o f  this Basic Law”. The 
social aspects are also partly based on “the fundamental right o f  protection o f  marriage and the family 
(Article 6 o f  the Basic Law)” (Badeck, para 34).
789 The German term sozialstaat or the Italian equivalent stato sociale are literally translated into English as 
social state. The term, however, never really caught on despite certain early twentieth century attempts. 
Smith, M. (1901). "Four German Jurists IV." Political Science Quarterly 16(4): 641-679
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into account. Five groups of rules that can justify the override of the quota are explicitly 
identified in the German authorities’ written response, including “the possibility of 
ending a period of long-term unemployment by an appointment” [emphasis added], as 
well as the preference to persons who have been unable to commit to full-time 
employment in the public service because offamily work engagements.790
Gender equality, therefore, may be a priority policy objective, but not one that 
operates in a social vacuum. Concern for disadvantage is the driving force behind 
positive action and, if the circumstances so require, the gender quota will give way to 
preference for those who are deemed to need it the most. The goal of equal treatment, 
then, is attained when concern is allocated proportionally to individuals as well as groups. 
This is arguably the most interesting element of the Badeck scheme: it manages to put 
forward a holistic view of equality by introducing “social aspects” into the equation, but 
at the same time it reinforces the centrality o f disadvantage as the underlying rationale 
and, hence, the ultimate criterion of deciding who is entitled to the benefits. In this way, 
the saving clause is formally disengaged from pure individualism, but it ensures that, at 
the end of the day, it is the more disadvantageous candidate in any given set of 
circumstances that will have the better chance to be given priority.
This simultaneous concern for the disadvantage of both groups and individuals is 
particularly evident when it comes to disability. The latter also constitutes one of the 
grounds that may lead to the override of the quota, with the German authorities stating 
that the “possibilities of advancement are more flexible for seriously disabled persons” 
[emphasis added].791 The careful choice of wording echoes the notion of proportionality
790 Badeck, para 35.
791 Ibid.
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of concern. Disability does not take automatic priority over gender, nor does it cancel the 
priority of addressing gender disadvantage through the Badeck scheme. Gender positive 
action, however, remains above all an equality instrument and as such it is open to 
adjustments when another equality dimension has a reasonable claim to ad hoc priority. 
This is the case when seriously disabled candidates are up for appointment or promotion, 
which would be granted to them if it weren’t for the quota. It is worth noting that the 
degree of disability plays an obviously significant role in whether the disabled candidate 
will take precedence over the female candidate. Although not explicitly identified as 
such, this is a typical proportionality test that will govern the relationship between 
disability and gender in this context and will determine the more desirable outcome in 
equality terms.
Prima facie the submission that gender equality programmes must take account of 
other equality dimensions as well may seem as innovative and, thus, not applicable de 
lege lata. This is, however, far from the truth. Adding a gender dimension into all 
Community policies under the strategy of gender mainstreaming is now an established 
priority of the Union and one of its Treaty-based central objectives.792 What is argued for 
here, therefore, is the other side of the mainstreaming coin, whereby the objective of 
addressing gender inequalities is not decoupled from the obligation to protect and 
promote equality of treatment in all its dimensions.
The suggestion that the saving clause in the Badeck scheme is not a return to
unqualified individualism is further supported by social facts. Two of the five types of
“reasons of greater legal weight” than the gender quota involve candidates that wish to
792 Hafher-Burton, E. M. and M. A. Pollack (08/2008). Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union: 
Getting the Incentives Right. Jean Monnet Working Paper
[http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/documents/JMWP08-08PollackandHafher-Burton.pdf]
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“return” to full-time employment in the public service after spending time on “family 
work”. Traditionally, of course, it is women for the most part that undertake the bulk of 
family responsibilities and, for this reason, find themselves temporarily unavailable for 
full-time work. The Badeck saving clause, therefore, is not only “innocent” of indirect 
discrimination as the Court requires.793 More than that, it is construed in such a way that 
it may serve social policy objectives without ignoring the gendered reality of the 
employment sphere, as influenced by the corresponding roles that the sexes assume at 
home.
Closely linked to that is the scheme’s inclusive conception of what counts as 
merit. The German law, in the first paragraph of its article 10, explicitly states that 
“[wjhen qualifications are assessed, capabilities and experience which have been 
acquired by looking after children or persons requiring care in the domestic sector 
(family work) are to be taken into account, in so far as they are of importance for the 
suitability, performance and capability of applicants” [emphasis added]. 794 A standard 
feminist critique that attacks the metric systems of professional qualifications is taken 
seriously here and it seems to inform the Badeck scheme. Criteria of appointment or 
promotion such as seniority or previous work experience tend to be gender-biased and to 
indirectly favour male candidates.
By adding family work to the pool of potential qualifications the scheme directly 
addresses one of the most serious competitive disadvantages that female candidates 
usually face. In doing so, it reinforces the link between equal treatment and
793 With a possible question-mark in this regard next to one o f  the grounds put forward by the German 
government, namely the possibility to give preference to “former temporary soldiers, that is, those who 
voluntarily served for a limited period longer than compulsory military service” (Badeck, para 35).
794 See Badeck, para 9.
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proportionality, as it allows for the assessment of relevant experience to go beyond 
formal credentials. This is, of course, premised on the assumption that the protection of 
the right to family life constitutes a legitimate state priority. Given that time is not an 
inexhaustible resource, contributions in the form of family work are likely to have a
H Q C
knock-on adverse effect on the person’s availability and performance in the 
employment field. These contributions, however, cannot but have some added value for 
the person undertaking family responsibilities, leading to the inevitable improvement of 
skills and capabilities that may be useful in other areas of social activity as well. The 
principle of proportionality, then, is the most suitable normative tool by means of which 
to draw the necessary analogies and measure the value o f qualifications that candidates 
have acquired from different sources and backgrounds.
Is, then, the Badeck positive action scheme a flawless legislative initiative that 
should serve as a model for national governments? Despite all the encouraging evidence 
that has been produced to this point, the answer is not that simple. The key issue once 
again is that o f defining under-representation. This time, however, the scheme was 
apparently tailored with this problem in mind. Although no actual definition is laid down 
in the law, measure 2 directly links under-representation of women in employment 
sectors with the percentage o f  female degree-holders or students in the corresponding 
discipline. The idea is rather straightforward and quite appealing to common sense: the 
discrepancy between the numbers of female employees and those of female degree- 
holders or students in the relevant discipline leads to a presumption of indirect 
discrimination against women. Such a presumption is the most reasonable explanation for
795 Or, more accurately, on the possibility to perform.
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the discrepancy and it is, thus, the justificatory basis for positive measures aimed at 
redressing the unfair imbalance.
On this ground alone it is possible to conclude that the Badeck scheme scores 
much higher that its predecessors. It sets out an objective frame of reference by virtue of 
which to measure under-representation and, consequently, gauge the actual scale of 
inequality that needs to be addressed. One should not disregard that this objective 
connection o f academic qualifications to professional potential allows us to avoid 
formally valid but substantively absurd claims of groups that may be under-represented in 
absolute terms within a particular employment sector. The statistical fact, for instance, 
that male nurses are a relatively “rare bread” does not entail that men should be 
understood as a disadvantaged group in this context. Under the Badeck scheme this 
would only be the case if it could be shown that the number of male nurses is lower than 
the number of male degree-holders or students in the relevant discipline.
Having said that, the Badeck approach to under-representation is still not immune 
to criticism. As discussed earlier, in view of the Marschall ruling, apparently objective 
criteria to determine under-representation are usually prone to essentialism. In the 
absence of any qualitative data weighing up the genuine willingness o f the under­
represented group to participate in a particular sector and, most importantly, an 
assessment of the reasons leading to a possible unwillingness, the objectivity of the 
Badeck criterion is not beyond question. Although it is accepted that this criterion will 
more often than not accurately predict that under-representation is the result of 
institutionalised discrimination, this is not necessarily always the case. The radical 
feminist argument, suggesting that the most invidious form of gender bias is the
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calculation of women’s desires and ambitions by male standards, is of particular 
relevance here. So is, though, the internal critique against several feminist accounts that 
treat women as some sort of “collective” with a single voice that can adequately speak for 
everyone’s interests, needs or desired life-choices.797
This is not to argue, of course, that the Badeck approach is unsuccessful or that it 
should be abandoned. On the contrary, it is undoubtedly the most useful metric system of 
under-representation that national legislatures have managed to come up with to date. 
One should note that the intentions of the German legislators are admittedly benign in 
creating a legislative platform to effectively address a genuine instance of social 
inequality. However, this is not enough to insulate the scheme from all fault or flaw and, 
even more importantly, it is not necessarily enough to effectively achieve the objective of 
gender equality.
Some elaboration with regard to this latter point is in order. Across the five 
measures introduced by the Badeck scheme, wherever merit is an issue, female 
candidates must satisfy the condition of being equally qualified to other candidates. As 
explained earlier, an important innovation of this positive action scheme is that it opens 
up the notion of merit to include experience and aptitudes that have been achieved 
outside typical employment. It thus becomes relatively easier, in theory, for women to be 
deemed equally qualified for the purposes of most job descriptions. In practice, however, 
the application of this extended notion of merit may prove more difficult than on paper. 
Do women develop their leadership skills, for instance, through running a household?
796 See generally Barnett, H. (1998). Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence. Routledge., p. 168 et seq.
797 Gilligan, supra no.87; N. Fraser (on the criticism), supra no.584
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And do their organisational skills improve through setting up and maintaining a schedule 
of their daily household and childcare related activities?
Answering these questions to the affirmative in principle may be enough to 
guarantee that women will be called for an interview under measure 4 of the scheme, but 
it does not seem to amount to a definitive determination of their equal qualifications for 
the purposes of measure 1. Insofar as the relationship between measures 1 and 4 in this 
regard remains unclear, it may be argued that the scheme is not radical enough to solve 
the problem of under-representation of women in the public service. Real progress, at 
least in the short term, can only be achieved through more aggressive positive action 
schemes that will allow for the possibility o f giving preference to sufficiently qualified 
candidates from the disadvantaged group.
Nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that the Badeck scheme is a very 
promising start and a step to the right direction. Its comprehensiveness alone constitutes 
an impressive sign of progress compared to earlier legislative attempts and raises the bar 
for national authorities. This is well in tandem with the theory of proportionality of 
concern advanced here, which is admittedly quite demanding in that it requires a 
multitude of equality dimensions to be taken into account. In this respect, however, it is 
essential to make two important remarks.
First, the legitimacy of positive action schemes such as the one in Badeck is not in 
any way compromised either according to the Court’s reasoning or under the rationale of 
proportionality o f concern. The latter does not put in jeopardy the legitimacy o f gender 
quotas of the Marschall variant either, because the deficiencies of the programme
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regarding the accurate identification of disadvantage798 do not affect the basic entitlement 
that women have to the positive action benefits. What it does is to allow for a stricter 
review o f  the positive state obligation under equal treatment, which may lead to an 
additional state obligation to extend positive action benefits to other disadvantaged 
groups as well.
This brings us to the second remark, which is closely linked to the body of 
literature that inspires proportionality of concern. In Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality 
of concern the judge occupies a central position, ingeniously named “Hercules” as a 
reflection on the magnitude of the task he is faced with. Proportionality of concern, on 
the other hand, attributes this role of Hercules to the legislator rather than the judge. It is 
the national and European legislatures that are primarily entrusted with the task of 
transforming equal treatment from an abstract principle into normative reality. And it is 
part of this duty to ensure that positive measures enacted to actively eliminate 
disadvantage are the product of a well though out and carefully designed policy that 
carries out an efficient, fair and justifiable prioritisation of equally valid claims.
798 Due to the fact that under-representation is treated as a “black box”, without any reference to degrees o f  
under-representation and corresponding adjustments in terms o f  equality priorities.
344
11.5 Positive Action in Employment. Politics and the Judiciary: Proportionality of 
Concern as a Unifying Theory?
The purpose of this penultimate section of the thesis is to provide a clear image of 
the types o f permissible quotas and of the conditions of legitimacy these need to fulfil 
under the principle o f equal treatment understood as proportionality of concern. The 
tripartite distinction between employment, politics and sensitive areas o f the public 
sphere, put forward in Part III, remains a pertinent analytical tool. As a result, the table 
that follows799 and which summarises the main points of the analysis will offer a graphic 
representation of how positive action should operate in each of these three areas.
The key contribution of the table to the analysis is this: the underlying assumption 
that, when it comes to positive action, “one size doesn’t fit all” is at once challenged and 
reinforced. Equal treatment as proportionality of concern constitutes the basis of a 
coherent theoretical framework, which adds a common equality dimension across the 
spectrum of human activity. In other words, equal treatment as proportionality of concern 
entails that, in all areas of the public sphere, there will be an equality obligation on both 
public and private actors, specified through the appropriate normative instruments. This 
equality dimension, however, does not entail that the actual content and the degree of the 
obligation will be the same across the spectrum. In other words, what equal treatment 
requires and - most importantly for present purposes - whether and under what conditions 
positive action forms part of these requirements will vary according to the area in which 
it operates.
799 The structure o f the table deliberately mirrors that o f  Table 1, presented in chapter 9.1.
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Before presenting and considering the table itself, it is important to flesh out an 
important distinction that has implicitly permeated the analysis of the ECJ case-law on 
employment quotas800 and of the merit principle.801 This is the distinction between 
equally, fu lly  and sufficiently qualified candidates for promotion or appointment. 
Although these terms seem relatively self-explanatory in theory, it is worth providing 
more precise definitions that correspond to standard employment practices.
In this regard, the differentiation between the three degrees of merit reflects the 
candidates’ possession of the competencies necessary to fulfil the duties and 
responsibilities typically listed on the job description, as well as of the essential and 
desirable qualifications typically listed on the person specification for the job. The term 
essential qualifications generally refers to the minimum requirements without which the 
candidate would not be able to perform the tasks involved, whereas possession of 
desirable qualifications would enable the candidate to achieve a high standard of job 
performance.
Two or more candidates, then, are deemed to be equally qualified to one another 
when their scores are identical with regard to both essential and desirable qualifications. 
Furthermore, candidates that possess all the essential qualifications should be considered 
as sufficiently qualified for the job in question, as was the case with the Abrahamsson 
quota scheme. Finally, it is submitted that there is a threshold of qualifications beyond 
which candidates should be regarded as fully  qualified for the job, in the sense that they
800 See infra, chapter 4.2.
801 See infra chapter 6.5.
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possess a combination of essential and desirable qualities and qualifications that will 
enable them to perform the job at a high standard.
The relationship between the three degrees of merit is rather complex and cannot 
be examined thoroughly within the framework of the present enquiry. It is, however, 
possible and necessary to explain those elements that are of particular importance for the 
justification of quota systems under the alternative conception of equality proposed here. 
More specifically, it is crucial to try and delineate the conceptual boundaries between the 
novel term fu lly  qualified and the competing two terms that also describe degrees of 
merit, with a view to determining the most appropriate threshold o f legality for quotas in 
employment.802
First o f all, fully  qualified candidates possess by definition more qualifications 
compared to sufficiently qualified candidates. While the latter fulfil only the essential 
requirements of the job description, fully  qualified candidates possess all essential 
qualifications and a number of desirable qualifications. The exact combination is, of 
course, a matter of interpretation and, insofar as the distinction between fully and 
sufficiently qualified candidates is concerned, it need not be pursued any further at this 
point.
The relatively more controversial aspect of the tripartite classification proposed 
here involves the relationship between fully  and equally qualified candidates. It goes 
without saying that two fully qualified candidates are not necessarily equally qualified to
802 The term employment here encompasses two o f the three categories identified in Part III, namely 
“standard” employment and employment in sensitive areas o f  the public sphere. For reasons that have 
already been explained in the relevant section (chapter 7), the legality o f  positive action in politics is not 
affected by the present analysis.
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one another and vice versa.803 Let us consider the simplest possible example, which 
would entail to assume that two candidates possess the totality of both essential and 
desirable qualifications. Two applicants for a University lectureship, then, may satisfy all 
the conditions set out in the job description, such as holding a doctoral degree or having 
the required teaching experience and publications, but may still not possess identical sets 
of qualifications. The difference may either be purely quantitative, such as in the number 
of publications and in the years of previous teaching experience, or encompass seemingly 
qualitative elements as well, such as the academic “ranking” o f the institutions of prior 
employment and the academic reputation of the journals of publications.
The preliminary conclusion that may be drawn from the preceding analysis is 
evident. From a pragmatic point of view it is in fact more difficult to determine when two 
candidates are equally qualified than deciding whether or not they are fu lly  qualified 
according to an agreed standard. In other words, making comparative evaluations of 
qualitative elements of merit is an exact science that requires in theory an extremely 
refined metric system, with inbuilt guarantees of objectivity, which will be capable of 
processing an almost infinite number of data.804 In the absence of such a system, it should 
be conceded that any interpersonal comparison of candidates that acknowledges them as 
equally qualified is inherently prone to a certain degree of subjectivity.
If what the interpersonal comparison, however, is looking for is fully  qualified 
candidates, it is possible to manage the potentially infinite and indeterminate data in a
803 Although it must be noted that in the latter situation, that is when two candidates are equally qualified 
but neither is fully qualified, may in fact result in neither candidate being ultimately selected.
804 Corresponding, in our example, to the almost infinite number o f  Higher Education Institutions, 
undergraduate and postgraduate degrees and academic journals that may feature in a candidate’s CV.
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more objective way. Insofar as a specific selection process is concerned both quantitative 
and qualitative differences, as in the case of the aforementioned example, must be 
understood as purely quantitative for the purposes of reasonably describing candidates as 
fully qualified for the position. In other words, the term fully  qualified - read in 
juxtaposition with the term equally qualified - intends to signify that the candidates are 
qualitatively at a tie at the final stage of the selection process, when all their relevant 
qualifications have been taken into account. Any differences that may remain between 
them have no bearing on the standard of performance they are expected to attain if given 
the job, since both are comfortably above the threshold of a projected high standard 
performance.805
With these remarks in mind let us now turn to consider Table 2. This summarises 
the basic propositions of this thesis regarding the place of positive action within the 
theoretical framework of equal treatment as proportionality of concern. Although the 
table is intended to cover the whole spectrum of social activity where positive action may 
operate, it is worth recapitulating the ECJ position on employment quotas as it currently 
stands. According to the Court only flexible result quotas allocating preference to equally 
qualified candidates from the target group may pass the test of legality.806 This is further 
evidenced by the fact that the Abrahamsson quota scheme, whereby preference was 
allocated to a sufficiently but not equally qualified female candidate, was struck down by 
the Court. It is further submitted that the current interpretation o f equality law and 
principles by the ECJ is unlikely to permit quota systems designed to favour fully  
qualified candidates.
805 This is clearly in line with the forward-looking understanding o f  merit discussed in chapter 9.
806 According to the Badeck formula and under its celebrated and fully explained conditions.
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POSITIVE 
ACTION IN:
EMPLOYMENT POLITICS JUDICIARY
TY PE- 
SOFTER 
FORMS 
(encouragement 
/ training)
COMPULSORY
targeted
encouragement and 
training policies
COMPULSORY
encouragement of individual 
candidates and of political 
parties to increase 
participation rates of under­
represented groups 
(training: N/A)
COMPULSORY
targeted
encouragement and 
training of individual 
candidates from 
under-represented 
groups
TY PE- 
QUOTAS / 
PREF.
TREATMENT
COMPULSORY
as a tie-breaker 
between fully or even 
sufficiently qualified 
candidates
(depending on nature 
of job)
PERMISSIBLE
in candidate selection 
processes
NON-PERMISSIBLE 
in election processes
COMPULSORY
as a tie-breaker 
between fully 
qualified candidates
CRITERION 
to trigger quota 
and determine 
target groups
DISADVANTAGE
+
UNDER­
REPRESENTATION
of the target group in 
the specific cadre
UNDER­
REPRESENTATION
of the target group in the 
particular elected body
UNDER­
REPRESENTATION
of the target group in 
the specific cadre
Table 2: De Lege Ferenda -  positive action under equal treatment as proportionality of
concern
o n a
When Table 2 is read in juxtaposition to the previously presented Table 1, 
which reflected the position of European law on positive action de lege lata, there are two 
immediate remarks that set the tone of the analysis. First, in two out of the three areas of
807 See infra, chapter 9.1.
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the public sphere quotas are not only permissible but compulsory. This is hardly 
surprising. Positive action under equality as proportionality of concern is an expression of 
equal treatment and not an exception to it. Existing inequalities, then, must be addressed 
as a matter of urgency and in the short term. Inevitably this involves an obligation to take 
active steps towards achieving a more balanced participation of social groups in the fields 
of “standard” employment and in the sensitive areas of the public sphere, such as the 
judiciary. In these areas tie-break quotas should be a compulsory and not just a 
permissible legal tool to effectively accomplish fu ll equality.
The second remark relates to the criterion of identifying both the need for positive 
measures and the target groups that will ripe the benefits of these measures. Positive 
action under its classical conception is an anti-discrimination law mechanism, aiming to 
cancel the on-going effects of past or present discrimination against particular social 
groups. Current legislative and judicial practice accordingly considers under­
representation as a proxy for disadvantage stemming from discrimination. In other words, 
when a social group is under-represented in a particular section of the social sphere, there 
is an assumption that this under-representation is the result o f discrimination against the 
group, which leads to the group being socially disadvantaged.809 In the alternative 
interpretative construct put forward here under-representation is decoupled from 
disadvantage. Instead, the criterion is different in the three distinct areas of social activity 
that have been identified. Employment quotas are legitimate - and, indeed, compulsory - 
for social groups that are both under-represented and socially or economically
808 With regard to elected public office see further below.
809 Unless, o f  course, it can be proved that under-representation in a particular area o f  the public sphere is 
actually not the result o f  discrimination.
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disadvantaged, without the former being automatically regarded as a proxy for the latter. 
In this way, there is no need to explain why under-representation of white men in a 
particular employment cadre does not give rise to gender quotas in favour of male 
candidates.
The legitimacy of quotas in elected public office and in sensitive areas of the 
public sphere, on the contrary, is linked only to under-representation of the groups, and it 
is not dependent on whether this under-representation amounts to socio-economic group 
disadvantage. In view of the preceding analysis the reason should be obvious. Equal 
treatment as proportionality of concern in these contexts entails that the law should be 
sensitive not only to the needs and entitlements of each particular group, but also to those 
of the society as a whole. It is this wider societal concern to address group disadvantage 
while maintaining social equality810 that acts as a guideline for the normative framework 
on equal treatment. And it is this concern that will ultimately determine whether quotas in 
politics and the judiciary are justified or not.
In this regard, an imbalanced electoral list from the perspective of gender, for 
instance, deprives the electorate from the full set of options that should be available to it 
in a democratic society. Under-representation of particular groups, then, is primarily 
detrimental to the democratic polity itself. Similarly, a judiciary that is primarily, if not 
exclusively, comprised by white, middle-aged male judges fails to resonate with the 
polity it purports to serve in a way that a democratic institution should. In both cases, 
then, quotas are justified as a means to achieve full equality not only between the under-
810 Wolff and De-Shalit, supra no. 709., chapter 10.
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represented groups and the rest of the citizenry, but also between all citizens with regard 
to their participation in the democratic processes through which state power is wielded.
In elected public office, however, quotas remain permissible rather than 
compulsory even under proportionality of concern. Contrary to what happens in sensitive 
areas of the public sphere, which organically belong to the core of the state apparatus, the 
realm of politics in a democratic society is dominated by the free and unfettered will of 
the people. Political parties are, undoubtedly, significant institutional actors in this 
democratic process and should be allowed an adequate margin of discretion to put 
forward their strategic plans for the accomplishment of the goals they wish to pursue. 
Ultimately their choices both on matters of principle and on matters of policy are the 
object of public scrutiny, expressed through elections. In view of the inherently 
participatory nature of the democratic process, then, introducing compulsory quotas at 
any stage of the process would amount to an unmerited and, in any case, self-defeating 
lack of trust to the democratic system itself.
To put it in more concrete terms, democracy cannot be externally imposed. If the 
electorate of a particular European state wishes to vote in office a political party that does 
not fully commit to gender or race equality in its philosophy or in its political practice, 
this is the price the European society has to pay in order to maintain its democratic 
integrity. A top-to-bottom approach, involving an obligation of national legislatures to 
impose rigid positive action requirements on national political parties, would be 
completely at odds with the principle of proportionality of concern. The latter is designed 
in such a way as to allow a maximum degree of sensitivity to national idiosyncrasies and 
democratically construed collective decisions of European societies.
Quotas in politics, therefore, cannot be compulsory, because this would seriously 
undermine the principle of equality understood in a pluralist way and within a democratic 
philosophical environment. They are, nonetheless, permissible. It is up to national 
legislatures and to national political parties themselves, in other words, to adopt a more 
proactive stance towards imbalances in representation and address them in the short term 
through quotas. It must be pointed out, however, that under proportionality of concern 
such quotas are permissible only in candidate selection processes, and not in the actual 
election process. The reasons have already been explored in depth811 and will not be 
reiterated here. Suffice it to say that the rejection of quotas in elections812 is premised on 
the same underlying rationale as the justification of quotas in candidate selection and in 
the judiciary. It is the wider equality interest of society as a whole that takes priority over 
the narrower equality interests of particular individuals or groups. Strict quotas that 
would predetermine to an extent the outcome of the electoral process inevitably amount 
to a heavy-handed and unwarranted interference with the constitutionally established 
right of citizens to freely elect the representatives o f  their choice.
In lieu of a conclusion, this thesis will end with a conditional recognition of its 
own limitations. A comprehensive theory of equality cannot possibly fit in a doctoral 
thesis, let alone in a single chapter o f it. Proportionality of concern, therefore, is 
admittedly not yet a complete theory. However, it was never an ambition of the analytical 
project undertaken here to present such a complete theory. The contribution of 
proportionality of concern to the discourse, even at this embryonic stage, is that it can act
811 See infra, chapters 7.3, 7.4 and especially 9.2.
812 That is quotas providing that a minimum number o f  members o f  the target group will necessarily be 
elected in office, possibly ahead o f  non-target group candidates with higher numbers o f  votes.
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as a philosophical canvass upon which to interpret the notion of full and effective 
equality and explain its relationship to positive action. The existence of such a canvass 
validates the claim that a distinctly European conception of equality inspires an 
overarching principle of equal treatment that permeates the European normative space. It 
enables a critical evaluation of European equality instruments and of positive action 
measures that conform to an unsupported “one size fits all” approach. It allows, instead, 
the adoption of an alternative view on positive action, one that is at the same time holistic 
and flexible so that it takes account of the different tensions that arise in different areas of 
social activity. Most of all, proportionality of concern encapsulates an understanding of 
equality as a process rather than as a fa it accompli. It requires nothing less than the 
unassailable commitment of law-makers, judges, stake-holders and citizens to a 
continuous fight against practices that perpetuate inequalities, disadvantage and social 
exclusion.
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